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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis explores the commercial links between Scotland and France in the long 
seventeenth century, with a focus on the Scottish mercantile presence in France’s 
Atlantic ports. This study questions long-held assumptions regarding this relationship, 
asserting that the ‘Auld Alliance’ continued throughout the period, despite the widely 
held belief that it ended in 1560. Such assumptions have led scholars largely to ignore 
the continuing commercial relationship between Scotland and France in the long 
seventeenth century, focusing instead on the ‘golden age’ of the Auld Alliance or the 
British relationship with France in the eighteenth century. Such assumptions have been 
fostered by the methodological approaches used in the study of economic history to 
date. While I acknowledge the relevance of traditional quantitative approaches to 
economic history, such as those pioneered by T. C. Smout and which continue to be 
followed by historians such as Philipp Rössner, I follow alternative methods that have 
been recently employed by scholars such as Henriette de Bruyn Kops, Sheryllynne 
Haggerty, Xabier Lamikiz, Allan Macinnes and Steve Murdoch. These scholars have 
pioneered methodologies that prioritise private sources, allowing us to delve into the 
motivations and actions of the individuals who actually effected trade, be they 
merchants, factors, skippers or manufacturers. The core of my research has therefore 
entailed the discovery and use of previously untapped archival material including 
account books, letter books and correspondence, which illuminate the participation of 
these individuals in international trade. Such a study, while filling a specific gap in our 
understanding of Scotland’s overseas relations, applies a more social methodology to 
this topic, suggesting that scholars’ approaches need to be fundamentally altered if we 
are truly to understand the whole picture of Scotland’s, or indeed any nation’s, 
commercial relationships or wider economic position. 
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STYLISTIC CONVENTIONS 
 
 
Names of individuals and places discussed in this thesis often appear in inconsistent 
forms in the sources used. All names that are unambiguous have been rendered as the 
most commonly used modern version in discussion.1 In quoted sources, they have been 
left as written. Contemporary spellings in directly quoted French sources have not been 
modernised. In considering certain European conflicts that are referred to by 
interchangeable terms, the following terminology has been used: the Dutch War (also 
known as the Franco-Dutch war) to describe the 1672-1678 conflict and the Nine Years’ 
War (also known as the War of the League of Augsburg and the War of the Grand 
Alliance) to describe the 1688-1697 conflict. Where terminology is now erroneous but 
standard, this has been rendered as expected – for example, while the ‘Anglo-Dutch’ 
wars had an independent Scottish element, and although that element forms the core of 
discussion here, these conflicts have nevertheless been termed the Anglo-Dutch Wars in 
order to avoid unnecessary confusion. 
 When discussing British monarchs, the Scottish application has been used (for 
example, James VI, rather than James I or James VI and I). There are two exceptions to 
this. In discussions of William II and III, ‘William III’ has been used, despite this being 
the English application, as this is how he is most commonly described. The other 
exception is in the use of the Stuart Papers, within which James Francis Edward Stuart 
is referred to as ‘James III’, and the Earl of Mar styled the ‘Duke of Mar’. Where this 
source has been directly cited, this is the terminology adopted. The Privy Council and 
Parliament of Scotland have been referred to as simply ‘the Privy Council’ and 
‘Parliament’, and when it is an English institution that is meant this has been stated. 
‘The Reformation’ denotes the Scottish Reformation of 1560 unless otherwise 
specified. Dates in this period can offer a challenge as it is often unclear, particularly in 
the unofficial records used extensively throughout this thesis, whether the author used 
the Julian or Gregorian calendar. Where both alternatives have been given (for example, 
7 January 1644/5) the Gregorian date has been cited (7 January 1645). When the 
calendar used has not been specified, dates have been cited as they appear in the 
sources. Weights and currencies have not been standardised as accurate conversion can 
be problematic. Further, in many of the accounts used here, the currency is not stated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 G. Black, The Surnames of Scotland: Their Origin, Meaning and History (Edinburgh, 2007) has been 
used as a guide. 
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(for example, whether pounds sterling or pounds scots). If a distinction has been made, 
this has been cited, otherwise references to monetary values are written exactly as they 
appear in original material. In some cases, to allow for comparison, conversions have 
been made as accurately as possible (for example, in Chapter 2, converting Spanish 
wine measurements from butts to tuns in order to compare quantities with French wine). 
In this and similar cases, Appendix II.i outlines the conversion rates used. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The onset of the Protestant Reformation [in Scotland] shattered Scotland’s 
close relationship with France (enshrined in the ‘Auld Alliance’).’1 
 
In 1634 the Scot John Clerk travelled to France as the apprentice of the Edinburgh 
merchant John Smith. In 1646 he returned to Scotland to live in the barony of Penicuik, 
an estate he had purchased with the fortune he made on the continent. While he lived in 
Paris Clerk operated within a wide network of merchants, factors, manufacturers and 
skippers – some he knew personally, others he did not, and these individuals were both 
British and European. This network traded in a wide variety of goods, including 
standard fare such as salt and wine but also diamonds, luxury cloths, atlases and book-
bindings. Clerk is one example of a host of individuals who pursued Franco-Scottish 
commerce during a century characterised by conflict and ostensibly hostile to trade, and 
facilitated commerce along routes that were often officially closed due to war or 
political or economic policy. The activities of such individuals and the networks within 
which they operated adds to new perspectives on international commercial relations 
which have recently come to the fore in economic studies, but within a geographical 
sphere that has not yet received due attention.2 By examining the actions of individual 
merchants, factors, skippers and manufacturers and the relative parts they played in 
these relationships, it has been possible to demonstrate that at times when official 
records seem to suggest that certain routes stagnated, commercial agents were in fact 
able to adapt their trading methods to allow them to continue to flourish. 
 
I. HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
The lack of attention paid to these trading routes is symptomatic of several scholarly 
traditions. The first is the long-held assumption that the Auld Alliance ended in 1560 
with the Scottish Reformation, the Treaty of Edinburgh and the removal of French 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J. Ohlmeyer, ‘Seventeenth Century Ireland and Scotland and their wider worlds’ in T. O’Connor and M. 
Lyons (eds.), Irish Communities in Early Modern Europe (Dublin, 2006) 459 
2 X. Lamikiz, Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and their 
Overseas Networks (Suffolk, 2010); H. de Bruyn Kops, A Spirited Exchange: the Wine and Brandy trade 
between France and the Dutch Republic in its Atlantic Framework, 1600-1650 (Leiden, 2007); S. 
Haggerty, The British-Atlantic Trading Community, 1760-1810: Men, Women and the Distribution of 
Goods (Leiden, 2006) 
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troops from Scotland, a tradition that has been passed down through generations of 
scholarship. In her 1986 article ‘The Scottish Export Trade 1460-1599’ Isobel Guy does 
not mention France even in passing,3 and such omissions are not uncommon in both 
British and French historiography for the period.4 Some research has recently 
investigated the continuing Franco-Scottish relationship in the military and intellectual 
spheres, but no sustained attempt has been made to question the validity of such claims 
in the commercial sphere.5 The second tradition that has fostered this neglect lies in the 
methodologies adopted by historians in addressing economic issues. In the last half 
century, our understanding of Scotland’s overseas trade and commercial interests has 
improved dramatically. The pioneering studies of Edgar Lythe and Christopher Smout 
have had stunning results both for our understanding of Scotland’s economic position in 
Europe and in the proliferation of subsequent works inspired by them.6 Many of these 
subsequent investigations have undoubtedly widened our knowledge of Scottish trading 
links in Europe, but have adopted Lythe’s and Smout’s methodologies to do so – that is, 
largely focusing on official records, on customs figures, port books and government 
legislation.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I. Guy, ‘The Scottish Export Trade’ in T. C. Smout (ed.), Scotland and Europe, 1200-1850 (Edinburgh, 
1986) 62-81 
4 Ohlmeyer, ‘Seventeenth Century’, 476, for example, recognises that trade links with France continued 
after 1560, but does not elaborate or consider the effect of the Reformation on them. French literature has 
either overlooked the relationship with Scotland completely or afforded it scant attention: E. Levasseur, 
Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 volumes (Paris, 1911) I, 600 mentions relations with England, but 
does not mention Scotland in this context; R. Gascon, Grand Commerce et vie Urbaine au XVIE siècle: 
Lyon et ses Merchants, 2 volumes (Paris, 1971) I, 85 mentions Scotland only in passing. 
5 M. Glozier, Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King (Leiden, 2004); M. Glozier, ‘Scots 
in the French and Dutch Armies during the Thirty Years’ War’ in S. Murdoch (ed.), Scotland and the 
Thirty Years’ War (Leiden, 2001); M. Tucker, Maîtres et étudiants ecossais à la Faculté de Droit de 
I’Université de Bourges 1480-1703 (Paris, 2001); M. Tucker, ‘Scottish Students and Masters at the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Bourges in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’ in T. van 
Heijnsbergen and N. Royan (eds.), Literature, Letters and the Canonical in Early Modern Scotland (East 
Linton, 2002) 
6 Primarily: S. G. E. Lythe, The Economy of Scotland in its European Setting, 1550-1625 
(Edinburgh/London, 1960); T. C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union (Edinburgh, 1963) 
7 P. Rössner, Scottish Trade in the Wake of Union: 1700-1760 (Stuttgart, 2008), T. C. Smout (ed.), 
Scotland and the Sea (Edinburgh, 1992); H. Hamilton, An Economic History of Scotland in the 
Eighteenth Century (Oxford 1963); S. Lythe and J. Butt, An Economic History of Scotland, 1100-1939 
(Glasgow, 1975); I. Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial Revolution: An Economic and Social History 
(London, 1995); I. Whyte, Scotland’s Society and Economy in Transition, c. 1500-c. 1760 (Hampshire, 
1997); R. Floud and D. McCloskey (eds.), The Economic History of Britain since 1700, 2 volumes 
(Cambridge, 1997); D. Dickson, J. Parmentier and J. Ohlmeyer (eds.), Irish and Scottish Mercantile 
Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Gent, 2007); A. Smith, 
Creating a World Economy: Merchant Capital, Colonialism and World Trade, 1400-1825 (Oxford, 1991) 
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The Auld Alliance has been extensively researched, as has the supposed ‘end’ of 
this relationship after 1560 and particularly 1603.8 Assertions that ‘the onset of the 
Protestant Reformation [in Scotland] shattered Scotland’s close relationship with France 
(enshrined in the ‘Auld Alliance’)’9 are representative of a wide range of literature that 
builds on a long tradition of scholarship, believing that ‘a significant element [of the 
Reformation of 1560] was rejection of the long-established association with France’.10 
The retrospective knowledge that 43 years later Scotland and England were to be united 
in the Union of Crowns (and again a century later in the Union of Parliaments) has led 
historians to see 1560 as not only a move away from France, but also a move towards 
Protestant England, as ‘the progress of Protestantism, meat to the Scottish Anglophile 
party, was poison to the French alliance’.11 The assertion that an Anglo-Scottish 
relationship replaced a Franco-Scottish one has been projected despite, in 1560, both 
French and English forces being asked to leave Scotland; if anything, at this juncture 
France still held the advantage in the form of the French dowager queen, Mary Stuart. 
Scotland’s ostensibly closer relationship with England following 1560, coupled with an 
emphasis on the significance of both the 1603 and 1707 Unions, has led to acceptance 
that Scotland’s trade interests became governed by English concerns. This has 
subsequently tended to dominate discussions of Scotland’s commercial position in 
Europe, leading to the supposition that after 1560, and especially 1603 and 1707, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Historians have usually studied the Auld Alliance at its ‘height’ pre-1560 or skipped forward altogether 
to the Jacobite period or to the ‘British’ relationship with France in the eighteenth century: H. Fenwick, 
The Auld Alliance (Kineton, 1971); N. MacDougall, An Antidote to the English: the Auld Alliance, 1295-
1560 (East Linton, 1988); M. James, Studies in the Mediaeval Wine Trade (Oxford, 1971); Macdougall, 
Antidote to the English; J. Macpherson, ‘Auld Alliance’ in Scottish Field, CXIV (1967) 41; F. Crouzet 
(M. Thom, trans.), Britain Ascendant: Comparative Studies in Franco-British Economic History 
(Cambridge/New York/Paris, 1990); Floud and McCloskey (eds.), Economic History of Britain; 
Hamilton, Economic History of Scotland. 
9 Ohlmeyer, ‘Seventeenth Century Ireland and Scotland’, 459 
10 Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial Revolution, 92. This opinion has been espoused by many 
scholars, including: M. Lynch, Scotland, A New History (London, 1992) 209; J. Burton, The Scot Abroad, 
2 volumes (Edinburgh/London, 1864) I, 226; T. Keith, Commercial Relations of England and Scotland, 
1603-1707 (Cambridge, 1910) 47; N. MacDougall, An Antidote to the English, 3 
11 Lythe, Economy of Scotland, 167; see also A. Smith, The Reign of James VI and I (London, 1973) 61; 
T. Pagan, The Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland (Glasgow, 1926) 199, Burton, Scot Abroad, 
215; Durkan, ‘French Connection’, 19; R. Mason, ‘Renaissance and Reformation: the Sixteenth Century’ 
in J. Wormald (ed.), Scotland: A History (Oxford, 2005) 107; Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial 
Revolution, 272-5; D. Ditchburn and A. MacDonald, ‘Medieval Scotland, 1100-1560’ in R. Houston and 
W. Knox (eds.), New Penguin History of Scotland (Somerset, 2001) 175. The catalyst for Scotland’s 
perceived change in allegiance has been belief in her overnight religious conversion: K. Brown, 
‘Reformation to Union’, in Houston and Knox (eds.), Scotland, 188; W. Anderson, ‘Narratives of the 
Scottish Reformation II: Thomas Innes on Catholicism in Scotland 1560-1563’ in Innes Review, VII 
(1956) 113. Many works draw no distinction between confessions of faith in Scotland, such as 
Presbyterianism or Episcopacy. 
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Scotland no longer pursued independent trading links.12 Moreover, beyond Scottish 
scholarship, the kingdom has seldom been viewed as a country in her own right, with 
‘Great Britain’ often being a veritable pseudonym for ‘England’.13 Yet Scotland, as will 
be demonstrated throughout this thesis, was not subordinate to England and continued 
to pursue her own agendas in both commercial and political spheres. 
Some historians have noted continuing Franco-Scottish commercial activity in 
this period. Theodora Keith acknowledged that this activity continued through the first 
half of the seventeenth century, but asserted that after Colbert’s mercantilist system was 
implemented in France ‘the exemptions which the Scots had formerly enjoyed were 
gradually disregarded’ and that Scottish trade with both the French and the Dutch 
‘suffered severely’.14 Professor Christopher Smout has also held that French 
protectionist policy in the mid-seventeenth century ‘deprived the Scots of the last of 
their ancient privileges in France’.15 More recently, Elizabeth Bonner has suggested that 
while ‘it has been generally held that the ‘Auld Alliance’ ended’ in 1560, in fact it did 
not ‘entirely disappear’. Instead, Bonner argues, the Auld Alliance ‘fell into abeyance’ 
during the second half of the sixteenth century, only to be ‘picked up with renewed 
vigour’ during the reign of Henri IV once James VI had reached his majority. She 
argues that the Auld Alliance experienced a gradual decline only after the Union of 
Crowns in 1603, and that its decline became more rapid following the Parliamentary 
Union of 1707; buying into the notion that a closer relationship with England emerged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe: the mediaeval kingdom and its contacts with Christendom, 1215-
1545, volume I: ‘Religion, culture and commerce’ (East Linton, 2001) 146-191; B. Harris, ‘Scotland’s 
Herring Fisheries and the Prosperity of the Nation, c. 1660-1760’ in Scottish Historical Review, LXXIX 
(2000); E. Graham, ‘In Defence of the Scottish Maritime Interest, 1681-1713’ in Scottish Historical 
Review, LXXI (1992) 88-109; C. Whatley, The Scots and the Union (Edinburgh, 2006); W. Ashworth, 
Customs and Excise: Trade, Production and Consumption in England, 1640-1845 (Oxford, 2003) esp. 
25, 54, 175, 190; Keith, Commercial Relations; B. Dietz, ‘England’s Overseas Trade in the Reign of 
James I’ in A. Smith (ed.), The Reign of James VI and I (New York, 1973) 106-22. A welcome recent 
contribution that does see Scotland’s trade as her own is Rössner, Scottish Trade in the Wake of Union. 
13 This is a problem recently emphasised by Allan Macinnes, Union and Empire: the making of the 
United Kingdom in 1707 (Cambridge, 2007) 4. Some examples of this are: G. Rambert, Histoire du 
Commerce du Marseille, 8 volumes (Paris, 1949-1966) VII; Levasseur, Histoire du Commerce; W. 
Scoville, ‘The French Economy in 1700-1701: an Appraisal by the Deputies of Trade’ in Journal of 
Economic History, XXII (1962) 231-252; F. Crouzet, Britain Ascendant: Comparative Studies in Franco-
British Economic History (Cambridge, 1985); J. Jones, Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century 
(London, 1966); J. Jones, Britain and the World: 1649-1815 (Sussex, 1980); A. Carter, Getting, Spending 
and Investing in Early Modern Times: Essays on Dutch, English and Huguenot Economic History 
(Assen, 1975); J. Condliffe, The Commerce of Nations (London 1951); R. Mitchison and P. Roebuck 
(eds.), Economy and Society in Scotland and Ireland, 1500-1939 (Edinburgh, 1988) 
14 T. Keith, ‘The Economic Causes for the Scottish Union’ in English Historical Review, XXIV (1909) 50 
15 Smout, Scottish Trade, 240 
 17	  
which precluded continuing links with France.16 Andrew Drummond and Isobel Grant 
have also accepted the continuation of commercial links, but such realisations have not 
yet been satisfactorily pursued,17 and while some welcome preliminary work 
considering Scotland’s continuing connections with France has recently been 
undertaken this is confined to Bordeaux and as much concerned with politics as trade.18 
Not even the most up-to-date research has addressed this historiographical gap. A 
conference held in Paris in January 2008 entitled Interactions et transferts entre la 
France et les îles Britanniques, 1640-1660, while containing a panel entitled ‘Franco-
Scottish Relations’, mentioned nothing of the commercial relationship.19 
Furthermore, new publications concerning Scotland’s overseas relations have 
often re-covered ground which has already been well trodden. The 2007 volume Irish 
and Scottish Commercial Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries comprises a number of well researched and convincingly argued 
essays, yet although connections between Ireland and France are covered over two 
chapters Scotland’s relations with France are not considered in this detail; where they 
are mentioned, it is in the context of the eighteenth-century Atlantic wine trade.20 This 
volume concentrates instead on figures such as Thomas Cunningham at Veere and 
Scotland’s entrepreneurs in eighteenth-century Sweden, particularly Colin Campbell. 
Such research builds on already established premises, rather than tackling those areas of 
Europe in which we still do not fully understand Scotland’s relations.21 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 E. Bonner, ‘French Naturalization of the Scots in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries’ in Historical 
Journal XL (1997) 1086; Lythe, Economy of Scotland, 167-191 
17 A. Drummond, The Kirk and the Continent (Edinburgh, 1956) ix, 26; I. Grant, The Economic History 
of Scotland (London, 1934) 80 
18 S. Murdoch, ‘The French Connection: Bordeaux's 'Scottish' networks in Context, c.1670-1720’ in G. 
Leydier, Scotland and Europe, Scotland in Europe (Cambridge, 2007). Some work has been undertaken 
on the Scottish presence in Toulouse, but this has focused on the Jacobite community, with an emphasis 
on political and cultural activities: E. Corp, ‘The Jacobite Presence in Toulouse’ in Diasporas, Histoire et 
Sociétés, V (2004) 124-145; E. Corp, ‘Jacobite Books in Toulouse’ in Journal of the Edinburgh 
Bibliographical Society, I (2006) 71-85. Corp does recognise the importance of this community 
commercially, and the participation of Robert Gordon in financing their activities is particularly 
interesting: ‘Jacobite Presence’, 128. Gordon’s activities are examined in more detail in Chapter 3. 
19 This panel (Relations franco-écossaises) focused on political issues. A panel entitled Parcours 
individuels included mention only of an Englishman in the Guyenne region of France, and the religious 
conflict between the Huguenots and Puritans. Commerce was not discussed in respect to any of the 
British nations. A full programme can be found at http://www.univ-paris13.fr/CRIDAF/conf17.htm 
20 C. Pfister, ‘Dunkerque et l’Irlande, 1690-1790’; G. Saupin, ‘Les Reseaux Commerciaux des Irlandais 
de Nantes sous le Regne de Louis XIV’; D. Hancock, ‘Combining Success and Failure: Scottish 
Networks in the Atlantic Wine Trade’, 16, 26, all in Dickson, Parmentier and Ohlmeyer, Irish and 
Scottish Mercantile Networks 
21 Such individuals have been examined extensively: D. Catterall, Community Without Borders: Scots 
Migrants and the Changing Face of Power in the Dutch Republic, c. 1600-1700 (Leiden, 2002); J. 
Davidson and A. Gray, The Scottish Staple at Veere: a Study in the Economic History of Scotland 
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Such review of old ground is, in part, representative of the traditional view that 
Scotland’s trade with the Low Countries was her most important during this period. The 
Convention of Royal Burghs has been recognised as having pursued a highly organised 
trade with the Low Countries through the Scottish trading staple, whereas trade with 
France and elsewhere was arguably more opportunistic and less regulated.22 This has 
been taken as indicative that trade with the Netherlands was the most important of 
Scotland’s overseas connections. It has been said that ‘if further organisation had been 
required, the Convention would have undertaken it, but the scope of the trade with 
England, France etc. was probably too insignificant to necessitate further 
organisation’.23 The presence of the office of Conservator in the Low Countries adds to 
the view that trade through the Scottish staple was more organised, and implicitly more 
important, than trade elsewhere.24 Yet when James VI and Henri IV concluded a 
commercial treaty in 1606, James made a concerted effort to establish an office in 
France similar to that of the Conservator at Veere, referring to this office by the same 
name.25 The very use of the term ‘Conservator’ highlights the importance of Scotland’s 
continuing independent relationship with France into the seventeenth century; as late as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(London, 1905) 202-10; M. Rooseboom, The Scottish Staple in the Netherlands (The Hague, 1910) 146-
194; G. Gardner, The Scottish Exile Community in the Netherlands, 1660-1690 (East Linton, 2004); A. 
Grosjean and S. Murdoch, ‘The Scottish Community in Seventeenth Century Gothenburg’ in A. Grosjean 
and S. Murdoch (eds.), Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period (Leiden, 2005) 191-
224; G. Gardner, ‘A Haven for Intrigue: the Scottish Exile Community in the Netherlands, 1660-1690’; 
D. Catterall, ‘Scots Along the Maas, 1570-1750’ both in Grosjean and Murdoch, Scottish Communities, 
277-300, 169-190; A. Grosjean, An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden, 1569-1654 (Leiden, 2003) 
189, 205 
22 Guy, ‘Scottish Export Trade’, 67. The staple was usually at Veere, although there were several attempts 
to move the Staple to other towns such as Middleburg, which failed, though it did move briefly to 
Dordrecht (1668-1675). In theory the staple port was the only place that Scottish merchants could land 
staple commodities – defined in 1602 as any goods which paid customs in Scotland. For more on the 
business of the Staple see J. Davidson and A. Gray, The Scottish Staple at Veere: a Study in the Economic 
History of Scotland (London, 1905) 190 and passim; M. Rooseboom, The Scottish Staple in the 
Netherlands (The Hague, 1910). However, Scottish merchants continued to take staple goods to other 
ports, to the consternation of the Convention. CRB, passim. 
23 Pagan, Convention, 151. Pagan contradicts herself, as on page 198 she states that the Scots ‘had a good 
deal of trade with France’. 
24 Pagan, Convention, 151. The Conservator in Veere was the highest Scottish official in the Dutch 
Republic, and was primarily responsible for representing the economic interests of Scotland’s Royal 
Burghs, as well as those of Scotland as a whole. 
25 Articles concluded at Paris the xxiiij of February 1605, stylo Angliae, by commissioners of the high 
and mightie kings, James by the grace of God King of Great Britaine, France, and Ireland, defender of 
the faith, &c. and Henrie the Fourth most Christian French king, and King of Navar, for the more 
commodious entercourse in traffique betweene their subjects (London, 1606). The fact that this treaty is 
entitled ‘Articles concluded betweene Great Britain and France’ has led to the assumption that Scotland 
was not a major part of it. B. Dietz, ‘England’s Overseas Trade in the Reign of James I’ in Smith (ed.), 
James VI and I, 107 
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the 1670s this remained a specifically Scottish notion.26 Furthermore, the Convention 
did involve itself in French matters, continuing to push for the renewal of the privileges 
Scotland had historically enjoyed there, commissioning individuals such as Henry 
Nisbett, Thomas Fischer, Ninian Cockburn, Gilbert Logan and James Maxwell to travel 
to France to negotiate their renewal.27 This involvement has led to the assertion that the 
sole reason that Scottish privileges were renewed after 1560 was due to ‘constant 
embassies and agitation by the Convention of Royal Burghs’.28 While this statement in 
itself should be re-evaluated, the Convention did involve itself in matters concerning 
trade between France and Scotland, again testifying to their importance. Although trade 
with France may have not been organised in the same way as that with the Low 
Countries, this does not necessarily mean that it was less organised, less lucrative or any 
less beneficial to the Scottish nation. 
 
II. SCOPE OF THIS STUDY 
 
The approach that has been taken to this investigation has been partly governed by the 
need for brevity. While there is much more work to be done on the Scottish trading 
interest in commercial centres such as Lyon or the French colonies in ‘New France’, 
this thesis has been geographically confined to examinations of the major Atlantic coast 
ports.29 Primarily this has included Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Nantes and Rouen, but 
examples from Dieppe, Le Havre, St Malo and St Martins are also prevalent. Paris, 
though not strictly an Atlantic port, had access to the sea through the fluvial system and 
housed a number of Scottish merchants/bankers such as John Clerk of Penicuik and 
James Mowat who were directly connected to the networks discussed. Such individuals 
have been included in this study, although there is scope for a more focused 
examination of Scottish mercantile activity in this location. Henry Hamilton has 
suggested that as Scotland’s main trade was to the Netherlands, Germany and the Baltic, 
the eastern ports (he cites Kirkcaldy, East and West Anstruther, Burntisland, Crail and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 S. Murdoch, Network North: Scottish kin, commercial and covert association in Northern Europe, 
1603-1746 (Leiden, 2006) 148f 
27 CRB, I, 143, 272-3, 284, 287, 483, 494, 531-2, 557; II, 39 
28 Grant, Economic History, 85 
29 F. Bayard, ‘Naturalisation in Lyon during the Ancien Régime’ in French History, IV (1990) 277-316, 
focuses on the Irish presence in Lyon, mentioning the English in passing but neglecting the Scots entirely. 
Without further research, it is impossible to say whether this focus is justified. 
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Dysart) were the most important.30 This is corroborated by Isobel Guy who has attested 
that 80% of all customs revenue was generated by the major eastern burghs – 
Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee and Perth.31 Leith has, in particular, been seen as 
Scotland’s primary port. In the 1520s it was arguably ‘the major player in Scotland’s 
limited overseas trade’, importing large quantities of wine and salt from France,32 and 
Sue Mowat makes a strong case for its significance.33 During the course of research for 
this thesis, it has become apparent that the east coast ports were essential for Franco-
Scottish commerce – the major ports such as Aberdeen, Dundee and Leith but also the 
smaller east coast ports (Kirkcaldy, Anstruther, Burntisland, Dysart, Arbroath, 
Montrose and St Andrews). As Christopher Smout has suggested, there was also a 
significant amount of Franco-Scottish trade operating from the Glasgow ports, 
particularly in the later seventeenth century, and the west coast of Scotland has 
therefore also been included in this investigation, as have the Northern Isles.34 
Some previous assertions relating to Scotland’s geographic commercial interests 
in France are easy to challenge. Suggestions that ‘[Rouen] did very little trade with 
Scotland’ merely represent a lack of attention paid to sources held in this port, and the 
presence of prominent Scottish merchants and bankers in Rouen speaks for itself, as 
will become apparent.35 The Scots Andrew Russell and Robert Arbuthnot, both of 
whom were successful merchants with connections throughout Europe, had commercial 
interests in Rouen. Indeed, this is where Arbuthnot, who became a prominent Jacobite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Hamilton, Economic History of Scotland 
31 Guy, ‘Scottish Export Trade’, 62 
32 S. Wrightson, Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain (New York/London, 2000) 
97.  Note the assumption that Scotland’s overseas trade was ‘limited’. 
33 S. Mowat, The Port of Leith: its History and its People (Edinburgh, 1994) 
34 T. C. Smout, ‘The Glasgow Merchant Community in the Seventeenth Century’ in Scottish Historical 
Review, XLVII (1968). Consideration of the role of the Northern Isles in Scotland’s overseas trade has 
been somewhat limited, and requires further research beyond the scope of this thesis. One useful 
contribution is Smith, Shetland Life and Trade. Brief mentions of the participation of the Northern Isles 
in Northern European trade (specifically Bergen and Hamburg) can be found in N. Pedersen, ‘Scottish 
Immigration to Bergen in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, 150, 152, 164; K. Zickermann, 
‘Briteannia ist mein Patria’: Scotsmen and the ‘British’ Community in Hamburg’, 252, 271; both in 
Grosjean and Murdoch (eds.), Scottish Communities Abroad. For literature on the internal economic state 
and domestic trade of the Northern Isles see F. Shaw, The Northern and Western Islands of Scotland: 
Their Economy and Society in the Seventeenth Century (Edinburgh, 1980). Chapter 5 of this work 
includes a detailed examination of trade between the Isles and the Scottish mainland. In general terms, 
ascertaining the relative volumes of traffic entering each Scottish port in this period or its value to the 
country is extremely difficult. Documentation detailing the total amount of customs entering the Scottish 
ports between 1 August and November 1704 gives some indication of their relative importance, at least 
for this narrow period. See Appendix I.i; NAS E73/128 
35 H. Sée and A. Cormack, ‘Commercial Relations between France and Scotland in 1707’ in Scottish 
Historical Review, XXIII (1926) 277 
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financier, primarily operated.36 Furthermore, the Royal Burghs of Scotland had 
historically received trading privileges from the Parlement of Rouen which contained 
‘exemptions and privileges in favour of Scottish merchants in the kingdome of France’, 
which they attempted to renew in 1690 (Chapter 6).37 
The chronological scope of this study is necessarily more limited than the time 
span might initially suggest. While concerned with the period from the Reformation and 
the Treaty of Edinburgh in 1560 to the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 
1713, this chronology has been broken down in order to pursue a specific intellectual 
rationale: that of the ways in which legislation and domestic and international conflict 
affected commercial activity. Previous examinations of Scotland’s participation in such 
conflicts have viewed it as both forced (as an English satellite state) and inherently 
damaging to Scotland’s commercial interests. War against France as part of the Nine 
Years’ War in 1688-1697, for example, has been seen as ‘damning to Scottish shipping 
and markets…war had undermined relations with France and wiped out the special 
privileges Scotland had enjoyed a hundred years before, under the Auld Alliance’.38 
This thesis will, by re-examining official records and utilising previously untapped 
archival material, question such assertions in the context of the wars in which Scotland 
and France participated in the late sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
both domestically and internationally, and in light of commercial policy pursued by 
both countries. 
 
III. SOURCES 
 
As mentioned above, the economy and overseas relations of Scotland have traditionally 
been examined through quantitative and government sources. Such approaches have led 
to economics and finance of the early modern period being directly related to the 
Treasury and to commercial institutions. In Scotland’s case, consideration of both of 
these aspects has led to an assumption that she was economically backward, given the 
low returns to the Treasury from trade and the failure of the Company of Scotland; in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 NAS, Andrew Russell Papers, RH15/106; Arbuthnot to Mar, 19 March 1716, SP, II, 30; Smout, 
Scottish Trade, 99-115; Murdoch, Network North, 145; Sée and Cormack, ‘Commercial Relations’, 277; 
DNB, II, 325-9; C. Nordmann, ‘Les Jacobites Ecossais en France au XVIIIe Siècle’ in M. Plaisant (ed.), 
Regards sur l’Ecosse au XVIIIe Siècle (Lille, 1977) 83 
37 RPCS, 1690, 125 
38 T. C. Smout, ‘The Road to Union’ in G. Holmes, Britain After the Glorious Revolution (Suffolk, 1969) 
184, 187 
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this case, its virtual collapse and eventual sale to the East India Company through article 
XV of the 1707 Treaty of Union.39 Yet covert, or at least non-governmentally controlled 
commercial networks were often more effective than those ventures of Scots who tied 
themselves to companies or monopolies.40 When the success or failure of the individual, 
rather than national companies, is examined, Scotland’s alleged backwardness is far less 
prominent and, in places, simply inaccurate, refuting claims that Scotland in 1603 was 
‘a country of underdeveloped economic resources, almost mediaeval in her organization 
of trade and industry’.41 Moreover, individual merchants contributed to their native 
society more than is usually assumed. The views of both contemporaries and modern 
scholars that merchants who traded for personal profit rather than specifically to 
improve their nation’s economy were economically damaging is also questioned here 
(Chapter 3). 
Henriette de Bruyn Kops, Sheryllyne Haggerty, Xabier Lamikiz, Allan 
Macinnes and Steve Murdoch have recently recognised the need to examine private 
mercantile sources, and such investigations have had important results for, for example, 
our understanding of the trading relationships between Nantes and Rotterdam in the 
seventeenth century and between Liverpool and Philadelphia and within the Spanish 
Atlantic world in the eighteenth.42 ‘Official’ records can be misleading: if goods en 
route to France were shipped through the Scottish staple in the Netherlands and then 
either re-shipped or even carried overland by Scots to a Scottish community in Dieppe 
these figures would appear in official port records as trade between Scotland and the 
Netherlands, rather than between Scotland and France.43 Furthermore, many goods were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 W. Ferguson, Scotland: 1689 to the present (Edinburgh, 1968/1990) 82-3; Murdoch, Network North, 
240-1; G. Insh, Papers Relating to the Ships and Voyages of the Company of Scotland trading to Africa 
and the Indies (Edinburgh, 1924); G. Insh, The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies 
(London/New York, 1932); G. Insh, The Darien Scheme (London, 1947); G. Insh, Scottish Colonial 
Schemes, 1620-1686 (Glasgow, 1922); Whyte, Scotland’s Society and Economy, 157 
40 Murdoch, Network North, 423; D. Dickson, Introduction to Dickson, Parmentier, and Ohlmeyer (eds.), 
Irish and Scottish Mercantile Networks, 2-3 
41 Keith, ‘Economic Causes’, 44; T. Keith, ‘Economic Condition of Scotland under the Commonwealth 
and Protectorate’ in Scottish Historical Review, V (1908) 276 
42 de Bruyn Kops, A Spirited Exchange; Haggerty, The British-Atlantic Trading Community; Lamikiz, 
Trade and Trust; Macinnes, Union and Empire, 11; Murdoch, Network North, 127-248. Although 
Professor Smout was aware of and used such sources, specifically the Russell Papers (National Archives 
of Scotland [NAS] RH15/106), they were not central to his work. See also R. Brenner, ‘The Social Status 
of English Commercial Expansion, 1550-1650’ in S. Subrahmanyam (ed.), Merchant Networks, in the 
Early Modern World (Aldershot, 1996) 280 
43 Murdoch, Network North, 207; Lythe and Butt, Economic History of Scotland, 63; R. Nash, ‘The 
English and Scottish Tobacco Trades in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Legal and Illegal 
Trade’ in English Historical Review, XXXV, 3 (1920) 355; G. Ramsay, English Overseas Trade in the 
Centuries of Emergence (1957) 172. Volumes of compiled statistics, such as that by M. Lynch and D. 
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sent through alternative channels, for example with individual messengers or through 
the postal system. Accurate conclusions regarding the state of a nation’s trade can only 
be drawn through a methodological approach that considers the actions of individual 
merchants alongside those of governments and larger trading companies. Through 
examination of this material it has been possible to reconstruct, at least partially, the 
networks within which these merchants operated, and to ascertain how individuals 
circumvented obstacles to their trade (for example, trade embargos and prohibitions in 
times of war). In so doing, the assumption that declarations of war, trade embargoes and 
prohibitive tariffs irreparably damaged trade has been questioned. 
It is inevitable that throughout the course of a three-year project, not all 
available material could be consulted in depth; conversely much valuable research has 
had to be omitted in order to comply with the stipulated word limit and produce a 
coherent thesis. The nature of the sources used has also meant that material is often 
incomplete. For example, a lone bill of exchange might indicate the presence of a 
Scottish merchant in La Rochelle, but if no further information can be uncovered 
pertaining to them it is impossible to follow this strand of the network further. 
Furthermore, it is inevitable that much of the material that does survive pertains to the 
upper echelons of both the merchant class and of society itself – much of the evidence 
relating to John Clerk highlights commercial exchanges with figures such as the 3rd Earl 
of Lothian, Lady Pittenweem and Lady Newliston (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). The material 
that has been selected for inclusion, however, offers a valuable insight into this 
commercial relationship, and fundamentally alters the traditional view of Scotland’s 
economic position both in relation to France and within Europe. 
 
IV. STRUCTURE 
 
This thesis comprises two parts. Part I, ‘Peace and Prosperity’, is largely thematic. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of legislation affecting commerce passed during this 
period, including declarations of war, trade embargoes, prohibitive rises in customs 
duties and domestic economic policy. This chapter also includes a discussion of 
legislation concerning the Auld Alliance. It seeks to establish the nature of the Scottish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ditchburn in P. McNeill and H. MacQueen (eds.), Atlas of Scottish History to 1707 (Edinburgh, 1996) 
240-283, are useful but cannot be taken, for the above reasons, as projecting the true nature and volume 
of trade during this period. Smuggled goods were also, obviously, not recorded in official records. 
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trading privileges in France, asking whether the alliance was ever formally abrogated or 
prolonged. Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned with the methods used by Scottish 
merchants to effect trade with France during times of conflict (providing the precursor 
to Part II). Chapter 2 readdresses the commodities that have traditionally been thought 
to comprise this trade. While salt, wine, fish and wool have, in particular, traditionally 
been seen as central to it (and their importance is certainly not denied here), in fact the 
commodities that made up this trade were far more wide-ranging. They demonstrate a 
larger trade in ‘luxury’ goods than has been previously considered, including furs and 
cloths, spectacles and furniture. The third and final chapter in Part I examines the 
commercial networks within which such commodities were exchanged, the ways in 
which these integrated into their host communities and the effect they had on their 
homeland as a result. Comparisons are drawn between the nature of Scottish settlement 
in France and the experience of Scots elsewhere in Europe in destinations where 
extensive research has thus far been undertaken, for example Sweden and the Dutch 
Republic. 
 Part II, ‘Conflict and Commerce’, considers the effect that the volatile political 
events of the long seventeenth century had on these continuing commercial links. 
Chapter 4 discusses the effect of internal war and domestic crisis, including examination 
of the Wars of Religion in France, but using the British Civil Wars and Interregnum 
(1639-1660) as the primary case studies.44 Chapters 5 and 6 consider the impact of 
international crises on Franco-Scottish commercial relations, focusing on periods of 
war. In these chapters interpretation of official documentation is questioned, private 
sources brought to light, and emphasis placed on the ways in which merchants used the 
methods outlined in Part I to pursue trade in the face of adversity. 
While readdressing a specific gap in the consideration of Scotland’s position on 
the European commercial scene and, more specifically, her special relationship with 
France, this thesis will adopt revisionist methodologies, questioning those traditionally 
adopted by economic historians. Evidence of government initiatives and trading figures 
should no longer be seen as the key components of identifying the condition of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The dates of these wars can be determined in a number of ways – in dating them until 1660, the period 
taken into account runs from the outbreak of the First Bishops’ War in 1639 to the Restoration of the 
Stuart Monarchy in 1660. While many have seen the regicide of 1649 as the ‘end’ of the Civil Wars, 
events such as the Royalist Uprising, led by John 1st Earl of Middleton (1652-1654) and the Glencairn 
Uprising (1653-1654) were ongoing. For a succinct account of the ongoing argument surrounding the 
dating of this conflict/s, see Macinnes, British Revolution, 3-4 
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nation’s trade. This should be based instead on the sum of all the commercial endeavors 
of the nation, be they governmental, corporate or individual. 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
‘In consideration of the ancient confederation’:1 
Legislation and Alliance, 1560-1713 
 
The Treaty of Edinburgh, July 1560, and the Reformation Parliament the following 
month have often been seen to have led directly to the expiration of the Auld Alliance 
between Scotland and France. Upon closer examination, however, the Treaty of 
Edinburgh was wholly concerned with the expulsion of French soldiers from Scotland – 
and even this was not absolute, with a French garrison being permitted to remain in the 
Castle of Dunbar and on the Isle of Inchkeith ‘untill the Estates should find means to 
maintain the said forts upon their own charges’.2 Commerce is not mentioned – and 
neither is the Auld Alliance formally dissolved. This piece of legislation is a prime 
example of one that has traditionally been fundamentally misrepresented, along with 
trade embargoes, declarations of war and increases in customs duties, which have been 
seen as necessarily indicative of a faltering in commercial relationships. 
This chapter will establish what types of legislation were passed concerning 
Franco-Scottish (and -British) commerce during the long seventeenth century. It will 
question the motivations of governments in passing such legislation and, most 
pertinently, ask whether such legislation can be taken at face value. The question of 
perception – whether the people it affected understood what the rules were – will be 
examined, as will any consequences for breaking them. The role of institutions such as 
the Convention of Royal Burghs in this relationship will also be re-evaluated. While the 
claim that the Convention did not pursue strict organisation of trade with France due to 
its limited scope is inaccurate,3 so are claims that ‘it was only by constant embassies 
and agitation by the Convention of Royal Burghs that…exemptions [and privileges] 
were maintained’.4 
Legislation concerning the Auld Alliance will also be addressed. While it has 
been widely accepted that the Scots continuously pushed for a reiteration of ‘the 
privileges’ they had previously enjoyed, similar actions on behalf of the French have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 21 March 1599, CSP, XVIII, i, 431 
2 J. Spottiswoode, The History of the Church of Scotland (Yorkshire, 1972) 148 
3 T. Pagan, The Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland (Glasgow, 1926) 151, see Introduction 
4 I. Grant, The Economic History of Scotland (London, 1934) 85 
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seldom been considered. The motivations of both sides in pursuing this continuation 
will be discussed – particularly in questioning the widely held view that the Franco-
Scottish relationship was of benefit to Scotland, but a hindrance to her ‘more powerful’ 
ally.5 Any formal reiteration or abrogation of the Franco-Scottish relationship will be 
explored, along with the question of what the ‘privileges’ enjoyed by the Scots in 
France actually were. 
 
I. ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED LEGISLATION 
‘The manufacture of this kingdom will abundantly serve for all domestick uses’.6 
 
As Part II will discuss in detail, any declaration of war suggests the breakdown of a 
relationship and many such declarations involved commercial matters. To take one 
example, the Scottish declaration of war on France in August 1689 stated clearly that 
the Privy Council ‘discharge all the leidges of his Majesties antient kingdom of 
Scotland to trade, corospond or have any intercourse or medling with the said French 
King or any of his subjects’.7 However, this particular declaration did not end all trade 
and correspondence between Scotland and France, and declarations of war and their 
effect on commerce can easily be misconstrued due to the complexity of motives for 
them and the many different aspects of a relationship they affected. Legislation that 
directly modified a commercial relationship – such as acts concerning the import and 
export of goods, or the increase or lowering of taxes and customs duties – may seem 
less susceptible to false interpretation, but in reality have not been any more immune to 
it. In the late sixteenth century bans on the export of coal (1563) and wool (1581 and 
1597) were implemented in Scotland, legislation apparently affecting her export trade, 
her economy and her overseas commercial relations.8 Yet, as one scholar has noted, this 
may not have had a detrimental effect on Scotland at all. In fact, the standard 
mercantilist device for the encouragement of manufacture was the banning of the export 
of vital raw materials,9 and the majority of prohibitions on the exportation of certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It is older literature which has recognised that both countries gained from this trade: H. Sée and A. 
Cormack, ‘Commercial Relations between France and Scotland in 1707’ in Scottish Historical Review, 
XXIII (1926) 275 
6 1681, RPCS, iii, VII, 653 
7 6 August 1689, RPCS, iii, XIV, 17-18 
8 A. MacDonald, The Burghs and Parliament in Scotland, c.1550-1651 (Aldershot, 2007) 68; see: 1 
November 1597, APS, IV, 135; 13 May 1597, Dundee, RPCS, V, 386; 27 February 1581, APS III, 221 
9 S. Lythe, The Economy of Scotland in its European Setting, 1550-1625 (Edinburgh/London, 1960) 106 
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commodities seem to have been influenced by domestic concerns regarding 
manufacture, consumption, and a desire to improve Scotland’s economy from within, 
rather than being used as political tools in times of conflict. 
 Wider global economic developments and the effect they had on policy must 
also be considered, and changes in the salt trade highlight this. Scotland traditionally 
imported large volumes of salt from France’s Biscay ports but, during the sixteenth 
century, the importance of this salt throughout Europe began to decline, causing prices 
to rise and French production to fall. Meanwhile, Scotland’s own salt production was 
expanding, and the quality of her salt improving. Although the decline of the Franco-
Scottish salt trade coincided with a perceived cooling of political and diplomatic 
relations the causes were economic and, as Edgar Lythe has convincingly argued, 
whatever had happened to their crown or church Scotland would have bought less 
French salt.10 The improvement of Scotland’s export trade in this commodity should be 
similarly considered in light of a wider European context, as well as the increase in 
domestic production. The Baltic lands had historically imported salt from Holland or 
France but, between 1576 and 1578, French producers were struggling to provide and 
the Dutch skippers, who carried salt from France to the Baltic, were suffering from 
political upheaval.11 As this coincided with the improvement of Scottish salt production, 
it is not surprising that there was a peak in shipments of salt from Scotland to the North 
in this period.12 Policy concerning the exchange of salt must therefore be viewed within 
this context. An Act of Parliament passed on 30 April 1574 prohibited natives from 
exporting salt from Scotland ‘without oure soverane lordis licence’,13 a stipulation 
which was implemented not due to political motivations but in an attempt to encourage 
domestic production and consumption of this commodity. 
Restrictions were also placed on the importation of foreign salt to Scotland, 
again to encourage the use of that produced domestically. This policy did present some 
problems for Scotland. Despite the drop in production, Biscay salt remained the 
optimum salt for curing Scottish fish, and this issue remained prevalent throughout the 
period. The Aberdeen Council continuously sent commissioners to the Convention of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Lythe, Economy of Scotland, 175-6 
11 Ibid, 160 
12 Ibid; see also K. Zickermann, ‘Across the German Sea: Scottish Commodity Exchange, Network 
Building and Communities in the Wider Elbe-Weser Region in the Early Modern Period’ (Unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of St Andrews, 2009) 68-74. I am grateful to Kathrin for granting me access to her 
thesis, which is officially under embargo until 2012. 
13 30 April 1574, APS, III, 93 
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Royal Burghs with instructions ‘to obtane ane libertie for bringing home of salt…this 
toune is singular for the mater of salting of fish and speciallie salmond which cannot be 
saltit without French salt’.14 In 1671 foreign salt was permitted to be imported, although 
it was stipulated that this should be only for the curing of fish intended for export, 
thereby protecting domestic production of salt as far as possible while encouraging the 
export trade in fish.15 This was reiterated ten years later by the Privy Council, who 
‘seing the salt manufacture of this kingdom will abundantly serve for all domestick 
uses, that no forrain salt be allowed to be imported from France except for curing of 
salmond and Spanish salt for curing of herrings’.16 Such concessions suggest that 
embargoes affecting the salt trade were not intended to be political; this would have 
undermined them. Rather, restriction of importation as opposed to complete prevention 
suggests economic rather than political motives. Consumption of domestic commodities 
was encouraged, but as legislation in 1579 clarified, although ‘our said soveranis lieges 
may be first servit’ with domestic fish, if ‘abundance occurit…they micht be sellit and 
transportit’.17 
Legislation regarding wine imports followed a similar pattern. In February 1650 
the Council of Aberdeen, when speaking on an ‘act anent our wyn customes’, stated that 
‘we will onlie get allowit to us ane hundredth tunes in all…for ane year’.18 Similarly an 
act drafted in 1701 regulated the amount of French wine that could be imported per 
annum rather than preventing its importation entirely, ceding that wine could be 
imported with ‘a speciall license from the Lords of his Majesties theasurer’.19 In 1649 
‘An Act for Relief of Feltmakers and Hat-band-makers against Aliens and Strangers 
importing such Wares to the hinderance [sic.] of their Manufacturers’ demonstrates 
similar protectionism and laws were also passed against the exportation of native 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Additional Instructions to Baillie Cullen, 1652, ACL, III, 214; see also Instructions to John Jaffray and 
Gilbert Gray, 12 October 1657, ACL, III, 295; Instructions to Mr Robert Patrie, 3 August 1671, ACL, V, 
84, 86; Commission from the provost and baillies to Andrew Skeine, 6 November 1671, ACL, V, 101; 6 
December 1671, ACL, V, 106. Concerns over the shortage of salt continued to be voiced during the reign 
of Queen Anne. George Flint wrote to the Earl of Morton that ‘I hear the Fishery of this Country is like to 
be quite lost this year for want of Foreign Sald; & that they intend to apply to the Government for leave to 
import Foreign Salt from Irland’: n.d., NAS GD150/3508/38. It is not clear whether this shortage of salt 
was due to a lack of availability or embargoes implemented during the War of the Spanish Succession. 
15 Robert Mylne to the Provost and Magistrates, 7 December 1671, Edinburgh, ACL, V, 108 
16 1681, RPCS, iii, VII, 653 
17 October 1579, APS, III, 146 
18 Instructions from the Council of Aberdeen to Alexander Jaffray, provost to the next session of 
Parliament, 20 February 1650, Aberdeen, ACL, III, 164 
19 Draft Act of Parliament, 1701, NAS PA7/17/1/90iv 
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commodities, including wool and beer, in 1662.20 In fact, the Crown was sometimes so 
committed to promoting domestic consumption of certain commodities that it 
compromised revenue from other avenues. In July 1695 privileges granted to the 
Incorporation and Society of Linen Manufactory were ratified, ‘considering the great 
advantage that may arise to this Kingdom’ by its establishment. This act also ordained, 
however, that the societies and masters and servants of the manufactory were to be free 
from customs and excise on malt liquors both in the citadel of Leith and in any other 
places where the company worked,21 presumably in an attempt by the Crown to ensure 
their loyalty and to keep the manufactory within the kingdom. 
Evidently commercial legislation did not necessarily concern itself with wider 
European concerns, but often had domestic issues as its focus. Regulation of prices of 
goods sold within the kingdom was not always intended to control markets or revenue, 
but instead to regulate internal disputes between merchants and consumers – in 1599, 
for example, the price of French wines was limited to 5s. per pint.22 In 1638 the Provost, 
Baillie and Council of Banff ordained that no merchant should ‘carrie away furth of the 
said burgh any merchandice of merchand wair to any landwart pairt to be sold be them 
except it be to public mercatis and fayres’,23 regulating the ways in which commodities 
could be traded, but not preventing their sale.  
The French also often prioritized economic rather than political concerns. In 
1668 the mayor of Bordeaux forbade foreigners to deal with anyone in France except 
French merchants.24 On close reading this declaration implies not that Bordeaux wished 
to prevent foreign merchants participating in trade, but that by this stipulation the 
government hoped to protect the domestic economy by ensuring that French merchants 
were involved in every transaction. In November 1687, a year before the Nine Years’ 
War broke out, an ‘Arrest du Conseil d’Etat du Roy, Qui regle l’Entrée des Draperies 
étrangers dans le Royaume’ was passed. The importation of foreign cloth was regulated, 
but no political motives for doing so were cited, and the declaration stated that ‘les 
Etrangers pour préjudicier aux Manufactures du Royaume se sont efforcez de les 
contrefaire en fabriquant des Draps de memes qualities & measures’.25 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 5 September 1649, AO, II, 239-40; Instructions to Andrew Cant, Alexander Cant, John Menzies and 
George Meldrum from the Privy Council, 18 November 1662, Edinburgh, ACL, IV, 191-2 
21 11 July 1695, APS, IX, 430 
22 7 December 1599, Edinburgh, RPCS, VI, 62 
23 2 July 1638, AB, 88 
24 1668, TNA SP117/288 
25 8 November 1687, ADLA C656 
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II. SOCIALLY AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED LEGISLATION 
     ‘Poore labouring people and servants who eat only bread and drinke water’.26 
 
Despite concerns for domestic economy and manufacture underlying many pieces of 
legislation, some commercial policy was not related to economic concerns. An act 
passed in July 1593 against exporting animal skins was ostensibly due to ‘how 
necessary and profitable the schurling skynis ar for lyning cuschenis making of pokis 
lyning powchis [and] gluiffs’, suggesting that here, also, the encouragement of domestic 
consumption was the primary motive.27 This particular act also notes, however, that 
these commodities were used for ‘clothing of the puir’, suggesting social concerns. An 
act prohibiting the importation of French wines in 1626 was motivated in part by 
consideration over scarcity of money in Scotland, but also cited ‘the wraik of mony 
poore people, who, neglecting that trade and calling whairunto thay ar called for 
winneing of their leving, does unthriftilie spend the most pairt of their meanis in 
drinking of wyne’, stating that the prohibition was being implemented ‘for preventing 
of whilk abuse’.28 This example suggests some discrepancies between purported and 
ulterior motivations for legislation, as it is in fact more likely that this was an act of 
retaliation for the seizure earlier that year by the French Governor of Guyenne of a fleet 
of 200 English and Scottish vessels who were bringing over the annual supply of French 
wines from Bordeaux (Chapter 5).29 In 1641 an act prohibiting the exportation of eggs 
did so as ‘it bringis not any considerable moneyes into the country…Considering the 
dyet of poore labouring people and servants who eat only bread and drinke water if 
egges were restrained might be bettered by getting eggis…at an easir rate’.30 
Throughout the early modern period, one prevalent social motivation for closing 
trade links was disease. In 1629 the Privy Council considered potential danger as 
Denmark, Sweden, Bordeaux and other places in France, Orkney and Shetland were 
‘visited with the contagious sicknesse of the pest’.31 In 1664 Sir George Downing wrote 
to Henry Bennett from the Hague referring to Scotland’s decision to prohibit all trade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 16 November 1641, APS, V, 421 
27 21 July 1593, APS, IV, 29-30 
28 Whitehall, 12 December 1626, RPCS, ii, I, 478-9 
29 RPCS, ii, I, 479-80, note. See Chapter 5. 
30 16 November 1641, APS, V, 421. Similar acts include that ‘anent the Exporting of Victual’: 12 June 
1649, APS, VII, ii, 409  
31 17 December 1629, RPCS, III, 386 
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with the United Provinces for fear of contracting the plague.32 The French were 
similarly aware of such dangers, in September 1712 passing an ‘Ordonnance du Roy, 
portant reglement, Sur les Précaurions qui doivent être observes dans les Ports de 
France pour prévenir la communication du Mal Contagieux qui regne dans le Nord’, 
citing problems in Denmark (Copenhagen in particular) and Sweden, but also following 
European precedent, as ‘l’Angleterre & la Hollande avoient par des Placards des 4 & 16 
septembre 1711 pris des precautions pour empêcher que les vaisseaux, Equipages ou 
marchandises provenant des Pays du nord n’y répandissent la Contagion’.33 
An emphasis on economic and social considerations is not to suggest that 
political considerations played no part in the formation of economic policy, although 
where they did this was again often indicative of domestic rather than international 
issues. A new custom proposed by Charles I in 1625 upon coal exported in foreign 
vessels had little to do with politics or commerce – this was instead intended as an 
additional tax, which the Convention of Royal Burghs unsurprisingly refused as they 
were concerned that trade would fall as a result.34 Some legislation was directly aimed 
against political enemies, including the ordinance passed in France in 1691 ‘interdisant 
à ses sujets ou aux étrangers d’importer des marchandises provenant des pays 
ennemis’.35 Some economic prohibitions can be directly linked to conflict, but not in 
terms of preventing trade. In 1643 an ordinance was laid ‘for the speedy raising and 
levying of moneys by way of charge and new-impost, upon the severall 
commodities…for the maintenance of the Forces raised for the defence of the King, 
Parliament, and Kingdom, both by Sea and Land’ and another new excise was raised on 
both native and foreign commodities in January 1644 ‘for the maintenance of the 
Armies raised in defence of the King and Parliament…the Navy cannot be sufficiently 
maintained out of the Revenue of the Customes’.36 The use of new excise taxes to raise 
money was fairly common – in fact, this was seen at the beginning of the Interregnum 
as ‘the most equal and indifferent levy that can be laid upon the people’.37 On occasion, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 [Sir George] Downing to [Henry] Bennett [first Earl of Arlington], 4/14 August 1664, TNA 
SP84/171/107 
33 12 September 1712, AMN GG 774 
34 W. Dickenson and G. Donaldson (eds.), A Source Book of Scottish History, 3 volumes (Edinburgh, 
1958) III, 294. This act was also vehemently opposed by the owners of the coalhouses on the Forth: 2 
November 1625, APS, V, 186 
35 1691, ADCM B5608 
36 8 September 1643, AO, I, 274-283. The goods included were wine, strong waters and salt, among many 
others; An Ordinance Touching the Excise of Flesh-Victuals, and Salt, 9 January 1643/4, AO, I, 364-6 
37 14 August 1649, AO, II, 213ff 
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in order to avoid inflaming a volatile political situation by imposing complete 
embargoes, taxes were simply raised to a level prohibitive to trade. Such attempts to 
maintain ostensible neutrality while pursuing a specific agenda did not pass unnoticed. 
The Committee for Trade in the Scottish Parliament in 1698 commented that France 
 
of late have prohibited the import of Scots goods by Scots men either directly or 
virtually by impositions equivalent to ane prohibition & as a remedy it is 
proposed That the import of ffrench goods be discharged until the scots 
preveledges be restored & those incumberances & havy impositions be taken 
off.38 
 
Indeed, retaliation was another motive for the implementation of commercial 
legislation. In 1701 Parliament passed an act stating that ‘tradeing with France may be 
discharged until they take off the prohibition of importing our herring and imposition 
upon Salmond and Scots ships there’.39 Contemporaries recognised the problems caused 
by retaliatory legislation, as the Deputies of the Council of Trade created by Louis XIV 
commented that to forbid imports from England simply because England forbade 
imports from France ‘would be like cutting off both our arms in order to deprive 
ourselves of the use of one hand’.40 
Political considerations not only affected the movement of commodities, but 
also the freedom of movement of commercial agents. The motivations for the 1652 act 
‘for calling home Seamen and Mariners and Inhibiting such to serve abroad without 
License’41 are not specified, but its concurrence with the outbreak of the first Anglo-
Dutch War cannot be coincidental. The French also ordered merchants home when they 
needed to furnish an army. In a letter from an anonymous writer to Sir Charles Hedges, 
English Secretary of State, in 1705 it was noted that the French restricted sailings of 
merchant vessels so that they could impress sailors they required for the navy during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 1698, NAS PA7/16/86/1; see also, in relation to trade with England, RPCS, iii, VII, 652; see also D. 
Defoe, The Trade with France, Italy, Spain and Portugal Considered (London, 1713) 22-3 [emphasis 
mine] 
39 9 January 1701, APS, X, appendix 82; see also 31 January 1701, APS, X, 278 
40 BnF, Fonds Français, ms 8038, f333, cited in W. Scoville, ‘The French Economy in 1700-1701: An 
Appraisal by the Deputies of Trade’ in Journal of Economic History, XXII (1962) 234 
41 9 September 1652, AO, II, 612-4. See also 10 July 1645, The Acts done and past in the second, third, 
fourth and fifth sessions of the first triennial parliament of our soveraigne lord Charles, by the Grace of 
God, King of Scotland, England, France and Ireland, defender of the Faith. Holden at Edinburgh, 
Stirling, Pearth, and S. Andrews respective (Edinburgh, 1646) 43 
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War of the Spanish Succession.42 The sustenance of such men was also essential, 
necessitating restrictions on the export of victual. In 1644 it was decreed that 
 
all meanes be used for provydeing of victual for maintenance of the 
armies…[Parliament] doe thairfore…inhibite All his majesties subjectis of what 
ranke and qualitie soever That nane of them presoome nor tak upon hand efter 
the date heirof To transport out of the Kingdome anie maner of victual wheat 
beare oatis meale or ry.43 
 
Pieces of legislation that were governed by political concerns were often 
precipitated, inevitably, by the outbreak of war or rebellion, and during the 1690s this 
pattern was no different. In 1696 a proclamation for apprehending people who remained 
in France illegally after 1694 was passed, listing many suspected Jacobites.44 In 1698 an 
‘Act anent Persons going to and returning from France’ specifically concerned 
 
severall disaffected persons who did go into or remain in the Kingdom of France 
during the late war contrary to the late Act of Parliament…We hereby 
Command and Appoint all Masters of Ships who shall bring home any 
passengers from any forraigne Countreyes after the date hereof that they do 
detain them and take security of them.’45 
 
Control of the movement of people was often effected by ordering that licences were 
required in order to travel abroad. While this may be presumed to have been a problem 
for merchants, in reality it seems to have been little more than an inconvenience, as 
passes do not seem to have been too hard to come by. In May 1693, during the Nine 
Years’ War, Scots were permitted to correspond with and travel to France with ‘express 
leave’ of the Monarchs or Privy Council – a loophole that allowed merchants to 
continue their trade while simultaneously allowing the government to guard against 
insurgency.46 During the War of the Spanish Succession, Queen Anne often granted 
passes to Scottish merchants to trade with France and Spain, and the plethora of appeals 
to her to do so suggest that this precedent had been set long before (Chapter 6).47 
Much of the legislation thus far examined, while often having some impact on 
commercial activity, was not usually directed specifically against France. In fact, some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 [?] to [Sir Charles] Hedges, 14 April 1705, La Rochelle, TNA SP78/154/18 
43 5 January 1644, APS, VI, i, 65 
44 12 March 1696, GCA T-PM/109/79 
45 1 September 1698, APS, X, 175 
46 23 May 1693, ‘Act anent Corresponding with France’, APS, IX, 265-6 
47 14 September 1705, APS, XI, 247 
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was governed by concerns to protect the Franco-Scottish alliance. In 1570 the Privy 
Council laid down a proclamation stating that no one may 
 
repair in the pairtis of France in their accustumat traid of merchandice without a 
testimonial frome the Queen…quhilk proclamatioune or edict is sinisterlie 
purchest be the malice of wickit persounes to steir up occasioune of trubill and 
unquyetnes betuix our Soverane Lord and his darrest brother, the maist Christian 
King of France, their realms, dominions, and subjectis, in hurt and prejudice of 
the ancient league and constant amitie that so lang hes continewit betuix the 
nationis.48 
 
Twenty years later James VI prohibited ‘the carriage of wine to Newhaven [Le Havre], 
St. Valirie [Saint-Valery-sur-Somme], and other Catholic places disobedient to the 
present authority of the King of France’,49 compromising Scotland’s own trade in order 
to offer political support to the French King – legislation here governed by political 
rather than economic motives, but being pro- rather than anti-alliance. 
 
III. DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL POLICY 
‘It is lack of freedom rather than a shortage of capable merchants 
which cripples overseas trade and navigation.’50 
 
Changes in the European economy led to a change in commercial policy in both France 
and Scotland in this period – particularly fostering a rise in protectionist policies.51 
Although in France the implementation of mercantilist policies has long been 
synonymous with Jean-Baptiste Colbert (see below), this approach had been previously 
advocated by politicians and some attempts had been made to apply it.52 Henri IV, for 
example, worked towards the development of the silk industry of Tours by prohibiting 
the importation of Italian silks.53 Although on this occasion the Lyon merchants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 [n.d.] 1570, RPCS, I, XIV (addenda) 56 
49 14 August 1590, CSP, II, 581; c.f. proclamation by James VI, 14 August 1590, CSP, X, 378 
50 BnF, Fonds Français, ms 8038, f105, cited in Scoville, ‘French Economy’, 234 
51 R. Nash, ‘The Economy’ in J. Bergin (ed.), The Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2001) 37, 46 
52 Many reforms later attributed to Colbert had already been identified in Antoine de Montchrestien’s 
Treatise of Political Economy (1614) and later in Richelieu’s Political Testament (1624); J. Félix (D. Bell 
trans.), ‘The Economy’ in W. Doyle, (ed.), Old Regime France, 1648-1788 (Oxford, 2001) 23; A. Usher, 
‘Colbert and Governmental Control of Industry in Seventeenth Century France’ in Review of Economics 
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Review, XXIV (1909) 44 
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resisted, forcing the relaxation of this policy,54 on other occasions merchants 
encouraged such activity. When Louis XIV acceded to the French throne in 1643, the 
textile sector was in the midst of a crisis marked by falling sales, profits and production 
levels. In order to minimise production costs and stimulate the industry, the Languedoc 
merchants transferred the majority of their cloth production into rural areas and out of 
the hands of urban artisans who were allegedly damaging the quality of cloth – a system 
of ‘putting out’ which not only improved manufacture of this commodity but promoted 
cheaper manufacturing in the countryside.55 Although the policies of Henri IV and his 
chief minister Sully (Maximilian de Béthune) were not always successful, they did 
initiate an economic policy of state-building that provided impetus for the mercantilist 
achievements of Richelieu and Colbert.56 In November 1626 Cardinal Richelieu 
presented an economic programme to the Assembly of Notables in which he praised the 
Dutch for their ability to pool resources, blaming the French merchants’ lack of success 
on their propensity to carry on overseas trade as individuals, concluding that ‘il 
faut…de grandes companies, obliger les marchands d’y entrer, leur donner de grands 
privileges comme ils [the Dutch] font’.57 His encouragement of trading companies, 
however, met with resistance and ultimately failed.58 Louis XIV’s first attempt to 
stimulate France’s domestic commercial activity – a crackdown on the payment of the 
taxe des estrangers (2.5% on the value of their goods) in 1643 – robbed foreign factors 
of their whole commission, removing their motivation for doing business in France in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid. The merchants of Lyon, their prosperity and status as a commercial city already having been 
undermined during the Wars of Religion, described this prohibition as ‘premature’ and exploited their 
strategic location near the frontiers of Italy and Savoy to induce the state to relax the prohibition. This 
was not the only one of Henri IV’s policies to be overturned by popular pressure. In 1605 Isaac Bernard, 
one of his court officials, was granted a ten-year monopoly on the transport of exported brandies from 
Nantes. The following year, the municipal authorities sided with the local producers when they protested 
against this monopoly, and Henri was forced to renounce this privilege. AMN HH 194, 237; H. de Bruyn 
Kops, A Spirited Exchange: the wine and brandy trade between France and the Dutch Republic in its 
Atlantic Framework, 1600-1650 (Leiden, 2007) 124 
55 Félix, ‘The Economy’, 20, 22; G. Bossenga, ‘Society’ in Doyle, Old Regime France, 70; P. Hoffman, 
‘Rural, Urban and Global Economies’ in M. Holt (ed.), Renaissance and Reformation France, 1500-1648 
(Oxford, 2002) 79 
56 F. Palm, ‘Mercantilism as a factor in Richelieu’s policy of National Interests’ in Political Science 
Quarterly, XXXIX (1924) 653; A. Smith, Creating a World Economy: Merchant Capital, Colonialism 
and World Trade, 1400-1825 (Oxford, 1991) 178; M. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629 
(Cambridge, 1995) 211 
57 H. Hauser, La Pensée et l’action économiques du Cardinal de Richelieu (Paris, 1944) 69; P. Boulle, 
‘French Mercantilism, Commercial Companies and Colonial Profitability’ in P. Emmer and F. Gaastra 
(eds.), The Organization of Interoceanic Trade in European Expanision, 1450-1800 (Aldershot, 1996) 
238 
58 Boulle, ‘French Mercantilism’, 239; Smith, Creating a World Economy, 189. Colbert later also 
attempted to implement trading companies: J. Cornette, Chronique de Règne de Louis XIV: de la fin de la 
Fronde à l’aube des Lumières (Paris, 1997) 125 
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the first place and thus eliminating competition to domestic factors (Chapter 2).59 Yet 
although this may have helped to stimulate the commercial activities of native factors in 
the short tem, it also damaged France’s overseas trade. 
 Several projects of economic reorganisation were entertained in the first half of 
the seventeenth century, but there was little effective accomplishment before the rise of 
Colbert.60 Colbert deemed a standardisation of business practice one of the most 
essential elements for the improvement of commerce, and in March 1673 laid out a code 
savary (code of commerce), detailing rules for apprenticeships and the admission of 
masters, regulations for bankers and brokers and instructions for the formation of 
companies, partnerships and instruments of credit. He also limited rates of interest on 
loans, hoping to encourage investors to put their money directly into business or 
commercial enterprise rather than acting individually as bankers or brokers.61 To 
consolidate this approach, and in line with the policy of Sully that had been so 
unpopular under Henri IV, Colbert reduced duties on imports of raw materials and 
exports of manufactures, levying high duties instead on exports of raw materials and the 
importation of manufactured goods.62 
The level of Colbert’s success and any effect it had on French commerce has 
been hotly debated, with some arguing that under his regime France was able to ‘direct 
its economy towards the ideal of self-sufficiency’ and others maintaining that he 
‘damaged French shipping interests and discouraged French efforts to take part in the 
highly competitive northern branch of shipping enterprise’.63 One French scholar has 
recognised that ‘l'histoire, la personnalité et l'oeuvre de Colbert ont été déformées par 
l'historiographie’.64 Voltaire noted that ‘the enemy captured fewer French merchant 	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60 Boulle, ‘French Mercantilism’, 650, 654, 251-2. Richelieu did make some progress, particularly in 
reforming naval administration: R. Knecht, Richelieu (Essex, 1991) 151-4; E. Levasseur, Histoire du 
Commerce de la France, 2 volumes (Paris, 1911) I, book 5, 233-292 
61 Cole, Colbert, 360-1. Rates of interest were limited to 5% in 1665 and raised to 5 5/9% in 1672 at the 
outbreak of the Dutch war. At this point banks were still underdeveloped, with most banking continuing 
to be done through the hands of private individuals or small companies: W. Doyle, The Old European 
Order, 1660-1800 (Oxford, 1992) 8, 37, 61-2 
62 Cole, Colbert, 415 
63 Ball, Merchants and Merchandise, 48; P. Bamford, ‘French Shipping in Northern European Trade, 
1660-1789’ in Journal of Modern History, XXXVI  (1954) 209 
64 Cornette, Chronique, 88. See also Levasseur, Histoire du Commerce, I, book VI, 294-423; M. Vergé-
Franceschi, Colbert: la politique du bon sens (Paris, 2003) particularly Chapters 4, 9 and 10; P. Mandrou, 
Louis XIV et son temps, 1661-1715 (Paris, 1973) 122, 137, 145-158; A. Corvisier, La France de Louis 
XIV, 1643-1715 (Paris, 1957) 146-150, 165-167; Voltaire (M. Pollack, trans.), The Age of Louis XIV, 321; 
W. Scoville, Persecution of Huguenots and French economic development 1680-1720 (California, 2006) 
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ships because there were fewer to be captured, Colbert’s death and the war having 
greatly reduced trade’, suggesting that during his life, Colbert had a positive effect on 
commerce.65 Undoubtedly, Colbert had attempted to tackle one of France’s biggest 
problems and, like Sully, precipitated massive economic recovery in some sectors, for 
example ending the crisis in the French textile industry.66 However, his reforms also 
caused problems for France’s overseas trade. Foreign ships had become accustomed to 
the advantages of trading with France on the numerous occasions when authorities, 
prioritising dynastic or political success, seemed willing to sacrifice the interests of their 
native merchants and shippers.67 Under Colbert, protective measures temporarily closed 
ports and a ‘hot and cold’ shipping policy damaged French shipping interests.68 In fact, 
although external war later in the century disrupted trade to some degree (Chapters 5 
and 6), it has been argued that the nationalistic economic policies developed by Colbert 
had by this time already affected Franco-Scottish trade – for example, the abolition in 
1663 of the exemption granted to Scots from the 50 sous per ton levy imposed on 
foreign imports.69 Moreover, by the time Colbert implemented his new tariff of 1667 
the monarchy, government and financial position of the French crown had all improved 
– in part due to the conclusion of the Franco-British war of 1666-1667 (Chapter 5). 
These new tariffs, therefore, unlike those implemented three years previously, focused 
not on domestic improvement but on injuring the trade of rival countries, and almost all 
duties were increased (Appendix I.i).70 Although these increased tariffs were designed 
to act primarily against the Dutch who, despite being allied with France in the war 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
few tolls and excises…local tradition thwarted his attempt to simplify France’s heterogeneous system of 
weights and measures’. 
65 Voltaire, Age of Louis XIV, 161 
66 In 1661, when he came to office, the royal income was approximately 32,000,000 livres p.a., while 
expenditure was 53,000,000. At Colbert’s death in 1683, income had risen to 94,000,000 and expenditure 
fallen to 40,000,000. G. Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and 
Private Interest, 1661-1701 (Cambridge, 2002) 111; Corvisier, Le France, 167; Cole, Colbert, 363; Félix, 
‘The Economy’, 24-5 
67 Bamford, ‘French shipping’, 208 
68 Bamford, ‘French shipping’, 209; Cole, Colbert, 7. Several deputies of the French Council of Trade 
recognised that countries needed to import if they also exported, bringing us back to considerations over 
the balance of trade. Scoville, French Economy, 233 
69 A. Cummings, ‘Scotland’s links with Europe, 1600-1800’ in History Today, XXXV (1985) 46; S. 
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Leydier, Scotland and Europe, Scotland in Europe (Cambridge, 2007) 29; Levasseur, Histoire du 
Commerce, I, 360-361, 403. For the Scottish reaction to the removal of this exemption see Privy Council 
to Charles II, 30 September 1663, Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, I, 433-34 
70 Cole, Colbert, 428-430; see also Levasseur, Histoire du Commerce, 356-360; Cornette, Chronique, 
151; for the duties laid on 18 September 1664 see Anon., The Tariff settled by the French King and 
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against the Stuart Kingdoms remained a fierce economic rival, in practice they were 
arguably more damaging to English and Scottish ship-owners and merchants.71 Despite 
further negotiations between England and France for a commercial treaty, from 1668 
commercial relations became strained by Colbert’s tariff legislation.72 
 Colbert was seen by some as ‘a sort of watchful father to the merchants of 
France’, or ‘the protector of merchants’, but many hated his interference and distrusted 
his motives.73 To many merchants the economic sanctions imposed, particularly 
protectionist measures, prevented them from buying in the cheapest markets.74 While 
the deputies of the 1700 Council of Trade maintained that Colbert had helped overseas 
trade by simplifying tariffs, subsidising shipping and shipbuilding and challenging the 
maritime supremacy of the Dutch and English, they believed that merchants should be 
granted more freedom and did not want to see a perpetuation of Colbert’s policy of 
regulation and control, as ‘commerce is presently too constrained both internally and 
externally…it is this lack of freedom rather than a shortage of capable merchants which 
cripples overseas trade and navigation’.75 
Scotland’s commercial policies must also be considered. Charles I’s policies 
have been seen as particularly damaging. His liberality with corporate monopolies, 
primarily in staple domestic commodities such as salt and malt, caused discord among 
independent commercial agents; this trend had begun under James VI, with 700 
monopolies already granted by 1625.76 Furthermore, in Britain as well as in France the 
cost of shipbuilding rose as the cost of domestic timber, plank, hemp, flax, pitch and tar 
increased, encouraging shipbuilders to import cheaper materials from elsewhere, for 
example Scandinavia, hindering domestic production.77 In an attempt to bring Scottish 	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practice in line with England James VI, at his final Privy Council before he went to 
London in 1603, attempted to prevent merchants from freighting foreign bottoms.78 For 
James, this stemmed from a desire to bring Scotland and England under a common rule, 
but from the time of Cromwell’s invasion and under the aggressive mercantilism that 
followed Scotland ceased to be treated as an equal. The English protectionist lobby 
succeeded in having the Scottish Marine reassigned ‘alien’ status in a new series of acts 
including the 1660 Navigation Act, the 1662 Act of Frauds and the 1663 Act for the 
Encouragement of English Trade, excluding foreigners (but particularly Hollanders) 
from the import trade of England, except as carriers of their own commodities. These 
acts excluded Scottish traders from further participation in English colonial and 
domestic trades and imposed inflated duties on the movement of cattle, sheep, corn and 
salt from Scotland to England.79 Scottish retaliation, in the form of the Scottish 
Navigation Act of 1661, included import embargoes and colonial and fishery schemes, 
but failed to produce a workable homespun version of mercantilism.80 Later in the 
century, attempts in Scotland to harden mercantilist policy included further bans on the 
co-ownership of vessels with foreigners. In 1681, in an attempt to resurrect the domestic 	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ship-building industry, the Privy Council compelled any Scottish owners of multi-
national ships to ‘sell their partes to forraigners or forraigners their partes to 
Scotsmen’.81 In the same year, a Council of Trade was revived under James, Duke of 
York (Lord High Admiral of Scotland), who intended to recover Scotland’s prosperity 
by stimulating an export-orientated carrying trade while actively discouraging imports 
with heavy customs tariffs, hoping to eliminate the trade deficit and bring Scotland in 
line with the developed European mercantilist system.82  
 
IV. LEGISLATIVE VARIANCES 
     ‘There are but Three Ports in France at which our 
       Manufactures are admitted to be imported’.83 
 
As well as complex motivations for the implementation of legislation, its execution was 
also convoluted. Rates on the same commodities hailing from different countries were 
not consistent, for example. In 1644 rates of customs and excise on wine imported to 
Scotland differed depending on the origin of the wine. While the import duty on a pint 
of French wine was 1s. 4d., on the same amount of Spanish wine it was a comparatively 
hefty 2s. 8d.84 Regulations were also somewhat inconsistent, depending on the purpose 
for which the wine was purchased. In 1657 it was ordained that wine which was not 
Spanish was liable for £6 of import duty per tun, to be paid by the buyer of the wine; 
whereas Spanish wine was liable for £9, also payable by the buyer. However, if the 
wine was being bought for the purpose of selling it on, the retailer was liable for the 
duty, which was 30s. per tun.85 Trade in other commodities had similarly diverse rules. 
An act of 1681 ‘anent the prices of French and Spanish salt’ stipulated, in order to 
‘prevent the unnecessary importation of forreigne Commodities and the exorbitant 
prices that may be exacted from the Leiges’, that ‘the Inland Salt of this Kingdom is 
sufficient for all other uses except the cureing of Fishes and Beeff exported…all 
Importers of French Salt or Retailers thereof…shall not…exact more…then [sic.] Five 
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wars’ in Scottish Historical Review, LXI (1982) 71, 89 
82 Graham, Maritime History, 51-2 
83 25-27 June 1713, Mercator or Commerce Retrieved, issue 15, London  
84 29 July 1644, APS, IV, i, 238 
85 26 June 1657, AO, II, 1186-1223. It was unusual for Spanish wine to be measured in tuns rather than 
butts – French wines were usually measured in tuns. 
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punds Scots for the Linlithgow boll of French Salt’, whereas ‘Importers and Retailers of 
Spanish salt shall not exceed six punds for the Linlithgow Boll thereof’.86 
While it is tempting to view nations as single entities, legislation often targeted 
specific ports or commodities rather than encompassing whole countries and rates of 
customs were often inconsistent.87 Rates from 1643 show a number of such 
discrepancies:88 
 
Table 1.1 Schedule of Commodities to be taxed, 22 July 1643 
 
It should be noted that some French commodities seem to have had a substantially 
lower tax laid on them than the same commodities from elsewhere.89 Control of the 
import and selling of wine from different ports of the same country also differed. The 
Scottish Parliament stipulated in 1573 the maximum prices that imported wine could be 
sold for:90 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 17 September 1681, APS, VIII, 356 
87 France did not have a single unified economy, rather a number of regional economies – which have 
traditionally been seen in economic terms as the Eastern Provinces, trading to Germany and the 
Rhineland, the North and West, trading to the Netherlands, and Central France, concentrating on 
Mediterranean trade: D. Parker, La Rochelle and the French Monarchy: Conflict and Order in 
Seventeenth Century France (London, 1980) 61 
88 Schedule of Commodities to be taxed, 22 July 1643, AO, I, 208-214 
89 This is examined in more detail in relation to wine imports in Chapter 2. 
90 30 April 1573, APS, III, 82 
Commodity Amount Customs duty 
Venetian, Florentine or Milan 
gold and silver thread 
12 ounces 3s. 4d. 
French and Paris gold and 
silver thread 
11.5 ounces 2s. 
Bridges silk 16 ounces 2s. 
Paris silk 16 ounces 9d. 
Callicoe quilt 1 item 2s. 
Satin or silk quilt 1 item 6s. 8d. 
French quilts Dozen 4s. 8d. 
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Table 1.2 Maximum prices at which imported wine could be sold, 30 April 1573 
 
In July 1596 the Convention of Royal Burghs discussed ‘the lait impost at Deip’, which 
‘is ceissit sen Maij last’,92 suggesting that this impost was both temporary and particular 
to this port. A commissioner sent by the Convention of Royal Burghs to France in 1601, 
charged with ‘doungetting of the customeis rayssit in France upoun the guide passand 
thairto further of this realm, contrair the preveldgeis grantit to this natioun and by the 
auld custome payit of befoir’, was instructed to consider goods being exported from 
Scotland to specific ports, namely Calais, Saint-Valery-sur-Somme, Le Tréport, Dieppe, 
Le Havre, Rouen and even Cayenne.93 Some ports, the ones with a significant Scottish 
presence, are notable for their absence – Bordeaux and La Rochelle in particular. This 
could have been either because the rates in these ports were satisfactory, or because it 
was perceived that there was little trade between Scotland and these ports (the latter is 
highly unlikely). Perhaps this was simply not intended to be an exhaustive list – either 
way, these discrepancies may have caused some confusion. In January 1612 the 
Convention of Royal Burghs suggested the placement of Scottish collectors at French 
ports, yet only considered ports in Normandy, naming Rouen, Dieppe, Le Havre and 
Caen.94 Often arrêts issued by the French Council of Commerce concerned only 
specific parts of France – for example, that issued against Scottish merchants trading in 
Normandy in 1635.95 Yet such stipulations and complications in trade were not new to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Before her formal annexation to France after the Fronde in 1653, Bordeaux was often recognised as a 
separate entity; in July 1605 discussions between the English and Scottish Privy Councils concerning the 
appointment of two Scottish and two English agents to be sent into France to report on the relative 
privileges of the Scots and the English in France stipulated that this included ‘all trade with France 
distinct from the Bordeaux wine trade’. RPCS, VII, xxxv, 472-3; see also 1 July 1601, CRB, II, 104 
92 CRB, I, 493-4 
93 14 February 1601, Edinburgh, CRB, II, 97-8 
94 14 January 1612, CRB, II, 334 
95 27 March/6 April 1635, TNA SP78/97/172 
Origin Maximum Price per tun Maximum price per pint 
Bordeaux91 £24 12d. 
‘Haultpoyis’ (a town in the 
Bordeaux region) 
£22 12d. 
‘Cunyeak’ (Cognac) £20 10d. 
La Rochelle £16 8d. 
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the post-Reformation period, nor were they confined to times of conflict, as the 1635 
arrêt demonstrates. A proclamation of 8 January 1550 had ordained that French wine 
could not be purchased for dearer than £22 10s. per tun of Bordeaux wines, £18 per tun 
of Rochelle wines and £25 per tun of Cognac wines.96 In France in particular, the 
implementation of legislation differed between regions, depending on both local 
tradition and particular circumstances – for example, some regions were governed by 
statute law, while others were governed by common law.97 
Regulations on customs and excise in the British Isles were similarly 
inconsistent, and legislation also differed between different ports. In 1633, Charles I 
granted Edinburgh and Glasgow alone an exemption from wine duty.98 In England in 
January 1644 it was specified that the excise on domestic salt had to be paid by the 
maker, whereas in Scotland the first buyer of the salt was liable.99 The differences in the 
implementation of legislation across the Stuart kingdoms is perhaps unsurprising, but 
confirms that Scotland remained largely independent from England after the Union of 
Crowns – an issue which will be examined further in Part II. Differences in the amount 
of customs duties that were payable also depended on who physically brought the 
commodities into British ports. In 1647 a tun of wine brought into London by an 
Englishman was charged £4 10s, whereas the same amount of wine brought in by an 
alien was charged £6 – similarly, wine brought into any other port by a native was 
charged £3; by an alien, £4 10s.100 In terms of customs duties at least, it was cheaper for 
French vintners to use British merchants to carry their wine back to Britain, rather than 
importing it in their own ships. In 1649 the importation of wine, wool or silk from 
France was prohibited in England and Ireland, but not Scotland – perhaps indicative of 
the different political situations north and south of the border as Scotland, under Argyll, 
rejected the regicide and declared for Charles II.101 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 21 March 1550, R. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials in Scotland, from AD 1488 to AD 1624, I (1833) 349 
97 L. Fontaine, ‘ Antonio and Shylock: credit and trust in France, c. 1680-c.1780’ in Economic History 
Review, LIV (2001) 41-2 
98 Robert Patrie and Alexander Alexander to the Baillies, 31 August 1672, Edinburgh, ACL, V, 192. This 
highlights the care that needs to be taken in analysing trading patterns. It would not be surprising if both 
ports saw an increase in the importation of wines after 1633, yet this would be due primarily to this 
ordinance, rather than to the general political or economic climate. 
99 9 January 1644, AO, I, 365 
100 16 December 1647, AO, I, 1032-1042. See also 19 March 1661, APS, VII, 88 
101 28 August 1649, AO, II, 239-40. This act was repealed, 26 June 1657, AO, II, 1129 
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V. FORMATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION 
     ‘The Custom house officers are so agog of seizing.’102 
 
By definition legislation was conceived and implemented by governmental bodies, 
rather than the wider population that was were affected by it – in our case, merchants, 
manufacturers, retailers and consumers. It is not surprising that the populace made use 
of representative bodies such as the Convention of Royal Burghs or the Privy Council in 
pushing for reduction in taxes or the abolition of certain decrees. Yet despite claims that 
‘even the most powerful merchant groups had no direct control over the state or policy’, 
instead merely trying to keep commercial objectives to the fore,103 throughout this 
period individuals at all levels were directly involved in the formation of commercial 
policy. Some acted as consultants; in 1681 merchants in Scotland were invited to 
participate in commercial proceedings of the Privy Council.104 Similarly the Councils of 
Commerce established in France by Colbert in 1664 and Louis XIV in 1700 involved 
members of the commercial classes; Louis XIV appointing thirteen men with 
‘experience in commercial matters’ to act as deputies and advise the controller general 
and the secretary of the marine.105 
 Petitioning was one typical way in which merchants and manufacturers 
attempted to influence policy. In 1672 the Masters of the Soap Works in Leith stated 
that despite the fact that soap works had been erected and the importation of foreign 
soap prohibited, ‘forraigne soape is brought in als great quantitie as ever…the 
manufactories of the country is therby absolutely discurraded and ruined’.106 Similarly 
in 1681 the saltmasters of Aberdeen submitted a petition ‘craving that all forraine salt 
may be discharged to be imported except for the curing of fish…and that they 
themselves may onlie import quhat is needful for fish’.107 These petitions are perhaps 
unsurprising – it stands to reason that those responsible for the domestic production of 
certain commodities would act if their businesses were affected by the importation of 
goods from abroad. In some cases, however, wider economic awareness was exhibited. 
In 1669 Robert Richardson, a sugar maker in Edinburgh, asked that ‘any goods which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 George Flint to [?], n.d. [c. eighteenth century], NAS GD150/3508/38 [my emphasis] 
103 Brewer, Sinews of Power, 170 
104 February 1681, RPCS, iii, VII, 653ff 
105 Cornette, Chronique, 127; Félix, ‘The Economy’, 22; Scoville, ‘French Economy’, 231; Scoville, 
Persecution of Huguenots, 366; Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 257 
106 1672, ACL, V, 120-121 
107 George Skene and David Ardie to the Magistrates, 7 September 1681, Edinburgh, ACL, VI, 343-4 
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are needed to be imported for the setting up of manufactories, for the encouragement of 
domestic production, may be imported without charge of customs or excise’.108 While 
the encouragement of domestic production was probably mentioned more as rhetoric 
than as a pressing personal concern, this nevertheless demonstrates an appreciation of 
the wider economic situation. The 1681 petition of the weavers, spinners and rural 
domestic producers against exporting wool to France considered both social and 
economic implications, acting to protect their own ventures but also voicing apparent 
concern about the state of their nation’s society and economy. They maintained that by 
exporting wool to France and elsewhere Scotland had ‘exposed the inhabitants to all 
manner ofe meanes sillieness vice and debaucherie throw idleness, so we have robbed 
the poor of their bread and given it to strangers’. The petition cited a ‘neglect to 
improve the product of our oun nation’, and the danger that 
 
the French will set up manufactories with our wool and by stealth import it unto 
England, And we our selves shall receive our oun back with a heave…the 
French in time will fill all the places wherewith we and the English trade in 
woollen manufactorie.109 
 
One issue broached in such petitions was the perception that domestic conventions did 
not always support legislation. In 1685 the Incorporation of Tailors of Edinburgh sent a 
petition to the Privy Council concerning the Act of Parliament forbidding merchants to 
import foreign cloth. They held that as there was ‘noe prohibition nor restraint as to the 
wearing of forraigne cloaths’, tailors who were unaware of the origin of the cloth they 
were supplied with suffered unduly. Furthermore, they stated that authorities ‘upon 
pretendit commissiones…cary away what they find at ther pleasure, soe that by this 
means your petitioners trade is absolutely ruined, for none will adventure to put any 
cloathes in their hands’.110 There is also some misunderstanding here, however, as there 
had been some acts passed which restricted the wearing of certain clothes, for example 
an act in 1672 ‘against all persones quha wearis silver or gold leafe silver buttons or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 7 August 1669, Edinburgh, NAS E73/25/2 
109 c. 1681, GCA TD589/972. Two decades later Parliament ‘discharged the import of cloth that the 
manufactories at home may be encouraged and the poor rightlie employed’: 9 January 1701, APS, X, 
appendix, 82 
110 February 1685, Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, X, 384 [my emphasis] 
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louping, striped silks etc…non of the said commodities ar to be imported…The said act 
is to reatche womenis apparel als weill as menis’.111 
The complex nature of commercial legislation unsurprisingly gave rise to 
confusion among both merchants and authorities. In 1614, in response to a proclamation 
prohibiting any goods being imported into England except in English ships, the French 
king issued an edict to the same effect. Although this was focused on England, it was 
also ‘to the great prejudice of the merchant estait of the Kingdome of Scotland’.112 
When Scots factors appealed to the Parlement of Paris, however, they were assured that 
this edict ‘did no ways extend towards the subjects of the Kingdome of Scotland, their 
ancient friends and allayes’ – merchants themselves facilitating clarification of this 
legislation.113 Moreover, this highlights the ongoing distinction between Scotland and 
England after 1603, and that notions of the Auld Alliance persisted in terms of 
economic policy. In 1686 the Edinburgh merchant George Veitch and James Clerk, his 
correspondent, petitioned the Privy Council concerning the duty imposed in 1681 on the 
importation of bound volumes, to which the Council replied 
 
it was not understood that the forsaid imposition imposed upon bound books 
imported was to be exacted off any lawfull books that are out of print or scarce 
to be had within the kingdome, and therefore the saids Lords does hereby allow 
the petitioners from time to time to import into this kingdome all lawfull 
books.114 
 
Despite periodically seeking clarification of their trading rights, it has been 
suggested that Scottish merchants were ‘apparently oblivious’ to embargoes 
implemented from London designed to inhibit imports to the British nations from 
France.115 Certainly it seems that they more often adhered to their perceptions of 
whether legislation should apply to them than to its actual stipulations, although this 
does not seem to have been due to obliviousness. In 1705 the French Board of Trade 
granted an extension to the passports of Dutch traders, who were at this time the direct 
enemies of France. Although the same favour was not granted to Scotsmen several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Robert Patrie and Alexander Alexander to the Provost and Baillie, 25 July 1672, Edinburgh, ACL, V, 
172. For similar prohibitions later in the century see 1698, NAS PA7/16/86/2; First Earl of Seafield, 14 
July 1705, Edinburgh, in P. Hume-Brown (ed.), James Ogilvy, first earl of Seafield and others: Letters 
relating to Scotland in the reign of Queen Anne (Edinburgh, 1915) 57 
112 Pagan, Convention, 48 
113 Balfour, Annales, II, 58, cited in Keith, Convention, 48 
114 2 December 1686, Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, XIII, 7-8, lxiv 
115 Murdoch, ‘French Connection’, 32 
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Scottish shipmasters believed nonetheless that these decrees were applicable to them, 
and in 1712 appealed for the privilege of freely exporting their herring to France as ‘the 
Dutch had this priviledge before the war and we were very unjustly refused it since that 
the Scots much more than a hundred years agoe were and are all naturalised in France 
beside the benefit they may demand of a free Commerce’.116 
 It is unsurprising that not all merchants understood the complex legislation 
passed in this period, even when it related specifically to them, but authorities, too, 
often misunderstood legislation or seemed unwilling to implement it. In 1607 Thomas 
Inglis, merchant burgess of Edinburgh, complained to the Privy Council concerning the 
difference between the ‘bind of Burdeaulz and heich cuntrey wynis’. While importers of 
the latter had always received ‘every fyft tun in the payment of their impoist’, 
 
the takkismen of the customes burdynnis the said complenair with the hail 
impoist of certane canarie wynis broght hame be tham within theis kingdom, 
craving als mekle for the canarie as for wyne seck, albeit it be of treuth that the 
pype of canarie is sevin gallonis les not the pype of seck, and thairfoir the lyke 
consideratioun proportionallie aucht to be had in the impoist of thir wynis as is 
had in the impoist of the cuntrey and tun wyns of France.117 
 
Such complaints persisted throughout the period. In a similar case in 1676 it was 
reported to the Aberdeen Council that merchants were being charged ‘with generall 
letters of horneing when not guiltie’ and denounced ‘wherby they ware debarred from 
persutes and defence of their lawfull actions and were forceit to suspend and relax or to 
compone with the collectors’.118 Into the eighteenth century, George Flint complained 
of the ruination of the wine trade of Scotland, as ‘the Custom house officers [are] so 
agog of seizing, that no sooner a Wine ship approaches a porte; But the first that can get 
aboard seizes her right or wrong, for Importing French Wines’.119 There were 
complaints concerning lack of action, as well as mistaken action. In 1608 the Scottish 
Parliament talked of ‘the bipast negligence in not seiking the executioun’ of acts against 
the exportation of coals and ‘barkit ledder’, as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Lord Advocate Stewart to [?], 9 August 1712, Edinburgh, TNA SP54/4/78; Sée and Cormack, 
Commercial Relations, 276-7 
117 Thomas Inglis against the tacksmen of the customs in the matter of duty on wines, 17 December 1607, 
Edinburgh, RPCS, VIII, 24. A bind was a standard measure for barrels containing certain commodities, in 
this case wine. 
118 Instructions to Master Patrick Sandilands, Treasurer of Aberdeen, commissioner, 4 December 1676, 
Aberdeen, ACL, VI, 58, 60 
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grite nowmeris of personis preferring their privt gayne to the obedience of the 
law ar not effrayed privatlie and publictlie to transports the saidis commodities 
To the grite hurte of the commounweele. Thairfore the estaities presentlie 
conveyed ordains new intimatioun and publicatioun to be maid of the saidis 
actis.120 
 
 The extent to which legislation was implemented varied, despite some efforts of 
bodies such as the Admiralty Court to punish lawbreakers. As will be demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, commercial agents often displayed impressive cunning in finding 
numerous ways of circumventing laws but in many cases were allowed to do so with 
ease, calling into question not only the dedication and commitment of these bodies to 
enforcing legislation, but also whether the legislation itself was fundamentally 
enforceable. In some cases, merchants were merely afforded the benefit of the doubt. In 
1595, following an Act of Parliament regulating the prices of imported wines, 
merchants and skippers who had brought wines home that year petitioned the Privy 
Council to be allowed to sell their wines at the old prices, claiming that they had 
embarked on their voyages with no knowledge of the change – this was permitted.121 In 
1627, in contravention of an act prohibiting the importation of French wines, several 
merchants claimed to have brought home these wines ‘before…this restraint could be 
made known to them’, and the wines were permitted to be sold, provided the customs 
were paid.122 Such claims were relatively common and were generally accepted, 
particularly when dates of sailing corroborated the claim that merchants had been 
unaware of the legislation when they embarked on the voyage. Yet in other cases, 
authorities chose leniency when punishment might have been deemed a more 
appropriate course of action. In 1643 Robert Constable appealed to the Council of 
Aberdeen after he was caught trading illicit goods from Flanders under commission 
from Scotsmen. He claimed that, having been out of the country in the East Indies for 
16 years, ‘quhat I have done hes bene out of ignorance not knowing the laws’. In 1645 
he was admitted as a free burgess and fined – a relatively lenient punishment, given that 
contravention of some embargoes was punishable by death.123 Moreover, the level of 
punishment received by a transgressor might also depend on luck – for example, who 
apprehended you and what the miscreant’s political or religious persuasion was. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 20 May 1608, APS, IV, 408 
121 18 December 1595, Holyrood, RPCS, V, 246-7 
122 30 January 1627, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, I, 506 (for the act prohibiting the importation see 489) 
123 8 November 1643, n.d. [1645], ACL, III, 11-12; Murdoch, Terror, 296 
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Marquis of Hamilton seized a Scottish ship laden with salt from La Rochelle in 1639 
and asked Sir Henry Vane for advice regarding how the master of the ship should be 
dealt with, stressing that he found him to be ‘a verie honest man swears he neid 
subscryved the countries covenant and most willingly did sweare and signe that oath 
and the oath of supremacie’.124 On this occasion, the severity of the treatment received 
by the merchant would be decided by a question of political loyalty. 
 
VI. THE AULD ALLIANCE 
       ‘De faulte de l'amitie et continuation de l'alliance avec c'est couronne’.125 
 
As we have already seen, the ‘ancient friendship’ between Scotland and France was 
often cited after 1603 to account for Scotland’s independent commercial position. There 
were attempts to re-implement the Scottish privileges in France, including the Auld 
Alliance in its pre-Reformation form. While it has been asserted that post-Reformation 
‘as a first economic result, the trading privileges enjoyed by Scotsmen in France 
became less secure’, in fact both the existence and significance of the Franco-Scottish 
trading route continued to be documented.126 Almost four decades after the Reformation 
James VI, perhaps motivated by the potential revenue, opened 
 
negotiations for observing the old liberties and privileges granted to Scottish 
merchants trading with France, and for obtaining discharge of customs and 
imposts raised on goods imported into that realm or transported furth thereof. 
Benefits redounding to the merchants of this country from the discharge of the 
said customs and exactions to be annexed to the crown.127 
 
To give just one more example, in January 1644 Charles I authorised the Privy Council 
of Scotland to appoint someone to go to the French court and ask that they ‘micht be 
restored to the former priviledges and enjoy the samene in tyme cuming without 
diminutione’.128 Yet despite Pagan’s inference that these attempts came only from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 [The Marquis of Hamilton] to Sir Henry Vane, Yarmouth Road, 16 April 1639, NAS GD406/1/1215 
125 January 1588, WP, II, 59, 66 
126 Lythe, Economy of Scotland, 171 
127 1597, RPCS, V, 369 [emphasis mine]. Customs regulations that were imposed were flouted: in 1579 a 
complaint was made in Leith against merchants who were not paying their customs duties: see the case of 
Laurence Fergusson, importing wine from Bordeaux, RPCS, III, 246. In the same year Andro Buk, a 
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Scottish side, the French also pushed for renewal of the old privileges.129 In 1561 a 
senator of Bordeaux, ‘Noalins’, came as ambassador to Scotland and ‘craved that the 
league betwixt Scotland and England might be brokin, the ancient league betweene 
Scotland and France might be renued’.130 While a decision was delayed until Parliament 
was due to convene the following May, this demonstrates not only that there was a 
desire to reiterate the alliance as soon as one year following its ‘demise’ but that this 
desire was on the French side as much as the Scottish. As David Chalmers of Ormond 
observed in 1579: 
 
Premierement icelle alliance est digne de grande merveille à raison de 
l’ancienneté, y ayant tantoft 800, ans quelle fut commence, & tousiours observe 
sans avoir estè rompue depuis: chose admirable & nompareille. Auparavant 
nulle histoire n’a fait mention, de quelque autre confederation que ce foit, 
laquelle ait duré si long temps de la troisieme partie.131 
 
If Scotland were the inferior partner in this alliance she would not have been in any 
position to negotiate, but in 1583 when offered a renewal of alliance terms by the 
French the Scots, rather than bending to their ally’s desire, saw this offer as an 
opportunity to obtain what they wanted from England.  
 
On the 14th there arrived an embassy from Scotland…[Colonel Stuart] is to 
request this Queen [Elizabeth, of England] to give a firm assignment for 
12,000lib to pay the pensions and the guard that holds the King, and to lend him 
a sum of money to repair the fortresses, some of which are in ruins. It is even 
said that if she will not agree to it they will be obliged to renew the alliance with 
France, and accept the subsidy and pensions from that country, which are again 
being offered by the French.132 
 
Five years later, a report from the Bishop of Glasgow suggested that the French had a 
specific need to preserve the Alliance, as he ‘d’informer le Roy son filz quelle perte il 
pourroict avoir si a leur default vous tumbiez en aultres mains au deffaulte de l’amytie 
et continuation delalliance avec ceste couronne’.133 	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Eighty-four years after the Reformation, re-establishment of the Alliance was 
still being mooted. In 1644 French diplomats, concerned with the visit of Sir Thomas 
Dishington, reported that 
 
the first thing to be done is to re-establish promptly and efficiently the privileges 
of his nation and its ancient alliance with France. That without this re-
establishment nothing can be done in the present state of things…It is necessary 
that those of his country be satisfied with the treatment they receive here.134 
 
While the French pressed for a formal reestablishment of the Auld Alliance, the Scots 
continued to play a political game. Throughout this correspondence the Scots were 
careful not to commit themselves to another formal alliance, instead obtaining all they 
could from France without offending England.135 The French had long been aware of 
this and in 1584 Henri III stated that he did not wish to affect Scotland’s relationship 
with England, merely to preserve his country’s league with Scotland.136 This is not to 
suggest, however, that France did not equally have her own motives for shows of 
loyalty towards Scotland. It was reported in 1570 that ‘the French ambassador continues 
his audiences with the object of frightening the queen of England into the idea that his 
master will not forsake the cause of the queen of Scotland, but little has come of it 
hitherto’.137 The French ambassadors in the 1640s consistently reported that 
maintenance of the relationship with Scotland would be a means of facilitating levies,138 
and at several junctures France’s desire to prolong the Auld Alliance was not borne out 
of a sense of loyalty but political expediency. Charles I himself actively encouraged the 
continuation of the Auld Alliance – seemingly compromising his anglocentric policies 
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because of domestic political developments.139 In French diplomatic correspondence we 
are told by Jean de Montereul that the Scots ‘had little care to perform what they 
promised’, but that Charles 
 
found it necessary for me to not break with the Scots, as much because he judges 
it would induce them further to try, even more eagerly than they do at present, to 
come to terms, at his expense, with the English Parliament, if they thought that 
France wished to give them up.140 
 
He stated also that the Scottish Parliament would always try to retain the friendship of 
the English Parliament, ‘even when they may be assured of the assistance of France’.141 
Negotiations to revive the Auld Alliance continued up to and including 1707, the year 
of Parliamentary Union, even if orchestrated by Jacobite politicians rather than those of 
Queen Anne. During an audience with Louis XIV in 1703 Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, 
‘enlarged upon the antient alliance between France and Scotland’, Louis responding that 
‘himself and the whole French nation had their hearts unfeignedly Scottish; and 
that…he desired to be understood as from that moment renewing all antient alliances 
between the two nations’.142 A year later, Colonel Nathaniel Hooke was sent to Scotland 
in secrecy to report on the prospects for a resurrection of ‘l’ancienne alliance’.143 Louis 
XIV was afterwards thanked ‘for the hopes he had given us by Colonel Hooke, of 
haveing our priveleges restored in France, and of seeing our king and this nation 
included in the future peace’.144 
Certainly attempts to renew the Auld Alliance and enforce trading privileges 
came from both sides. Robert Arbuthnot, Scottish factor in Rouen, wrote to the Duke of 
Hamilton in 1700 that 
 
your grace knows the ancient priviledges the Scots have had in ffrance formerly, 
the which within these threttie years by past have been clipt to a great degree, 	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not by any publick authority, but rather by bringing them in desuetude, so that 
wee have as yet just title to pretend to them, and I have been assured here by 
such as pretend to know it that if a continuance of our priviledges was hansomly 
asked it would be granted provided our parliament renew’d the French 
priviledges in our country’.145 
 
A belief pervaded many quarters that the Scottish privileges had never been officially 
rescinded, and that their re-establishment was a formality.146 Yet throughout all of these 
exchanges, one thing is conspicuous for its absence – any explanation of what ‘the 
privileges’ were. 
 
VII. THE ANCIENT PRIVILEGES 
    ‘Our people have been too careless about preserving our muniments’.147 
 
While ‘the privileges’ are often cited, illumination of the details of them repeatedly 
proves elusive.148 Thomas Moncrieff’s Memoirs Concerning the Ancient Alliance 
Between the French and the Scots states that ‘it is unquestionable, that, to begin from 
Philip the Fair [King of France, and John Baliol, King of Scotland, 23 October 1295], 
there runs an uninterrupted train of alliances between the Kings of France and Scotland, 
down to Henry IV and James VI’.149 It is widely accepted that Henri IV confirmed ‘the 
privileges’ in April 1599, declaring that 
 
we desiring to treat well and favourably the subjects of the King of Scotland…in 
consideration of the ancient confederation and alliance so long kept and 
observed between the two crowns…the said privilege…we grant and confirm to 
them.150 	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One year prior to this Henri had granted a patent of nobility to David Kinloch, a doctor 
of medicine and a native Scot who had studied and worked in France for more than 20 
years, and his wife, Grisel Hay, granting them the same rights and privileges as the 
nobles of France ‘in consideration of the friendship and confederation we have long 
held with the Scots and which continues today…and whom [our Kings] have favoured 
as if they were the natural subjects of our Kingdom’.151 A year before this was granted, 
James VI opened ‘negotiations for observing the old liberties and privileges granted to 
Scottish merchants trading with France, and for obtaining discharge of customs and 
imposts raised on goods imported into that realm or transported furth thereof’.152 Louis 
XIV re-confirmed the naturalisation privileges of the Scots at Fontainebleau in 
September 1646 and in the same year issued a decree stating that ‘there has never been 
any difference in this Kingdom between his Majesty’s subjects and those of 
Scotland’.153 In 1648 the Committee of Estates of the Parliament of Scotland wrote to 
Mazarin regarding the privileges of the Gardes Écossaises, including a statement that 
‘nous lui presentons de perpetuex l’ancienne amitié entre l’Éscosse & la France & de 
nous obliger d’estre à jamais’.154 Moncrieff in his Memoirs talked of the ‘letters-patents 
containing the privileges of the Scottish merchants trading in France’ of May 1518, 
February 1554 and March 1599, yet the letters themselves, included as an appendage to 
this volume, do not state exactly what these privileges were.155 The letter of 1518 
mentions an exemption from a ‘new impost of twelve French deniers per livre, raised in 
the city of Dieppe upon foreign merchandise’, the Scots only being obliged to pay four 
deniers per livre, which ‘hath been anciently collected’.156 The letter of 1554 granted an 
exemption that ‘the subjects of the said country of Scotland shall not be bound to pay 
for the commodities which they shall take and carry out of our country and duchy of 
Normandy, whatsoever they be, if designed for the said country of Scotland’. Henri 
IV’s 1599 ‘confirmation of the privileges’ spoke of ‘the same franchises, privileges and 	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immunities for foreign customs and imposts, and after the same sort and manner that 
they enjoyed them in the days of the kings Francis and Henry’, remaining 
conspicuously vague concerning precisely what this ‘sort and manner’ was.157 
  The French did continue to grant practical benefits to the Scots. In a discussion 
concerning the Gardes d’Écossaises in 1575 it was reported that  
 
the captain of the King’s guard in like manner to be given to a Scotsman…The 
yearly pension of money or munition contained in the old league shall be yearly 
paid and sent into Scotland. All these offers shall be performed sua your grace 
with the rest of the nobility will observe and keep the old and ancient league 
betweixt the two realms.158 
 
In 1588 the Archbishop of Glasgow, the King’s ambassador in France, secured from 
Henri IV a customs reduction of one half for goods exported to Scotland,159 and in 1635 
the merchant John Trotter succeeded in securing a reduction in import duties on Scottish 
wool and hides.160 When the Governor of Guyenne seized the fleet of English and 
Scottish vessels bringing in wine from Bordeaux in 1626, the Scottish vessels alone 
were released ‘in respecte of the ancient league’.161 Scots were initially exempted from 
Colbert’s 1659 duty of 50 sous per ton on foreign vessels trading to France.162 In the 
wake of the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick, French diplomats considered Scottish antipathy to 
the English as potentially beneficial to Louis XIV. Although it has been stated that at 
this juncture they held out no meaningful prospect for a revival of the Auld Alliance, in 
1701 the French accorded the Scots ‘favoured-nation status’ in the war of the Spanish 
Succession.163 As the Parliamentary Union between England and Scotland approached, 
the French became increasingly concerned with re-establishing the precise terms of the 
Alliance. A letter from Lewis Innes to Hooke in January 1707 stated that the Marquis de 
Torcy had ‘asked about the French league’.164 Hooke stated that Torcy was ‘very 
impatient to have the treaties’, to which Innes replied that 	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I have sent him the treaties and priviledges confirmed by Louis 12th, which are 
the most ample, and the confirmation of all by Henry the 4th and Louis the 13th, 
which are the latest…the said privileges [are] still in vigour.165 
 
Later in 1707, a letter to the French King from the Earl of Errol talked of 
 
renouvellement des anciennes et heureuse alliances que votre Majesté et les 
Roys ses predecesseurs ont eu avec la nation Ecossoise, comme aussi pour la 
conservation des libertez et de l’independance de ce royaume.166 
  
Some exemptions were granted on request, rather than following specific precedent or 
established privilege. In 1647 Montereul wrote to Mazarin from Edinburgh that he 
informed the members of the Town Council there ‘you had kindly granted their request 
on their first application, to prevent the Scots who are in France from being obliged to 
pay their tax’.167 
Even to those who have recognised the continuation of certain privileges into the 
seventeenth century, 1663 has been seen as a turning point.168 At the same time as the 
‘practical exclusion’ of Scottish commodities from England, which arguably disposed 
Scottish merchants to attach greater importance to their trading privileges with France, 
Colbert’s mercantilist policies caused a shift in French attitudes towards Scottish 
traders. The French impost of 50 sous per tun of cargo exported in foreign bottoms was 
extended to include Scots, who claimed they were ‘in hazard to be reduced to the 
common condition of strangers and losse the benefite of these antient priviledges which 
for many ages they have enjoyed’.169 Yet the following year, despite the apparent 
apathy of the state, French merchants continued to desire a renewal of Alliance.170 In 
respect of this, coupled with Charles II’s desire to regain Scots privileges in France, the 
Privy Council forbade the farmers of the customs 	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to exact any more customes or other deuty for goods imported and exported in 
French bottomes then is payed be the natives of this kingdome, and that in 
regard of the priviledges and immunities that the natives of this kingdome doe 
enjoy in the kingdom of France for their vessells and goods.171 
 
The Scots believed that they retained a special relationship with France despite 
Colbert’s policies, and they too continued to push for an official renewal of the 
Alliance. In 1684 the Privy Council stated that ‘the subjects of this his Majesties antient 
kingdome haveing right to the priviledges of succeeding in France as natives, and of 
being free from all impositions due by strangers’.172 Later that year the Provost and 
Magistrates of Edinburgh appealed to the King (through the Lord High Commissioner) 
that he might instruct his ambassador at the Court of France to interpose with the 
French King, ‘that the Scotts merchants and all other his Majesties subjects in this 
kingdom may be restored to ther ancient priviledges in France, and particularly that the 
Scotts merchants may be free of the fifty souse upon the tunn’.173 
Perhaps the confusion over the correct terms of the privileges is not surprising 
when it is considered that those in government did not seem to have access to details of 
them. As demonstrated above, there are several instances of either French or Scottish 
ambassadors asking the other side for documents outlining the extent of the privileges, 
something which is prevalent from as early as 1562 when the French ambassador ‘sent 
for all the treaties in force between France and England and Scotland in order to provide 
against any injury being done to his masters’ interests’.174 While on occasion some 
documents were produced, on others this proved impossible. In a proclamation made by 
James VI in 1597 he noted that 
 
we find no letters patent of this privilege earlier than the time of the said King 
Francis, whether because there was no occasion to demand them, or whether 
because our people have been too careless about preserving our muniments, yet 
it is to be presumed that the nation enjoyed this privilege before that date.175 
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When reporting on Dishington’s visit in 1644 French diplomats noted that ‘he does not 
like to speak of the originals about which so much has been written’,176 suggesting 
either that he was not aware of what was written in the originals, or that he did not want 
to admit that the originals had been lost. Mid-negotiation with Louis XIV in 1684, 
ostensibly in respect of the 50 sous impost but perhaps with the underlying hope of a 
renewal of the Auld Alliance, the Privy Council reported the existence of 
 
severall ancient papers and records that wer in the touns charter house which are 
absolutly necessary to have for clearing the Scotts priviledges in France…bot 
these papers are all now abstracted and withdrawen, and, albeit the Lord Provest 
and magistrates hes made all the dilligent search that could be for getting of 
them, yit they cannot be found; and, seing Sir James Rochhead certainly had 
these papers when the inventar was made…they crave that Sir James Rochheade 
may be ordered to exhibit and deliver to the lord provest these records and 
papers concerning the Scots privileges in France, so that the principals or 
authentic copies may be sent to France now when the matter is being considered 
by the French King.177 
 
While it was stated six years later that the Convention had ‘not only obtained extracts 
[of the privileges] but lykwayes…had procured up the principall charters and 
priviledges granted by the kings of France to this nation to be keeped for the use of the 
royall burrowes’, no record has yet been found of what these documents detailed.178 The 
fact that contemporaries themselves often did not know the full terms of the Auld 
Alliance, and indeed seem not to have had any one document outlining them, speaks 
volumes for its nature, that perception was often more important than reality. Indeed, 
the general perception in France appears to be demonstrated by the publication of a 
pamphlet in Paris in 1579 outlining the history of the Auld Alliance and suggesting that 
it be continued.179 As the following chapters will demonstrate, merchants continued to 
pursue old trade links, despite not being in possession of clear facts relating to their 
privileges. For the commercial agents involved in this trade the actual terms seem not to 
have been as important as their belief in an enduring Alliance. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 M. du Bosc to Cardinal Mazarin, Fontainebleau, 21 October 1644, DC, I, 564-5 
177 Supplication by the lord provost and magistrates of Edinburgh, 19 August 1684, Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, 
IX, 115-6; see also 10 July 1685, CRB, IV, 57. 15 July 1690, 121 
178 15 July 1690, CRB, IV, 121 
179 Anon., Histoire Abbregee de Tous les Roys de France, Angleterre, et Escosse, mise en ordre parforme 
d’Harmonies contenant aussi un brief discours de l’ancienne alliance, & mutual secours entre la France, 
& l’Escosse (Paris, 1579) SAUL TypFP.B79FC, 233-7 
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VIII. A CHANGING ALLIANCE? 
   ‘The amity of France with Scotland will be so much more sure when it shall 
    also be constantly maintained between France and England’.180 
 
It would be folly, however, to suggest that the Auld Alliance was in the same condition 
in 1713 as it had been prior to 1560, as changing political, financial and social contexts 
inevitably dictated change. While assumptions regarding Scotland’s move away from 
France and towards England immediately following the Reformation may be somewhat 
inaccurate, the English made some attempts to change the nature of Scotland’s 
relationship with France. This was precipitated by a defensive alliance between 
Elizabeth I of England and Charles IX of France in April 1572 – an agreement that not 
only provided for the provision of soldiers for both sides, but also included an 
arrangement for the pacification of Scotland (then in the throes of Civil War).181 
Furthermore, an entry in Francis Walsingham’s letter book from 1577 describes ‘the 
amitie and good intelligence that hath bin of longe time established’ between England 
and France.182 This was rhetoric, as no long-term relationship, at least not one 
comparable with the Auld Alliance, existed. Rhetoric it may have been, but the French 
were not wholly averse to this change, although they made it clear that they would 
remain loyal to Scotland. Monsieur de Mauvissier assured Walsingham in 1583 that 
 
the King of France only asks union and good understanding between those two 
Princesses, peace and quiet in Scotland with liberty and surety for the young 
Prince, and that he render all honour to the Queen of England, provided that it be 
not to the prejudice of the amity of France with Scotland, which will be so much 
more sure when it shall also be constantly maintained between France and 
England.183 
 
This is supported further by an answer of the English merchants to a complaint of the 
French merchants in 1590, showing that they had the same privileges in England as the 
English merchants had in France.184 While both France and Scotland pushed for 
renewals of the Auld Alliance throughout the seventeenth century the traditional basis – 
an alliance against the ‘auld enemy’ of England – changed after 1560. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Monsieur de Mauvissier to Walsingham, 6 April 1583, CSP, VI, 370 
181 19 April 1572, TNA E30/1152 
182 1577, TNA SP104/163 
183 Monsieur de Mauvissier to Walsingham, 6 April 1583, CSP, VI, 370 
184 ?1590, CSPD, II, 711 
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It is perhaps unsurprising that the English pushed for inclusion in the Alliance, 
and their continued fear over its existence demonstrates that contemporaries did not see 
the Auld Alliance as having ended in 1560. In 1599 a consideration delivered to the 
English Parliament suggested that 
 
the Statute 40 Edward III. ch. 8 be revived, ordaining that no Englishman fetch 
or buy any wines in Gascony or France, but have them brought into the realm by 
Gascons for the profit of the realm…and so make the French King ‘afeard’ to 
break friendship with us.185 
 
A letter to the Lord Chancellor of England in 1605 on the difference in payment 
between English and Scottish merchants in France highlighted that English merchants 
actively pushed for the same trading privileges the Scots enjoyed – suggesting not only 
a desire on the part of the English to foster a closer relationship with France, but also 
that Scottish privileges in France remained covetable.186 By this time, the English had 
succeeded to a degree. An embassy consisting of two Scotsmen and two Englishmen, 
sent to France in 1605 to establish their respective alliances, found that the English 
privileges in Bordeaux and Gascony almost balanced those of the Scots in 
Normandy.187 
Yet even given the changing nature of the Alliance, there were plentiful 
occasions when the French maintained clear distinctions between their respective 
behaviour towards the Scots and the English, particularly during times of war (Chapters 
5 and 6). At the beginning of the eighteenth century it was being reported in England 
that an alliance was being considered between Scotland and France (undoubtedly one 
symptom of perceptions of Scottish Jacobitism). The English perhaps feared exclusion, 
and desired to protect herself by being included in the Alliance that was once aimed 
directly against her.188 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
Reliance on official sources creates some problems in determining the state of the 
Franco-Scottish relationship throughout the long seventeenth century. While trade 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Considerations Delivered to Parliament, 1599, TED, I, 327 
186 [1605], TNA SP78/52/433 
187 7 August 1605, Edinburgh, RPCS VII, 1604-1607, 113, 377-8, xxxii-xxxiii; 21 November 1606, 
Journal of the House of Commons, I, 318-9 
188 [?] to [Henning], 5 May 1702, Paris, TNA SP78/153/72 
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embargoes, declarations of war and commercial prohibitions ostensibly affected 
commercial relationships, closer examination of them reveals several things. First, that 
the motivations behind the implementation of such legislation was often far more 
complex than has hitherto been appreciated, secondly that even when commercial 
legislation was passed, this was often for an independent purpose rather than being 
indicative of a failing relationship, and thirdly that implementation of legislation did not 
guarantee its enforcement. Coupled with this, as will be demonstrated in the following 
chapters, reliance on official sources of a different nature – on port books and customs 
records – has also fostered misunderstandings. 
 While the Auld Alliance inevitably evolved over time it endured, in fact if not in 
name, in the minds of contemporaries and the actions of individual merchants who 
consistently exhibited their belief in the continuation of their privileges in France. Not 
only did the alliance endure throughout the long seventeenth century, but assertions that 
the Franco-Scottish relationship was one-sided must be qualified. Whatever the 
motives, there were evidently occasions when France desired the renewal of the alliance 
just as much, if not more, than the Scots, countering the assumption that Scotland had 
always been the inferior partner in the Alliance. No evidence has been uncovered that 
suggests that many involved were aware of what the ‘privileges’ were during the 
seventeenth century. Paperwork was lost, diplomats were asked to provide copies, and 
members of the Privy Council appear to have been unsure of the situation. Often, 
references to the ‘privileges’, or the ‘Ancient Alliance’ were used as rhetoric – with 
neither side being sure what these were, but continuing to maintain their commitment to 
them. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the actions of individuals often tell 
historians far more about the reality of any commercial relationship in this period than 
we can hope to learn solely through an examination of official legislation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
‘My prettie cap and brave big gooseberries’:1 
Commodities and Methods of Trading 
 
Franco-Scottish trade has often been seen as synonymous with wine, salt and fish.2 
Indeed, assertions that the export trade of Scotland was heavily dependent on fish and 
sheep (woollen goods accounting for 60% of all customs revenue) can be substantiated 
from some sources, with customs receipts from 1595-1599 confirming that the primary 
export commodities were wool, cloth, fells and salmon – ‘native commoditeis’, 
according to the Privy Council.3 In terms of imports, wine and salt continued to account 
for large volumes of Scotland’s trade with France, and into the first quarter of the 
eighteenth century Scottish merchants maintained an interest in the quality of French 
wine vintages.4 Contemporary commentators saw these commodities as being central to 
Franco-Scottish trade, although suggested some limited diversity. Fynes Moryson stated 
in 1598 that ‘the Easterne Scots carry to Bordeaux coarse cloathes, both linen and 
woolen…also the skinnes of goates…and divers kinds of fish smoked or salted; and 
they bring from thence wine, prunes, walnuts’.5 
However, while these goods appear to have been central to Franco-Scottish 
commerce, from the sixteenth century this trade comprised a much larger variety of 
commodities. In December 1564, the Neptune from Dieppe arrived in Burntisland, 
among her cargo ‘ane little knok with ane wakener’ – an alarm clock.6 A book outlining 
the rates of customs and valuation of merchandise produced in 1612 includes mention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Countess of Stair to Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, 3 September 1715, Edinburgh, NAS GD18/5271/4 
2 T. Devine, ‘The Cromwellian Union and the Scottish burghs’ in J. Butt and J. Ward, Scottish Themes: 
essays in honour of Professor S. G. E. Lythe (Edinburgh, 1976) 10-11 (concerning Glasgow specifically). 
Many works which consider trade between Scotland and France take this as a given. Some examples 
include: J. Robison, Kirkcudbright (St Cuthbert’s Town): its mote, monastery and parish churches 
(Dumfries, 1926) 136; H. Sée and A. Cormack, ‘Commercial Relations between France and Scotland in 
1707’ in Scottish Historical Review, XXIII (1926) 275 
3 I. Guy, ‘The Scottish Export Trade, 1460-1599’ in T. C. Smout (ed.), Scotland and Europe, 1200-1850 
(Edinburgh, 1986) 62-5; P. McNeill and H. MacQueen (eds.), Atlas of Scottish History to 1707 
(Edinburgh, 1996) 266; 26 February 1628, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, II, 243 
4 John Steuart to Robert Gordon, 7 April 1721, Inverness, W. Mackay (ed.), The Letter-Book of Bailie 
John Steuart of Inverness, 1715-1752 (Edinburgh, 1915) 146; Walter Pringle to Edward Burd, 22 
November 1735, Bordeaux, NAS RH15/54/19/19; Walter Pringle to Matthew Sharp, Bordeaux, 3 
November 1736, NLS Acc.6552 
5 F. Moryson, An itinerary written by Fynes Moryson Gent (London, 1617); A. Drummond, The Kirk and 
the Continent (Edinburgh, 1956) ix; I. Grant, The Economic History of Scotland (London, 1934) 80 
6 30 December 1564, RPCS, I, lxxxv 
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of ‘beds of silk or walnut trie French making’, ‘Gloves, of Bridges or French making’, 
‘Gould and silver thread…Frenche copper gold and silver’, ‘Hats: French feltis lined 
with velvott…French feltis lined with Taffatie’, ‘Frenche Knyves’, ‘Linning cloth: 
French canves and Line narrow broun or white’, ‘Pottis: of irne French making’, 
‘Quilts: of French making’, ‘Silk stockings: of Milan or France’, alongside more 
traditional commodities such as salt and wine.7 The Aberdeen Shore Work Accounts 
(1597-1670) seem to verify that goods traded between Scotland and France comprised 
only fish (predominantly salmon), wine and salt. Only a handful of entries cite any other 
commodities – for example, in 1611-12, Robert Guthrie’s ship from Dieppe is recorded 
as having brought in ‘potts and strayvald’;8 in 1621 George Stewart brought in ‘pottes’ 
from Dieppe after taking salmon there,9 and in 1670 James Hunter’s ship came from La 
Rochelle with barrel hoops, alongside salt.10 However, a Book of Rates from 1612 listed 
commodities being exported from Scotland including brass, gloves, honey and nuts, and 
a customs book of Aberdeen from 15 April to 31 May two years later demonstrates the 
importation of luxury goods into the north-east, including French and Italian silks, 
taffeta, grograms, napkening, cambrics, tapestries, velvets and satins, among many 
others.11 The Compt Buik of David Wedderburne demonstrates a similarly wide variety 
of goods imported into Dundee from France, including wine, woad, vinegar and salt, 
but also violet powder from La Rochelle, comfits, sugar candy, syrup, aniseed oil and 
toffee.12 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 C. Innes, Ledger of Andrew Halyburton, Conservator of the Privileges of the Scotch Nation in the 
Netherlands, 1492-1503: together with, the book of customs and valuation of merchandises in Scotland, 
1612 (Edinburgh, 1867) 289-334. ‘Bridges’ could be the Flemish city of Bruges. 
8 1611-12, ASWA, 68 
9 September 1621, ASWA, 108 
10 9 June 1670, ASWA, 591 
11 RPCS, IX, lxix; ACL, I, xxii-xxxiii. It is stated that only the ‘most characteristic articles’ in the Book of 
Rates are listed, suggesting that the range of commodities exported from Scotland is even wider than 
shown by this source. The commodities listed here seem to be goods indigenous to Scotland. With regard 
to imports, as has been argued by Louise Taylor in the introduction to her transcription of the Aberdeen 
Council Letters, Aberdeen could not have provided a market for all these goods – some must have been 
redistributed, either domestically or internationally: ACL, I, xxii-xxxiii. James Dow has also shown that 
Scottish exports to Scandinavia included large quantities of wine that was certainly re-exported: J. Dow, 
‘Scottish Trade with Sweden, 1580-1622’ in Scottish Historical Review, XLVIII (1969) 78, 147f. The 
triangular connection between Scotland, France and Scandinavia is further highlighted by John Charteris, 
a merchant of Edinburgh connected closely with the port of Bordeaux, who was appointed as an 
intermediary in Scottish-Swedish commerce by the Privy Council after petition from Scottish merchants. 
S. Murdoch, ‘The French Connection: Bordeaux's 'Scottish' networks in Context, c.1670-1720’ in G. 
Leydier, Scotland and Europe, Scotland in Europe (Cambridge, 2007) 33 
12 CBDW, xxxiii, xliv and passim. 
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I. RANGE AND REPATRIATION OF COMMODITIES 
    ‘A watch or two for gentlewomen, of small value but small & handsome’.13 
 
By examining official records not in isolation but in conjunction with each other, our 
perception of the commodities that comprised this trade changes, and examination of 
private records of commercial agents demonstrates further just how wide a range of 
items were involved. Many luxury goods imported from France were in the form of 
cloth. In 1692, in the midst of the Nine Years’ War, the Countess of Caithness 
purchased from a French tailor a ‘black crep manto’, a ‘black crep peticot’, a ‘percien 
tefety petticoat’ and ribbons.14 Cloth was not only purchased for clothes. In 1664 the 
Laird of Pitfodels purchased through Michel Mel, a Scottish merchant based in Dieppe, 
‘48 els of ritch scarlet couloured Avignon taffatie to line a bed and to be very large…11 
els of fine Callico of sam coulour to line the courtpoint…2 once halfe of silk of the 
coulour to stitch it’ – the account also included ‘drinking moneys to the tapissiers 
man’.15 Of particular use in demonstrating the range of goods sent back to Scotland 
from the continent are the extensive records of John Clerk of Penicuik, a Scottish 
merchant based in Paris in the mid-seventeenth century. Items commissioned from him 
by William Kerr, the 3rd Earl of Lothian included books and even book bindings for 
books he sent to France to have bound and returned to him,16 ‘gold watches of the 
newest fashion’ and ‘a reasonable faire ibeny cabinet trimmed with silver’.17 Other 
goods included spectacles and botkins, romany and clothes such as gowns and 
petticoats.18 In 1655 James Mowat informed Clerk that ‘Mr Charteris tells me your atlas 
is ready, and shalbe sent be Lord Craighall his sonne’.19 There was also interest in 
diamonds, as Alexander Charteris wrote to John Clerk in 1654 – in the middle of the 
Interregnum – that ‘at present Diamonds are verry deare here but if you have occasion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 John Johnstoun to John Clerk, NAS GD18/2387 
14 16 July 1692, NAS GD112/35/14/25 
15 29 July 1664, NAS GD237/11/95/6 
16 Account between John Clerk and William, Earl of Lothian, for books 20 January 1645, Edinburgh, 
NAS GD18/2439; Michel Mel to John Clerk, 30 October 1655, Dieppe, NAS GD18/2542 ‘with ane 
accompt off 18-15-6 for the charges off 2 tronks off my lord lothians conteining Books to be bound’. 
17 William, Earl of Lothian to John Clerk, 30 March 1643, Paris, NAS GD18/2425; Account between 
Clerk and Lothian, 20 January 1645, Edinburgh, NAS GD18/2439; Michel Mel to John Clerk, 30 October 
1655, Dieppe, NAS GD18/2542 – this instance begins to suggest the number of people involved in such a 
trade, an issue which will be examined in more detail in the following chapter; John, Lord Maitland, to 
John Clerk, 9 November 1643, NAS GD18/2426; see also Lothian to Clerk, 1643-44, NAS GD18/2440, 
asking Clerk to buy pictures and books for him. 
18 Letter-book of John Clerk, 1644-5, NAS GD18/2455, for example ff13v-14r, 17r-17v, 24r; Account 
between Lothian and Clerk, 8 March 1650-5 June 1652, NAS GD18/2445 
19 James Mowat to John Clerk, 6 July 1655, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/7 
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for any he will furnish you at the easiest rates’.20 Clerk’s son and namesake, who also 
traded on the continent, was thanked by the Countess of Stair in 1718 ‘for your prettie 
cap and your brave big gooseberries’, and a month later for his ‘good big pears’.21 
Perhaps one reason that scholars have often focused on a narrow range of 
‘traditional’ commodities has been due not only to the sources consulted, but also to 
assumptions over what defined a ‘commodity’, as they are often presumed to comprise 
foodstuffs, drink or substances such as coal or salt. Yet in an economic sense a 
‘commodity’ is anything that is bought and/or sold, comprising commercial exchanges 
and impacting on the economy. Ships themselves were sold or exchanged – Alexander 
and Andrew Watson sold their ship in Cadiz in 1668, purchasing another in its place.22 
Between 1682 and 1696, the Amirauté of La Rochelle reported four English-built, but 
French-named and owned, ships being registered.23 Damaged ships were also sold, as 
one Adam Smith reported in 1698, ‘we sold the wreck and I came to Rojan and from 
that to burdeaux’ – presumably after a more seaworthy vessel had been purchased.24 
Furthermore, as Steve Murdoch has recently noted, ships involved in trade often re-
fitted and gained provisions from foreign ports at which they were docked, and the 
merchants and skippers needed to sleep, dine and, of course, sample the local beverages 
– contributing to the economy of these ports.25 In 1595 Mungo Mackall wrote to Robert 
Galbraith, a Scottish merchant in Bordeaux, asking that if ‘ony of your friends or 
acquaintance passis to saintmalloss I pray yow to send with thame sua mekill money as 
to by for me 20 boulttis of narrow canves the best can be gottin for topsails’.26 The 
accounts of the David from 1713 show provisions being bought in Leith and Kirkcaldy 
in Scotland, but also in Danzig, Bordeaux, Dublin and Waterford, including beef, peas, 
butter, vinegar, brandy and candles.27 These accounts show money being paid to a sail 
maker and a smith in Bordeaux.28 A list of provisions bought here in October, 
November and December totalled 976 livres, 7 sous (converted here to £551, 18s Scots; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Alexander Charteris to John Clerk, 8 April 1654, Paris, NAS GD18/2528/3. It is likely that Clerk was 
purchasing these jewels as a business investment. 
21 Countess of Stair to Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, 3 September 1715, Edinburgh, NAS GD18/5271/4; 
same to same, 1 October 1715, Edinburgh, NAS GD18/5271/8 
22 20 August 1668, London, SAUL Watson Papers, ms38527/3a/18/5. These letters have been transcribed 
by Colin and Paula Martin. 
23 ADCM B235 
24 Journal of Adam Smith (1679-1723), October 1698, GUSC ms Gen 1035/2 
25 Murdoch, ‘French Connection’, 42 
26 Mungo Mackall to Robert Galbraith, 10 February 1595, Bayonne, NAS JC62/1/31 
27 1713, NAS RH15/59/5/7/A 
28 20 December 1713, NAS RH15/59/5/7/A/4 
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£51 09s 10d sterling), and the amount of money paid to tradesmen in this location 
totalled 890 livres, 15 sous, 11 deniers (£569 0s 4½d Scots; £47 0s 9½d sterling).29 It 
was not only merchants and skippers passing through these ports who contributed to 
their economy, but also those who settled on a more permanent basis, spending money 
on accommodation, food and clothing.30 Some spent money on lavish personal goods – 
two account books of John Clerk, dating from 1646-1659, retrospectively list 
commodities he seems to have bought during his time in France. These include 
paintings, silver and musical instruments – many of them ‘for the usse of my wyffe and 
childring’.31 Scots on the continent who were not ostensibly involved in commerce also 
had an impact on the French economy. The personal and household accounts of the 
Yester Estates, owned by the 2nd Marquess of Tweeddale, illustrate travel expenses 
from France and Italy in the late 1670s. These lists include goods that were bought for 
personal use, or perhaps as gifts for those back in Scotland, such as a coat, a ring, books 
and stamps, waistcoats, fans, a picture, a hunting horn, a gun, jewels, a periwig and 
essences.32 
Professor Christopher Smout, one of the few scholars to recognise the wide 
range of goods Scotland imported, has suggested that their type and diversity provides 
‘an illuminating example of Scotland’s economic backwardness’.33 It has, however, 
more recently been suggested by Philipp Rössner that the range of goods was not 
necessarily indicative of this, but rather that the demand for such items in Scotland was 
not large enough to warrant the risk and capital expenditure of setting up domestic 
manufactories.34 Perhaps, if anything, the range of goods Scotland imported, and the 
small amount she manufactured, is indicative of the understanding within Scotland of 
her realistic economic situation. Furthermore, although Scotland’s trade may have been 
proportionally small within Europe as a whole this did not mean that she did not 
participate effectively in overseas trade; while Scottish salt exports were only a tiny 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 1713, NAS RH15/59/7/3-4. These are the figures given in the account – although it seems that some 
mistake has been made in conversion. 
30 For example, John Clerk included in his accounts a bill for breakfast, between 1636 and 1641, NAS 
GD18/2377/4 
31Account books of John Clerk, 1646-1659, NAS GD18/2482 
32 25 June 1674 onwards, NLS ms.14646(i) f1 
33 T. C. Smout, ‘The Overseas Trade of Scotland with Particular Reference to the Baltic and Scandinavian 
Trades, 1660-1707’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1959) 54f 
34 P. Rössner, Scottish Trade in the Wake of Union (1700-1760) (Stuttgart, 2008) 139 
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fraction of European trade Scottish producers were quick to take advantage of market 
opportunities.35 
Misunderstanding over the range of commodities Scots traded in could also be 
due to the methods by which these goods were delivered back to Scotland. They often 
bypassed traditional channels of trade and have therefore not been recorded in official 
documentation; instead, such goods were sent back to Scotland in the care of trusted 
friends or family. John Clerk engaged William Paton as carrier on more than one 
occasion for goods sent to numerous individuals.36 The practice of commissioning 
goods from countrymen abroad was not uncommon. In 1638 John Johnstoun requested 
that Clerk send home ‘a watch or two for gentlewomen, of small value but small & 
handsome’, which were gifts for his wife and daughter.37 Such transactions were 
conducted through orders and accounts in the ‘traditional’ manner, though not recorded 
in the same statistical sources that have formed the basis of conventional economic 
histories. 
While such transactions fostered commercial exchange, they also expedited 
cultural exchange – although evidence for this is scarce as these exchanges seem to 
have been more usually conducted outwith formal accounts. John Hutcheson wrote in 
1669, while in France, of a game played there, stating that ‘this bilzard table is neither 
difficult neither dear to erect, the clybs may be mad by any wright, and the balls also, 
otherwise as yo[u]r w[i]sh desired I wold have sent of them home, & yet with this letter 
I could not for they are not posts cargo’.38 While on this occasion it was not a viable 
option, ‘post’s cargo’ suggests that individuals used general post to send goods home. 
Although the goods themselves were not sent as part of an official commercial 
transaction, they nevertheless contributed to Scotland’s social, economic and cultural 
development. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 I. Whyte, Scotland’s Society and Economy in Transition, c. 1500-c. 1760 (Hampshire, 1997) 144, 152-
5 
36 John Clerk to Lady Pittenweem, 15 April 1645, Paris, NAS GD18/2455, f13v. For other examples of 
Paton acting as a carrier to both Lady Pittenweem and others in Scotland, including Margaret Gray, see 
20 May 1645, f13r; 20 September 1645, f17r-17v; 3 November 1645f 17v. Clerk acted as banker for 
Paton: 26 July 1644, f2v; John Clerk to Robert Inglis, 20 October 1644, Edinburgh, f3v 
37 John Johnstoun to John Clerk, 27 [blank] 1638, NAS GD18/2387 
38 John Hutcheson [of Auchingray] to Sir George Maxwell, 14th of Nether Pollok, to be delivered to 
‘Bailiff Russell in Stirling’, 1 February 1669, GCA T-PM/113/795/1  
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II. ADAPTATION OF TRADING METHODS 
  ‘To be sauld quhair he happenis to mak mercat to my profit’.39 
 
Scholars have recognised the importance of certain locations for Franco-Scottish trade. 
It has been contended that commerce occurred in two distinct regions – the Northern 
region (Dieppe, Rouen), which drew on a hinterland of rich agriculture and advanced 
industrial technology, and the Biscay ports of La Rochelle and Bordeaux, which have 
been described as ‘synonymous’ to Scotsmen with salt and wine.40 Assertions over 
patterns of imports are, to some extent, supported by contemporary sources. The 
Dundee shipping lists for 1580-1618 show these patterns emerging. Cargoes from 
Bordeaux commonly contain commodities such as wine, woad and prunes,41 whereas 
cargoes from Dieppe contained ‘cradilles of glas’ and cork, as well as wine.42 Cargoes 
from La Rochelle and St Martin de Rhé invariably contained salt. It was recognised that 
Rouen, in particular, was a port at which cloth was traded: ‘the great vent of suche 
Cottons is at Roane in ffraunce…they have in the Countrie it self a kinde of Course 
cloth’.43 While a much wider range of commodities were exported from France’s 
Atlantic ports than has been previously considered, different ports did specialise in 
different commodities.  
That Scotland imported such a wide range of goods has led to her overseas trade 
being described as ‘not so much a policy as a complex ad hoc response by 
producers/traders to a changing market situation’, fuelling the assumption that trade 
with France was unregulated and opportunistic.44 Such assertions, however, have 
recently been qualified. In the seventeenth century international merchants thrived 
precisely because they did not specialise in a single commodity, as diversification 
minimised risk, and commodity-specific specialisation did not become the norm until 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 27 February 1591, CBDW, xxxv, 140 [my emphasis] 
40 Lythe and Butt, Economic History of Scotland, 62; A. Cummings, ‘Scotland’s links with Europe, 1600-
1800’ in History Today, XXXV (1985) 46; I. Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial Revolution: An 
Economic and Social History (London, 1995) 272 
41 These shipping lists have been transcribed as an accompaniment to the Compt Buik of David 
Wedderburne. 28 March 1614, CBDW, 242. This is merely one example – a thorough examination of this 
source demonstrates that nearly all cargoes coming from Bordeaux carried the same commodities, and 
were almost exclusively intended for numerous individuals in Scotland; the lists of individuals invariably 
not containing mention of the trading merchant himself, suggesting that skippers often operated on 
commission, travelling on behalf of a merchant situated in Scotland. This is a practice examined in further 
detail in Chapter 3. 
42 This particular example is from 4 February 1588, CBDW, 221  
43 c. 1582, TED, I, 206-7 
44 Pagan, Convention, 151; Guy, ‘The Scottish Export Trade’, 67 
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the eighteenth century.45 Indeed, it was this very ability to take advantage of diverse 
ranges of opportunities that led to success, particularly during periods of maritime 
conflict. In his Essays Upon Projects (1697), Daniel Defoe noted that 
 
ships are sent from port to port, as markets and merchandises differ…[exchange 
of information] and travel makes a true-bred merchant the most intelligent man 
in the world, and consequently the most capable, when urg’d by necessity, to 
continue new ways to live.46 
 
It has been recognised in the context of the seventeenth-century brandy trade between 
Nantes and Rotterdam that ‘official bans on trade diminished neither supply nor demand 
for import/export commodities – but forced merchants involved in coastal trade to 
create new routes, new destinations and new commercial connections’.47 Where there 
were obstacles to trade, merchants developed methods for dealing with this, for example 
when trade in certain commodities was affected – perhaps because of bad harvests – 
they generally switched commodities rather than ceasing trade altogether.48 
Furthermore, it was not uncommon for merchants to use different ports when one was 
closed to them, or when they could not acquire what they desired. In 1716 it was 
reported to the Earl of Mar by George Hamilton that ‘I have sent you 93 bottles of 
champagne which I bought at Montreuil, not finding a drop of any good at Calais’.49 
The ‘ad hoc response’ of Scottish merchants is evidenced in many account books from 
the period listing a diverse range of both commodities and destinations.50 Such 
willingness to adapt contributed to the extensive knowledge of Scottish merchants 
regarding a variety of markets and commodities, and merchants were willing to share 
this knowledge with those less experienced than themselves. In November 1717 James 
Ogilvy wrote from Angers to Alexander Irvine in Bordeaux, asking him to ‘let me know 
your opinion of the places you have passed through particularly La Rochelle, Bordeaux 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 H. de Bruyn Kops, A Spirited Exchange: the wine and brandy trade between France and the Dutch 
Republic in its Atlantic Framework, 1600-1650 (Leiden, 2007) 5, 96 
46 D. Defoe, Essays upon Projects (1697) cited in H. Roseveare, ‘Merchant Organization and Maritime 
Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660-1815: Some Reflections’ in O. Janzen (ed.), Merchant Organization 
and Maritime Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660-1815 (Newfoundland, 1998) 
47 de Bruyn Kops, A Spirited Exchange, 245 
48 J. Dow, ‘Scottish Trade with Sweden, 1580-1622’ in Scottish Historical Review, XLVIII (1969) 144 
49 George Hamilton to the Duke of Mar, 13 February 1716, Paris, SP, I, 504 
50 Memorandum book of John Charteris, Edinburgh, 1671-1688, NAS CS96/3937; account book of James 
Lawson, Anstruther, 1688-1696, NAS CS96/3263; William Russell and Company, Wigtown, 1700-1705, 
NAS CS96/1145-1150; Day and Memorandum Book of John Gordon and John Martin, Dumfries, 1707-
1712, NAS CS96/1324; letter-book of John Swinton, 1673-1677, NAS CS96/3264 
 71	  
and Montpellier & how you find the way of living there, because I intend to 
follow…when I go from this place’.51 
 Most merchants were proficient at last-minute adaptation and it was common for 
their commissions to offer several alternate commodities or ports, or for decisions to be 
left entirely to the skipper of the ship. A commission from the Dundee merchant David 
Wedderburne to Peter Man in 1591 noted ‘1 last hering to be sauld quhair he happenis 
to mak mercat to my profit’.52 From Archibald Hamilton’s letter-book, we can see that 
this Edinburgh merchant used the same practices. In a commission granted in August 
1663 he instructed a Burntisland skipper to go to either Ireland or Spain, allowing the 
skipper to assess himself which one would be the most lucrative, or to adjust his voyage 
should weather conditions necessitate it.53 This method demonstrates a high level of 
trust between the merchant at home and those he commissioned to travel abroad and 
trade on his behalf. 
That Scottish merchants were used to such practices was undoubtedly an asset as 
they continued to pursue trade to areas that were ostensibly closed to them throughout 
the changing political and economic conditions of the seventeenth century. They were 
also assisted by other nations, who were adept at certain tactics themselves. Dutch 
captains adopted ‘a series of cunning contrivances to cover their trade’, including the 
acquisition of a number of different false passes, so that if capture seemed imminent 
they could throw those that incriminated them overboard. ‘Flags of convenience’ were 
used – sailing under different flags depending on where you were trading – or neutral 
domicile claimed.54 During the Wars of the Three Kingdoms the Dutch declared 
themselves neutral – and thereafter their ports became safe havens for British ships, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 James Ogilvy to Alexander Irvine, 4 November 1717, Angers, NAS RH1/2/964. I would like to thank 
Professor Steve Murdoch (St Andrews) for providing me with a transcription of this document. 
52 27 February 1591, CBDW, xxxv, 140 [my emphasis]; see also August 1693, when Wedderburne sent 
power with Peter Imbrie under the same instructions: ‘to be sauld quhair he makis mercat to my 
profit…and gif he waris other in Rwen or Bordeaux schip my geir and mark it with my awin mark and 
send it hame in the first gude schip of our toun’: August 1593, CBDW, 79. See also 1603, W. McNeill, 
‘Papers of a Dundee Shipping Dispute, 1600-1604’ in Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, X 
(Edinburgh, 1965) 57-8 
53 4 August 1663, NLS Adv.mss.31.3.2, f 31r. See also James Carstairs to Alexander and Andrew 
Watson, 15 August 1668, London, SAUL, Watson Papers, ms38527/1/1/2, stating that the journey he had 
been commissioned to undertake would ‘intend for france and from thence to Holland, zelland ore 
brittan’ [my emphasis]. 
54 E. Graham, ‘The Scottish Marine during the Dutch wars’ in Scottish Historical Review, LXI (1982) 72; 
G. Rommelse, ‘English Privateering against the Dutch Republic during the Second Anglo-Dutch War 
(1664-7) in Tijdschrift voor overdruk zeegeschiedenis, XXII (2003) 23-4; for an account of a passport 
being forged see Hen. Thirkell to Lord Burghley, 2 May 1594, CSPD, III, 497 
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providing them with new papers.55 Scottish merchants both used and provided flags of 
convenience and it was suggested by the Privy Council in 1619 that the best ships of 
Scotland were continually employed in the service of Frenchmen. It has been argued 
that due to the ‘somewhat indeterminate diplomatic status of Scotland’, France and 
England both used Scottish ships to enter waters where their own nationals could not.56 
Furthermore, ‘the greater affability of the French towards the Scots’, has been seen to 
provide ‘an obvious explanation of the English willingness to employ them in Anglo-
French trade’, revealing an interesting perspective on Anglo-Scottish relations post-
1603.57 The practice of using foreign ships was not new, and during conflict merchants 
were able to draw on their experience of this practice to their advantage. In the 1660s 
both the Edinburgh merchant Henry Wilkie and the London merchant Thomas Culter 
used a Swedish ship, the St John of Congolfe, to pursue trade between Scotland and 
France.58 This ship seems to have been used as a carrying ship, commissioned for use 
on voyages presumably to ports in which the merchant who had hired her had prior 
experience and connections. The practice of hiring foreign ships was prevalent 
throughout Europe in the seventeenth century.59 In 1676 the Frenchman Etienne 
Jousselin transported ‘vins, sucres et eaux de vie’ in the Signe de Foi, ‘navire anglais’ to 
St Valéry,60 and in the same year Drick Boendermaker transported ‘l’eau de vie et des 
graine de lin’ in two ships, the Providence of Aberdeen and the Jacques of London, to 
Rotterdam.61 
On occasion, attempts to deceive authorities were noted and the miscreants 
punished.62 Often, however, authorities did not identify contraband activity, or else 
chose to turn a blind eye to it. A paper submitted to the Treasury in 1702 concerned 
French wine being brought over from St Sebastian: 
 
It was taken there from Bordeaux, a Spanish name given to it, and reshipped in 
Spanish casks. Sufficient number of hogskins were kept in every cellar, and 
mules were also kept that it might be supposed the wines were brought from 
Navarre on mules’ backs in hogskins. Mr Manly and Mr Cooke, who were sent 
over to inspect the trade were blinded with this device, for in the night the gates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 de Bruyn Kops, Spirited Exchange, 55 
56 A. Smith (ed.), The Reign of James VI and I (London/New York, 1973) 73 
57 S. Lythe, The Economy of Scotland in its European Setting, 1550-1625 (Edinburgh/London, 1960) 230 
58 n.d. (1660-1670), 10 April 1667, SRA Anglica VII, 542 (unfoliated) 
59 2 May 1690, ADG 6 B 193 
60 19 March 1676, ADCM B5675, 31 
61 14 March 1676, ADCM B5675, 24-5 
62 6 November 1586, Richmond, APCE, XIV, 248-9; see also Bernardino de Mendoza to Martin de 
Idiaquez, 8 May 1588, CLPS, XVII, 280; 1593, TED, II, 82-3 
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were opened, and what was brought unto the town by day was sent out in the 
night to be ready to come in again the next day, and this method was used whilst 
they stayed.63 
 
In January 1703 it was recognised that there was a ‘clandestine trade carried on from 
Bourdeaux and other parts of France by way of St Sebastian and other ports of Spain, 
whereby great quantities of French wine were imported, paying only the Spanish duty’. 
This report noted that ‘this management seemed to be carried on in concert between the 
consuls in foreign parts and some officers in the Customs…who for private gratuities 
undertook for and passed such wines as were of the growth of Spain’.64 A House of 
Lords enquiry in 1704 reported 15 ships, mostly from the West Country, Scotland and 
Ireland, in Bordeaux loading brandies and wines – there was a suggestion that the 
government discouraged informers, and was inclined to hush the matter up rather than 
pursue the offenders.65 
 
III. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES 
‘If the French Wines and the Port Wines were all at a Price.’66 
 
Given the experience of commercial agents in adapting their itineraries it stands to 
reason that if trade with France had been affected by political upheaval, Scottish 
merchants would have tried to access the commodities they imported from France from 
elsewhere.67 It was noted by the deputies of the French Council of Trade in 1700 that 
French ports were being by-passed and wines bought in Spain and Portugal, and Louis 
XIV was heavily criticised for taxing wine and brandy exports excessively, decreasing 
foreign sales.68 Debate concerning French and Portuguese goods was rife in Britain in 
the early eighteenth century.69 The London newspaper the Mercator claimed in 1713 
that ‘to take these People then at their own Words…They had rather drink Port Wine, if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Robert Leslie to John Taylor, Esq., [?1702], CTP, III, 90. This practice continued: see 17 April 1706, 
ADG C 4260 
64 23 January 1702/3, CTP, III, 105-6 
65 A. Francis, The Wine Trade (London, 1972) 125 
66 18-20 February 1713, Mercator, issue 117 
67 W. Scoville, ‘The French Economy in 1700-1701: an Appraisal by the Deputies of Trade’ in Journal of 
Economic History, XXII (1962) 233 
68 Ibid, 233, 238 
69 For example, see 30 January 1713-2 February 1713, Mercator, issue 109; 9-11 March 1713, Mercator, 
issue 125 
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the French Wines and the Port Wines were all at a Price’.70 In typically satirical vein, 
the editors of the Tatler had reported much the same fashion three years earlier: ‘He 
went on, Do you love French Wine? I believe you may; I did once my self: But let me 
tell you, that White Port is not only the cheapest, but the best Wine now about Town’.71 
Such examples may speak more to taste than practicality (or outward antagonism 
towards all things French), but they certainly emphasise that alternative avenues of trade 
were available.  
Throughout the seventeenth century Scottish merchants traded in both French 
and Spanish wine, and it has been suggested that in 1620s Scotland Spanish wines were 
equal in popularity with French.72 The activities of several members of the merchant 
Marjoribanks family trading in Edinburgh and Leith later in the century – John, 
Edward, James and Joseph – corroborate this. John is particularly prolific in the port 
entry books, and purchased quantities of both French and Spanish wine from Bordeaux 
and Cadiz, from various merchants, between 1680 and 1690; in two consecutive days in 
April 1681 he purchased wine from three different merchants’ cargoes.73 He had 
perhaps given prior commissions to several merchants; certainly it was not uncommon 
for merchants to commission or freight two or more different ships to different 
destinations if the size of their enterprise would allow it. Two receipts were drawn up 
by Henry Shelle, merchant in Leith and owner of the Mary of Leith and the Alexander 
of Borrowstoness, both dated 4 March 1654, to Henry Hope and Walter Younge, 
merchants in Edinburgh, for the freight of these two barks for voyages to Norway and 
Rouen and back respectively.74 In adopting this policy merchants spread their interests, 
insuring themselves against loss. This practice of ‘risk distribution’ as a means of 
insurance was a common one before official insurance came to the fore,75 and one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 18-20 February 1713, Mercator, issue 117 
71 10-13 March 1710, The Tatler, issue 301 
72 Francis, Wine Trade, 47 
73 Accounts of collectors of H.M. Customs and Foreign Excise, November 1690-November 1691, NAS 
E73/109/11/9/4; Leith: Entry books (wine), 1 November 1680-1 August 1681, NAS E72/15/22; 1 
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NAS E72/15/33. Numerous other examples can be found within these records. 
74 Henry Shelle to Henry Hope and Walter Younge, 4 March 1653/4, NAS RH9/17/32 
75 A. Forte, ‘Marine Insurance and Risk Distribution in Scotland before 1800’ in Law and History 
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adopted by Daniel Masson, a Scottish merchant based in St Martins and La Rochelle 
towards the end of the seventeenth century.76 
Despite the fact that Scots did import Spanish wine in some quantity, French 
wine seemed to have remained the more popular in the later seventeenth century. As 
demonstrated by Figure 2.1, in the twelve months from November 1669 re-exports of 
French wines to England vastly outnumbered those of Spanish, suggesting that the total 
amount of French wine imported into Scotland was also superior.77 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1    Re-exports of wine, Scotland to England, November 1669-November 1670 
 
Indeed, the customs records for wine imports into Leith demonstrate the continuing 
popularity of French as opposed to Spanish wines:78 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 24 November 1689, ADCM B5678, 124-5; 25 November 1690, ADCM B5686, 91; 5 January, 28 
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77 Data taken from ‘Accompt of Wines Exported overland to England’, November 1669-November 1670, 
NAS E73/23. For conversion rates used see Appendix II.i. 
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Figure 2.2 French and Spanish wine imported into Leith, 1672-1689 
 
While some merchants seem to have taken advantage of alternative routes – particularly 
following the outbreak of the Nine Years’ War in 1688 – French wine, on the whole, 
remained favoured. One undated but certainly contemporary epigram suggests that this 
was also the case with Portuguese wine: 
 
Firm and erect the Caledonian stood, 
Prime was his mutton and his claret good, 
Let him drink Port! the wily Saxon cried, 
He drank the poison, and his spirit died.79 
 
In the case of some commodities, the reasons for continuing to pursue trade with a 
particular port are apparent – as examined in detail in Chapter 1, particular types of 
French salt were needed for the curing of certain fish. In the case of French and Spanish 
wine, taste was undoubtedly one factor that persuaded merchants to favour one 
destination over another. However, there were also financial motivations – as the same 
entry books for wine for Leith in the 1680s show, the customs on imports of French 
wine were lower than that of Spanish. Data is available for the years 1680-81, 1683-84 
and 1684-85 and in these years (once the conversion from Spanish to French 
measurements has been made – see Appendix II.i) excise on French wine was £36 per 
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tun, and on Spanish was £54 per tun.80 As we will see in more detail in Part II, while 
Franco-Scottish trade demonstrably continued throughout the seventeenth century 
aspects of it were affected by political events, trade embargoes and diplomatic actions. 
As evidence regarding wine imports begins to demonstrate, however, this did not seem 
to deter merchants from pursuing their preferred trading routes or the ones that would 
bring them the most profit, despite alternatives being available to them. 
 
IV. ROLES OF COMMERCIAL AGENTS 
 ‘A diversity of interests and talent’.81 
 
Merchant classes in the seventeenth century have been seen as embracing ‘a diversity of 
interests and talent’, and this talent is evidenced in both the methods of trading 
described above and in the determination of merchants to continue their trade in the face 
of adversity. However, there were many ways in which one could be said to be 
‘involved’ in international trade.82 There were those who acted as merchants, bankers or 
factors, those who traded alone and those who traded as part of a company, those who 
manufactured or retailed, those who settled in one place and those who were transient, 
being reliant on opportunity rather than knowledge or precedent. Several prominent 
Scots abroad acted as bankers and several of these became Jacobite financiers at the 
turn of the eighteenth century, including Robert Gordon, William Gordon and Robert 
Arbuthnot.83 Many individuals acted in multiple roles; some Bordeaux wine merchants 
also acted as agents for merchants who sold regional wines in foreign markets.84 These 
individuals were commissionaires – brokers who bought wine at the request of a distant 
correspondent.85 While they occasionally bought wine as investments for themselves, 	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French or 30lib per butt/60lib per tun Spanish. These years run from November – November. 
81 G. Howat, Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy (London, 1974) 5-6 
82 Ibid. 
83 S. Talbott, ‘Jacobites, Anti-Jacobites and the Ambivalent: Scottish Identities in France, 1680-1720’ in 
B. Sellin, P. Carboni et A. Thiec (eds.), Écosse : l'identité nationale en question (CRINI, 2009) 81-2; 6 
October 1717, William Dicconson reported that he borrowed 15000 livres from William Gordon, SP, V, 
593-6; Charles Carnegy to Lord Panmure, 28 October 1716, describes Gordon as ‘a Jacobite banker’, 
NAS GD45/14/219/5/1; DNB, II, 325-9; SP, II, 30, Arbuthnot to Mar, 19 March 1716; C. Nordmann, 
‘Les Jacobites Ecossais en France au XVIIIe Siècle’ in M. Plaisant (ed.), Regards sur l’Ecosse au XVIIIe 
Siècle (Lille, 1977) 83; Murdoch, ‘French Connection’, 40 
84 T. Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne: the wine trade in early modern France (Baltimore/London, 
1997) 43 
85 For a near contemporary explanation of the role of commissionaires see J. Savary, Le Parfait 
Négociant, 2 volumes (Paris, 1777) II, 213, 312-315 
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and were identified equally as merchants and négociants, most of their commercial 
activity was by commission.86 
It has been argued that by the late seventeenth century Scottish merchants 
preferred to trade with the aid of a Scottish factor overseas who would have been an 
expert on business, languages and foreign markets and who, of course, charged a 
commission for his services (usually 2.5%).87 It has also been argued, however, that the 
use of factors actually restricted the horizons of overseas trade, as merchants would 
have been wary of trading to ports where there were no Scottish factors present.88 
Furthermore, factors throughout Europe often abused their position and there were 
several attempts made by Scottish institutions to regulate their income and behaviour.89 
Despite specific attempts by the Convention of Royal Burghs to address this problem in 
1599, complaints regarding the conduct of factors were made into the 1620s.90 By 1634 
the Council of Aberdeen had stipulated that 
 
as for the factors in France ye sall condescend that nane sall be employit be any 
merchand quhatsumever, bot as salbe authorized be the burrowes And ye sall 
nominat Mr Gilbert Paip to be a factor wha will set sufficient cautioun to obey 
the injunctiounes.91 
 
 The many different guises in which commercial agents became involved in 
business dealings facilitated contact and dissemination of information – letters to and 
from the continent were often sent in merchant ships via, for example, ‘the ordinary 
merchant-post which starts from Rouen’.92 Individuals with no direct interest in 
commerce made use of merchants to transfer goods. In 1699 Sir James Dick used 
Alexander Stevensone, a banker in Paris, and Alexander Campbell, a merchant in 
Edinburgh, to expedite the passage of goods. Stevensone sent ‘3 bills of loading wi one 
for Sr James Dick being his sons books cloathes &…passing att the custome heer with 
port to Rouen and shipping abroad there coast 2 new crowns abt £7 Scots’ to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne, 43 
87 Smout, Scottish Trade, 96-7; de Bruyn Kops, Spirited Exchange, 44, 60 
88 Smout, Scottish Trade, 97-8 
89 5 July 1599, CRB, II, 50 
90 Instructions to Alexander Jaffray, Baillie of Aberdeen, July 1624, ACL, I, 232 regards complaints made 
against the factors in Campheir; a missive letter for the Convention of Royal Burghs from the Council of 
Aberdeen was ‘to send overtured for preventing factors’ abuses in France’, 7 July 1629, ACL, I, 299 
91 Instructions to Alexander Jaffray, Baillie, commissioner of Aberdeen, July 1634, ACL, II, 16. Gilbert 
Pape was a prominent Scottish merchant in France during this period (Chapter 3). 
92 Bernardino de Mendoza to the King, 9 June 1586, CLPS, XVI, 583; same to same, 10 September 1586, 
623; [Henry Gilbert to Robert Balfour], 4 November 1592, CSP, XI, 8 
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Campbell.93 Governments also did not hesitate to exploit the connections of merchants 
and bankers abroad. In 1713 John Gordon, a factor in Rotterdam, was  
 
ordered to send for the use of the town [Banff] as much weights as will weight 
two bolls of meal weighing 16 stone weight, Amsterdame weight, which doth 
agree with our old Scots weight, to consist of two four-stone weights, four two-
stone weights, one stone weight and two half-stone weights. 
 
John stated on 19 December that the weights had been sent, and billed the burgh court 
of Banff for £5 19 9 sterling.94 Merchants were also commissioned to provide or carry 
arms, munitions or victual, or to serve in the Navy during conflict.95 Charles Chalmot, a 
French merchant in La Rochelle, received payment of 1,318 livres tournois, 37 sous 
from Henry Balfour, colonel of the Scots Regiment in the service of the Prince of 
Orange for firearms, mines and other equipment.96 While acting as couriers for the 
government may be assumed to have been an inconvenience, the merchants involved 
were usually compensated. In 1593 John Gibson submitted an account ‘for the charge 
for purchase and transport of 20 horses to Brittany, and for impressing, victualling, and 
transporting 22 men: total £247 15s’.97 Merchants were able to take advantage of being 
under commissions for the government as ‘shippes or boats serving the Countrey, or the 
Prince, have great prerogatives. For first they go free from all Imposts, Customs, and 
Arrestments, not only in forth-going but also in their return’.98 Merchants who acted as 
couriers for the government had the opportunity to carry cargo on their return journeys 
custom-free, perhaps avoiding the expense of travelling one-way in ballast, or collecting 
a cargo which they might not otherwise have pursued.99 
Merchant ships also facilitated the movement of people. The accounts of the 
David, examined above, included wages paid to men working on the ship. This in itself 
is not unusual, but it seems that many of these men travelled only one way, as this 
account lists wages for ‘Jo Morton Gunner for coming from Dublin to Kircaldy, Jo 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Alexander Stevensone to Alexander Campbell, Paris, 28 January 1699, NAS RH15/14/76 
94 3 October 1713, AB, I, 184 
95 ‘An Ordinance to enable to Lord high Admiral to press Mariners, Saylers, and others for the service of 
the Navy’, 21 February 1644/5, AO, 646-7 
96 Discharge by Sieur Charles Chalmot to Sieur Henry Ballfour [Balfour], La Rochelle, 15 November 
1576, NAS GD63/42; the commissions were dated 15 November, 22 December and 29 December 1570 
and 30 January 1571  
97 February 1593, CSPD, III, 323 
98 W. Welwood, An Abridgement of all sea-lawes (London, 1613) 48-9 
99 For an example of this practice see John Dougall to John Clerk, 14 May 1642, Dieppe, NAS 
GD18/2416, which is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Blyth Book for coming from Dublin, Andrew Aken For coming to Kircaldy, Jo Lamb 
for coming from Dub: to Kircady, Jo Michell for coming from Do. to Kircaldy’ – 
indeed, only three men listed for wages appear to have completed the whole voyage.100 
Merchant ships, as well as facilitating the exchange of commodities, munitions, victual 
and providing a postal and courier service, seem also to have acted as transport for those 
willing to work on the ship to pay for their voyage. Furthermore, some individuals who 
could afford to pay their way, rather than work, used merchant ships as transport. In 
1674 William and Madame Lockhart planned to travel together to Dieppe on a merchant 
ship, presumably paying a fee to the skipper.101 
In their capacities as bankers and financiers, merchants contributed to the war 
effort in other ways, doing business with those who were on the continent in military 
capacities. In May 1627, John Seaton of the King of France’s guard acknowledged 
receipt of money from Andrew Bethune, a merchant in Paris.102 In 1643 William 
Douglas, a captain in James Douglas’s regiment, borrowed 670 francs from Robert 
Murray, also a merchant in Paris.103 During the Interregnum the French ambassadors 
used merchant bankers – in 1647 Montereul reported to Cardinal Mazarin that ‘j’ay 
offert au Chevr Moray de luy toucher presentement quatre mille ecus, que le Sr du 
Talmond, marchand, m’a tenir prêts’.104 All of these examples suggest that individuals 
who operated in different spheres should not be viewed as entirely separate from one 
another.105 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 1713, NAS RH15/59/5/7/A/7 
101 William Lockhart to Madame Lockhart, 25 July 1674, NAS GD406/1/11395 
102 5 May 1627, NAS GD7/2/33; see also Discharge, Patrick Seaton (Scots Guard in France) to James 
Lord Ogilvy of 100 crowns, owed to Mr Julian Quantine (merchant in Paris), 4 June 1588, NAS 
GD16/42/29. It is not known if these two individuals were related. 
103 1 April 1643, re-payment of debt acknowledged by James Murray, 22 March 1644, NAS GD29/1309. 
There is scope for a wider study on the contacts between expatriate Scots in different spheres. It has 
recently been recognised that there was interaction between Scottish merchants and their countrymen in 
military service, education and churches – although the ‘nature of the interaction remains unclear’. D. 
Dickson, ‘Introduction’ to D. Dickson, J. Parmentier and J. Ohlmeyer (eds.), Irish and Scottish 
Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Gent, 2007) 3 
104 Montereul to Cardinal Mazarin, 23 March/2 April 1647, Edinburgh, DC, II, 66-70 
105 This is a conclusion also reached by Kathrin Zickermann in her recent work on Scottish communities 
in northwest Germany: K. Zickermann, ‘Across the German Sea: Scottish Commodity Exchange, 
Network Building and Communities in the Wider Elbe-Weser Region in the Early Modern Period’ 
(unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of St Andrews, 2009) 177, 181-2 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
In utilising only official records such as port books, scholars have continued to assume 
that ‘traditional’ commodities – wine, salt and fish – fully constituted Franco-Scottish 
trade. In fact, deeper examination of official records such as books of rates and an 
examination of private records reveals a much wider range of commodities involved in 
this commercial exchange than has often been recognised. While the diversity of goods 
imported and the number of destinations utilised by these merchants has historically 
been seen as negative, in fact such willingness and ability to adapt served two purposes 
– first, it highlights the amount of trust placed in merchants and/or skippers, in allowing 
them to trade with destinations and in commodities that they believed would make a 
profit, rather than having them follow strict itineraries. Secondly, we now begin to see 
why Franco-Scottish trading links did not break down during times of political crisis, as 
will be demonstrated at length in Part II. Moreover, the roles played by commercial 
agents in France in this period add to our understanding of their flexibility. Merchants 
often acted as bankers or factors – sometimes progressing to these roles over time. Their 
contribution to society, for example in effecting an international postal service and 
serving during periods of war, perhaps goes some way to explaining why authorities did 
not clamp down as hard as they might have done on illegal trade – it often suited the 
authorities to keep trade links open to facilitate the transfer of information, men, arms 
and munitions, and to protect the domestic economy. 
Previous research has begun to counter the argument that all who lived or 
worked in France in this period must have held religious or political beliefs – including 
those tied to political institutions such as the Stuart exile court. Instead, many looked to 
improve their own position, regardless of the political issues that surrounded them.106 
Merchants were no different, often not adhering to the religious or political policies of 
the area in which they worked or the people they worked with, and not taking heed of 
political obstacles or governmental decrees which interrupted their trade. In order to 
effect their personal aggrandisement, merchants, while often working for themselves, 
did not work in isolation. Indeed, it has been argued that the ports that were popular 
with foreign merchants were not so due to the commodities which could be sourced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Talbott, ‘Jacobites, Anti-Jacobites and the Ambivalent’, 73-88 
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there, but due to a high concentration of brokers.107 Merchants often operated as part of 
commercial networks and communities, relying on others as much as on themselves. In 
order to understand these trading links fully, it is essential to understand these networks; 
to examine the people with whom these merchants did business, both home and abroad, 
and the ways in which they assimilated into their host communities in France. These 
issues, along with consideration of the effect that merchants’ behaviour had on the 
economy of their native country, particularly when it is considered that their primary 
motives were largely personal, are examined in the following chapter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne, 101 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
‘His individual interest and that of the nation are opposed’:1 
Merchants and Commercial Networks 
 
The way in which trade links have traditionally been examined has greatly affected 
conclusions drawn regarding them, with the changing nature of commercial 
relationships in the long seventeenth century not always being taken into account. It has 
been argued that as the domestic economy of France engaged increasingly in long-
distance trade in the seventeenth century (as opposed to the domestic and short-distance 
European trade that characterised earlier periods), two contrasting market systems 
emerged – a public one and a private one, each obeying different rules, with the 
‘asymmetrics of knowledge and power’ in long-distance trade ‘violat[ing] popular 
assumptions about the way that markets were supposed to work’.2 These developments 
meant that the intermediaries – factors, bankers, and merchants themselves – began to 
play a crucial role in making the market economy function.3 Yet despite this realisation 
being made at the beginning of the twentieth century, historiographically it is only 
recently that the role of these individuals has been seen as crucial to such studies. This 
chapter will support the argument that 
 
once one leaves behind the antiseptic realm of theoretical economic models, and 
enters into an historical world of flesh and blood, merchants appear not as 
faceless facilitators, but as a social reality, an interest group, or even a class. 
Merchants thus do not appear as abstract individuals but as concrete collectives, 
indeed as merchant communities.4 
 
Considering these merchants as ‘flesh and blood’, rather than as part of economic 
models, is essential to understanding the motives governing their actions and the 
methods they employed, and therefore to understanding Franco-Scottish trade (or, 
indeed, any commercial links) in this period.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Meek (ed. and trans.): Quesney, l’analyse, 164-5, cited in T. Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne: the 
wine trade in early modern France (Baltimore/London, 1997) xv 
2 Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne, xiv 
3 R. Westerfield, ‘Middlemen in English Business: particularly between 1660-1760’ in Transactions of 
the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, XIX (New Haven, 1915) particularly Chapter VII, 329-
428 
4 S. Subrahmanyam, ‘Introduction’ to S. Subrahmanyam (ed.), Merchant Networks in the Early Modern 
World (Aldershot, 1996) iii-xiv 
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As examined in the previous chapter, commercial agents adapted their trading 
methods to allow them to pursue commerce during times of adversity. In understanding 
the networks within which these agents operated, we can further illuminate the methods 
used by them to trade, and examine the effect that such activity might have had on both 
their native and host countries. Any examination of such individuals is necessarily 
dependent on surviving evidence pertaining to them, and we are especially fortunate 
that the letter-books, account books and vast correspondence relating to one of the most 
successful Scottish merchants in France in this period – John Clerk of Penicuik – 
survive, allowing us to piece together in some detail the networks this entrepreneur 
fostered.5 Although the methods and networking undertaken by Clerk cannot be seen as 
indicative of the behaviour of all Scottish merchants in France in this period, he does 
provide us with a viable case study from which to begin our analysis. Contrast between 
his network and the networks of other, equally active Scottish merchants in France (and 
the links between them) allow us to form a more comprehensive picture regarding the 
nature of Franco-Scottish trade in this period, illuminating how commerce was 
fundamentally effected. 
 
I. THE COMMERCIAL NETWORKS OF JOHN CLERK OF PENICUIK 
‘A merchant sitting at home in his counting-house 
at once converses with all parts of the known world’.6 
 
John Clerk first appeared in Paris as the apprentice of John Smith, a merchant burgess 
of Edinburgh, in 1634 and remained in France until 1646, at which time he returned to 
Scotland and to his newly purchased barony of Penicuik, just south of Edinburgh.7 
Although his residency in Paris was temporary his continental commercial networks 
were extensive, continuing long after he returned home and spreading not only back to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 NAS collection GD18; NLS Adv.ms.35.1.10; NLS Adv.mss.23.3.26 
6 D. Defoe, Essay upon Projects (1697) cited in H. Roseveare, ‘Merchant Organization and Maritime 
Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660-1815: Some Reflections’ in O. Janzen (ed.), Merchant Organization 
and Maritime Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660-1815 (Newfoundland, 1998) 259 
7 Contract, John Smith and John Clerk, 16 August 1634, Edinburgh, NAS GD18/2359. The date on which 
Clerk left France to return to Scotland permanently has not yet been conclusively determined. However, it 
seems that it was during the autumn of 1646: in August he is still styling himself ‘John Clerk, marchant 
[sic] in Paris’, whereas in September this changes to ‘merchant in Edinburgh’. John Clerk to William 
Gray of Pittendrum, 16 August 1646, NAS GD18/2381/7; Account, same to same, September 1646, NAS 
GD18/2381/5 
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Scotland but also throughout France and across Europe.8 Reliable correspondents were 
vital to the success of commercial networks that spanned large geographical areas, and 
all involved were dependent to some extent on others to inform them of business 
opportunities and facilitate contacts.9 Indeed, Daniel Defoe noted in 1697 ‘the help of 
strange and universal intelligence; wherein some are so exquisite, so swift, and so exact, 
that a merchant sitting at home in his counting-house, at once converses with all parts of 
the known world’.10 James Mowat, a Scottish tailor and merchant in Paris, had a close 
business relationship with Clerk, dealing with him on many occasions. After Clerk had 
returned to Scotland, Mowat informed him that he was sending papers home with a Mr 
Thomson, who was ‘shortly for Scotland’.11 Throughout the 1640s Clerk dealt directly 
with Thomas Thomson, while Thomson was residing in Rouen,12 and Thomson helped 
Clerk to facilitate other lucrative contacts, for example in acting as a banker for Clerk in 
his transactions with the Earl of Lothian.13 Michel Mel, another prominent contact of 
Clerk’s based in Dieppe, was also part of Clerk’s business dealings with Lothian and on 
several occasions he was entrusted with facilitating the movement of goods. Included in 
an account between Mel and Clerk from 1652 is ‘a memore off 2 tronks off my lord 
lothians and 1 off my own which ar in Michel Mels hand marchand in Dieppe’ and in 
October 1655 Clerk received ‘1 letter fra Michel Mel in Dieppe…with ane accompt of 
18:15:6d off charges he layd out for 2 tronks off my lord lothians containing Books’.14 
Mel participated in other commercial transactions, and in the same 1652 account Clerk 
notes ‘inclosit is ane order fra Michel mel adrest to John Moyant marchant in Rouen to 
delyver up to me the above wreatten Thrie coffers’.15 
 Like communities elsewhere, the Scottish merchant community in France 
operated through networks that fostered kith and kin relations and within which 
connections were passed down through generations of families. It was the longevity of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Clerk maintained contacts in Italy, London, Rotterdam, Veere, Middleburgh, throughout France and 
Scotland, as will be seen further throughout this chapter. John Clerk to Robert Inglis, London, 8 February 
1645, John Clerk to John Dougall Younger, 9 March 1645, Dieppe; John Clerk to Lady Pittendrum, 20 
September 1645; John Clerk to Lady Pittendrum, 3 November 1645; John Clerk to Janet Gray, 3 
November 1645, NAS GD18/2455, f7v, 11v, 17r-v;  
9 Roseveare, ‘Merchant Organization’, 263 
10 Defoe, Essay upon Projects (1697) cited in Roseveare, ‘Merchant Organization’, 259 
11 James Mowat to John Clerk, 22 January 1650, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/6 
12 Accounts, John Clerk and Thomas Thomson, 1641-1645, NAS GD18/2414 
13 Accounts, Thomas Thomson (Rouen), John Clerk (Paris) and the Earl of Lothian (Edinburgh), 1643-
1644, NAS GD18/2439 
14 Account, Michel Mel and John Clerk, 1 September 1652, NAS GD18/2371; Michel Mel to John Clerk, 
30 October 1655, Dieppe, NAS GD18/2542 
15 Account, Michel Mel and John Clerk, 1 September 1652, NAS GD18/2371 
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these contacts that propagated commercial links throughout the turmoil of the long 
seventeenth century,16 as is demonstrated in Part II. Robert Galbraith, an Edinburgh 
merchant in Bordeaux, had contact with Edward and James Macmath in the 1590s.17 
The Macmath family continued to be prevalent throughout the seventeenth century. In 
1612 Alexander ‘McMath’, merchant burgess of Edinburgh, complained to the Privy 
Council that James Dundas owed him ‘the sowme of twenty sex schillingis aucht 
pennyis money of this realme for everie liver of the sowme of four hundredth liveris 
Frensche money current in Burdeaux’.18 The Macmaths later dealt with John Clerk, and 
there survive from between 1635 and 1637 25 letters written by Hector Macmath from 
Dieppe, Rouen and ‘St Jermains’ to Clerk in Paris. During this period, Hector Macmath 
also had connections with Thomas Thomson, bringing a case against him before the 
Admiralty of Rouen in 1635.19 David Macmath acted as a witness for the closing of an 
account between Clerk and Michel Mel in September 1652.20 John Clerk introduced his 
sons to his trade and they, the eldest John and the youngest James, were active on the 
continent after Clerk’s death in 1674, having benefited from the advice and assistance 
of their father. In 1676, the two Clerk brothers can be found corresponding regarding 
the purchase of household furniture. James, located in France, wrote to his brother in 
London that ‘ther is a place the Rag mercatt in Rotterdam or Amsterdam wher you will 
buy all sort of houshold furnitur very cheap’, demonstrating the range of commodities 
involved but also the wide range of knowledge of European markets and the 
geographical spread of these networks.21 James was also involved in the importation of 
bound books, acting as the correspondent of George Veitch when this Edinburgh 
merchant appealed to the Council for permission to import this commodity in 1686 
(Chapter 1).22 As previously discussed in the context of freighting ships, many 
merchants chose to spread their commercial interests across many different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For more on this phenomenon in general see S. Murdoch, Network North: Scottish kin, commercial and 
covert association in Northern Europe, 1603-1746 (Leiden, 2006) particularly Chapter 1, 13-48 
17 Discharge, Edward and James MacMath to Robert Galbraith, 21 July 1596, NAS JC62/1 
(unnumbered); James MacMath and David Ritchesone to Robert Galbraith, Bloye, 24 March 1596, NAS 
JC62/1/79 
18 23 July 1612, Edinburgh, RPCS, IV, 417 
19 1635, ADSM 204 BP 4 
20 1 September 1652, NAS GD18/2371 
21 James Clerk to John Clerk younger, 6 July 1676, France, NAS GD18/5177/2 
22 2 December 1686, RPCS, iii, XIII, 7-8. A John Clerk appears in 1676 in the letter book of John 
Swinton, mentioned above, and although it cannot be ascertained whether this is the same John Clerk 
who is the son of our protagonist Clerk, it is possible that this demonstrates further threads of this 
network interlinking and continuing through generations. John Swinton to Walter Benthall, London, 21 
September 1676, stating ‘my last was per John Clairk’, NAS CS96/3264 
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commodities and locations, rather than confining themselves to a single market. The 
Jolly family operated primarily in northwest Germany, but maintained commercial 
interests in Scandinavia, Spain and France. In 1682, Alexander Jolly was chartered by 
the Hamburg merchant Otto Danke to freight goods to Cadiz, Alicante or Marseilles, 
and the following year Jolly again sailed to Marseilles, although he was shipwrecked en 
route.23 The Jolly family maintained commercial interests in La Rochelle during the 
Nine Years’ War, as is noted in Chapter 6. Furthermore, Robert and John Jolly appear 
in the records of the Bordeaux Parlement in 1620, providing evidence in defence of a 
case brought against the Edinburgh merchant John Ur, demonstrating that this family 
was present on the continent throughout the century.24 
 Links between merchant families, passed down by relatives, was a 
comparatively common phenomenon – and perhaps this is not surprising when it is 
considered that networks were often based on trust, recommendations and personal 
relationships.25 What remains impressive is the longevity of these contacts, further 
countering the notion that Scotland’s trade with France – and, in particular, the methods 
used to precipitate it – represented a disorganised and opportunistic trade.26 
 
II. NETWORK HIERARCHY 
‘My merchant wold not weill acept me nor answer me’.27 
 
Commercial networks comprised individuals in many different capacities, but they 
nevertheless remained largely non-hierarchical with every individual involved in them 
important if the network was to be successful.28 Limitations of surviving evidence leads 
us to certain assumptions, particularly regarding the relative importance of individuals 
within these networks and who was at the ‘centre’ of them. The vast amount of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 K. Zickermann, ‘Across the German Sea: Scottish Commodity Exchange, Network Building and 
Communities in the Wider Elbe-Weser Region in the Early Modern Period’ (unpublished Ph.D thesis, 
University of St Andrews, 2009) 86 
24 Alexander Seaton, Chancellor of Scotland, to the Court of the Parlement of Bordeaux, 1620, NAS 
RH9/5/6 
25 For more on this see Murdoch, Network North, Chapters 1 (13-48) and 2 (49-83); D. Horsbroch, ‘Wish 
you were here? Scottish Reactions to ‘Postcards’ home from the ‘Germane Warres’’ in S. Murdoch (ed.), 
Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War (Leiden, 2001) 247-8, 252-3 
26 As argued in T. Pagan, The Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland (Glasgow, 1926) 151 
27 Thomas [Dinmuir] to Andrew Russell, 7 May 1677, Nantes, NAS RH15/106/268/11 
28 For recent arguments regarding the non-hierarchical nature of Scottish trading networks, see D. 
Dickson, ‘Introduction’, 2; D. Hancock, ‘Combining Success and Failure: Scottish Networks in the 
Atlantic Wine Trade’ both in D. Dickson, J. Parmentier and J. Ohlmeyer (eds.), Irish and Scottish 
Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Gent, 2007) 
14, 20 
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evidence surviving that relates to John Clerk, for example, suggests that he was at the 
centre of this particular network; and certainly leads us to assume that he founded it and 
cultivated the ties within it. Yet Scottish networks within France were present long 
before Clerk began his continental career, and the network that became ‘Clerk’s’ was 
not established or entirely cultivated by Clerk himself. As Kathrin Zickermann has 
recently stated, every individual formed the centre of their very own network, but 
participated in multiple networks of those connected to them.29 At the end of the 
sixteenth century Robert Galbraith was already trading with Henry Hope, James Hope 
and Jean Mel;30 this older generation of Hopes and Mels engaged in commercial activity 
with each other before Clerk pursued his own links with either of these families.31 
Throughout the seventeenth century the Mels operated as a merchant family, and an act 
of the Parlement of Rouen in 1617 shows Jacques Mel, ‘bourgeois marchand demourant 
à Dieppe,’ interacting with ‘Jehan le Tourneur, bourgeois marchand demourant à 
Rouen’.32 Much later in the century the Mels continued to pursue commercial links 
independent of any network of Clerk’s, for example in pursuing contacts with 
individuals in Scotland. Even though Clerk was at this time present in Penicuik, the 
Mels do not appear to have used Clerk to facilitate commerce – although of course it 
must be considered that evidence for this may simply have not survived. In January 
1652 Michel Mel appears in the Aberdeen Propinquity Books as part of a dispute over a 
bill of exchange. The individuals involved in the dispute – John Donaldson elder 
(burgess of Aberdeen) and Mr John Irving – were Aberdeen-based individuals who 
appeared to have had Mel as their sole French contact; no evidence has been unearthed 
suggesting that they had any further links with France or the individuals based there.33 
Later, in 1666, Jean Mel is recorded as ‘capitaine du Lion sur son voyage d’Ecosse à La 
Rochelle avec une cargaison de harengs, saumon, beurre et suif’ – on this occasion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Zickermann, ‘Across the German Sea’, 3 
30 Henry Hope to Robert Galbraith, n.d. [?1596], NAS JC62/1/30; James Hope to Robert Galbraith, 10 
January 1596, Newhaven, NAS JC62/1/52; Jehan Mel to Robert Galbraith, n.d., 1596, NAS JC62/1/76. 
Galbraith appears to have only settled in France temporarily, as he is present in the records of the Privy 
Council in 1619 as a ‘merchant burgess of Edinburgh’, 25 August 1619, Holyrood, RPCS, XII, 75 
31 Once Clerk had established himself in Paris, his contacts with the Mels, especially Michel in Dieppe, 
were extensive. For example, see accounts and copies of letters held at NAS GD18/2371, containing 
several documents dating from between 1635 and 1652; Michel Mel to John Clerk, 30 October 1655, 
Dieppe, NAS GD18/2542; and Clerk’s dealings with Hope were fairly long-lived, with correspondence 
between the two surviving from 1649: Henry Hope to John Clerk, 20/30 November 1649, Paris, NAS 
GD18/2413 
32 7 June 1617, NLS Adv.mss.33.1.1 VI 
33 ACA, Propinquity Books, I, 13 January 1652, f42v 
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trading in more ‘conventional’ commodities, rather than the luxury goods which 
appeared to have often been the most prevalent in Clerk’s networks.34 
As has been noted, these networks comprised numerous individuals, in various 
locations and in varying capacities (Chapter 2). While it has been suggested that the 
nature of foreign exchange and the dangers of trading overseas (for example, piracy and 
privateering) meant that ‘it isn’t surprising that the merchants carried out every stage of 
their trading operation personally’, examination of networks of merchants in France 
suggests a different pattern.35 These networks were ‘private’ in the sense that individual 
merchants/factors/bankers were involved at every stage, but the very nature of these 
networks, and the ways in which business was conducted across large geographical 
areas, meant that carrying out every stage personally was impossible. One only has to 
examine the behaviour of the Dundee merchant David Wedderburne to see that while he 
may have overseen matters personally, he certainly was not involved at every stage 
himself. There is no evidence to suggest that he ever ventured to any of the European 
countries he traded with, or that he met any of the factors who facilitated his business. 
Instead, he often used the same merchants on several occasions, establishing business 
relationships with those whom he trusted.36 
Furthermore, the most prominent of Clerk’s business partners did business with 
each other independently. James Mowat and Michel Mel began to correspond in 1656.37 
Mel also dealt independently with Henry Hope, and Hope at times facilitated business 
between Mel and Clerk, placing himself at the centre of this partnership.38 Michel Mel 
maintained his own independent high-end contacts, buying goods including ‘ritch gold 
and selver dentel of the newest fashon’ for the Laird of Pitfodels in 1664.39 Mel had 
begun fostering this relationship several years previously, and during the 1650s 
correspondence with Pitfodels concentrated on less luxurious items, namely salmon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 18 February 1666, ADCM B5667. This could perhaps be the same Jean Mel recorded as ‘ingénieur et 
géograph du Roi; créancier de Jacques Duchesne’ in Rouen in 1683, although this is merely conjecture: 
1683, ADSM G 9402 
35 H. Smith, Shetland Life and Trade, 1550-1914 (Edinburgh, 1984) 38; for more on the dangers of 
trading overseas, particularly with reference to pirates and privateers, see S. Murdoch, The Terror of the 
Seas? Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513-1713 (Leiden, 2010) passim, and Chapter 7 for a French context. 
36 This was a method of trading used throughout Europe – for example, wine buyers and distributers in 
Rotterdam also depended on international merchants to bring merchandise to the Republic, rather than 
venturing abroad themselves: H. de Bruyn Kops, A Spirited Exchange: the wine and brandy trade 
between France and the Dutch Republic in its Atlantic Framework, 1600-1650 (Leiden, 2007) 81 
37 James Mowat to John Clerk, 8 March 1656, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/8, ‘I have written to Michel Mel at 
Dieppe to let me know of any vessell goeing for Scotland.’ 
38 Correspondence and accounts between John Clerk and Henry Hope, 30 December 1643, 19 January 
1644, Dieppe, NAS GD18/2437 
39 Account, Pitfodels and Clerk, 29 July 1664, Dieppe, NAS GD237/11/95/6 
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being shipped from Aberdeen to France – Mel perhaps needing to gain Pitfodels’s trust 
before he was commissioned to send luxury goods.40 James Mowat facilitated the 
meeting of two more of Clerk’s key business connections, writing that he had not yet 
‘found convenient tyme to speak to Mr Poncet but shall once this day and speak [to] mr 
thomsone and cause maik them meitte’, here Mowat acting as the protagonist in 
establishing these new threads.41 
Clerk’s network cannot be seen as ‘standard’ in this period, although the 
plethora of surviving evidence makes it tempting to see it as such. Comparison between 
Clerk and Wedderburne demonstrates differences between the ways in which merchants 
chose to operate – Clerk settling in Paris and overseeing his network from a central, 
French location; Wedderburne remaining in Dundee and operating from there.42 Other 
Scottish merchants with extensive ties to France chose to operate from home and have 
their contacts facilitate trade – for example the Edinburgh based merchant Archibald 
Hamilton.43 Although Clerk lived in France, he still relied on factors in other locations. 
Jacques du Cornet acted as Clerk’s banker in Bordeaux, facilitating links between Clerk 
in Paris and other Scots on the west coast of France: Robert Brown in La Rochelle, 
Adam Mitchelson in Rouen and William Monteith in Bordeaux.44 Such practice was not 
uncommon. As Steve Murdoch has recently demonstrated in relation to the network of 
Andrew Russell, many Scottish merchants trading with Bordeaux in this period did not 
travel to Bordeaux themselves, nor did they ever meet the factors – usually Robert 
Stewart and William Popple – whom Russell put them in contact with. Instead, the 
merchants considered by Murdoch relied on Russell – an individual based in Rotterdam 
– to guarantee and oversee their business.45 It did not seem to concern merchants that 
Russell was not geographically based within a Scottish community in France. Through 
the large amount of Russell’s correspondence which survives, we can see the extent of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Michel Mel to Sir Gilbert Menzies of Pitfodels, 1652-1658, Dieppe, NAS GD237/11/200 
41 James Mowat to John Clerk, 8 March 1656, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/8. Clerk had, by this time, returned 
to live in Scotland, and so Mowat perhaps took over from Clerk as one of the protagonists of this 
network. 
42 CBDW, passim. 
43 Account Book of Archibald Hamilton, 1657-1679, Edinburgh, NLS Adv.mss.31.3.2 
44 Jacques du Cornet to John Clerk, 9 August 1638, NAS GD18/2375E; same to same, 19 September 
1636, and on reverse, Adam Michelsonne to John Clerk, ‘with order to remit James de Cornet 1000lib 
and John de Cornet 800lib’, 28 August 1636, Rouen, NAS GD18/2375F. See also other documents A-I in 
this bundle. I would like to thank Professor Steve Murdoch (St Andrews) for providing me with copies of 
these documents and Dr Alexia Grosjean (St Andrews) for providing me with translations of them. A 
relation of du Cornet’s, Nicholas, was also involved in this network. Nicholas du Cornet to John Clerk, 13 
October 1639, NAS GD18/2390/15 
45 S. Murdoch, ‘The French Connection: Bordeaux's 'Scottish' networks in Context, c.1670-1720’ in G. 
Leydier, Scotland and Europe, Scotland in Europe (Cambridge, 2007) 33 
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his connections with Scots who were very much part of the French network – from 
Robert Stewart and William Popple in Bordeaux46 to James Gordon (who evidently 
stayed with Russell, correspondence being addressed to ‘Mr James Gordon, to be found 
at the hous of Mr Andrew Rousell Marchant in Rotterdam, Holland’)47 and Henry 
Lavie.48 Similarly Henry Hope was not only active in France, but more often in the 
Netherlands – the usefulness of his connections recognised by the Convention of Royal 
Burghs in 1671, as he was sent to act as a factor at the Scottish trading staple, which 
was at Dordrecht at this time.49 These connections suggest that despite not being 
physically present in France, both Hope and Russell maintained a presence within this 
network; being settled in France was clearly not a prerequisite to participation in the 
commercial networks within it. Furthermore, many individuals opted to change 
location, with the William Popple present in Bordeaux in the 1670s probably being the 
same as that present in Hamburg as part of the Company of Merchant Adventurers in 
the 1650s and 1660s.50 
Several individuals and networks utilised factors such as Popple and Stewart in 
Bordeaux. The Aberdeen merchant Robert Gerard corresponded with them in 1681, 
stating that ‘som frinds & I intends to send a small vessel for wyns brandy vinager’.51 
He asked them to send him the rates and also asked for the price of stockings and 
tallow, presumably contemplating a return cargo. Similarly, Hamilton used Robert 
Stewart (among other contacts) to facilitate the sending home of goods such as wine, 
brandy and vinegar.52 There were many Scottish factors present in Bordeaux in this 
period, despite Christopher Smout’s assertion that ‘it is astonishing to find how few 
they were in number…John and Richard Gordon, for example, seem to have managed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 May 1675, NAS RH15/106/174/6; 9 March 1675, NAS RH15/106/199; 20/30 November 1675, NAS 
RH15/106/199/9-11; n.d. [1681], 4 August 1681, 1 September 1681, Bordeaux, NAS RH15/106/424/23-
26; 12 December 1683 (bill of loading), NAS RH15/106/163/5; 8 February 1676, Bordeaux, NAS 
RH15/106/231/30, 32 
47 John Caldrom to James Gordon, 20/30 November 1675, NAS RH15/106/199/11; 15 August 1676, 
Popple and Stewart wrote to Andrew Russell and James Gordon collectively, suggesting that Gordon was 
not only staying with Russell but that he also had an inherent interest in Russell’s business, 15 August 
1676, Bordeaux, NAS RH15/106/231/33 
48 Henry Lavie to Andrew Russell, 5 August 1680, Bordeaux, NAS RH15/106/387/31; same to same 30 
November 1680, Bordeaux, NAS RH15/106/387/32 (this letter written by Walter Rankin ‘for Mr Henry 
Lavie’); same to same, 22 June 1680, Bordeaux, NAS RH15/106/387/33 
49 12 August 1671, Edinburgh, Convention, III, 630; Instructions to Mr Robert Patrie or Andrew Skeine 
as commissioners, August 1671, ACL, V, 85 
50 Zickermann, ‘Across the German Sea’, 80, 186 
51 Robert Gerard to Robert Stewart and William Popple, 25 June 1681, Aberdeen, AUSC ms3175/Z/156 
52 Account book of Archibald Hamilton, 1657-1679, NLS Adv.mss.31.3.2. Dealings with Robert Stewart 
occurred primarily between August 1671 and February 1674 (f51r-f87r). On 12 February 1674 (f87r), the 
partnership of ‘Robert Stewart and William Popple’ is explicitly mentioned. 
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almost all the trade to Bordeaux’.53 As well as Stewart and Popple, other factors 
included Henry Lavie who, as we have already seen, was in contact with Andrew 
Russell. Lavie appears in the 1670s dealing with John Swinton, a Scottish merchant 
based in London – in this correspondence a ‘J Lavy’ is also mentioned, perhaps another 
member of the Lavie family.54 Lavie acted as factor not only for individuals, but also for 
unofficial companies, including the cartel of Glasgow merchants in 1674 who formed a 
bond of co-partnery to control the import of the Bordeaux vintage of that year.55 Lavie 
was probably trusted in this capacity as he had previously acted on behalf of John 
Cauldwell, who headed the cartel, again highlighting the importance of experience, 
contacts and reputation.56 
That all members of the network were vital to its smooth running is emphasised 
on the occasions that someone did not perform their role adequately, causing problems 
further down the line. Henry Lavie was compelled to write to Annabella, Lady Lothian 
in 1651 that  
 
I am now sorry to tell your lady how I am disappointed of the confidence I had 
in the Mr boullay of Nantes who I thought would not refuse mee the favour I 
desire of him (in messers Broune & Inglis name) towards payinge your lady the 
£500, he hath been pleased to answer mee that he cannot doe it at all, in soe 
much that I am now forced to tell your lady plainly that I know noe way…to 
satisfie your lady’s desire.57 
 
In 1675 Thomas Smith wrote to Andrew Russell that ‘I have bein heir [Bordeaux] neow 
a meownth and ther is not eney apereinc of my lodeing for my merchen heir seyed that 
he knoes not of on town of guwdes yeit to peit a bord of us bowt seir I heve down all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 T. C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707 (Edinburgh/London, 1963) 98 
54 Letter-book of John Swinton, Merchant (London), 1673-1677, NAS CS96/3264. This particular letter is 
from Swinton to Lavy, 6 November 1673, stating ‘ordered him buy ten tunn Brandy & ship in…for 
account of J Lavy & my selfe’. 
55 See, for example, Henry Lavie to John Anderson, Petter Gemmull, John Walkinshaw, John Caldwell, 
Hugh Nisbet, & Alexander Knox, 26 October 1674, Bourdeaux, NLS Acc.8100/143; Murdoch, ‘French 
Connection’, 30 
56 B. Kay and C. Maclean, Knee Deep in Claret: a Celebration of Wine and Scotland (Isle of Skye, 1994) 
190. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, we begin to see more ‘official’ companies trading. 
William Russell and Company, based in Wigtown, traded with Holland, Rouen, Nantes, Norway, 
England, Ireland and various Scottish ports in the first years of the eighteenth century, and Leith Rope 
and Sailduck Co.’s business account book includes invoices for Bordeaux wine shipped in 1725. 1701-4, 
NAS CS96/1145; 16 March, 10 April and 8 May 1725, NAS RH15/159. Working within a group of 
merchants was, however, not a new concept. It was usual practice, for example, for a ship to be owned by 
several merchants, either having equal shares (a quarter, eighth or sixteenth) or some merchants owning a 
bigger share than others. 
57 Henry Lavie to Lady Lothian, 27 September 1651, Bordeaux, GD40/2/5/13/23 
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that I can do heir’.58 In a similar case two years later Thomas Dinmuir wrote to Russell 
from Nantes that ‘I am lying heir on the river of nantis & hes bein heir neir four weiks, 
& ame not readie yet for at first my merchant wold not weill acept me nor answer me’.59 
As well as the commercial agents involved at all stages of transactions, 
participants at either end of trading routes were also essential – for example French 
vintners and Scottish consumers, whose roles have often been neglected in favour of 
those who ‘carried out’ the trading. That merchants were vital in linking vintners or 
manufacturers with consumers is undeniable, but their importance at the expense of 
other members of the networks has at times been overstated.60 The adoption of a 
‘Rubik’s Cube Model’ of economic history, a phrase coined by Henriette de Bruyn 
Kops, entails the acceptance that all commodities, all sectors and all regional economies 
were interconnected.61 This model could be extended to encompass people at all stages 
of economic exchanges. Inevitably, we are often thwarted in our investigation of this 
due to the sources that survive, but we are fortunate that for one year, 1672-1673, the 
final destinations of imported wines can be determined in more detail than is typically 
possible. In the entry books of wine for Leith, there is information not only regarding 
who imported the wine and who bought it in Scotland, but a separate list of who these 
people then sold their wine to, allowing the two sources to be cross-referenced. On the 
22 January 1673, John Harmonson Lepman imported wines from Bordeaux in the 
Rowland of Hambrough on commission from several different merchants, and these 
merchants then sold their goods to a variety of people in Leith (Appendix III.i).62 This 
data demonstrates first, that commercial networks spread far wider than just the 
merchants, skippers and factors directly involved in them, with the consumer being 
vital,63 and secondly, that consumers often bought wine from different merchants, 
despite the wine being part of the same cargo. This suggests that wine was not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Thomas Smith to Andrew Russell, 4/14 [damaged] 1675, Bordeaux, NAS RH15/106/199/12 
59 Thomas [Dinmuir] to Andrew Russell, 7 May 1677, Nantes, NAS RH15/106/268/11 
60 P. O’Brien, ‘Merchants and Bankers as patriots or speculators? Foreign commerce and monetary policy 
in wartime, 1793-1815’, in J. McCusker and K. Morgan (eds.), The Early Modern Atlantic Economy 
(Cambridge, 2000) 251 
61 de Bruyn Kops, Spirited Exchange, 14, 242-3; Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne, xvii. The individuals 
who facilitated the movement of commodities once they were on British soil must also be considered. T. 
C. Smout, ‘The Glasgow Merchant Community in the Seventeenth Century’ in Scottish Historical 
Review, XLVII (1968) 63-70 
62 Entry books of Leith, November 1672-November 1673, NAS E74/15/13; E74/15/15. This is just one 
example; there are many other entries in the books for this year that demonstrate this. 
63 Sources which may be used in a similar way exist in the French archives, for example the Account 
Book of the Bordeaux merchant Broissy, 1700-1705, which details people he sold goods to. 
Unfortunately on this occasion, no evidence has been found to connect this merchant to Scottish trade. 
ADG 7 B 1177 
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necessarily purchased from the same merchant each time, raising the question of 
whether trust and fidelity were as important at this extreme of the network. This could 
also be a way of safeguarding investment, as noted in Chapter 2 – if one merchant were 
to default on their agreement, not all would be lost, but the fact that this wine arrived as 
part of the same cargo suggests that this was unlikely. It was common for a wide range 
of people to have a stake in imported cargos during this period.64 Often, the very nature 
of business meant that it was not possible always to purchase goods from the same 
merchant, particularly in the same season, as the voyages themselves took several 
months. Many merchants who had stakes in the cargo of wine imported by Lepman had 
stakes in several different cargos throughout the year, imported by various merchants.65 
Similarly, many individuals contributed to cargos that were exported from Scotland. A 
list of money owed by the Wigtown company William Russell and Co. includes a 
lengthy list of individuals from whom they acquired skins to be shipped to Nantes in 
December 1700, likewise the same account book demonstrates that many individuals 
owed money to the company for goods from the return cargo.66 Finally, several 
merchants purchased wine from Lepman for themselves. In the case of John Trotter, he 
purchased some wine on 23 January, and then after a week’s delay purchased some 
more. This behaviour is difficult to explain conclusively but could suggest that Trotter, 
rather than already having consumers in place, bought the wine on spec, selling it on an 
ad hoc basis rather than through previously agreed commissions. While there was often 
a prior commission for imported goods, other retailers relied on ad hoc sales, as 
evidenced by advertisements in British newspapers for sales of such goods.67 Adopting 
a ‘non-hierarchical’ model of trading networks correctly grants these individuals as 
much importance in the survival and success of the networks as the people at the 
‘centre’ of it. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See, for example, the shipping lists of Dundee from 1580-1618, transcribed as part of CBDW, 193-302 
65 NAS E72/15/15. These individuals included Robert Learmonth, Andrew Stevenson, John Hall, James 
Law, Andrew Johnston, John Hall, John Trotter, Thomas Wilson and John Govan. 
66 1700, NAS CS96/1145 
67 Some of these instances are selling wine ‘condemn’d as prize’, for example 29 April 1708, London 
Gazette, issue 4432. Others, however, appear to be independent sales of wine by merchants, for example 
16 July 1702, Post-Man and the Historical Account, issue 992 
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III. FAMILIAL CONNECTIONS 
‘Truly I cannot cleanse myself of ingratitude’.68 
 
Commercial relationships in the seventeenth century have been seen to function as a 
foundation of trust and personal acquaintance that developed over generations, and in 
the case of many merchant families this was indeed the case.69 As well as the longevity 
of families such as the Galbraiths, Hopes and Mels, many merchants relied on family 
members to undertake business for them. Peter Imrie, whose service was commissioned 
by David Wedderburne in August 1593, was Wedderburne’s uncle by marriage. 
Wedderburne sent his nephew Alexander to Europe in May 1614 with a ‘woffin 
[woven] bed’ to be sold.70 Interestingly, these cargos were carried by members of the 
same family – Alexander and Walter Rankine. The benefit of a reputable family name is 
further demonstrated by the inclusion of different members of the same family in 
commercial transactions. In 1654, Mowat enclosed with a letter to John Clerk 
 
a leter for…your brother which I pray you be cairfull to cause delyver to him in 
hand, for it conteines a bargaine I hav maid with his father for some salmond he 
is to send him.  I pray you wreitt me two lynes of your resaite theroff.71 
 
Family members relied on each other to gain initial access to networks and James Mel 
used his brother, Michel, in this way.72 It was perhaps this association which led James 
to act later in the period as a factor for the Edinburgh merchant James Graham – 
although the evidence we have for this suggests that his foray into factoring was not 
successful. Graham petitioned the Privy Council in 1686 complaining that Mel ‘having 
stayed a long time without giving the petitioner any satisfaction or security…is shortly 
to goe from this place [Rouen] without securing the petitioner as to what is duly resting 
him’.73 While endorsements from one’s family might be used to pursue a career, links to 
such a successful network did not make all members of it necessarily successful in their 
own right, James Mel here clearly failing to make the successful transition from junior 	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merchant to factor. The use of family ties to facilitate business dealings was not 
uncommon. A letter from Charles Erskine of Cambuskenneth to his wife, Mary Hope, 
in 1645 asked her to 
 
tell Harie Hope that the monie doeth concerne my sellfe and otheres will doe it 
to me for 19s the franke and if he will doe that some he shall have it before anie 
bodie he most pay thrie thousand poundes Scots to you and I shall pay it to anie 
he plesies at paries.74 
 
It has been suggested that the personal nature of trading networks in this period 
was a disadvantage, as it reduced the clarity of the business at hand, clouded or delayed 
rational decision-making, and provided ‘no contractual coordination’ as there would 
have been between strangers.75 Indeed, instances can be demonstrated where interest 
was not charged on loans made to family, and where debts were not chased up as 
vociferously as they might have been, for example in the case of Jean-Louis de Rodolp, 
a French country gentleman in Castres in the early eighteenth century.76 Often, it has 
been argued, social and political obligations lay behind the granting of credit (for 
example to family members or patrons), at the expense of the consideration of economic 
imperatives and further, that family members were granted special terms, for example 
no-interest credit.77 Yet conversely, many merchants appear to have adopted a level of 
professionalism, even when working with family members. In 1590 a list of ‘debtis 
awin me’ made by Wedderburne included a sum of 5 pounds, 27 and a half merks owed 
by ‘Lady our mother’ (Lady Westhall, Wedderburne’s mother-in-law), and another list 
from the 1590s includes, ‘Robert my brother’ for 3 pounds and ‘James my brother’ for 5 
pounds.78 The Edinburgh merchant John Charteris included in his memorandum book 
money owed to him by his mother and Pierre Petit, a Bordeaux merchant, listed in 1688 
‘tous les achats que le seront entre ma mere et moy’.79 
Yet merchants did not always view these connections in a positive way – and at 
times they were inconvenient. In 1642 John Dougall wrote to John Clerk from Paris that 
‘sore against my will I am forcet to goe doun to Newheaven for ther ar arryvet tuo of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Charles Erskine to Mary Hope, 25 February 1645, London, NLS ms.5089 f97 
75 Hancock, ‘Combining Success and Failure’, 17 
76 L. Fontaine, ‘Antonio and Shylock: credit and trust in France, c. 1680-c.1780’ in Economic History 
Review, LIV (2001) 45-6 
77 P. Mathias, ‘Risk, Credit and Kinship in Early Modern Enterprise’ in J. McCusker and K. Morgan 
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my fathers barks, truly I cannot cleanse myself of ingratitude’.80 The family elders did 
not always know best, and earlier in the year Dougall had written that ‘ther is no calling 
for salmond in this toun [Dieppe] and I am affrayed to be long heir, my father wreats to 
cause sell them all and let non ly over year but treuly they cannot be sold without 
merchands’.81 Furthermore, despite claims that ‘all merchants were dependent on the 
good or bad fortune of the members of their family’, permanent settlement of a family 
on the continent, and their prolonged success, was not necessarily indicative of success 
for all parties involved.82 The Hope family appears to have been present on the 
continent from at least 1548, as in that year we have a letter written by an Alexander 
Hope in Dieppe to his father, John Hope, a burgess of Edinburgh, detailing a 
consignment shipped from Dieppe back to Edinburgh. Over two centuries later, between 
1787 and 1789, correspondence survives between a James Hope in Amsterdam and his 
sister, Anne Hope, in Edinburgh. These letters focus primarily on his work, which he 
did not enjoy – relaying his long hours in the counting house, the intense cold and the 
unwelcoming atmosphere created by his fellow lodgers. One of the letters also speaks of 
his worry at having upset a ‘Mr Henry Hope’ – and he writes to his sister that he does 
not know what he could have done to deserve the treatment he received from him. 
James was likely on the continent due to family precedent, yet seems to have lost (or 
been excluded from) the mercantile links that had made his predecessors so 
successful.83 
 
IV. NON-FAMILIAL CONNECTIONS 
‘I never saw such an discreet and oblidging marchand as that Mr Thomson is.’84 
 
Fortunately, familial connections were not the only way for merchants to gain access to 
commercial networks, and even those merchants who did use them did not do so 
exclusively. An examination of Wedderburne’s Compt Buik demonstrates that while he 
may have used family on occasion he also entrusted many voyages to independent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 John Dougall younger to John Clerk, 6 November 1642, Paris, NAS GD18/2416 
81 John Dougall younger to John Clerk, 10 January 1642, Dieppe, NAS GD18/2416; Dougall expressed 
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individuals. Clerk trusted recommendations from his close contacts, often concerning 
individuals we have no evidence he previously knew or had any experience of working 
with. Through this practice, we can begin to see the ways in which such networks 
expanded. In the space of just three months from January 1644 Clerk, now acting as a 
banker, lent more than 720 livres to Sebastien Jauffray, 422 livres to Monsieur Belm 
and 145 livres to Jean Perouet, all on recommendations from Henry Hope, to whom he 
also provided finance.85 No evidence has been found that Clerk personally knew these 
individuals – and they were certainly not family – instead it seems he implicitly trusted 
Hope’s recommendations. 
While they did not have to be familial, recommendations of some description 
were essential for merchants at all stages of their career, and credit and reputation have 
been described as ‘elusive but the fundamental key to success in early modern 
commerce’.86 There are many examples of Clerk furnishing fellow Scots with contacts 
in France. James Mowat wrote in 1654: 
 
I hav found…that M[onsieur] Dourny was a good friend butt not fite for my 
business, for this six months bygone I have not one lyne from him…If you know 
of any merchand that would taik peines for me in my bussines, I would pay what 
he desyreth. You will infinitely oblidge me to give me advise.87 
 
Evidently such recommendations encompassed native Frenchmen as well as expatriate 
Scots.  In the same year, Alexander Charteris thanked Clerk 
 
most hartily for your good advise in reference to my livin and tradeing in this 
place [Paris]…and for your sake shall recommend such of my acquaintance as 
hav neede of draperi to Mons[ieu]r Poncet who is my neare neighbor for I am 
now lodged a la pomme d’or the next shop.88 	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Monsieur Poncet appears to have been recommended by Clerk to multiple individuals, 
and Clerk acted as an intermediary for business between Poncet and Henry Hope.89 
Moreover, positive experiences such as that of Charteris guaranteed Poncet more 
recommendations among Charteris’s, as well as Clerk’s, contacts. Reputation was of 
paramount importance, among clients as well as fellow merchants. In 1680 Robert Kerr, 
4th Earl of Lothian, wrote to his wife that 
 
I just now receaved 200 crowns from Mr [Thomas] Thomson in Burdeaux, upon 
whom the Bill was drawn from Mr Ellision in Newcastle, althow I had neither 
Bill nor letter of credit which should have come from Rosline, cam somewhat 
slow, I writ to Mr Thomson who immediately returned me all I desird, so Intreat 
that so soone as my Bills for that sume coms, yow cause Androw Ainster pay it 
immediately, conform to the Bills to Mr Ellison, before any other, for I never 
saw such an discreet and oblidging marchand as that Mr Thomson is.90 
 
This was a successful transaction for Thomson not only because he was paid promptly, 
but also because Lothian would presumably have recommended Thomson as reliable – 
and a recommendation from such a high profile member of Scottish society must have 
been invaluable. Of course, some individuals did not receive such positive reports, and 
this inevitably affected their business standing and their profits. In 1668 James Carstairs 
reported to his business partner, Alexander Watson in Kirkcaldy, that 
 
there hath been one with us anent the fraughting of the ship for Copperwich in 
Noravey and to Load great timber to Bring for this port of Rotterdam and hath 
proffered us ane and twentieth hundred gulders Butt we are doubfull of him 
because he hath abade report which hath caused us to desist from Imbraceing his 
proffers.91 
 
Inevitably, not all recommendations fostered lucrative relationships. From 1643, after a 
recommendation from Henry Hope, Charles Erskine began dealing with Clerk.92 When 
Erskine asked that Clerk also assist his brother, William, while he was on the continent, 
Clerk obliged – William benefitting from the reputation of his family but unfortunately 
for Clerk not living up to the name. In 1644 William wrote to Clerk thanking him 	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‘hartile for the paynes ye have taken to furnish my coffer I doue not dout of your carr of 
it…as for my monies I am confident my brother will put that in order schortlie’.93 
However, this particular venture proved ill advised, and money lent to William in the 
1640s had still not been repaid by 1669. Clerk stated in one of his account books in this 
year that ‘I keep thir letters – that if I ever see his face; to see iff he will repair any off 
my great losse of the 4444 livres Bot I fear the worst’.94 This occurrence supports the 
assertion that information, while vital to commercial success, was only as good as the 
provider.95 
For experienced merchants such recommendations were beneficial, but for 
younger merchants hoping to start a successful career they were essential. This social 
credit, obtained through association with older, more experienced and well-trusted 
individuals, was often the precursor to financial credit.96 In October 1644, Clerk wrote 
from Edinburgh to Michel Mel to introduce 
 
Robert Fletcher sonne eldest to Sir Andrew Fletcher…on off the lords off the 
session: the gentlman with him is Mr Piter wederburne whom ye knoue weill in 
my name I bessich yow offer to doe them any pleaser you can: I have wreatten 
to Jhone dougall younger to give them sum money for my Accompt.97 
 
Clerk himself had benefited from the patronage of more experienced merchants at the 
beginning of his career, which started with an apprenticeship to an Edinburgh 
merchant.98 Despite the opinions of some, many merchants recognised how vital 
recommendations were. In 1678 John Snodgrass wrote to Andrew Russell seeking his 
advice on whether to go to France, talking of the ‘vain conceit’ held in Scotland that ‘it 
is almost sufficient to obtain employment and credit…that he have lived in France were 
it but for two days’. Snodgrass, however, recognised that Scottish or not, 
recommendations were essential, and asked for Russell’s ‘counsell in this matter, (for in 
this place, you are to me as ane other father,) for I am altogather undetermined of my 
self’.99 As well as recommendations helping merchants to kick-start their careers, they 	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could also be instrumental in protecting them. Laurence Fontaine has argued that the 
credit system was designed to foster leniency; that merchants were encouraged to 
display disinterestedness. Indeed, Savary in Le Parfait Négociant emphasised that it 
was essential to adopt a gentle approach with debtors: ‘one should not make too much 
of debtors who are unable to pay their debts because their business has failed; this is a 
time when one should treat them gently, so as not to force them into bankruptcy’.100 As 
a consequence of such attitudes, it often happened that the first to be hit by bankruptcy 
were the most recently established merchants, those who were least well-integrated, 
even if they were not the deepest in debt, whereas those who had high levels of support 
could escape bankruptcy even if their level of debt was high.101 
That so many relationships were forged on trust and understanding explains why 
many merchants opted to trade with or through the same individuals, particularly those 
who did not travel abroad themselves. Merchants would have welcomed commissions 
to the same ports multiple times, especially if they had family or acquaintances there, as 
it allowed both captains and crew to build up experience of sailing specific routes.102 
This might lead to a repeat commission if they could demonstrate superior competence 
to other crews. The Scottish skipper Alexander Gillespie kept a record of his voyages 
between 1663 and 1682, demonstrating knowledge of multiple destinations and of the 
seas surrounding them. At the rear of the volume he included instructions for other 
sailors, describing how to navigate certain areas of sea safely. This source demonstrates 
the importance of experience – Gillespie left his knowledge as a legacy for future 
skippers and, as Thomas Riis has pointed out, such experience helped significantly to 
reduce sailing times, making these voyages more efficient.103 
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V. TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT SETTLEMENT? 
‘Being well known in trade, and being desirous to settle in this Kingdom.’104 
 
The longevity of many of the networks and individual contacts mentioned above is 
impressive, but the question of whether merchants settled permanently or temporarily 
remains. There has been some debate over this, particularly in the context of northern 
Europe.105 Concerning France, a number of assertions have previously been made. It has 
been suggested that Scotsmen were so at home in Dieppe that they ‘semblent avoir été 
absorbés par la population indigene’,106 whereas it has been contradictorily asserted 
more recently that the status of all foreigners in France was precarious.107 In some 
locations, municipal records of births, marriages and deaths indicate that some families 
settled on a permanent basis, and Henry Lavie was part of a merchant family of which 
several generations were active in Bordeaux. The death of ‘Samuel Lavie, filz naturel et 
[legistime] de Sieur Henry Lavie bourg[eois] et marchand de bourdeaux’ was recorded 
in June 1676.108 Less than two years later another son, Henry Lavie junior, was born. 
This settlement continued – Pierre Lavie is recorded in the records of ‘receptions de 
capitaines de vaisseaux’ for this city at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and it is 
probable (though not proven) that he was a relation of Henry.109 Well into the 
eighteenth century branches of this family remained in Bordeaux; François Lavy 
married a Frenchwoman, Marie Judith François, in Bordeaux in 1758 and 25 years later 
a Jeanne Elisabeth Lavie is included on the death registers.110 Marriage into an ‘alien’ 
society has been seen as having ‘special business significance’,111 and may suggest a 
desire for permanent settlement. In 1642 a ‘Madame Mell’ is present in Dieppe, and can 
be assumed to have been the wife of either Michel or James, both of whom were in 
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Dieppe at this time.112 While it is not known whether she was French or Scottish, both 
of these scenarios suggest that at least one of the Mel brothers wished to settle in 
Bordeaux. Either they married a Frenchwoman, and opted to settle in her country, or 
Madame Mel was Scottish and travelled to France to be with her husband, this also 
suggesting that the merchant Mel intended for his stay to be prolonged. Marrying into 
the indigenous population did not, however, necessarily lead to permanent settlement. 
In 1619 John Hamilton married a Frenchwoman in Bordeaux, but then persuaded her to 
move with him to Scotland – when they stopped at Ireland en route, ‘within few dayis 
efter their arryvell their he did foirsaik hir uterlie, and mariet him self privilie to ane 
Scottis woman’.113 
There are also cases in which permanent settlement for the merchant did not 
result in permanent settlement for his family. In 1561 the widow of Gilbert Logan, 
Marie Ross, was living in Dieppe, presumably having travelled there with her merchant 
husband. In this year, one year after her husband’s death, she requested safe passage 
back to Scotland, along with ‘her subjects, and James Logane, with the rest of their 
bairns, families, &c. 12 persons in all’.114 Although Gilbert’s wife, children, subjects 
and other relatives had made a life for themselves in France, after his death they 
returned to Scotland. The death of Logan does not, of course, conclusively prove that 
there was ever an intention to remain in France permanently as it is not known, as in 
many cases, whether the family had always planned to return to Scotland. Similarly, 
while the notable Jacobite financier Robert Arbuthnot is recorded dying in Paris in 1723 
after a long and successful career abroad it is not known whether he had ever planned to 
return home.115  
 Although the notion of kith and kin within merchant networks was indeed 
important, this has sometimes been over-emphasised, and even within merchant 
families who ostensibly opted to settle permanently some members chose instead to 
return to Scotland.116 Despite the settlement of the Lavie family in Bordeaux, one son of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 John Dougall younger to John Clerk, 16 May 1642, Dieppe, NAS GD18/2416. This letter concerns the 
acquisition of a trebuchet for Madame Mell. 
113 11 June 1619, Glasgow, RPCS, XI, 638 
114 Randolphe to Cecill, 29 March 1561, CSP, I, 534; [Queen] Mary to [Queen] Elizabeth, 22 January 
1562/3, CSP, I, 677. While the timing of this request may suggest that the events of 1560 were a factor, it 
is more likely that the family had business to settle in France before they made their journey back to 
Scotland. 
115 23 April 1723, Paris, E650/79 
116 See for example: Mathias, ‘Risk, Credit and Kinship’, 17-8; Steele, ‘Introduction’, Merchant 
Organization, 2; Fontaine, ‘Antonio and Shylock’, 49-50 
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Henry Lavie appears in legal papers in Edinburgh at the turn of the century, having 
returned to Scotland despite being born in Bordeaux and the rest of his family being 
settled there.117 Hugh Galbraith can be found acting as a merchant in Glasgow in 1683, 
choosing not to continue the French links forged by his kinsman Robert a century 
earlier, despite pursuing the same career.118 Not all members of the Macmath family 
involved themselves in commercial networks in France – William Macmath, despite 
carrying on the family trade as a merchant, remained in Edinburgh and no evidence has 
yet been uncovered that he ever exploited his family connections to pursue business 
with France.119 
Despite some evidence for the permanent settlement of Scots in France, the 
majority of merchant Scots appear to have always intended to return home. William 
Gordon, a Scottish factor in Paris, was part of a family whose members were 
particularly prolific in Scottish commercial networks throughout Europe. Yet by 1705 a 
contract relating to the sale of fir wood between Gordon and David Ross, a merchant in 
Elgin, describes him as ‘late factor at Paris now merchant in Edinburgh’.120 This is in 
contrast to Robert Gordon, who was still loading cargoes in France for Scotland in the 
1720s.121 Even merchants who remained in one location for a prolonged period often 
sought a return to their homeland. John Clerk, for example, resided on the same street 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 13 February 1678, AMB GG 856/98; Legal papers concerning Henry Lavie, ‘son of the deceased 
merchant and factor in Bordeaux, Henry Lavie’, 1673-1711, Edinburgh, NAS GD243/10/1. Murdoch has 
argued that many of these ‘second-generation’ returnees saw their travel to Scotland as a return to their 
spiritual or ancestral home, despite never having lived there. S. Murdoch, ‘Children of the Diaspora: the 
‘homecoming’ of the second-generation Scot in the seventeenth century’ in M. Harper (ed.), Emigrant 
Homecomings: the return movement of Emigrants, 1600-2000 (Manchester, 2005) 56 and passim. 
118 Instrument of resignation in favour of John McCuir, merchant in Glasgow, by Hugh Galbraith, 
merchant in Glasgow and others, 25 June 1683, GUSC ms Gen501/37 
119 1627-29, NAS RH15/29/148 
120 August 1705, NAS GD199/205 
121 Robert Gordon applied for a pass to come home in 1703, yet remained in France until at least 1727: 13 
August 1703, CSPD 1703-4, 339: pass for ‘the Robert of Leith to come from Bordeaux to Scotland 
between now and the end of November. Is bringing home the goods of Robert Gordon, factor at 
Bordeaux, who has petitioned for this pass. He has, at his own charge, released a sufficient number of 
English [or Scotch] subjects, prisoners of war at Bordeaux, to sail the vessel home, and has hired her to 
bring home his belongings, wishing to withdraw from France’; Murdoch, ‘French Connection’, 36. 
However, Gordon demonstrably remained in France long past this date, calling into question the 
legitimacy of his application for a pass. For example, Robert Gordon wrote to John Innes from Bordeaux 
2 July 1716 regarding business transactions: NAS RH15/147. He appears also in a bill of loading from 
Bordeaux shipping the Catrin of Leith with Robert Beatson, master, with 2 tuns of wine for Arthur 
Clephame: 27 February 1723, NAS RH15/32/21. He also writes from Bordeaux to William ?Syne at 
?Banff, 16 May 1724, with an invoice for wine from Bordeaux, destined for Banff: NAS 
GD248/568/1/2/5. Gordon appears in cases brought before the Admiralty Court from the mid to late 
1720s, still being termed a ‘merchant of Bordeaux’. 1724: AC8/297; 1725: AC8/319; 1726: NAS 
AC8/336; 1727: AC8/349; 1728: AC8/376 It seems that Gordon may have spent some time in Inverness, 
as he appears in a case from 1724 as a ‘merchant of Inverness’: NAS AC8/297 
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throughout his twelve-year stay in Paris.122 Despite this stability and his range of 
business associations in France, many of Clerk’s actions suggest that he always 
intended to settle ultimately in Scotland. Frequent visits back to, and correspondence 
with, Edinburgh suggest that he did not uproot himself entirely – he continued to visit 
his homeland, preparing for life after his career in France, and his pursuit of Mary Gray, 
a Scotswoman, for his wife adds weight to this speculation.123 Clerk became acquainted 
with Mary through his business dealings with her father, William Gray of Pittendrum.124 
He wrote to William Rires in 1645 that ‘I dare not promisse so much hapynes to my 
selff that shoe sould be to me what ye name hir, housoever pray hir to pardon me who 
honors & respects hir in the highiest measur I can (thogh not suteable to hir 
decerneing)’.125 Certainly, the lengths that Clerk went to in order to acquire the goods 
she desired went beyond the call of duty for an ordinary merchant: 
 
Efter I had run over all the shops in Paris I resolved and tooke this Flourd tabein 
with the grein conteining 4 ell and a quarter: the stuff is excellent and verie 
chaip. Efter I had boght it I began to repent persuading my selff that cullor wold 
not pleas your Lady whair for I made a new recerche and happened on ane uther 
flourd tabein in which is sum gridilyne, which in my opinion I thoght a litle 
graver as the uther and to the end your Lady might resave the better 
contentment.126 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Correspondence from early in his career is addressed to ‘Johne Clerk, chez Madame Cuthbert’ in 
Paris, with some specifying ‘Jean le Clerque Madame Caudebert Rue St Honore A Paris’; later his 
address is rendered as ‘Monsieur le Clerk, marchand Escossois ay Coeur Royal, rue St Honoré, A Paris’: 
NAS GD18/2363, GD18/2386, NAS GD18/2426. Although Clerk’s correspondence appears to have 
ceased being sent through Madame Cuthbert, she remained one of his primary contacts, writing to 
Edinburgh in February 1645 to enquire when he would be returning to Paris from Scotland: Madame 
Cuthbert to John Clerk, 3 February 1645, Paris, NAS GD18/2466. The fact that Madame Cuthbert wrote 
to Clerk in French suggests that she was French, but unfortunately no other information pertaining to this 
Frenchwoman has thus far been uncovered. Her name may certainly have been Scottish, and this may be 
an example of Clerk receiving succour from a fellow Scottish expatriate on arrival in Paris. 
123 Clerk’s exact movements are difficult to ascertain, but can be gleaned to some extent from the vast 
amounts of correspondence which survives addressed to him. In February 1645, he was being written to 
in Edinburgh, whereas by December of the same year he had returned to Paris. Madame Cuthbert to 
Clerk, 3 February 1645; James Arnott to Clerk, 13 December 1645, NAS GD18/2466. This trip to 
Edinburgh was to purchase the barony of Penicuik, and by the autumn of the following year he had 
returned to Edinburgh. 
124 For Clerk’s business with Gray see: John Clerk to William Gray of Pittendrum, 16 August 1646, NAS 
GD18/2381/7; Account, same to same, September 1646, NAS GD18/2381/5. Sir William was one of the 
most important merchants of Edinburgh. He traded with several foreign countries, acquired much landed 
property as a result and was knighted before 1642. J. Balfour Paul (ed.), The Scots Peerage: founded on 
Wood’s edition of Sir Robert Douglas’s ‘Peerage of Scotland: containing an historical and genealogical 
account of the nobility of that Kingdom, 9 volumes (Edinburgh, 1904-14) IV, 288 
125 John Clerk to William Rires, 15 April 1645, Paris, NAS GD18/2455, f14r 
126 John Clerk to Lady Pittendrum, 20 May 1645, Paris, NAS GD18/2455, f14r 
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Again these transactions were conducted by formal accounts.127 Moreover, several 
purchases made by Clerk demonstrate a continuing interest in his homeland (as well as 
suggesting the level of education such a successful merchant would have had). 
Accounts from 1648 include learned books such as ‘histoire d’angleterre, Escosse & 
Ireland par du Chesne’, New Testaments in French and Latin, works of Calvin, and 
‘regiam maiestatem the old laws and constitutions of Scotland’.128 
While Clerk seems to have always intended to return to Scotland, once there he 
continued to maintain correspondence with his associates in France. In 1655 he 
communicated with Michel Mel concerning books that the 3rd Earl of Lothian had 
commissioned him to have bound in Paris, and in 1663 sold ‘431 onces 14 drape of 
paris silver plait’ to Lothian.129 His contacts in France kept him informed of events, 
both professional and personal, that affected the network. In July 1655 James Mowat 
informed him that ‘Mr charteris is latly marryed with a verry veryy pretty madamoisle, 
of Picardye…Nicholas Macmath a month befor mr charteris marryed’ – these events 
perhaps suggesting that Charteris and Macmath had chosen to settle in France.130 In 
December 1688 one Charles Charteris wrote to John, his cousin, concerning 6 tuns of 
wine imported from La Rochelle – this presumably being a later generation of the 
Charteris family.131 Mowat also kept Clerk informed of ongoing commercial activity, 
involving the same individuals with whom Clerk had previously operated – Michel Mel, 
Mr Thomson and Mr Poncet – again demonstrating the length of time these individuals 
remained part of the network.132 Clerk remained important to his contacts abroad, and 
he continued to provide recommendations. Although James Mowat had long been 
established in his profession in Paris by 1655 he continued to benefit from these, being 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 The accounts are mentioned in a letter from John Clerk to Lady Pittenweem, 20 May 1645, Paris, NAS 
GD18/2455, f14r 
128 1648, NAS GD18/2482 
129 Account between John Clerk and William, Earl of Lothian, 20 January 1645, Edinburgh, NAS 
GD18/2439; Michel Mel to John Clerk, 30 October 1655, Dieppe, NAS GD18/2542; 7 July 1663, NAS 
GD18/2445. It is not clear whether Clerk brought home these goods himself or whether he used his prior 
connections in France to have goods sent home to him, although his continuing links to the French 
network he was once part of suggests that the latter is possible. 
130 James Mowat to John Clerk, 6 July 1655, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/7. This example perhaps indicates 
permanent settlement by Charteris. 
131 25 December 1688, Falkirk, NAS RH15/59/5/7 
132 James Mowat to John Clerk, 8 March 1656, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/8 
 107	  
extremely glaid to know be yours that Mr andersone would be pleased to taik 
paines for me, in my bussinesse, I can not meitt with a moore honest man. I have 
heir written againe to him to desire the same courtesye of him.133 
 
As well as maintaining French connections after his return to Scotland, Clerk also 
continued to deal with individuals he had known before his departure. William Paton, 
who often acted as a courier for Clerk (Chapter 2), also acted as a financial contact for 
Clerk in Scotland – as is illustrated by a bond made between John Lermond and Clerk 
in 1643. Clerk loaned money to Lermond to be paid ‘to the said John Clerk…or in his 
name and of his usse to William Paton’.134 The contract between Clerk and John Smith 
on his first foray to France in 1634 was witnessed by two people – one of these was 
James Nasmyth, whom Clerk was ‘for the present servitor’ to, and the other was a 
fellow servitor, William Paton.135 Participation in Scottish commercial networks in 
France did not begin on arrival and end on departure, but fostered contacts that were 
maintained and networks that endured across large geographical areas and over long 
periods of time, affording a wide range of opportunities to merchants and factors. 
While this transiency had some benefits, the decision over whether to settle 
permanently or temporarily was perhaps made, in part, according to laws governing 
merchants’ rights while abroad. As part of the ‘Scottish Privileges’ in France it was 
understood that the monarchies of France and Scotland automatically granted 
naturalisation to each other’s subjects (Chapter 1),136 and it has been said that 
 
Scots noblemen at the French court…had always been treated courteously and 
like fellow-countrymen…Some Scots even went so far as to assert that the 
difference between their relationship with France and England was the 
difference between…brotherly love and rabid hostility.137 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 James Mowat to John Clerk, 6 July 1655, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/7. It is not known how long Mowat 
remained in France, but he was still present in Paris in October 1667: 24 October 1667, NAS 
GD172/1919 
134 1643, NAS RH15/45/31. For further examples of the relationship between Clerk and Paton, see 
correspondence and accounts 1643-1644, NAS GD18/2438 – this correspondence also mentioning 
Michel Mel, James Mowat and John Dougall. 
135 Contract, John Smith and John Clerk, 16 August 1634, Edinburgh, NAS GD18/2359 
136 For the grants by Louis XII in 1513 and Mary Queen of Scots in 1558 see H. Fenwick, The Auld 
Alliance (Kineton, 1971) preface; WP, II, 351. For further information on the laws governing the 
naturalization of foreigners in France in this period, see P. Sahlins, Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens 
in the old regime and after (Ithaca/London, 2004) and C. Wells, Law and Citizenship in Early Modern 
France (Baltimore, 1995), particularly Chapter 5, ‘The Transformation of Citizenship in the Seventeenth 
Century’, 94-120 
137 D. Duncan (ed.), History of the Union of Scotland and England, by Sir John Clerk of Penicuik 
(Edinburgh, 1993) 61. This can be compared to propagandist attitudes which prevail in works such as D. 
Defoe, A Dialogue between Whig and Tory, alias Williamite and Jacobite (London, 1693) 
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Certainly naturalisations were granted to Scots, for example to Thomas Pringle in 
Nantes between January and May 1620.138 Naturalisation of other Britons in France was 
evident, the Irishman Nathaniel Hooke obtaining letters of naturalisation in 1706 and 
having them confirmed in January 1720.139 ‘Lettres de naturalité’ were also granted to 
citizens of other European nations; at the beginning of the seventeenth century to Henri 
que Mendez de Quaros and Jérôme Mendez ‘de Portugal, domiciliés à Rouen’, and their 
wives and children.140 The skills for which some of these individuals were naturalised 
suggest the high level of Scottish activity, as Laurent Vauchek, who lived in Quillebeuf, 
was an ‘interprète des langues flamande et ecossaise’, and probably made himself useful 
to the French as a translator.141 The French in Scotland also continued to enjoy these 
privileges. In March 1707 it was declared that a Frenchman, John Hugueton, 
 
being well known in trade, and being desirous to settle in this Kingdom and to 
bring all his effects here in order to carry on trade…the said John Henry 
Huguetan and the Children of his Body…be to all intents and purposes 
whatsomever holden and repute, taken and esteemed a naturall born subject of 
the Kingdome.142 
 
In 1715, a Calais merchant approached the Earl of Stair, British Ambassador in France, 
taking ‘la liberté d’Ecrire à votre Excellence pour la supplier três Humblement de 
m’accorder un passeport par aller en angleterre…avec mon fils’.143 
 Data compiled by Françoise Bayard concerning naturalisation in Lyon between 
1594-1764 suggests that a greater number of merchants, when compared to professions 
such as priests, artists, craftsmen, students, doctors and soldiers, were naturalised during 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 January-May 1620, ADLA B 205 
139 DNB, volume XXVII, 949-50 
140 1604-5, ADSM C1263 
141 1604-5, ADSM C1263 
142 25 March 1707, APS, XI, 484 
143 30 October 1715, NAS GD135/141/4/145; Marquis of Wharton to the Duke of Mar, 2 December 1716, 
SP, III, 279. The settlement of the French in Scotland was not always peaceful. In 1559 it was reported 
that ‘since I came to Scotland, the French in Leith and Edinburgh, use such cruelties, that all Scots absent 
themselves: and they are like to drive their friends away…’: R. Melvyn to Croft, 15 December 1559, 
CSP, I, 275. Some French individuals who sought to settle in Scotland included: Francis Shammo, a 
feltmaker who in 1686 petitioned the Privy Council that he ‘haveing been bred all my lifetime in France 
att my imployment of making all sorts of hats, and being now forc’t to retire from my owne native 
countrey, and being informed there wes now manufacturie of hatts in this kingdom, I presume to make 
application to your Lordships, haveing the great encouragement of that excellent act of Parliament made 
by his sacred Majestie in favours of strangers quherby its expressly provided and declared that strangers 
setting up manufactories within this kingdome shall enjoy the whole priviledges of a native, as also be 
frie of any imposition, and that it shall be lawfull to them to sett up their manufactories…’ – and he was 
in due course naturalized as a Scot: 14 September 1686, RPCS, iii, XII, 450-1. In this case, it seems likely 
that Shammo was a Huguenot who had been driven out of France by persecution following the revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. 
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this period (Figure 3.1). While her calculations include only the Irish of the British 
nations, and focus only on Lyon, the higher total figures for merchants indicates that 
naturalisation among Scottish merchants was likely to be higher than those among the 
military, intellectual or religious classes:144 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Naturalisations by Profession: Lyon, 1594-1764 
 
Yet being naturalised did not necessarily benefit merchants’ business. In 1705 Staipaert, 
a Dutch merchant in Nantes, wrote to Michel Chamillart, the Controller-General of 
Finances, that ‘I am always included with the foreign merchants, even though I have 
been naturalised for 36 years and established here since 1660’, and the Intendant of 
Brittany confirmed in April that Staipaert, who was originally of Bruges, had been 
established at Nantes for 30 years and had a large commerce in wines and brandies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Bayard, ‘Naturalization in Lyon’, 296-7. Origins of individuals included in these figures are: Savoy, 
Florence, Milan, Piedmont, Lucca, Venice, Genoa, Papal States, France-Comté, Brese, Germany, 
Spanish/Austrian Netherlands, Lorraine, Switzerland, Ireland and the United Provinces. It is possible that 
Scotland is not included in these figures as no data exists, as Scots were automatically classed as 
naturalized foreigners in France. 
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there.145 Such an example, while of a Dutchman rather than a Scot, suggests that even 
when naturalisation was obtained this did not always place the individual on an equal 
footing with the indigenous population. 
 The level to which Scottish merchants became integrated into the indigenous 
population is well demonstrated by the actions of French merchants in Britain, who 
often chose to deal with Scottish merchants in France rather than their own countrymen. 
In December 1688 François Roux, ‘natif de Saint Malo, de present resident à Limérik, 
en Irlande, faisant profession de la religion catholique, apostolique et romaine’, bought 
l’Explication of Limerick from Jean Butler, a Scottish native settled in La Rochelle.146 It 
has been argued in the context of the trading relationship between Nantes and 
Rotterdam that partnerships between a Dutchman and a Frenchman were rare – that 
usually merchants operated within their own national communities.147 However, this did 
not seem to be the case within Franco-Scottish trading networks. A contract was drawn 
up in 1603 between George Christie of St Andrews, master of a ship called the St 
Michael, and the merchant brothers Jean and Jean Dorath from Bordeaux, for a joint 
return venture from Bordeaux to London. Although there is no mention of the nature of 
the cargo, the Dorath brothers financed 586 livres 11 sols – presumably Christie’s 
contribution was the use of his ship.148 Scotsmen continued to embark on transnational 
ventures despite government attempts to dissuade them; in 1665 Michel Mel made a 
successful supplication to the Privy Council to be allowed to embark on a voyage to 
France in the Margret of Diep with salmon and herring, ‘of which vessel the master 
skipper and whole company (except three Scotsmen [Walter Anderson, George Gorthy 
and James Fisher]) are Frenchmen’.149 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Sr. Staipaert to Michel Chamillart, 12 April 1705, AN G7 1507; Brennan, Burgundy to Champagne, 
305 n. 63 
146 30 December 1688, ADCM B222. Of course, this may simply have been a case of Butler being in the 
right place with desired merchandise. 
147 de Bruyn Kops, Spirited Exchange, 56 
148 30 May 1603, Bordeaux, NAS RH9/5/5.  
149 19 January 1665, Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, II, 5. In 1661 it had been ordained that ‘all ships belonging to 
Scotts that have not the Master of most part of the companie natives or inhabitants within the kingdome 
salbe reputit as forrengers’. ACL, IV, 155 
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VI. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
‘I am much pressed by your advysse of my friends 
to taik a great lodging to lodge out countrymen’.150 
 
The nature of the Scottish community in France bears some resemblance to Scottish 
expatriate communities elsewhere – for example, in operating through kith and kin 
networks and in becoming well integrated into the indigenous population. The depth of 
integration suggests that these expatriate Scots would have had a level of institutional 
support available to them – as Scottish communities in Stockholm, Gothenburg and the 
Netherlands did in this period. The Scottish Staple in the Netherlands has been 
described as a ‘centre for market advice and commercial intelligence’ and ‘invaluable to 
merchants abroad’ because of the social support network it offered in providing 
accommodation, advice and financial assistance to both visiting and settled 
merchants.151 Andrew Russell, James Gordon and other merchants in the Netherlands 
were bolstered by the strong presence of the Scottish Kirks in Rotterdam and Veere,152 
and there was obvious institutional support for the Scottish merchant community based 
at the Staple in the form of a resident chaplain – whose stipend was ‘payed by a 
contribution to be imposed upon the merchands goods that cummes to Camphear and no 
utherwayes’.153 When the Convention of Royal Burghs ratified the re-establishment of 
the trading staple at Dordrecht in 1669, provision was made for a Reformed church and 
an apothecary, as well as a well-maintained harbour and a night watch.154 Steve 
Murdoch has convincingly argued that many locations that hosted foreign communities 
had some form of institutional structure, which both lured Scots to that location initially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 James Mowat to John Clerk, 6 July 1655, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/7 
151 A. Cummings, ‘Scotland’s links with Europe, 1600-1800’ in History Today, XXXV (1985) 47 
152 A. Grosjean and S. Murdoch, ‘The Scottish Community in Seventeenth-Century Gothenburg’, in A. 
Grosjean and S. Murdoch (eds.), Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period (Leiden, 
2005) 191; R. Houston, ‘The Scots Kirk, Rotterdam, 1643-1795: a Dutch or Scottish Church?’ in J. 
Roding and L. van Voss (eds.), The North Sea and Culture, 1550-1800 (Hilversum, 1996); D. Catterall, 
‘The Rituals of Reformed Discipline: Managing Honor and Conflict in the Scottish Church of Rotterdam, 
1643-1665’ in Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte, XCIV (2003), 194-222; Catterall, Community Without 
Borders, 91; V. Enthoven, ‘Thomas Cunningham (1604-1669): Conservator of the Scottish Court at 
Veere’ in Dickson et. al. (eds.), Irish and Scottish Mercantile Networks in Europe and Overseas, 36 
153 Instructions to Alexander Jaffray, Baillie, January 1630, ACL, I, 313; see also Instructions to Sit 
Thomas Mengzes Cultis knicht provest of Aberdeen and George Nicolsoun Commissionaris, July 1619, 
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abuses practised in the Stepell’, 1670s, ACL, III, 175 
154 7 July 1669, CRB, III, 675-688. I would like to thank Claire McLoughlin (St Andrews) for alerting me 
to this entry. 
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and supported and protected them once they were there. In Stockholm, for example, 
Scottish entrepreneurs oversaw ore-mining and iron production, and became embedded 
in institutions such as the nobility, councils and parliament.155 In Gothenburg two seats 
were reserved on the city council for Scots and Thomas Cunningham, Scottish 
Conservator at Veere, became part of that city’s upper class and married into the local 
oligarchy.156 
 In some ways, Scottish mercantile activity in France reflected commercial 
structures elsewhere in Europe – for example, in the use of factors.157 Previous research 
into the Scottish community in Bordeaux has revealed some level of institutional 
support for Jacobite refugees – the Irish College, an institution sympathetic to Jacobites, 
was established in 1603. Murdoch has suggested that it is probable that any Scottish 
Jacobites would have retained links with members of this institution, although this has 
yet to be proven.158 In France, independent institutional support appears to have been 
more readily available. In July 1655 James Mowat wrote to John Clerk that ‘I am much 
pressed by your advysse of my freinds to taik a great lodging to lodge out countrymen, 
and others when they come’.159 Yet Murdoch convincingly argues that clear 
comparisons of the Scottish communities in France and in the Dutch Republic are 
impossible – primarily as Bordeaux, unlike the Dutch Republic, did not appear to host a 
sizeable enough static Scottish community within which to absorb Jacobite refugees.160 
In places such as the Netherlands and Sweden, a distinct expatriate Scottish community 
mirrored the community back home, offering individuals who were part of it a secure 
and distinctly Scottish environment in which to operate,161 although some traders within 
such communities also travelled around in order to facilitate the best deals, rather than 
remaining entirely static.162 By comparison the Scottish community in France operated 
more often through transient networks, rather than within geographically close-knit 
communities, with less institutional support and more onus being on the actions of the 	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individual.163 Zickermann’s investigation into Scottish communities in the Elbe-Weser 
region of northwest Germany reveals that in this location too, there was an absence of a 
centrally organized group of permanently settled Scottish merchants.164 
 However, some Scots did become involved in local government in France. In 
1670 Thomas Kirkpatrick, Secretary to the King of France, applied for a Scottish 
birthbrieve; as did James Pringle in 1672, giving his occupation as Councillor in Rennes 
in Brittany.165 James Pringle stated that he was the son of ‘the deceast Thomas Pringle 
Esquyre’ – likely the same Thomas Pringle naturalised in Nantes in 1620. In Bordeaux 
Scots testified on behalf of countrymen applying for passports to travel back to 
Scotland. Robert Gordon testified to the Admiralty of Bordeaux on behalf of William 
Ramsay in October 1717, stating that ‘Je certifie a Messieurs les officiers de l’amirauté 
et tout ceux a qu’il apartier que le nomme Guillaum Ramsay est Escossé de natione et 
qu’il desire se retuner cheq luy a Bordeaux’.166 In other testimonies, Gordon explicitly 
stated that the individual wished to return home, certifying in 1718 that ‘Jaques 
Strachen est Escossois de nation et qu’il souhaite se retirer dans son payé’.167 Gordon 
testified on behalf of his kinsman George in May 1718, as had J. Albertson in April 
1717.168 
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VII. THE EFFECT ON THE HOMELAND 
‘The grit hurt the natioun does suffer through occasioun of the factoures abroad.’169 
  
Scots used such established associations to retain strong connections with their home 
country, on many occasions functioning as ambassadors and acting in Scottish 
interests.170 In the Dutch Republic Scottish exiles formed a temporary community 
between 1660 and 1680, based largely around Rotterdam but with salient and transient 
members elsewhere.171 From the early 1680s, the influx into this community of 
individuals with the specific intent of influencing events at home arguably led to the 
Earls of Argyll’s and Monmouth’s invasions in Scotland and England in 1685.172 The 
Netherlands served as a convenient base from which the Swedes could send 
Covenanting supplies to Scotland in the 1630s and 1640s and Thomas Cunningham, 
factor at Veere, used his position to ship a sizable military supply to the Covenanters in 
1639 – an action noted by the Royalist Conservator, Patrick Drummond.173 Many Scots 
in Poland-Lithuania in this period contributed to the subsidy raised for Charles II in 
1651, even if for some this was under duress.174 
In contrast, there is little evidence to suggest that Scottish merchants in France 
actively intended or even desired to influence their homeland. Even among politically 
minded and religious Scots in France there seems to have been no real predilection to 
influence events at home,175 although there was some transnational influence in the 
religious sphere. In 1622 Robert Fleming, one of the bailies of Glasgow, delivered to 
Benjamin Basnage, of the general assembly of the Reformed Churches in France, £3565 
6s 8d collected in Glasgow for transmission to La Rochelle. The discharge is signed by 	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Basnage, but also by John ‘Makmach’, William Dick and James Speir.176 We have no 
evidence that Dick or Speir were tied to the merchant network, but can speculate that 
John Macmath was linked to the merchant family of the same name. Some Protestant 
Scots in France acted in support of the Restoration, Rev. Robert Douglas receiving a 
letter from Mr Sharp in France in 1660 stating that ‘the letters which are come from 
France, we intend to publish them, they will be of good use for the vindication of the 
King, whose restitution is most passionately desired by the protestant ministers there 
upon account of the protestant interest’, yet this does not include any evidence of 
merchant involvement.177 There are other occasional suggestions of merchants 
attempting to influence political issues, but these usually concerned English or Irish, 
rather than Scottish, individuals. For example, in 1570 Spanish intelligence reported ‘it 
is understood that some of the English traders in Calais had formed a plot with certain 
soldiers to deliver the town [back] to the English, but it was discovered’.178 Certainly 
these occurrences seem to have been few and far between among merchant Scots settled 
in France. 
The two Roberts, Gordon and Arbuthnot, acted as Jacobite financiers, and their 
participation in these roles stemmed from careers as successful merchants and bankers – 
in Rouen and Bordeaux respectively – positions which were established long before the 
outbreak of the Jacobite movement.179 In 1716, Robert Gordon was sent a list of thirty-
three people from Charles Stewart with an order to pay them a month’s subscription of 
585 livres, and to these were later added a further twenty names. Arbuthnot noted that 
these additional men, the crew of Captain David George’s ship the Bonaccord, had been 
lying in Bordeaux since February, ‘eating her provisions and being paid their full pay, 
and have done very little for it’.180 In 1716 Charles Carnegy wrote to Lord Panmure 
numerous times, stating that there ‘att present is a grat many more of our country of nott 
knowing how to subsist…I beg your lordships advice and assisting…I have not received 	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any of my subsistance from Mr [Robert] Gordon’.181 Gordon later complained to the 
Earl of Mar that 
 
I am sadly harrassed for want of money…I have got nothing for last month nor 
this from the Court. I do not grudge my pains and would as little grudge my 
money for the king’s service, but I shall not be able to serve if not supplied.182 
 
While Gordon may have sympathised with the Jacobite cause and, on occasion, donated 
significant amounts of money to it, he was not always prepared to assist out of his own 
pocket.183 
Instead, the priorities of these merchants appear to have been largely personal. It 
has previously been suggested that all Scots present in France during the Jacobite period 
were necessarily affiliated to the Stuart exile court, and that their presence in France 
was political, yet it is now understood that this was not the case.184 While some Scots 
involved in migrations to France in this period did attach themselves to the Stuart court, 
there were also notable numbers of ‘economic Jacobites’, who yearned for personal 
aggrandisement away from the political scene and led their lives separately from the 
exiled court.185 For example, the Irish family the Whites, based in Nantes, ran one of 
France’s largest tea-firms and managed a bustling contraband trade with Ireland. While 
part of the Jacobite emigré community there is no evidence of their being involved in 
any kind of sedition.186  Many simply wished to carry on their business undisturbed. 
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James Axton…a loyal subject to [King James], and a good Catholic…he only 
asks permission to continue to work at his trade of weaver at Paris, where he has 
already worked for several years, without giving cause of complaint to 
anybody.187 
 
One Moses Corbett in 1691 ‘declared he would trade to France in spite of anybody’,188 
demonstrating that commercial priority often outweighed dynastic or religious 
conviction, and the Letter-Book of James Wauchope from 1717 contains much 
commercial correspondence with Robert Gordon, but makes little mention of politics.189 
Individuals such as Andrew Russell evidently preferred to concentrate on their 
commercial interests, rather than turning their efforts towards politics.190 Although there 
were many connections between Scotland and France in this period which were 
Jacobite, they were not exclusively so,191 and despite assertions that ‘political 
affiliations were significant for the trading classes’ many individuals do not seem to 
have considered politics as they strived to make their living.192 Many who arrived on the 
continent chose to invest ‘dans des affaires commerciales, et pour beaucoup d’entre eux 
la première préoccupation fut de gagner de l’argent, de reconstituer leur fortune’.193 It is 
clear from examining correspondence between those in exile on the continent and their 
wives and families at home that, for many, political issues were not the most pressing 
matters. Even individuals such as the Countess of Stair and John Clerk junior 
corresponded primarily regarding personal concerns, despite having vested interests in 
the outcome of political upheaval.194 In 1715 the Countess of Stair thanked Clerk for 
‘your prettie cap and your brave big gooseberries’ and a month later for ‘your good bigg 
pears’.195 Many individuals in France demonstrate concern for personal well-being; an 
anonymous letter from 1720, from a husband home to his wife, says ‘there is one 	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exsellant ocasion for yr coming to Pareis, as Charlie tells me he advis’d you too…I am 
told 40 per cent can still be made’.196 
It is arguably such attitudes that have led to the merchant being distrusted; the 
physiocrat François Quesnay in his l’Analyse accused the merchant of trying to ‘buy out 
at the lowest possible price and to sell at the highest possible price, so as to make his 
gain as high as possible at the expense of the nation: his individual interest and that of 
the nation are opposed’.197 The Convention of Royal Burghs complained in 1630 of 
 
the grit hurt the natioun does suffer through occasioun of the factoures abroad 
who haiveing thair meanes and educatioun frome the merchandis of this 
countrey yit proves so unthankfull that they becum altogidder negligent of all 
deutye ather to thair native cuntrey or merchandis, that hes imployed theme, and 
by maryeing with straingeris becumes altogether alienants and straingeris.198 
 
In Rouen at the turn of the century similar concerns were raised that  
 
since the sole purpose of merchants is to make profits and become wealthy 
without regard to the welfare of the state, their actions may prove prejudicial to 
the nation as a whole. The Council [of Trade] therefore, should endeavour to 
ascertain [and then to encourage] whatever lines of trade are likely to prove most 
beneficial to the state.199 
 
In 1713 the Flying-Post reported that ‘the private Interest of a few Men’ corrupted 
British trade with France,  
 
for there ever was, and will be some in the World, that always value nothing but 
private or particular Gain, although such may be a ruin to the fair Merchant or 
Trader, and bring a general Calamity upon Trade in all its Parts.200 
 
However, merchants had a positive effect on their native economy even when 
they did not intend to do so. Perhaps this was why Adam Smith, looking back on 
commercial history from his eighteenth-century vantage point, was such a supporter of 
the private entrepreneur:  
 
By directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of greatest 
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led 	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by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.  Nor 
is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it.  By pursuing his 
own interests he frequently promotes that of the society more effectively than 
when he really intends to promote it.201 
 
One way in which merchants inadvertently assisted the Scottish economy was by the 
repatriation of capital back to Scotland, as touched upon above and in the previous 
chapter in the context of gifts being sent to family and friends. John Black and the 
Temperance of Anstruther spent 1602-1603 sailing between Boston in Lincolnshire and 
Bordeaux, and in February 1603 Black shipped 200 quarters of malt and beans from 
Boston to Leith. His earnings from months of Anglo-French voyages were therefore 
repatriated to Scotland in kind.202 If we assume that he was not the only individual to 
embark on such ventures and eventually return with his earnings to Scotland, Scotland’s 
trading account must have been substantially enlarged as a result. Clerk’s purchase of 
the barony of Penicuik came as a direct result of money he made in France, from 
beginning as an apprentice in 1634 to returning home a wealthy man over a decade 
later. In 1701 the Aberdeen merchant Robert Gerard wrote to an ‘RA’ in Bordeaux, 
highlighting the importance of Bordeaux to the cloth manufactory in Aberdeen and 
asking his correspondent to ‘advise me if thow please what may be most vendible with 
yow at this tyme’, in this case the types of cloth being manufactured in Aberdeen being 
directly influenced by foreign trade.203 Internationally the merchant community (not just 
Scots) impacted upon the way in which individuals, communities and governments 
operated. For example, the bill of exchange ‘started life as a way of paying for traded 
goods but had long since been transformed into a means by which governments could 
move money within their own borders and abroad’.204 Indeed, it has been recognised 
that expatriates often fundamentally altered local business practices.205 
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document to my attention. 
204 G. Rowlands, ‘France 1709: Le Crunch’ in History Today (2009) 44 
205 Dickson, ‘Introduction’, 4. Chapters 1, 3, 5 and 6 of this volume particularly highlight this: Hancock, 
‘Combining Success and Failure: Scottish Networks in the Atlantic Wine Trade’, 5-38; J. Parmentier, 
‘‘The Sweets of Commerce’: The Hennessys of Ostend and their Networks in the Eighteenth Century’, 
67-92; G. Saupin, ‘Les Réseaux Commerciaux des Irlandais de Nantes sous le Règne de Louis XIV’, 115-
146; L. Müller, ‘Scottish and Irish Entrepreneurs in Eighteenth-Century Sweden’, 147-174 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Examination of merchant networks of Scots in France reveals that their situation was 
quite unique when compared to other European locations where research has thus far 
been undertaken, although in some ways mirroring that in northern Germany. Scottish 
communities in France seem to have been less static, more transient and less interested 
in using their position abroad to influence matters at home, and any economic benefits 
were largely inadvertent. Networks of merchant Scots in France were both organised 
and lucrative, suggestive of the state of Franco-Scottish trade in general in this period. 
What has been perceived as ‘disorganisation’ in fact meant that, rather than been 
confined to a geographically static community, the Scottish merchant community in 
France was wide-ranging, perhaps more flexible, and as a result encompassed a wide 
range of commercial opportunities. Moreover, the claim – made by contemporary 
polemicists and reinforced by modern scholarly commentators – that the activities of 
commercial agents had no economic benefits for either France or Scotland and that they 
harmed the native economy must now be questioned. 
 Furthermore, assumptions regarding network hierarchy need to be adjusted. 
While commercial agents such as John Clerk were instrumental in facilitating business 
connections, all individuals involved in trading routes should be granted consideration – 
one unreliable person could result in problems throughout the network. Moreover, 
without vintners or consumers at either end of the spectrum, the actions of merchants 
themselves would be made somewhat void. The importance of family connections also 
requires further evaluation. While family connections remained important, many 
individuals acted outwith these links, building relationships both with other Scots and 
throughout the indigenous population. Indeed, we have examined instances where 
merchants chose not to take advantage of familial connections, or where they felt they 
were disadvantaged by them, in the case of John Dougall. 
This and the preceding chapter have examined the methods used by Scottish 
merchants in France to conduct trade in this period, and the ways in which they used 
commercial networks to their advantage. In Part II, we turn to specific ‘crises’ of the 
long seventeenth century, focusing on those which have traditionally been seen as the 
most detrimental to Scotland’s overseas trade, particularly with France, in this period. 
The following chapters will ask how successfully Scottish merchants in France were 
able to use their skills at adapting their trading methods, routes, commodities and 
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personnel in order to circumvent embargoes caused by war and diplomacy, and question 
whether the prosperity achievable during peacetime was also attainable during times of 
conflict. 
PART II: CONFLICT AND COMMERCE 
 
‘If commerce had to accommodate itself to war, it is equally true that in 
certain circumstances war had to accommodate itself to commerce’.1 
 
It has been argued that in seventeenth-century Britain, unlike in the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries, there was no purpose or coherence to foreign policy and no 
consistent or widely accepted foreign enemy. Further, it has been said that none of the 
Stuart Kings, nor Cromwell, had any real expertise in trade and commerce.2 
Undoubtedly, the seventeenth century was a period of conflict.3 Internationally and 
domestically, wars and changes in policy meant that the parameters within which 
merchants conducted trade changed regularly. This, as discussed in Part I, at times gave 
rise to confusion regarding legislation governing trade, often exacerbated by the 
perception of merchants of whether legislation was applicable to them. Legislation and 
restrictions on trade aside, the very fact that the nation was at war created problems for 
all those who participated in overseas commerce, as the crown needed extra revenue – 
often raised through increased taxes and customs duties – to furnish ships and recruit 
men for service. 
In Part I, the legislation affecting merchants, the commodities they traded and 
the methods and networks used by them as they pursued commerce between Scotland 
and France during the long seventeenth century were examined. Part II considers how 
these methods were implemented during specific ‘periods of crisis’ that characterised 
the seventeenth century. Chapter 4 examines the effect of domestic crises on overseas 
trade, considering for example the prolonged Wars of Religion in France. Its focus, 
however, is the domestic situation in Scotland throughout the British Civil Wars (1638-
1660), incorporating the Interregnum (1649/1651-1660). Chapters 5 and 6 then focus on 
the effect of international conflict. The Franco-Stuart conflicts, including the Scottish 
declaration of war in 1627, the failed British expeditions to La Rochelle and events up 
to the peace agreed at Susa on 24 April 1629, and the 1666-67 conflict which took place 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J. Ball, Merchants and Merchandise: the expansion of trade in Europe, 1500-1630 (London, 1977) 45 
2 G. Howat, Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy (London, 1974) 1, 5 
3 There has been ongoing debate among historians regarding a general ‘crisis’ of the seventeenth century. 
There is not room to go into these historiographical arguments here, but see E. Hobsbawn, ‘The Crisis of 
the Seventeenth Century’ in Past and Present, V-VI (1954); H. Trevor-Roper, ‘The General Crisis of the 
Seventeenth Century’ in Past and Present, XVI (1959); G. Parker and L. Smith (eds.), The General Crisis 
of the Seventeenth Century (London, 1978) 
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as part of the second Anglo-Dutch War, are discussed in Chapter 5. Here, the apparent 
antipathy of the authorities responsible for upholding restrictions on trade implemented 
during these conflicts, such as the Privy Council and the High Court of Admiralty, is 
considered. Questions are also asked regarding the attitude of the authorities and of 
Scots more generally during the Franco-Stuart wars – in particular whether Scotland 
became involved in ‘England’s’ war or fought on her own terms. Chapter 6 considers 
the external conflicts fought after the final capitulation of the Stuart monarchy in 1688, 
including William of Orange’s usurpation of the British throne in the Glorious 
Revolution, 1688-1689, his anti-French policies and wars on France as part of the Nine 
Years’ War (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession under Queen Anne 
(1702-1713). The changing political situations in both Scotland and France will 
inevitably feature in both of these chapters, although certain elements – for example the 
effect of the British Unions, or the Jacobite movement, do not form a key part of the 
discussion here. Of course, their ramifications are inevitably considered where 
applicable to the question of ‘Conflict and Commerce’ – for example, the fact that it 
was the unions that have led scholars to believe that Scotland did not act independently 
during the ‘British’ wars, or that affiliation (or otherwise) to Jacobitism affected 
individuals’ commercial activity. 
 By placing legislation and restrictions on trade in their proper context, and by 
examining how merchants pursued commerce in the face of adversity, a fuller 
understanding of both the specific Franco-Scottish relationship and the wider European 
economic situation can be gleaned. As stated by Adam Smith, the actions undertaken 
and the profits made by individual merchants often had an effect on the economic 
situation of the nation, even if the merchants themselves did not envisage it,4 and as one 
merchant stated during the height of the Nine Years’ War: ‘I will trade to France, in 
spite of anybody’.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Edinburgh, 1863) 115-116 
5 Moses Corbett, 1691, CSPD, 1690-1, 479 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
‘Civill War ruines Trade faster than any other’:1 
Domestic Conflict and Continuation of Commerce, 1560-c.1660 
 
Now there is no greater enemy to Trade than War, be it in what Countrey it 
will…Yet forraigne war is not so great a disturber of Trade, nor halfe so 
destructive, as intestine; For as the fire that’s kindled within doores, and in the 
bed-straw, as it were, rageth more violently: so civill War ruines Trade faster 
than any other.2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Voyages between Aberdeen and France, 1597-1670 
 
The above data, detailing ships both entering and departing the port of Aberdeen on 
voyages from or to France in the first part of the seventeenth century, suggests that this 
particular route of Franco-Scottish trade was affected by domestic upheaval.3 There is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J. Battie, The Merchants Remonstrance (London, 1648) HL 434906, 2 
2 Ibid. 
3 Data compiled from ASWA, passim. It should be noted that the pattern of French trade with the port of 
Aberdeen, when both entries and departures are considered, follows that of overseas trade from Aberdeen 
generally, indicating that Franco-Scottish trade was not affected in a particularly distinct way to trade 
between Aberdeen and other overseas destinations. ASWA, passim; T. Devine, ‘The Cromwellian Union 
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significant lull at the time of the Union of Crowns and a distinct fall during the British 
Civil Wars, with figures improving significantly after the Restoration. While it has been 
stated that in the seventeenth century ‘stumbling foreign policies had repercussions on 
domestic affairs’, whereas in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries domestic events 
dictated the course of foreign policy,4 the long seventeenth century too saw domestic 
events in both Scotland and France affect not only foreign policy but also the ways in 
which commerce between these countries was conducted. 
The assumption that France was necessarily the dominant participant in the Auld 
Alliance has already been questioned (Chapter 1), and claims that the seventeenth 
century was economically a ‘golden age’ for France require similar re-evaluation.5 
Despite being geographically blessed with a long coastline, harbours, forests and a large 
sea-faring population, it has been argued that France remained ‘tragically 
underdeveloped’ at the beginning of the seventeenth century, with a ‘tiny and 
ineffective’ merchant and war fleet and disparate regional and local economies.6 
Internal government was preoccupied with continental issues and France lacked 
established mercantile dynasties, due to negative attitudes surrounding participation in 
trade fostered by both the nobility and those merchants successful enough to gain social 
elevation on the back of their trading activities.7 While the noblesse were never 
officially excluded from commerce, entrenched attitudes discouraged their participation 
until 1664, when an edict was passed that permitted nobles to enter the East and West 
India companies and the customary laws of Brittany and the privileges of Lyon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and the Scottish Burghs’ in J. Butt and J. Ward, Scottish Themes: essays in honour of Professor S. G. E. 
Lythe (Edinburgh, 1976) 5 
4 G. Howat, Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy (London, 1974) 2 
5 F. Palm, ‘The Seige and Capture of La Rochelle in 1628: its Economic Significance’ in the Journal of 
Political Economy, XXXI (1923) 115 
6 P. Hoffman, ‘Rural, Urban and Global Economies’ in M. Holt (ed.), Renaissance and Reformation 
France, 1500-1648 (Oxford, 2002) 74, 85-6; R. Knecht, Richelieu (Essex, 1991) 150; D. Parker, La 
Rochelle and the French Monarchy: Conflict and Order in Seventeenth Century France (London, 1980) 
61; T. Munck, Seventeenth Century Europe, 1598-1700 (Basingstoke, 1990) 31. It has been argued that 
comparatively, Scotland was disadvantaged in that she lacked the resources to match her desire to trade – 
for example, she was richly endowed with fisheries, yet did not have the resources to exploit this 
effectively: I. Whyte, Scotland’s Society and Economy in Transition, c. 1500-c. 1760 (Hampshire, 1997) 
144 
7 For further details on these attitudes see R. Grassby, ‘Social Status and Commercial Enterprise under 
Louis XIV’ in R. Kierstead, State and Society in Seventeenth Century France (New York, 1975) 200, 
202; W. Scoville, ‘The French Economy in 1700-1701: an Appraisal by the Deputies of Trade’ in Journal 
of Economic History, XXII (1962) 246; G. Brunelle, The New World Merchants of Rouen, 1557-1630 
(Missouri, 1991) 165; Hoffman, ‘Rural, Urban and Global Economies’, 63-4 
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recognised that nobility and business were compatible.8 Despite progress under Colbert, 
however, and a reiteration of these policies in 1669, such attitudes prevailed in France 
until the turn of the eighteenth century, at which time one of the deputies of the Council 
of Trade noted that ‘one has only to become a merchant to be held in contempt’.9 By 
contrast, noted the deputies, the English (and the Scots) had a much healthier attitude to 
trade, with nobles often apprenticing their younger sons to merchants – it was not 
uncommon for these sons to become wealthier than the eldest, who had inherited the 
family estate.10 
Before the seventeenth century France’s infrastructure was not conducive to 
successful mercantile activity.11 Historically, the French crown manipulated the 
coinage, spent little on roads and canals and distrusted the middlemen who would have 
allowed trade to extend into the countryside. They also condoned the behaviour of the 
guilds, which although encouraging trade to a degree taxed heavily and limited 
competition among manufacturers, ensuring that prices of French goods remained high 
and therefore unattractive to potential foreign buyers.12 The willingness of the French to 
allow their strongest economic competitors – the Dutch – a monopoly over the carrying 
trade in the first half of the seventeenth century was arguably an effect of France’s 
inherent economic weaknesses.13 In the regions in which France did have some success 
in commerce and manufacturing, this was limited and often temporary. Lyon, for 
example, was the focal point for European finance and Italian trade in the sixteenth 
century, but her status declined following the Wars of Religion and the development of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Voltaire, (M. Pollock, trans.), The Age of Louis XIV (London, 1958) 322; C. Cole, Colbert and a century 
of French mercantilism, 2 volumes (London, 1964) I, 384. For more on the Asian trade see P. Haudere, 
'The French India Company and its trade in the eighteenth century' in S. Chaudhury and M. Morineau, 
(eds.), Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era (Cambridge, 1999); 
R. Indrani, The French East India Company and the Trade of the Indian Ocean: A Collection of Essays 
edited by Lakshmi Subramanian (New Delhi, 1999) 
9 Scoville, ‘French Economy’, 246-7 
10 Ibid; Knecht, Richelieu, 150. Nonetheless, French merchants did operate within family networks. The 
personal correspondence of the Bordeaux merchants Anthoine and Pierre Filheau, 1663-1728, shows that 
they did business with nephews, sons and brothers, as well as operating in partnership with each other: 
ADG 7 B 2548 
11 R. Bonney, The King’s Debts: Finance and Politics in France, 1589-1661 (Oxford, 1981) 272, 280. 
For more on France’s commercial infrastructure see E. Levasseur, Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 
volumes (Paris, 1911) I, 313-363 (seventeenth century) and 440-459 (eighteenth century). 
12 Hoffman, ‘Rural, Urban and Global Economies’, 74, 79-80; P. Benedict, Rouen During the Wars of 
Religion (Cambridge, 1981) 17; R. Mackenney, Tradesmen and Trades: the world of the guilds in Venice 
and Europe, c.1250-c.1650 (London, 1987) xii, 1; R. C. Nash, ‘The Economy’ in J. Bergin (ed.), The 
Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2001) 46 
13 P. Bamford, ‘French Shipping in Northern European Trade, 1660-1789’ in Journal of Modern History, 
XXXVI  (1954) 207-208. Under Louis XIV, the French finally began to counter this monopoly, and by 
1690, with the exception of Baltic traffic, most French commerce was being carried in French, not Dutch 
ships – including colonial trade. W. Doyle, The Old European Order, 1660-1800 (Oxford, 1992) 2 
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more accessible financial markets elsewhere – for example in Antwerp.14 Trading 
centres such as Rouen, Nantes, Bordeaux and La Rochelle could arguably not compete 
with those in Antwerp, Lisbon, Seville and Amsterdam, and none of the merchants in 
France generated enough business to have a significant impact on regional or national 
economy.15 
 
I. DOMESTIC CONFLICT IN FRANCE 
‘Be ressoun of the civile trouble and Insurrectioun 
quilk hes Intervenit within the cuntrey of france.’16 
 
When considering the effects of both domestic and international conflict, care must be 
taken to account for natural developments in policy. As one scholar succinctly put it 
when considering the consequences of the French Wars of Religion, ‘the principal 
difficulty in assessing the economic impact of half a century of civil wars is 
distinguishing between what was the result of civil wars and what was simply the result 
of half a century’.17 However, direct effects of civil war on commerce can be discerned 
in both France and Scotland during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many 
scholars have examined the French Wars of Religion from both domestic and 
international viewpoints.18 Civil war in France arguably ‘killed the only major centre of 
international commerce and finance’ and ‘paralyzed French economic initiative in the 
critical latter half of the sixteenth century’.19 During the wars, particularly following the 
Massacre of St Bartholomew’s Day in August 1572 and later the Revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes in 1685, many Huguenots fled the country and sought work elsewhere, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Hoffman, ‘Rural, Urban and Global Economies’, 67, 95, 96; Mackenney, Tradesmen, 177 
15 Hoffman, ‘Rural, Urban and Global Economies’, 68 
16 4 March 1596, APS, IV, 112-3 
17 M. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629 (Cambridge, 1995) 193 
18 For example see R. Knecht, The French Wars of Religion, 1559-1598 (London/New York, 1989) 84-
98; Holt, Wars, 191-214 
19 J. Ball, Merchants and Merchandise: the expansion of trade in Europe, 1500-1630 (London, 1977) 
191; J. Condliffe, The Commerce of Nations (London, 1951) 59. The Wars of Religion coincided with the 
end of a period of extended economic growth precipitated by the arrival of large sums of money from the 
New World. Climate change also led to harsh winters and poor harvests in 1565, 1570, 1573, 1585, 1586 
and 1588, and by the 1590s plague was widespread. The presence of soldiers in France exacerbated these 
problems as they spoiled land and stole crops to feed to their horses. Holt, Wars, 194, 198-9; Knecht, 
Wars, 90-93. Efforts to alleviate the shortage of grain by importing Baltic rye were hampered by English 
privateering: the English were feeling the effects of the bad weather and specifically targeted grain ships 
to combat their own shortage. 
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depriving France of skilled individuals and contributing to economic hardship which 
exacerbated Catholic hostility towards Protestantism.20 
It has been argued that the division of France into regions of Catholic and 
Protestant influence in some ways played into the hands of the Scots as many of their 
traditional haunts (for example La Rochelle and Dieppe) became strongholds of 
Protestantism.21 The impact of political occurrences has been shown to have had a 
marked impact on the religious make-up of certain areas. For example, after the siege of 
La Rochelle, 1627-1628, this location and particularly its trading links to New France 
slowly became Catholicised.22 While it has been claimed that the business arrangements 
in which Catholics and Huguenots collaborated were due to ‘the pressure of economic 
circumstance’ – out of necessity rather than choice – both Protestants and Catholics 
continued to trade in this location.23 As well as seeking refuge in sympathetic locations 
some merchants adapted their religious affiliation. In 1665 Alexander Strachan saw 
religious conversion as the key to commercial success: ‘for Mr Alexander its [sic.] some 
17 years since he came to France: he had nothing imaginable. Seing he could make no 
fortune unless he turned his coat, he turned Papist’.24 Despite such precedent however, 
and the fact that the importance of religious fellowship has been (over-) emphasised,25 
most Scottish merchants did not choose locations based on religion and such 
considerations have recently been demonstrated to have been a much weaker motivation 
for most Scots than previously assumed.26 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Condliffe, Commerce, 59. William Scoville’s study on the effect of Huguenot persecution on France’s 
economy and trading relationships provides detailed discussions of this and related issues: W. Scoville, 
Persecution of Huguenots and French economic development 1680-1720 (California, 2006) passim. 
Scoville concludes that while Huguenots did flee persecution particularly following the Revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes, no more than 10% of the Huguenot population fled, and that those that remained worked 
to strengthen their economic position: 445. His discussion of the relative effects of Huguenot persecution 
in different French ports is also enlightening: 253-260 
21 S. Lythe, The Economy of Scotland in its European Setting, 1550-1625 (Edinburgh/London, 1960) 171 
22 J. Bosher, ‘The Gaigneur Clan in the Seventeenth Century Canadian Trade’ in O. Janzen (ed.), 
Merchant Organization and Maritime Trade in the North Atlantic, 1660-1815 (Newfoundland, 1998) 23-
4 
23 Bosher, ‘Gaigneur Clan’, 36 
24 S. Murdoch, Network North: Scottish kin, commercial and covert association in Northern Europe, 
1603-1746 (Leiden, 2006) 88-93 
25 I. Steele, ‘Introduction’ to Janzen (ed.), Merchant Organization, 3; Bosher, ‘Gaigneur Clan’, 15-16, 20 
26 Changing confessional affiliation in order to circumvent commercial or political restrictions was 
neither new nor confined to merchants. S. Talbott, ‘‘My Heart is a Scotch Heart’: Scottish Calvinist 
Exiles in France in their Continental Context, 1605-1638’ in D. Worthington (ed.), Emigrants and Exiles 
from the Three Kingdoms in Europe, 1603-1688 (Leiden, 2010) 197-214, considers the extent to which 
religious affiliation affected Scots in France in this period in varying capacities, including military, 
intellectual and commercial. H. de Bruyn Kops, A Spirited Exchange: the wine and brandy trade between 
France and the Dutch Republic in its Atlantic Framework, 1600-1650 (Leiden, 2007) 70, 105 
demonstrates that in spite of official rules, Dutchmen in Nantes were not refused naturalisation based on 
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Many merchants continued to trade regardless of France’s internal conflict, and 
David Wedderburne’s continuing activity during this period has already been examined 
(Chapter 2). Moreover, this was carried out with the knowledge of the French monarch, 
who in 1584 wrote to the diplomat Monsieur de Castelnau that ‘my intention was, that 
the Scottish merchants might exercise their trade in my kingdom, in all freedom and 
surety, with no harassment or extortion’.27 Later in the century, despite the Fronde 
being said to have gone hand in hand with a severe economic crisis,28 Michel Mel wrote 
from Dieppe and Le Havre to Sir Gilbert Menzies of Pitfoddels, one of his regular 
customers, regarding shipments of salmon from Aberdeen to France in the midst of this 
conflict. On one occasion Mel wrote of the political situation in France: 
 
heir we have the civill wars the prince of condi with a strong army cum near al 
saith but has retired & we houp sal not harme uss any more…at see [sic.] the 
dangers ar much great for we have nothing bot taking of schips…the marchands 
have nead of a more setled tyme god graunt it.29 
 
Despite these concerns, however, other letters in this collection of correspondence from 
Mel to Pitfodels, which dates from 1652-1659, make no mention of interruption to 
commerce, and these merchants were not deterred from trading.30 
The effect of civil war in France on Franco-Scottish trade inevitably had an 
impact on attitudes towards the Auld Alliance. In March 1596 the Scottish Parliament 
outlined its concerns: 
 
Quhill now of lait that sindrie Impoistis and Exactionis hes bene rased of the 
guidis of the saidis maircheantis of this realme, be ressoun of the civile trouble 
and Insurrectioun quilk hes Intervenit within the cuntrey of france thir divers 
yeiris bigane, be the qlk forme of doing his majestie finding the said auld league 
tobe sumquhat infringeit and alterit and the saidis maircheantis of this Realme 
thairby gritlie prejugeit.31 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
religious affiliation. In order to become naturalised in Scotland however, Frenchman were bound to 
adhere to the Protestant religion. Both Abrahame Turrin, a hatmaker from Rouen, and the feltmaker 
Francis Shammo had to testify to the Privy Council that there were ‘of the Protestant reformed religion’ 
before naturalisation, although of course this may have been lip-service: 14 September, October 1686, 
Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, XII, 450-1, 478 
27 Henri III to Monsieur de Castelnau, 9 May 1584, A. Teulet, Relations Politiques de la France et de 
l'Espagne avec l'Écosse au XVIe Siècle (1515 - 1561), 5 volumes (Paris, 1862) II, 647 
28 de Bruyn Kops, Spirited Exchange, 49 
29 Michel Mel to Pitfodels, 16 September 1653, Dieppe, NAS GD237/11/200/8 
30 Michel Mel to Pitfodels, Dieppe and Le Havre, NAS GD237/11/200 
31 4 March 1596, APS, IV, 112-3 
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Parliament acted on these concerns, instructing John Lindsay of Balcarres, the king’s 
secretary, to go to France ‘to procuir at his said darrest brutheris handis a speciall 
discharge of the saidis impostis and exactionis and to have the auld liberties and 
previlegeis of the saidis mercheantis of this realme observit’.32 Despite the effect on his 
commercial interests James VI offered support to the French King during these 
conflicts. In 1590, as Henri IV was engaged in trying to win back Paris from the hands 
of the Catholic League, James wrote to the Viscount of Turenne that 
 
since the present danger of France…your master may count upon the whole of 
our forces, means or credit for the advancement of this most just and holy war, 
which manifestly also touches us closely, by reason of the ancient alliance 
between our crowns and the holy and firm bond of our religion.33 
 
James wrote to the German Princes in an attempt to expedite the sending of succour to 
Henri IV, and promised to send 3000 Scots to serve in France if it became necessary.34 
Though evidence for the period is somewhat sparse, it is clear that trade continued 
between the two nations while civil war ravaged France and that the two monarchies 
continued to maintain a close relationship. Their alliance was sealed by treaty in 1606, 
once Henri gained total control of his kingdoms.35 From a Franco-Scottish perspective, 
the British Civil Wars were perhaps more complicated, having more of an impact on the 
relationship between the auld allies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid. 
33 James VI to the Viscount of Turenne, Holyrood, [26] December 1590, WP, II, 147-8 [my emphasis] 
34 Robert Bowes to Lord Burghley, 26 December 1590, Edinburgh, CSP, X, 441; WP, II, 147-8. The 
German Princes concluded that James ‘intended no further treaty for peace, but rather wished succours to 
be sent to the French king for defence of the common cause endangered, but without looking for other 
answers to the articles proposed by his ambassadors’. See ODNB entry for Colville, James, first Lord 
Colville of Culross (c.1551–1629); S. Murdoch, ‘The April 1640 Committee: The Projection and 
Reflection of the Covenanting Revolution’ in M. Landi (ed.), L’Écosse et ses Doubles; Ancien Monde, 
Nouveau Monde (Rives, forthcoming) 2. I am grateful to Steve Murdoch (St Andrews) for sharing this 
research with me prior to its publication. 
35 Articles concluded at Paris the xxiiij of February 1605, stylo Angliae, by commissioners of the high 
and mightie kings, James by the grace of God King of Great Britaine, France, and Ireland, defender of 
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 131	  
II. CASE STUDY I: THE BRITISH CIVIL WARS, 1639-1649 
‘The great prejudice of trade, not only to the Staple, 
but also to France and other places’.36 
 
The British Civil Wars (1639-1660) were an intricate web of political, economic and 
social upheaval, which many scholars have attempted to unravel.37 This series of 
conflicts pitched Charles I against a variety of opponents within his own dominions, 
including the Scottish and English Parliamentarians and the Irish Confederates. The 
wars also saw the two British parliaments come together as allies under the Solemn 
League and Covenant (1643-1647) and fight against each other (1648, 1649-1651). 
While this conflict was a domestic one, involvement of overseas nations was perhaps 
inevitable. From the very beginning of the conflict the Irish Confederates worked 
alongside the notorious Dunkirk privateers, and Ireland’s privateering armada was 
almost exclusively composed of Dunkirk frigates.38 In November 1639 a ship of Gilbert 
Aikman was ‘taken by the Irish frigatis and dunkirkeries’39 and in 1648 the Dunkirkers 
sank a ship belonging to Gilbert Andersone that was en route to Bordeaux.40 Some 
individuals lost cargos to this partnership on more than one occasion, Andersone having 
20 tuns of wine ‘caste away in Bichebay’ in 1648,41 and George Aikman losing a cargo 
worth 3000 merks plus 16,000 merks worth of salmon to Dunkirkers in 1639 and 
having ‘ane schip of Aberdein…with 15 last Salmon’ taken in 1648.42 A ‘schip 
belonging to the Forth’, of which Andrew Burnet was merchant, was taken to Dunkirk 
with 45 lasts of salmon and the merchandise was ransomed for 26,000 (currency not 	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123. For a detailed discussion of Irish Privateering during the Civil Wars see Ibid., 119-133; for a detailed 
examination of activities at sea on all sides from an Irish perspective see E. Murphy, ‘‘No Affair before 
us of Greater Importance’: The War at Sea in Ireland, 1641-1649’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, Trinity 
College Dublin, 2007), especially Chapters 5, 6 and 7, 174-279 
39 Report for the commission for trying the losses of Aberdeen, 6 December 1648, ACL, III, 115 
40 Report for the commission for trying the losses of Aberdeen, 6 December 1648, ACL, III, 121; S. 
Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas? Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513-1713 (Leiden, 2010) Appendix V:2, 
384. At this point Dunkirk was temporarily under French control, having been captured from the Spanish 
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specified).43 Several merchants were assisted by foreign powers. Throughout these 
conflicts the Dutch were instrumental in providing British ships with false papers that 
allowed them to continue trading (Chapter 2). As the Wars of the Three Kingdoms 
began to be fought at sea the States General declared the United Provinces neutral, 
facilitating the acquisition of false papers and allowing foreign ships refuge in Dutch 
ports. The Dutch benefited from their neutral ‘participation’ in this conflict, selling arms 
and ammunition to all sides and seeing a rise in the number of English ships paying 
anchor money at Veere after 1641, as rebellion in Ireland broke out in Ulster in October 
and the first civil war in England erupted in January 1642.44 
Such a lengthy, widespread conflict inevitably impinged on British commercial 
activity. In 1640 a report to the Aberdeen Council spoke of 
 
the imminent danger we now stand in, we thought gude first to let yow know 
that the Englishe (whether freebuitters or the kingis ships we know not) have 
takine sindrie of our Scotishmen comming from Holland and France and have 
confiscate ther gudis and schippis stript ther men naked and used them with all 
kynd of hostilitie.45 
 
In 1645 Thomas Cunningham observed that ‘our Staple ships, being affrighted from 
comming to Sea, because of the many Irish and other men of warre, and for want of 
convoyes from Scotland to the great prejudice of trade, not only to the Staple, but also 
to France and other places’.46 When Cunningham visited Scotland in 1648 he observed 
‘a very great quantity of all sort of native commodities lying upon merchants hands 
ready to spoile in Scotland, for not daring to venture them in regard of the many Irish, 
and Dunkirk pirates’.47 Alongside negative consequences for individuals the Civil Wars 
allegedly ‘retarded national industrial development’, affecting the nation as much as the 
natives.48 French views of the Civil Wars saw them as similarly destructive; Voltaire 	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stated that ‘this civil war…prevented England for a time from interesting herself in the 
concerns of her neighbours, she lost alike her prosperity and her reputation; her trade 
was suspended’.49 The local effect of the wars made itself evident, as the Council of 
Aberdeen petitioned central government that as a result of the debt created by war ‘this 
place is become so miserable that almost ther is non in it that can subsist or have any 
liveing’.50 Financial repercussions of ‘the late troubles’ were still prevalent in August 
1675, when 32 noblemen and heritors of Aberdeenshire consented to a tax on ale, beer, 
wine, brandy and strong waters ‘for relief of the publick debts’ that had resulted from 
the conflict.51 Official records suggest that trade stagnated during the 1640s. The 
Scandinavian Sound Toll Registers show that while 98 Scottish ships on average per 
annum sailed through the Sound between 1625-1630 (eastwards and westwards), this 
figure dropped to 56 between 1644 and 1649.52 Trade through the commercial centre of 
Aberdeen fell during the civil war years with an average of 83 entries and departures per 
year (from/to all destinations) for the period 1643-1649, compared to an average of 126 
per year between 1620 and 1625.53 We saw at the beginning of this chapter that this fall 
manifested itself in voyages specifically to and from France. 
Problems were also experienced in the exchange of information. John Clerk of 
Penicuik wrote to Janet Gray in November 1645 that he had 
 
resavet a letter fra Mr William Rires date at Newliston, 6 September last, in 
which he wreat that long ago he had wreatten to me & then sent a letter ye wes 
pleasd to honor me with. I have never sein it, sorie it is unhapily miscairied, 
since I beleve it wes the first. At this tyme I have wreattein to Mr William to 
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informe me hou and what way and with whom he sent his letters, to the end I my 
wse means to discouer them.54 
 
The threat at sea from contesting parties interrupted trade as well as the flow of 
information. In April 1644 the Edinburgh merchants John Slowane and Adam 
Mitchelson presented a supplication to the Convention of Estates that having loaded 
James Redie’s ship in Burntisland for a voyage to Bordeaux for wine the ship, wines, 
skipper and whole company were taken at St Martins by John Tisone of Dartmouth, 
‘who is imployed and direct out be his majestie’. The petition stated that ‘the said ship 
companie and wynes is takin by his majesties warrant be reason of the common cause 
now in hand, covenant and reformation’. The estates declared that the crown should 
repay the value of the goods lost to the supplicant, but by this time the merchants 
involved had already been affected.55 Retaliation compounded the effects of the 
conflict. In July 1649 John Gillespie was given a commission by the Parliament ‘for 
pursueing the Irish friggots and uther enemys of this kingdome by sea’, due to 
 
the great losses susteaned by diverse merchandis of his kingdome through the 
taking of thair schipps by irish friggots Pirrats haunting upon the coast of this 
kingdome and elswhair to the obstructing of the trade merchandize and utter 
ruine of many merchands. 
 
His commission stated that 
 
Captain Johne Gillaspie, Captane of the schip callit the Elizabeth of kirkcaldie 
To protect secur and defend all the merchand schips of the kingdome in the 
exercesing of thair laufull trade from the violence and wrongs of the Irish 
frigotts and piratts and all other pirrats and sea robbers whatsoever.56 
 
 The need for both men and ships to participate in these wars hampered 
commerce as merchant ships were pressed into service by the Covenanted Parliament, 
usually as troop transports, victualling ships and sometimes as convoy escorts. On 27 
April 1640 William Keith, sixth Earl Marischal of Scotland, ordered ships to be stripped 
of their sails in order to keep them in Aberdeen and as reported by John Spalding: 
‘wnder feir the tounes covenanteris wold flie…Many tounes men, heiring of 
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Marischallis cuming to the toune, takis the flight.’57 This policy was one which 
continued throughout the conflict, particularly after the signing of the Solemn League 
and Covenant (1643) when the executive body of this confederation, the Committee of 
Both Kingdoms, officially took on responsibility for all matters military, naval and 
concerning foreign policy after February 1644.58 Only a month prior to this, an 
ordinance had been issued in the English Parliament setting a new rate of excise on 
several commodities, both native and foreign, ‘for the maintenance of the Armies raised 
in defence of the King and Parliament’.59 This included new rates on foreign salt, much 
of which can be presumed to have come from France. In 1645, Parliament decreed that 
due to the need to prevent the transportation of men abroad in order to suppress the 
rebellion ‘no person whatsoever [may] transport themselves forth of this kingdome to 
Ireland, or any other place, without a sufficient passe granted by the Committee of 
Estates’.60 Furthermore, the actions of soldiers damaged the state of trade at home, as 
‘under the pretence of the libertie that suldiors claims to traid in any part of the thrie 
dominions all sort of unfrie people have usurpit the libertie and priviledgs and traid at 
ther pleasur and bear no part of the common burdens’.61 Not only was commerce 
affected during periods of conflict, the periods of peace immediately following them, as 
well as periods of ‘ceasefire’, were fraught with danger, as many ships that had been 
prevented from sailing suddenly took to the seas. In October 1640 it was reported that 
there was ‘ane cessation fra Warres both be sea and land for tua moneths and libertie to 
pass and repass during the said space’.62 In the same year, and apparently after this 
cessation was granted, it was reported that ‘mony schippis tane the seas being very 
full’,63 suggesting that merchants had to contend with increased danger during periods 
of ostensible peace. 
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Despite these conflicts – or perhaps because of them – belief in the Auld 
Alliance was perpetuated as some Scots sought refuge in France. In 1646 it was 
reported in the Aberdeen Council that 
 
many of our neighboures quha haid best estates and greatest traffique have 
removeit themselffis, and ar setlit in forrein countries as in France, Mr 
Alexander and Robert Irwingis, David Inglis, Thomas & Alexander Mengzeis, 
Mr Alexander Burnet, Mr Gilbert & George Paipes, William Robertsone…and 
many others have quytt thair burgess richts and gone, sum to the south otheris to 
the north to dwell.64 
 
The Inglis, Burnet, Pape and Robertson families all played a significant part in Franco-
Scottish trade in this period.65 Rather than ceasing overseas activities during this 
domestic conflict, they chose instead to relocate to France where they may have been 
better placed to facilitate commercial links. For those entrenched in politics, as well as 
for merchants, France was seen as an ally and was approached for assistance by both the 
Covenanters and the Royalists, the latter through Charles’s queen, Henrietta-Maria. In 
1639 a principal adviser of the Covenanters, John, second Lord Balmerino, voted in 
Parliament for the necessity of a defensive war and subsequently wrote to Louis XIII to 
implore, in consideration of the ancient alliance between France and Scotland, 
assistance against the ‘tyrannical proceedings’ of Charles I.66 The Royalists, buying into 
the nationalistic rhetoric of the Covenanters, were wary of the continuation of this 
relationship. Secretary Coke wrote to Secretary Windebank in May 1639 that  ‘you will 
understand what heavy burden the French begin to lay upon our merchants, and how 
they favour the Scots after the old manner.’67 In September, the Covenanted Scots 
remained hopeful of external assistance, Robert Baillie writing that ‘we were hopefull 
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of powerful assistance from abroad if we should have required it. France would not 
failed to have embraced our protection. Holland and we were bot one in our cause’.68 
However, despite Coke’s opinion that France favoured Scottish merchants, 
France provided support for all sides during this conflict. In 1642 a supplication by 
James, Duke of Lennox, Great Admiral, and Alexander, Earl of Linlithgow, Vice-
Admiral, reported a great number of Irish rebels with merchant goods on the Clyde 
‘intending to France’, although these rebel ships were captured by the Laird of 
Greenock and the merchants held prisoner.69 While being pursued by the Cavaliers in 
1644 the English Parliamentarian Thomas Ellis was ‘forced for safety, being sought 
after by the Cavaliers to be apprehended…to fly towards France, carrying such 
commodities as he could procure’.70 While Ellis did not, in the event, make it to France, 
it was his destination of choice as a place of safety. The plethora of British citizens in 
France at this time also provided a location for the Royalist army to dispose of 
prisoners. The English Royalist Sir Thomas Allin RN worked under Prince Rupert of 
the Rhine after completing his service to the king during the English Civil War. He was 
instructed by Rupert in 1644:  
 
when you have taken any prize from any of the rebels against the King of 
England…keep all your prisoners safe aboard your own ships; suffer none of 
them to remain in the prizes, till you may conveniently send them on shore in 
England or France after that the goods are sold and the whole fleet put out to 
sea, to prevent noise and discovery.71 
 
Charles himself, by early 1647, sought the protection of the French ambassadors, as he 
‘did not see a single place within the three kingdoms where he could remain in safety’.72 
He proposed to Jean de Montereul that the French ambassador ‘publish loudly here that 
he [Charles] was right in not sanctioning the Covenant, and in not establishing 
Presbyterianism, and not doing the other things that were demanded by the Scots’.73 
Despite their earlier support the French started to voice their frustration with the 	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conduct of the Scottish Covenanters, and in 1647 Montereul informed the British king 
of ‘the unwillingness of the Scots and the little trust he ought to place in their 
statements’ and wrote to Cardinal Jules Mazarin that 
 
the treatment that he [Charles] was at present receiving from the Scots gave him 
no reason to wish to do anything towards releasing them from their 
promises…The King of Great Britain manifested his approval of what I said, 
and stated that he would act accordingly.74 
 
Despite a continuing desire, whether pragmatic or cynical, to rekindle the Auld 
Alliance (Chapter 1), France wished to maintain profitable relations with all of the 
contesting parties of the British nations, although a willingness to assist was often equal 
to downright interference in British affairs. Mazarin succeeded Richelieu as the 
principal agent of French government and diplomacy in 1642, and pursued policies that 
entwined the French government with British affairs.75 It was at Mazarin’s behest that 
Montereul spent the majority of 1646-1648 in England and Scotland meeting the King, 
Scottish Covenanters and English Parliamentarians, under a remit to persuade the 
Scottish Covenanters to stand by Charles, urge the King to consider acceptance of the 
National Covenant and suggest the official revival of the Auld Alliance. One goal was 
to protect the institution of Monarchy, but the French also thought that there was less 
for France to fear from an England under Charles than from a Republican England that 
might threaten France’s declining naval strength.76 France’s vacillating allegiance did 
not go unnoticed by the Scots, some of whom voiced concerns regarding France’s 
motives and the dangers of trusting her. The Scottish Dove, a populist news-book 
produced throughout the mid-1640s, stated in August 1646 that 
 
the desires of France were granted before they could be asked!…The French 
Ambassador and Montrill [Montereul] are conceived to doe hutt [hurt] not 
good…and it is believed our Brethren of Scotland will…not be stirred either by 
large promises nor greatest threats.77 
 
The Scottish Covenanters were right to exercise caution in dealing with France, the 
actions of the French testifying to the largely selfish nature of their motives. The French 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 idid, 404-5 
75 For more on Mazarin, see A. Corvisier, La France de Louis XIV, 1643-1715 (Paris, 1957) 140-145, 
156-164 
76 Howat, Foreign Policy, 48-9 
77 The Scottish Dove, 5-12 August 1646, cited in DC, II, Appendix P, 588, 593-4 
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ambassadors constantly pursued the levying of British troops for French service. In June 
1646 Montereul wrote to Mazarin that ‘I believe it will be possible to send from here 
four or five hundred men, who have formerly served the King of Great Britain, but I 
fear there may be some difficulty in obtaining passports for them’.78 In March of the 
following year the French ambassador Pompone de Bellièvre confirmed that he had ‘the 
verbal assurance of the leaders of Parliament and of this Committee…that the ships in 
the service of Parliament on the coast of Ireland [would] allow the ships sent there from 
France to convey the soldiers to pass and repass’.79 Not only were French ships allowed 
to collect soldiers, these ships brought over arms and ammunition for Ireland, ‘the 
letters from France by last mail increase still more the suspicions that exist here. Those 
of Augier affirm that the ships for which we are asking passports are laden with arms 
and gunpowder for Ireland’.80 
 French involvement in British affairs, rather than truly assisting any nation, had 
actually heightened the effect of the civil wars on commerce by the spring of 1647. 
 
The shelter given in the French harbours to the ships that keep the sea with 
commissions from the Prince of Wales make them [the Parliamentarians] look 
for an opportunity of avenging themselves on the French, which they propose to 
do on the first opportunity, by giving letters of marque to their traders, who say 
they have not been able to obtain justice in France for the wrongs that have been 
done them there…the principal members of Parliament are in favour of granting 
reprisals.81 
 
That spring, the ‘St Malo incident’ further fuelled mistrust of the French. A ship sent by 
the English Parliament to Ireland laden with cloth for soldiers’ uniforms was captured 
by a French frigate and taken to St Malo. Bellièvre felt that ‘although those who are 
acquainted with such affairs know well that this cannot have taken place as it is related, 
such rumours produce the worst possible effect on the public mind’, and he asked for 
more information, to prevent ‘what may impair the good understanding that ought to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Montereul to Mazarin, 28 May/7 June 1646, Newcastle, DC, I, 208; see also Mazarin to Bellièvre, 12 
January 1647, Paris, Mazarin, II, 356-7 concerning Scottish levies for French service. French attempts to 
levy Scottish troops are documented well before these occurrences. See Richelieu to Bellièvre, 6 October 
1638, Paris; 13 November 1638, Richelieu, VI, 211-213; 238-240 
79 Bellièvre to Brienne, 14 March 1647, London, DC, II, 43 
80 Ibid, 74. The intention to recruit soldiers from Ireland is evident from the other side of this 
correspondence from 1 January 1644, Mazarin writing to the Comte de Harcourt that ‘je jouis ce mot à la 
depesche que vous a faite M. de Brienne, pour vous prier de vous employer auprès du roy de la Grande-
Bretagne pour faciliter une levee de deux ou trios mille Irlandois, que nous avons resolu de faire’: 
Mazarin, I, 354 
81 Bellièvre to Brienne, 4 April 1647, London, DC, II, 86-7. For a detailed explanation of the role of 
letters of marque and letters of reprisal see Murdoch, Terror, particularly Introduction and Chapter 2. 
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exist between these two kingdoms [crowns]’.82 Ultimately, though reluctantly, Bellièvre 
wrote that 
 
Parliament has ordered today that…this ship laden with uniforms, which they 
say has been taken to St Malo, [be] restored to them…it will obviate great 
complaints…I cannot engage to prevent the letters of reprisals that have been 
spoken of for some time from at last being granted.83 
 
The distraction of the Civil Wars was continually exploited by the French ambassadors 
not only for material gain, but to permit them to influence the course of events in 
Britain, sometimes resulting in their actions being contradictory. In September/October 
1645, the French assured the Covenanted Scots that despite the fact that they were no 
longer ‘the masters of the settlement of affairs in Great Britain’, France would willingly 
maintain ‘the union that has always existed between the two kingdoms’,84 yet by 1646 
the French had intervened in an attempt to bring the British Civil Wars to a close in 
favour of the King. 
 
Our negotiations will place the king at the head of more than four thousand 
Scottish cavalry, and assure him of one of the best fortresses on this island, 
which will render it necessary evidently for the Scottish Government to 
interpose in order to make peace on some tolerable terms.85 
 
Even correspondence which cited ostensible support for Scotland included observations 
that ‘the king’s party being reinstated, France will have full time to consider how she 
can interpose to assure the peace of these kingdoms’86 and the intention of Bellièvre to 
‘continue to influence matters here as much as I can.’87 Moreover, when Montereul 
reported in 1644 that France had an interest in preventing Charles I from coming to 
terms with the Independent party because this would mean the ruin of the Scots, whom 
France should ‘maintain as a power she will one day be able to oppose to England’, he 
also stated that France should effect the agreement before the Spanish could benefit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Bellièvre to Brienne, 11 April 1647, London, see also Bellièvre to Brienne, 15 April 1647, London DC, 
II, 98-9, 106, 109-11 
83 Bellièvre to Brienne, 18 April 1647, London, DC, I, 109 
84 Montereul to Mazarin, 28 September/7 October 1645, DC, I, 8 
85 Bellièvre to Brienne, 14/24 September, London, DC, I, 269 
86 Montereul to Mazarin, 28 September/7 October 1645, DC, I, 8 
87 Bellièvre to Brienne, 14/24 June 1647, London, DC, II, 165 
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from facilitating it themselves, suggesting that France was always governed primarily 
by her political position within Europe.88 
Yet despite the volatile diplomatic and political relationships within the British 
Isles and the problems this precipitated between Scotland and France, re-examination of 
official data can go some way to demonstrating that commercial relations were not 
affected as severely as might be expected. For example, there was little change in the 
amount of trade passing through Dumbarton during the civil war years compared to the 
1620s, and in fact there was a slight increase in activity, with 8 ships on average per 
year being recorded between 1643 and 1648, compared with 7 on average from 1620 to 
1625.89 Furthermore, although examining the Aberdeen figures for both entries and 
departures shows trade falling during the civil war years (to France specifically as well 
as more generally) data for ships’ entries alone yields an alternate view. While the 
French import trade into Aberdeen was not the largest, it seems to have been more 
consistent than from other European destinations during this period, a consistency 
maintained even as entries from Norway and the Baltic declined over the first half of the 
decade:90 
 
 
 
[Chart on following page.] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 ‘…deux puissants intérêts que le roy de la Grande Bretagne ne s’accommode point, par le moyen des 
Indépendants – l’un parceque ce serait la ruine entire des Ecossais, que la France doit maintenir comme 
une puissance qu’elle pourra un jour oppose à l’Angleterre; l’autre pour ce qu’il vaut mieux que 
l’accommodement se fase par l’entremise de la France, que par celle des Espagnols, par les offices 
desquels il se rouvera, que les Indépendants se seront accommodés’. Montereul to Cardinal Mazarin, 
18/28 September 1645, London, DC, I, 11-17 
89 F. Roberts and I. MacPhail, Dumbarton Common Good Accounts, 1614-1660 (Dumbarton, 1972) 
appendix B. I am grateful to Claire McLoughlin (St Andrews) for sharing her tabulations of this data. 
90 Data taken from Devine, ‘Cromwellian Union’, 6 
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Figure 4.2 Ships entering Aberdeen from Europe, 1640-1650 
 
The discrepancy in the patterns of trade exhibited by examining the entries alone as 
opposed to the entries and departures in conjunction with each other suggests that 
overseas relations were not adversely affected by civil war, but that domestic demands 
on seafaring equipment and men meant that overseas voyages were somewhat curtailed. 
What does become clear from Figure 4.2 is that one cannot assume that the civil war 
period produced constant statistics, or that domestic crises did not have any effect on 
overseas trade. For example, the Scottish Covenanters triumphed over Charles I in the 
Bishops’ Wars (1639-1640) only because of aid arriving by sea from their Dutch and 
Swedish allies, somewhat skewing the shipping figures.91 Moreover, there were periods 
of relative peace for Scotland, particularly after the Covenanter occupation of 
Newcastle in 1640 and up until the re-entry of the Covenanters into the war on the side 
of the English Parliament, in 1643. Figure 4.2 reveals a slight rise in ‘French’ voyages 
at this juncture and a massive rise in Dutch ones. Similarly we can see periods of 
apparent collapse. 1644-1645 witnessed the spectacular Montrosian campaigns against 
the Covenanters, also including the sacking of Aberdeen. The year 1647 began with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Murdoch, Terror, 197-9 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
Norway 
Holland/Flanders 
France 
Baltic 
 143	  
Argyll party still in control of Parliament, but the Duke of Hamilton and his pro-
Royalist Engagers ousted them from power. This led to a failed invasion of England in 
1648 and the return of Argyll through his military coup d’etat – the Whiggamore raid. 
His return to power and the good terms he brokered with the English Parliament helped 
to secure the seas for Scottish shipping, and the recovery of trading voyages is apparent. 
Once Argyll proclaimed Charles II as King of Great Britain in 1649 after the execution 
of the Charles I, Cromwell invaded Scotland and the impact on overseas voyages can 
also be seen from this data. 
The Aberdeen data appears to reflect the political machinations of the civil war 
period rather well, as well as highlighting the relative stability of the French trade when 
compared to other European nations. There are also other ways of interpreting the 
period. For example, when considering merchant activity in general within the town of 
Glasgow, the civil wars do not seem to have had such an adverse effect. In order to 
receive full commercial privileges (including the right to import goods from Europe), 
merchants were required to be registered as guild brethren. In Glasgow, the number of 
merchants registering themselves remained healthy during the civil war years. Between 
1610 and 1615, 101 merchants registered, between 1645 and 1650 this was slightly 
higher at 104, from 1675 to 1680 the figure was 99 and between 1700 and 1705 it was 
98.92 Thus the number of merchants operating in Glasgow during the civil war period 
appears to have remained fairly constant, suggesting that the civil wars did not impact 
equally on all Scottish cities. 
Examination of private sources suggests still further that merchants were not 
deterred from their pursuit of Franco-Scottish commerce. For many merchants, the 
biggest concerns they faced were not commercial. A month after the First Bishops War 
broke out at the beginning of 1639, William S. Chilthomas wrote to Lewis Dick at 
Bordeaux concerning daily military discipline, stating that he hoped ‘he will be home 
shortly in these dangerous times’.93 Alongside this concern for his family and assets at 
home, however, he also discussed his continuing participation in the wine trade. Sir 
Charles Erskine of Cambuskenneth wrote multiple letters to his wife Mary Hope from 
France in 1643 giving no indication that his travels were unduly affected by the Civil 
Wars. In August, he concerned himself with matters that, to him, were more important 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 J. Anderson, The Burgesses and Guild Brethren of Glasgow, 1573-1750, Scottish Record Society 
(Edinburgh, 1925). Data compiled from this source by T. C. Smout, ‘The Glasgow Merchant Community 
in the Seventeenth Century’ in Scottish Historical Review, XLVII (1968) 59-60 
93 William S. Chilthomas to Lewis Dick, 26 February 1638/9, Edinburgh, CSPD, XXIV, 507 
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than the outcome of international politics and diplomacy, though which perhaps testify 
to where his loyalty lay during this conflict, as otherwise his reluctance to name his son 
after himself seems surprising:  
 
I am so over joyed since the receat of your last letter shoing of your hapie 
deliyverie of a young Charles for so your father called him bot we knoe that it 
was not my desyer for I deseyred if a sone Thomas if a doctor [daughter] 
Elisabeath and tell him so from me.94 
 
Many merchants remained in France and continued to pursue commerce with Scotland, 
their continued interest in their native country leading to news from Scotland being 
reported in France. John Clerk wrote to John Murray from Paris in 1640 that ‘sum 
agreement is past Betuixt the noble men of England. And the Scotts commissioners at 
Rippon in England sum 4 myles fra Boroubrigs. First, A Cessation of Armes. By Both 
Armies. Second, A trade to be made open for both kingdoms’. He added a postscript 
that 
 
in respect that nou the passage is open to Scotland. Letters will cum more 
frequently as Before: in cace any fall in my hand for Mr Metland or you: ye 
wold not doe amisse to Advyse hou they sould Be sent you – If I had knouen all 
this tyme whair ze had Bein I wold have wreatte more frequently: off the 
passages of our Countrie.95 
 
The Treaty of Ripon paved the way for an end to the Bishops’ Wars, and commercial 
opportunities increased, as Clerk described. The Scots also paid off their debt to France 
for remaining neutral in the conflict by providing soldiers for French service.96 This in 
turn facilitated a trading opportunity in that Scots transporting these soldiers could 
return with goods from France custom free (Chapter 2). In 1642 John Dougall wrote to 
John Clerk that  
 
yesterday Mr Mell resaved [a letter from Dougall’s father] wherin he wreats that 
he hes fraight the ship that is heir cum over with the souldiers to goe to the 
Rochell for salt and also one uther ship that is coming from Scotland heir to goe 
to St Mallos or any uther pairt aux environs to load with cornes if they are 
cheap.97 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Sir Charles Erskine to Mary Hope, 2 August 1643, Châtillon, NLS ms.5089 f12 
95 John Clerk to John Murray, 11 November 1640, Paris, NLS Adv.mss.23.3.26 f106 
96 Murdoch, ‘April Committee’, 7 
97 John Dougall to John Clerk, 14 May 1642, Dieppe, NAS GD18/2416 
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John Dougall was one of several itinerant Scots who embarked on commercial missions 
despite the outbreak of renewed hostilities in the British Isles between Charles I and the 
English Parliament. He was certainly not averse to changing location in order to achieve 
the best profit. Correspondence from him to Clerk in 1636 sees him at Rouen, but in 
1643 he is in Dieppe, and correspondence from later in that year places him at Le 
Havre.98 Similarly William Erskine appears in Orleans, Angers, Geneva, Marseilles and 
Lyon in the space of 18 months between February 1644 and October 1645.99 
 Charter parties and commissions continued to be drawn up regarding imports of 
commodities from France. In the brief period of peace between the Pacification of 
Berwick (1639) and the outbreak of the Second Bishops’ War (1640) Alexander Dick, 
collector of customs at Burntisland, acknowledged the payment of customs on salt from 
La Rochelle by skipper burgess Robert Angus.100 Although this cargo arrived during a 
time of ostensible peace, an agreement for this shipment is likely to have been drawn up 
several months before it landed and in any case, relations between the King and the 
Covenanters remained tense even during this period of peace. Similar examples can be 
found throughout the period. An account from August 1643 detailed furnishings 
including satin, taffetas, a black trellis and a ‘toile de rouan blanche fine’ provided for 
Lord Ross from a merchant in Toulouse.101 In 1647 an agreement was drawn up 
between David Dunbar in Garmouth and the partnership of Aberdeen merchant 
Alexander Farquhar and James Browne in Findhorn, skipper of the Aberdeen ship the 
George, for Bordeaux wine, with no mention of any particular difficulties or special 
considerations to be made due to the ongoing civil war.102 Thomas Cunningham, while 
reporting on the effect conflict in Britain had on the trade through the staple, acted to 
circumvent this problem by obtaining 
 
from the Admiralty of Zeland a ship of warre, not only to carry me over…but to 
stay there upon my returne and to follow my orders, so as thereby I gave 
warning to all the merchants who presently laded their commodities, and they 
were safely convoyed, to the number of 12 shipps full of Staple goods.103 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 John Dougall to John Clerk, 21 January and 10 April 1636, Rouen, NAS GD18/2380/1/1-2; John 
Dougall to John Clerk, 7 November and 2 December 1643, Le Havre, NAS GD18/2380/4/42, 48 
99 William Erskine to John Clerk, various correspondence, February 1644-October 1645, NAS 
GD18/2457 
100 Discharge, Alexander Dick to Robert Angus, 1 November 1639, NAS GD172/1765 
101 Account, Lord Ross and Monsieur [Daldeguie], 23 August 1643, NAS GD3/13/2/1/9 
102 1 September 1647, NLS Culloden Papers, Ch.1657 
103 Courthope, Journal of Thomas Cuningham, 242-3 
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We know from a variety of sources that there was little variation in consumer 
goods sought in France during the civil wars – although the transportation of arms and 
ammunition inevitably increased. The numerous letters and accounts between Henry 
Hope and Clerk consistently mention luxuries; in January 1644 Clerk recorded that 
Hope owed him 17 livres ‘payit to a goldsmith for setting your ring & for gold’.104 
Clerk wrote to Lady Pittenweem from Paris in 1645 to inform her that sixteen gowns 
and petticoats were being sent to her with William Paton.105 For the rest of the year, at a 
time when the Montrosian civil war raged in Scotland and the wider British war 
continued, Clerk consistently sent such commodities home, including a packet to Lady 
Pittenweem ‘conteining divers callors off worsit [worsted]’ and a ring, ‘tyed with A Bit 
off bleu ribbon to on off the little pacquets’. In the same letter Clerk enquires as to 
‘what hight ye wold have the pearling for your oune goun’, stating also that he had ‘bein 
verie desireous to have found out sum prettie stuff to be A waskyne [vasken] for your 
Lady’.106 On another occasion he sent ‘1 grein etuise [a French case] with sheirs botkin 
and knyffe’.107 Lady Pittenweem was not the only recipient of goods from Clerk; in the 
same letter-book there are copies of letters to Lady Newliston and to Janet, Margaret 
and Mary Gray, Clerk’s future wife, to whom Clerk sent similar merchandise.108 Goods 
exchanged by Clerk and James Mowat in 1647 included ‘ane sute of blak clothe for 
Robert Gray & the compt off A gray drap de Berrie [French design] casak for my 
self’.109 Sir Charles Erskine consistently sent home gifts with his letters, including a 
watch and clothes for his wife Mary’s brother, Sir Alexander,110 a pair of ‘Romon’ 
gloves from Paris for Lord Hadington111 and a ‘sticke of black silke stufe’ and ‘tuoe 
glasses’ for his wife.112 Although he mentioned the conflict in October, he wrote not of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Closed account between John Clerk and Henry Hope, 26 July 1644, NAS GD18/2437 
105 John Clerk to Lady Pittenweem, 15 April 1645, Paris, NAS GD18/2455, f13v. For other examples of 
Paton acting as a carrier to both Lady Pittenweem and others in Scotland, including Margaret Gray, see 
20 May 1645, f13r; 20 September 1645, f17r-17v; 3 November 1645f 17v. Clerk acted as banker for 
Paton: 26 July 1644, f2v; John Clerk to Robert Inglis, 20 October 1644, Edinburgh, f3v. 
106 John Clerk to Lady Pittenweem, 20 May 1645, Paris, NAS GD18/2455, f14r 
107 John Clerk to Lady Pittenweem, 20 September 1645, Paris, NAS GD18/2455, f17r. This is an item 
usually associated with dressmaking. 
108 John Clerk to Lady Pittenweem, 20 September 1645, 3 November 1645, Paris, NAS GD18/2455, f17r-
17v. Mary Gray was the daughter of Sir William Gray, with whom Clerk did business. It can be assumed 
that he met his future wife through this connection (Chapter 3). John Clerk to Michel Mel, 3 February 
1645, London; John Clerk to John Dougall elder, 6 February 1645; John Clerk to James Cutler, 1 March 
1645, NAS GD18/2455, f7r, 7v, 13v 
109 James Mowat to John Clerk, 1647, Paris, NAS GD18/2484 
110 Sir Charles Erskine to Mary Hope, 2 August 1643, Châtillon, NLS ms.5089 f12 
111 Sir Charles Erskine to Mary Hope, 2 August 1643, Paris, NLS ms.5089 f11 
112 Sir Charles Erskine to Mary Hope, 12 September 1643, Bourges, NLS ms.5089 f15 
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the effect on international affairs or commerce but only of dangers to his own person, 
demonstrating again the understandable preoccupation of merchants with their personal 
position as opposed to the state of their home nation; ‘my dear heart, I resovelled not to 
let you knoe of our leat voyages wich he have head to the franche armie for I knoue ye 
wolld have bein feared although ther was no danger wee are nou returned and going to 
Chatillion’.113 Existing networks of merchant Scots in France were used to facilitate this 
continuation of trade. Michel Mel, in Dieppe, settled an account with Andrew Bethune, 
a Scot who had once been in Paris but had returned to Edinburgh, in June 1643.114 This 
occurrence not only demonstrates the continuation of this link after Bethune had 
returned to Scotland, but also during the height of the British Civil Wars. 
 
III. CASE STUDY II: INTERREGNUM, 1649/1651-1660 
‘I am not able to do anything with this new state.’115 
 
By April 1654, the domestic situation in Scotland had changed radically. The 
Covenanters under Argyll had been defeated by Cromwell at Dunbar in 1650, while the 
Royalist Army of the Patriotic Accommodation that entered England found itself 
seriously under-supported by English and Irish Royalists, and met its fate against 
Cromwell at Worcester in 1651 – leading to the Cromwellian conquest of Scotland. 
Scotland was then incorporated first into the English Commonwealth and then the 
Cromwellian Protectorate, drawing Scotland into war against the Dutch during the first 
Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654). The relationship between the British states was of 
course fundamentally altered following the civil wars, and further by Cromwellian 
usurpation, with the Earl of Loudoun stating that Scotland was ‘under the power and 
force of the armie of the Parlament of the pretended Comonwealth of England’.116 
While some scholars have adopted this view, others have questioned it, with varying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Sir Charles Erskine to Mary Hope, 12 October 1643, Marne, NLS ms.5089 f23 
114 Discharge, Andrew Beaton and Michel Mel, Dieppe, 18 June 1643, NAS GD7/2/38 
115 Andrew Hay to Archibald Hay, 10 April 1649, Holyrood, NAS GD504/9/88 
116 ‘The Earl of Loudoun’s Narrative of the Union of England and Scotland’, September 1653, in C. Firth 
(ed.), Scotland and the Commonwealth: Letters and Papers Relating to the Military Government of 
Scotland, from August 1651 to December 1653 (Edinburgh, 1895) 208-213. An ordinance on 12 April 
1654 made the union official, and it was proclaimed in Edinburgh on 4 May. J. Casada, ‘The Scottish 
Representation in Richard Cromwell’s Parliament’ in Scottish Historical Review, LI, 152 (1972) 124 n.1; 
P. Pinckney, ‘The Scottish Representation in the Cromwellian Parliament of 1656’ in Scottish Historical 
Review, XLVI (1967) 96. 
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conclusions.117 It is now clear that Cromwell was not indifferent to his northern 
kingdom, and certainly not to the ships hailing from it. In May 1657 Cromwell wrote to 
Frederick III of Denmark-Norway concerning two Scottish ships captured between 
Dunkirk and Whyting in Norway – the Greyhound, captained by William Adamson and 
the Comfort, captained by John Robertson. Upon receiving letters from the captains 
concerning the incident, Cromwell asked Frederick III to punish the behaviour of those 
responsible, asking that an example be made of them.118  
Although Cromwell eventually demonstrated his concern for Scottish commerce 
the upheavals caused by changes in government impacted upon commerce in similar 
ways to open conflict. Three months after Charles I’s execution in January 1649 
Andrew Hay wrote to his kinsman Archibald discussing at length the political situation 
in Scotland, stating that ‘I am not able to do anything with this new state…it is not 
possible yet for a little tyme to procure yow a passe to goe to France, becaus they doe so 
much search into mens actions’.119 Such obstacles, however, while inconvenient, 
provided incentives for commercial expansion. After relaying these troubles, Andrew 
wrote that ‘I have enquyred for shippes going to Barbados, ther is on going within ane 
moneth from the west countrey to barbados, and ther is on going from Leeth presently 
to Virginia’.120 Some merchants had already been pushed towards other trading 
destinations following the turmoil of the 1640s. In February 1642 Benjamin Fletcher, a 
Scottish merchant in Rouen, sent an account to Alexander Hayes in London concerning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 It is perhaps overstating the case that ‘Ireland and Scotland, after being conquered, were forcibly 
incorporated in a military state totally dominated by England’: Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, 84. Other 
scholars have also adopted this view, see G. Donalsdon, Scotland, James V-James VII (Edinburgh, 1965) 
344-346. For two articles refuting this, see Pinckney, ‘Scottish Representation’; Casada, ‘Scottish 
Representation’. The former argues that Scotland ‘had a semblance of valid representation in the 1656 
parliament, and some of the English representation were capable of working for Scottish interest’ (113); 
the latter that ‘although it is not true that Scottish representation was wholly English…from a Scottish 
perspective the union was a dismal constitutional failure’ (146-147). R. Hutton, The British Republic, 
1649-1660 (Basingtoke, 1990) rightly acknowledges that ‘it is in a British, not an English, context that 
the true importance of the Interregnum should be appreciated’ (135), however he focuses almost wholly 
on England, especially in regard to overseas relations (for example, 54-7, 107-113). For another view on 
the wider British aspect of the Commonwealth see P. Little, ‘An Irish Governor of Scotland: Lord 
Broghill, 1655-56’ in A. Mackillop and S. Murdoch, Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers (Leiden, 
2003) 79-98. For a comprehensive overview of the union see C. Terry, The Cromwellian Union 
(Edinburgh, 1902) xv-xcvii; see also Firth, Scotland and the Commonwealth; C. Firth, Scotland and the 
Protectorate: Letters and Papers Relating to the Military Government of Scotland from January 1654 to 
June 1659 (Edinburgh, 1899); F. Dow, Cromwellian Scotland (Edinburgh, 1979); R. Hutton, The British 
Republic 1649-1660 (Basingstoke, 1990); Macinnes, British Revolution, Chapter 8; S. Murdoch, Britain, 
Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660 (East Linton, 2003) Chapter 7 
118 Cromwell to Frederick III, 12 May 1657, Westminster, DRA, TKUA, England A1. 
119 Andrew Hay to Archibald Hay, 10 April 1649, Holyrood, NAS GD504/9/88 
120 Ibid. 
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a shipment of cotton wool from Barbados.121 At times when Franco-Scottish trade was 
interrupted, merchants tended to turn to alternative destinations and different 
commodities rather than ceasing commercial activity, and Benjamin Fletcher’s 
continued presence within Scottish trading networks in France throughout this period 
suggests that although he sought alternative locations for trade this was in addition to, 
not at the expense of, commercial links with France.122 Of course, it is feasible that 
these merchants merely spotted new opportunities and took them, although the timing 
of these ventures suggests that they were pushed towards these new destinations.  
Continued optimism among the merchant classes immediately following 
Charles’s execution is again epitomised by the Clerk network and the desire to source 
and send home luxury goods remained evident. In January 1650 Mowat assured Clerk 
that ‘Madam Selon hath maid and delivered your six hats to Mr Houp [Henry Hope]’, 
and that ‘Monsieur Peronet hath maid you 8 hatbands…according to your order he gave 
them to Monsieur Houp’.123 Indeed, twice in 1650 Mowat wrote to Clerk regarding 
continuing opportunities in France, in the first instance stating that 
 
any merchand ther in Paris, with whom you hav haid to doe with before would 
send you [goods] upon your simple leter, for says often to me that they mutch 
mor wish you send your commisones for waires, and that you should not pay 
one pennye moor as give you were in persone yourself.124 
 
Perhaps most poignantly, he wrote five days later that 
 
if you werre hier you could gaine what you please, for theris many english and 
severall Scots that you might deall with, and now a firme peacce betwixt 
bretaigne and France and oppen commerce. good Mr Clerk taik once moor a 
triall of it, and you shall be most heartly welcome…if you find your owen 
securitye you may deall with gentlemen at home, and remite your moneys hier 
and fournish them, and maik good profite you know the way before.125 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Benjamin Fletcher to Alexander Hayes, February 1642, Rouen, NAS GD34/843/1/20. This account 
includes an item for ‘portage from newhaven to Rouen’, suggesting that overland transport was utilised 
after the goods had docked in a French port – further highlighting the need to look beyond port records to 
see the true destinations of commodities. 
122 Benjamin Fletcher was connected to the commercial network of John Clerk of Penicuik (Chapter 3), as 
evidenced by a letter written to him by an A Hay, concerning sending cloths to several individuals, 
including William Blackburn in Rouen: [1650], NAS GD34/843/2/15. Sir Andrew Fletcher, Lord 
Innerpeffer wrote to John Clerk in 1646 regarding the provision of money for his son, and asking Clerk to 
keep him updated with new of his son. NAS GD18/2475. There is also evidence of a George Fletcher 
entering the port of Havre, 17 December 1653, ADSM, 200 BP 35 (unpaginated). 
123 James Mowat to John Clerk, 17 January 1650, Paris NAS GD18/2593/3; see also same to same, 19 
January 1650, Paris, NAS GD18/2595/4 
124 James Mowat to John Clerk, 17 January 1650, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/4 
125 James Mowat to John Clerk, 22 January 1650, Paris, NAS GD18/2505/6 
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The fact that James Mowat, even at this juncture, thought nothing of mentioning trade 
with Englishmen, Scots and Frenchmen is indicative that for the merchant classes, 
commercial concerns were more important than political divisions. 
The Cromwellian Union of 1654 has, perhaps understandably, not been 
examined as thoroughly as the unions of 1603 and 1707. Under Cromwellian 
government Scotland was arguably ‘ill-prepared for the importation of aggressive 
mercantilism’126 and foreign trade, it has been argued, was unable to prosper.127 
Christopher Smout has suggested that Scotland was too ‘enfeebled [by] years of 
anarchy’ to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Cromwellian Union in 
1654,128 and Theodora Keith has stated that 
 
on the whole it does not seem that the country benefited materially during the 
Interregnum. Poverty was great, manufactures could not be set up. Trade, both 
inland and foreign, had decayed, and showed little sign of recovery, and the 
bankruptcy of the country continued towards the bankruptcy of the whole 
government, and the downfall of the Protectorate.129 
 
If we look again at the Sound Toll Registers, we see that Scottish trade through the 
Sound deteriorated throughout the 1650s as well as the 1640s, with just 26 Scottish 
ships on average per year sailing through the Sound between 1653 and 1658 (compared 
to 98, 1625-1630 and 56, 1644-1649).130 This is perhaps better attributed, however, to 
the outbreak of the first Anglo-Dutch War in 1652 and the embargo placed on all 
Scottish ships through the Sound in 1653 rather than to a general decline in trade – and 
accordingly in 1653 no Scottish or English ships are recorded passing through the 
Sound in either direction.131 Although no ships were recorded entering the Glasgow 
ports in 1651, the year following the Scottish defeat at Dunbar and the Cromwellian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 E. Graham, A Maritime History of Scotland, 1650-1790 (East Linton, 2002) 330 
127 T. Keith, Commercial Relations of England and Scotland, 1603-1707 (Cambridge, 1910) 65; T. Keith, 
‘The Economic Condition of Scotland Under the Commonwealth and Protectorate’ in Scottish Historical 
Review, V (1908) 273-284 
128 T. C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707 (Edinburgh/London, 1963) 195 
129 Keith, ‘Economic Condition’, 284 
130 Bund (ed.), Tabellr Overskibsfart. Despite this, records for entries into the Swedish ports of 
Gothenburg, Lubeck, Antwerp and Augsburg show that nine Scottish ships made their way into these 
ports. Six of these arrived after the declaration of war with the Dutch Republic and four of those ships 
deemed it safe enough to attempt a return journey. Dalhede, Handelsfamiljer, data collected from CD 
database. 
131 Macinnes, British Revolution, 208. Denmark-Norway were obliged to assist the Dutch republic during 
this conflict under the terms of their alliance of 1649, see Murdoch, Britain, Denmark- Norway, 173-180. 
This occurrence would benefit from more careful scrutiny – for example, asking whether British 
merchants adapted their trading methods in order to circumvent such embargoes, in the same way in 
which they did when pursuing trade with France. 
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occupation of Edinburgh,132 Tom Devine argues that the Cromwellian Union was not 
disastrous for either Aberdeen or Glasgow as under the regime both towns quickly re-
established the level of commercial operations that had prevailed before the civil 
wars.133 Dumbarton and Aberdeen displayed a marked improvement in traffic under the 
Cromwellian regime. In Dumbarton, 16 ships on average are recorded for the period 
1654-1659 (both entries and departures), a 116% increase from 1643-1649, and in 
Aberdeen 119 ships on average are recorded between 1654 and 1659, a 43% increase on 
the previous period.134 As during the civil war period, entries into Aberdeen from 
France appear to have remained more consistent than from their European 
counterparts:135 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Ships entering Aberdeen from Europe, 1650-1660 
 
 
In this case, the impact of the outbreak and conclusion of the second Anglo-Dutch War 
is evident, and figures for the Baltic perhaps suggest the effect of the abdication of 
Queen Christina of Sweden in 1654. 
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Both French and Scottish records corroborate the fact that voyages between 
Scotland and France continued regularly throughout the Interregnum. The records of the 
Juridiction Consulaire of Dieppe and the Amirauté of Le Havre attest to continuing 
British trade in these ports through the second half of the Interregnum and into the 
Restoration period, although these records frustratingly stop in 1656 and 1664 
respectively.136 Most notably the Scot Gilbert Pape appears in the Dieppe records 
several times: in January 1654, twice in March of the same year, in January 1655 and 
again one year later.137 In March 1662 the records of the Admiralty of La Rochelle 
record a case of ‘Guillaume Robertson, marchand écossais à Bordeaux, contre Daniell 
Smythe, marchand écossais à La Rochelle, reclamation d’une somme de huit cent huit 
livres à saisir entre les mains dudit, appurtenant à Antoine Hal, marchand anglais en 
Irlande’.138 While this particular case demonstrates the negative side of business 
relationships, it also indicates that merchants from all British nations continued to 
operate in France. 
 Mention of politics does not tend to feature heavily in surviving mercantile 
correspondence from the Interregnum and Restoration periods. William Robertson 
enjoyed a prolonged period of business in various ports in France under the 
Cromwellian regime, his disagreement with Smythe coming in 1662 but he having been 
active in Franco-Scottish trade from at least as early as 1651. Robertson, an Aberdonian 
who acted as both a merchant in La Rochelle and a factor in Le Havre appears in 
business documentation from this year along with the partnership of John Forbes, 
provost of Inverness, Edinburgh merchant Patrick Leslie and Alexander Keith. This 
documentation details exchange of money but gives no hint that ubiquitous domestic 
crises and changes in government in Britain affected his business transactions.139 In the 
same year Annabella, Countess of Lothian, wrote from La Rochelle to her daughter 
Lady Lothian that the best way to send her letters was by John Inglis, her merchant. She 
wrote to her daughter’s husband in March that Inglis had gone to Scotland but would 
return shortly, suggesting that political upheaval in Britain was not preventing this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 The records of the Juridiction Consulaire of Dieppe cover the period October 1653-April 1656, and 
entries for British ships include: 19 November 1653; Jean Duval, 13 December 1653; George Fletcher, 17 
December 1653; Thomas Richardson, [?] February 1654; Jean Anderson, 27 February 1654; B[enjamin] 
Duval, 14 April 1654 and 23 April 1655; Thomas Gray, February 1655: ADSM, 200 BP 35 
(unpaginated); the records for the Admiralty of Havre date from 10 February 1655 to 17 March 1664: 
ADSM, 216 BP 122 
137 January and March 1654, January 1655, January 1656, ADSM, 200 BP 35 (unpaginated) 
138 4 March 1662, ADCM, B309 
139 24 February-27 March 1651, NLS Culloden Papers, Ch.1673-5 
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merchant from either travelling between Scotland and France or from continuing to act 
as her merchant.140 Inglis was another Scot who continued to pursue commercial links 
with France throughout the 1650s and who had contacts in more than one location, 
writing to George Maine eight years later of his ‘correspondent in deip [Dieppe] mester 
biger’.141 Similar occurrences can be seen in the first volume of the Aberdeen 
Propinquity books. John Donaldson, burgess of Aberdeen, allegedly drew a bill of 
exchange on Michel Mel in Dieppe in November 1650 to be paid to John Irving, but 
Donaldson submitted a complaint that Irving had forged this bill. Although this, again, 
represents a negative side of doing business, no indication that domestic issues caused 
difficulties for such a transaction are highlighted here. Incidentally, Donaldson used his 
good reputation here to his advantage, as Thomas Melville, former Dean of Guild, 
Alexander Alexander, burgess of Aberdeen, Alexander Davidson, advocate and former 
bailies George Morrison and Alexander Lumsden testified that Donaldson was ‘a man 
of good credit and honest and of good estimation within the said burgh’.142 A discharge 
in 1662 by Edinburgh merchant Thomas Crawford and Francis Kinloch in Paris to Sir 
Thomas Hay of Park detailed money loaned for Park’s ‘travels in France and England 
preceding the month of December 1656’.143 Being under the Commonwealth did not 
prevent individuals from continuing to utilise merchants in order to finance their travels, 
and political troubles did not preclude travel through France. Alexander Charteris wrote 
to John Clerk in 1654 that he ‘made a journey to Bordeaux, Rochelle and other places in 
these quarters where I stayed three months much longer then I intended’, the 
unexpected length of stay being due to previously unforeseen mercantile opportunities – 
testifying not only to the continuation of commerce, but to its health.144 Indeed, at home 
standard commercial concerns continued to dominate local burgh records, with the 
Council of Aberdeen, for example, continuing their efforts to gain permission to import 
French salt for the curing of fish, with apparently no expectation that this might be 
prevented by the current government (Chapter 1).145 Non-essential items continued to 
be sent home from the continent, and in 1652 John Clerk sent to the Earl of Lothian ‘a 
knyffe for cutting the corns on the feet’, noted in an account that also contained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Annabella Lothian to William, Earl of Lothian, 4 March 1651, La Rochelle, NAS GD40/2/5/13/1 
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142 13 January 1652, Aberdeen, ACA Propinquity Book I, f42v 
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remittance for items such as hose, silk hose, knives with tortoise shell handles, ivory 
handles and combs.146 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The involvement of the French in Scottish/British affairs, particularly during the civil 
wars, again calls into question assumptions regarding the perceived discontinuation of 
the Auld Alliance. Evidently both sides continued to desire a renewal of the alliance and 
trading privileges between their countries. Care must be taken, however, to recognise 
the ulterior motives of both parties. Moreover, for the diplomats involved in these 
discussions, commerce does not appear to have been a primary concern. Once again, 
merchants took matters into their own hands, influencing policy where possible and 
otherwise taking advantage of opportunities to increase their profit, altering their trading 
patterns where necessary. There is some evidence that individuals acted on behalf of a 
certain political cause; in April 1651 James Bruce wrote to the Earl of Lothian from La 
Rochelle that ‘he had procured a cargo of materials for his majesty’s army, which would 
be sent upon the engagement that it should be paid in Scotland, with the freight of the 
ship’ – but while Bruce was willing to assist the Royalist cause, he was not willing to 
finance this assistance himself.147 Such exceptions aside, assistance for the Royalist, 
Parliamentary or Covenanting causes from the merchant sphere in France appears to 
have been limited – although, of course, it may be that evidence for this assistance 
simply does not survive. However, what this chapter has demonstrated is that individual 
merchants were adept at discerning opportunities for continued trade, It is now beyond 
doubt that there was continued commodity exchange not only in the traditional trades in 
wine, salt and fish but also in luxury goods – most noticeably in the network 
surrounding John Clerk of Penicuik, but also undertaken by similar organisations for 
which surviving evidence affords us only a glimpse of activities. It is true that Clerk 
returned to Scotland during the civil war period, but no evidence found suggests that his 
return was motivated by the conflict, and as seen in Chapter 3 he continued to be 
involved in this network after his return home. Once again the individual merchant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Account between Lothian and Clerk, 8 March 1650-5 June 1652, NAS GD18/2445 
147 James Bruce to Lord Lothian, 5 April 1651, La Rochelle, NAS GD40/2/5/13/6. It should be noted that, 
unlike in the case of Cuningham and Petrie in Rotterdam, above, this was Royalist, rather than 
Covenanter, support. An investigation into the differences between Scots in different locations and the 
sides they chose to support might yield interesting results, although that is outwith the scope of this thesis. 
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appears impressively resilient to political change, if somewhat selfish in his aims and 
methods. It is apparent that domestic conflict in either France or Scotland did not 
extinguish either practical Franco-Scottish commerce or notions of the Auld Alliance, 
regardless of the regime in power. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
‘The outbreak of war between the King’s majestie 
and the Kingdome of France’:1 
International Conflict and Continuation of Commerce I, 1627-1667 
 
Despite the impact domestic upheaval had on Franco-Scottish trade, merchants 
continued to pursue commerce through both open and covert channels. While John 
Battie claimed that ‘civill war ruines trade faster than any other’, international conflict, 
bringing with it trade embargoes, commercial legislation and increased dangers from 
privateers, perhaps provided an even tougher arena in which to compete.2 Throughout 
the seventeenth century several international conflicts threatened the continuation of the 
Franco-Scottish commercial relationship, although these conflicts took place within 
different contexts, with the interests of the House of Stuart being prominent until 1688. 
However, the 1627-1629 and 1666-1667 Franco-Stuart wars arose out of different 
circumstances and thus affected commerce in different ways. While the 1627-1629 
conflict was concerned with relations directly between the Houses of Stuart and 
Bourbon, the conflict that broke out in 1666 was part of the wider second Anglo-Dutch 
War.3 
The marriage of Charles I to Henrietta-Maria, Louis XIII’s sister, in June 1625 
provided Britain with a strong ally against Spain, with whom hostilities officially broke 
out after the English and the Dutch agreed the Treaty of Southampton in September. 	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However, the disastrous efforts at La Rochelle, Buckingham’s deplorable conduct and 
the refusal of Charles I to alter his religious policies at Louis’s request caused this 
relationship to fracture and by April 1627 the Stuart navy was preparing to sail to La 
Rochelle to assist the Huguenots against their monarch.4 In the later conflict, Britain and 
France became enemies by default as a direct result of wider European issues, and Louis 
XIV’s motives for involving himself in a war against Charles II have attracted some 
debate. He was bound to assist the Dutch by a treaty of 1662 and they enlisted his 
support, which Louis reluctantly offered.5 Louis’s involvement in the 1666-1667 war 
epitomised his long-term political aims, rather than a sense of loyalty or empathy for 
Dutch interests, and he certainly appeared apathetic to pursuing war actively against 
Stuart Britain. He allowed his Court to express freely their reluctance to enter the 
conflict and permitted his sister-in-law, Charles I’s daughter, to continue her 
correspondence with her brother, retaining the channel of communication that would be 
used after 1667 to reconcile the two kings and initiate the negotiations that ended in the 
Secret Treaty of Dover in 1670.6 That France was sympathetic to Charles II had 
previously been suspected by the Dutch, a report in the English parliament in 1664 
stating that they ‘begin to be somewhat suspicious & jealous as if his Majestie & the 
French King did too well understand one another’, although perhaps these fears had 
abated by the time France involved herself in the war.7 Louis’s antipathy towards 
pursuing a policy of enmity towards Britain continued after he had declared war in 
January 1666, allowing three months for English merchants to move their belongings 
and families out of France. This undoubtedly caused some level of upheaval for the 
merchant class, but suggests that his commitment to the war was not emphatic.8 
Moreover, British merchants remained in France regardless of the conflict, as will be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 ODNB. For Buckingham’s role in this conflict see Cogswell, ‘Foreign Policy’, 247-265; RPCS, ii, I, lxi-
lxii; S. Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas? Scottish Maritime Warfare, 1513-1713 (Leiden, 2010) 157, 
163-4, 170-1 
5 Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, 14; Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, 166; Voltaire, (M. Pollock, trans.), 
The Age of Louis XIV (London, 1958) 75. Louis, arguably, did not feel any particular loyalty to England 
or the Stuart Crown; one of his primary motivations was the death of Philip IV of Spain in September, 
which brought the issue of the Spanish inheritance to the fore in Europe. Louis hoped that if he declared 
war on England Johan de Witt (councillor pensionary – raadpensionaris – of the States of Holland) 
would assist him in his plan to annex portions of the Spanish Netherlands. De Witt, however, with Dutch 
trade being endangered by England and Dutch security being endangered by France, needed to secure the 
Spanish Netherlands as a ‘buffer state’ for protection from France. Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, 166-7 
6 Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, 167-8; Sir Arthur Bryant, (ed.), The Letters of King Charles II (New York, 
1968) 274, speech of Charles II to both Houses, 7 January 1674; also 222, 243-245; Howat, Stuart and 
Cromwellian Foreign Policy, Appendix 3, 166-171 
7 Downing to Bennett, 2/12 December 1664, The Hague, TNA SP84/173/65 
8 Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, 151 
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demonstrated below. Descriptions of the Franco-Stuart wars as ‘unnecessary’ (1627-
1629) and ‘reluctant and half-hearted’ (1666-1667) epitomise the lack of dogged 
determination on either side.9 
While Scotland was inevitably drawn into the Stuart conflicts, her dedication to 
the causes has been called into question. It has been suggested that the value of 
Scotland’s contribution to Charles’s wars was limited,10 and a report in the English 
Parliament from the end of 1664 stated that ‘Scotland is very much against the war with 
this country & that his Majestie must expect nothing from that kingdome nor Ireland 
towards the maintainance thereof’.11 Certainly on occasion some Scots did not seem 
wholly committed to their monarch’s participation in the later Stuart wars. Scots as well 
as English were targeted by legislation ordering seamen to return from abroad in order 
to participate in the conflict, but William Coventry reported to Secretary Bennett in 
November 1664 that he ‘believes the Scotchmen at Yarmouth may be found on 
merchantmen, where they have run for great wages’.12 However, Andrew Little has 
recently provided an alternate view, demonstrating high levels of participation by Scots 
in ‘England’s’ wars throughout the Stuart period.13 Moreover, while the English may 
have discerned little support from north of the border, it was reported from Edinburgh 
in August 1666 that ‘people want peace with Holland and war with France. The King 
might have 20,000 volunteers from Scotland’.14 Whether reluctantly or not, Scotland 
participated in the Franco-Stuart wars of this century. 
However, although Scotland participated, she also maintained her independence. 
While participation particularly between 1666 and 1667 formed part of the wider 
Anglo-Dutch Wars, Scotland entered into the war as an independent nation and under 
different rules of engagement and separate legal jurisdiction, despite sharing a crown 
with England, a fact that was appreciated throughout Europe.15 As stated by Thomas 
Cunningham, Conservator of the Scottish nation in the Dutch Republic, ‘the States of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 J. Jones, Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century (London, 1966) 68 
10 RPCS, ii, I, lxxxii 
11 Downing to Bennett, 2/12 December 1664, The Hague, TNA SP84/173/65 
12 William Coventry to Secretary Bennett, 19 November 1664, CSPD 1664-5, 79; A. Little, ‘A 
Comparative Survey of Scottish Service in the English and Dutch Maritime Communities c.1650-1707’ 
in A. Grosjean and S. Murdoch, Scottish Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period (Leiden, 
2005) 339 
13 Little, ‘Comparative Survey’, 333-374 
14 Robt. Meine to Williamson, 7 August 1666, CSPD 1666-1667, 15 
15 Murdoch, Terror, 238; see also Little, ‘Comparative Survey’, passim. For the now outdated view that 
these were ‘English’ conflicts, see T. C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707 
(Edinburgh/London, 1963) 18, 185 
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Zeland were very willing to contribute towards the protecting and exempting of our 
Staple shipps, so as our Staple trade might still be continued notwithstanding of the 
warre with England’.16 The realities of trading links that existed during this period 
suggest that England and Scotland followed separate legislation regarding commerce 
with France. In an occurrence which can speculatively be dated to 1667 the Edinburgh 
merchant Henry Wilkie freighted a Swedish ship, the St John of Congelfe, from 
Scotland to Bilbao, from there to Bordeaux and then back to Scotland, with 140 tuns of 
French wine and 11 bales of paper. He claimed that the ship was forced into the Thames 
for ‘shelter from the Enimie’ and therefore could not complete her intended voyage 
from Bordeaux to Scotland. Wilkie asked for permission, as some of the cargo was 
perishable, for a licence to enter and sell the goods in London.17 As well as 
demonstrating the use of a neutral Swedish ship, this occurrence suggests that 
embargoes on French goods (or at least their implementation) differed between London 
and Scotland. One implication could be that the claim of needing to ‘shelter from the 
Enimie’ was fabricated in an attempt to circumvent the English embargo on French 
goods during the 1666-1667 war. In April of the same year Thomas Cutler, a London 
merchant, freighted the same ship to go from London, to Leith, to Gothenburg, to 
Bordeaux and back to London. On the final part of the voyage the ship ‘came to a 
disaster being cast ashoare neare the coast of ffrance’, and he was forced to unload all 
the goods and repair his ship, which took almost three months, meaning that the ‘ship 
could not arrive here within the time of his Majesties proclamation’. He therefore asked 
for permission to unload his goods after the embargo had been implemented.18 It is not 
stated which particular proclamation is being referred to, but as the ship was coming to 
Britain from Bordeaux, it may be surmised that it was the embargo on trading with 
France implemented as a result of the war which began in 1666. His troubles, of course, 
may have been genuine but he perhaps bent the truth in order to pursue illegal 
commerce. 
These examples also demonstrate the benefits afforded to neutral Swedish ships 
by the conflict – this ship being hired multiple times to facilitate Franco-Scottish trade. 
As France and Denmark joined the second Anglo-Dutch War in 1666 proclamations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 He did note problems caused by ‘private freebooters’, and advised ‘that our nation should rather 
suspend their traffique until it should please God to reconcile those differences’. E. Courthope, The 
Journal of Thomas Cuningham of Campvere, 1640-1654 (Edinburgh, 1928) 245-6 
17 [?1667] 1660-1670, SRA Anglica VII, DXLII (unfoliated) 
18 10 April 1667, SRA Anglica VII, DXLII (unfoliated) 
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against foreign shipping, in addition to those already present, and the hampering of the 
extensive Dutch carrying trade practically prevented trading in all but neutral Swedish 
ships.19 In the context of circumventing embargoes and avoiding seizures by privateers, 
neutral shipping was a valuable commodity for all nations. If legitimate neutral shipping 
could not be acquired, merchants carried false or duplicate passes and/or sailed under 
‘flags of convenience’ (Chapter 2).20 The complexity of international trade and the 
methods merchants used to effect it caused problems for officials whose job it was to 
implement legislation. For example if, before the French formally entered the war, 
French merchants used Dutch ships to transport goods to the Netherlands and the ship 
was (legitimately) seized by the English, the French could still claim neutrality and 
demand their goods back.21 During the Anglo-Dutch Wars, the Duke of Albemarle told 
the French ambassador De Cominges, while discussing the capture of French ships, that 
he found it remarkable that French maritime trade seemed to have doubled in quantity 
in one year, suggesting that when France was not involved in these wars herself her 
ships were used to facilitate trade between the warring nations.22 
 
I. COMMERCIAL CONSTRAINTS? 
‘In pursuit of His Majesty’s enemies.’23 
 
Scottish independence in the wars was not commensurate with a disinclination to 
participate, despite some views revealed above. Numerous Scottish seamen became 
actively involved in the Stuart conflicts, often volunteering themselves and/or their 
ships for service.24 A notebook of Vice-Admiral Sir John Pennington, found among 
Scottish papers including correspondence between Louis XIII of France, Monsieur 
Courcelles (French ambassador to Scotland) and Nicolas Bruart, the French chancellor, 
concerns the assembling of the fleet at Portsmouth for La Rochelle, and the inclusion of 
this in Scottish papers is suggestive of Scottish involvement in this conflict.25 There are 
specific cases of Scotland actively pursuing the French, not only in Europe but also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Rommelse, ‘English Privateering’, 21 
20 Murdoch, Terror, 264 
21 Rommelse, ‘English Privateering’, 25 
22 Ibid, 23-4 
23 31 December 1628, Edinburgh, NAS AC7/2, 117 
24 For the granting of letters of marque against Spain, for example, see 20 April 1626, Holyrood; 2 June 
1626, Edinburgh, RPCS, ii, I, 283-4, 295, lxi-lxii. For the most recent analysis of this practice see 
Murdoch, Terror, passim. 
251628-1631, NLS Newbattle Collection, ms.5741 
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futher afield, and not simply in terms of privateers’ captures of ships or cargo. Scots 
under the authority of Sir William Alexander of Menstrie (later Earl of Stirling), 
Admiral of Nova Scotia, captured Quebec in 1629, a prize not returned to the French 
until 1632 despite the Peace of Susa in April 1629.26 
Participation in privateering certainly afforded opportunities to individuals to 
take advantage of the wars, and it may be assumed that a desire to make personal profit, 
rather than acting in the interests of the nation, was commonly prevalent. However, to 
obtain a privateer’s commission individuals had first to pay a surety of £2000 sterling – 
even if they never took any prize, which was not uncommon, suggesting that financial 
reward was not always the primary motivation for undertaking such a commission.27 
Steve Murdoch has estimated that the total amount held in escrow by the state in just 
one of the conflicts of the 1660s was between £160,000 and £240,000 sterling.28 For 
some individuals, this did prove to be a profit-making exercise. Recent research has 
demonstrated that Scottish privateers had some success in the various conflicts of 1626-
1630 against the Imperial cities, France and Spain,29 and certainly instances of Scottish 
privateers acting against the French are documented. In September 1628 a fleet of five 
ships, two of the Royal Navy (the Unicorn, captained by David Murray and the Thistle, 
captained by William Duff) and three privateers (the Grace of God of Dysart, captained 
by David Robertson, the Alexander Bucephalus, captain David Alexander and the Gift 
of God of St Monans, captain James Binning) captured the Jonas of Dunkirk, which had 
a Calais skipper, Albert Jansonne, as its master.30 David Alexander appears again in the 
Gift of God in November 1629 alongside two other Scottish men of war off the coast of 
Shetland, having captured the Green Drake, a Dutch ship from Alkmure captained by 
Cornelius Peterson, as it sailed illegally from Gothenburg to Bayonne in France 
carrying masts, tar, deals and copper.31 The skipper argued that they had sailed for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Murdoch, Terror, 173-174; S. Murdoch, ‘The April 1640 Committee: The Projection and Reflection of 
the Covenanting Revolution’ in M. Landi (ed.), L’Écosse et ses Doubles; Ancien Monde, Nouveau Monde 
(Rives, forthcoming) 2; A. Macinnes, The British Revolution, 1629-1660 (Basingstoke, 2005) 69 
27 Murdoch, Terror, 28, 262. Patrick Crowhurst has argued that except for a few spectacular successes, 
most privateers do not seem to have made any profit. P. Crowhurst, The Defence of British Trade, 1689-
1815 (Kent, 1977) 16 
28 Murdoch, Terror, 279, 328. For an idea of the numbers of Scottish privateers who paid the sum of 
£2000 between 1665 and 1667 see Appendix VI:1, 386-395. For the earlier periods see IV:2, IV:3 and 
V:1 
29 Murdoch, Terror, 174 
30 2 September, Leith, 2 September 1628, NAS AC7/1, 190 
31 3 February 1629, Edinburgh, NAS AC7/1, 246. This appears to be the same case as the Green Dragon, 
reported in the Privy Council 5 March 1629, RPCS, ii, III, 86. Both names have been cited: Murdoch, 
Terror, 175, 395, 397 
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Bayonne before Charles I had issued his proclamation against trading with France; the 
case appears not to have gone before the Admiralty Court, suggesting that it was 
dismissed and the ship released.32 The personal benefit that was gleaned by some from 
forays into privateering is evidenced by the case of Richard Binning, a mariner of 
Yarmouth, who in May 1627 was hired by William Ramsay, captain of the Alexander, 
for a passenger voyage to Nova Scotia. The ship sailed in September 1628 but Ramsay 
changed his plans, putting his passengers ashore at Loch Ryan and going to sea ‘in 
pursuit of His Majesty’s enemies’ on 24 September33 – believing that acting as a 
privateer would prove more lucrative than his current employment. He seems to have 
been proven right; on 28 September, just four days after being granted his letter of 
marque, he captured a Lubeck ship laden with salt. He later captured two French barks 
carrying fish. However, French trade was not exclusively targeted. David Alexander 
appears in a different ship, the James of Anstruther, having captured the Houpe of 
Calais, master Jacob Hanson, bound from Norway to Malaga with deals and tar in May 
1629.34 
 Patrick Logan, captain of the James of Leith, was granted a letter of marque in 
February 1667 ‘against the ships and goods belonging to the French King, the King of 
Denmark and the State of the United Provinces and to their subjects or inhabitants’.35 
Privateering activity remained a real concern during the later Franco-Stuart wars, and 
individual Scots with commissions exploited their geographical position to take 
advantage of certain opportunities. As war continued, most of the Atlantic trade of 
northern Europe began to round Scotland rather than sail through the Channel, avoiding 
a route which had hitherto presented a higher capture risk.36 Already by the end of 1664, 
before the second Anglo-Dutch War had broken out, the Dutch were officially ordered 
to avoid using the Channel and sail around Scotland instead.37 This practice became so 
common that the authorities discussed the possibility of having forts built in Shetland to 
prevent it,38 perhaps as a way of forcing the Dutch back through the Channel and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 5 March 1629, RPCS, ii, III, 86; Murdoch, Terror, 175 
33 31 December 1628, Edinburgh, NAS AC7/2, 117 
34 30 January 1630, 23 February 1630, 18 March 1630, Edinburgh, NAS AC7/1, 259, 269, 272. While it 
is not conclusive that this is the same person, the fact that he captained ships from St Monans and 
Anstruther respectively suggests that it probably is. 
35 1 February 1667, London, NAS RH9/17/32/11 
36 E. Graham, ‘The Scottish Marine during the Dutch wars’ in Scottish Historical Review, LXI (1982) 69 
37 Downing to Bennett, 6/16 December 1664, The Hague, TNA SP84/173/69 
38 De Bacquoy to Bennett, 2/14 February 1665, Leeuwarden, TNA SP84/174/84; Alvise Saguedo, 
Venetian Ambassador in France to the Doge and Senate, 9 January 1665, CSPV, XXXIV, 74-5 
 163	  
making them easier prey. The fort was not completed during this conflict, however, and 
the Scots continued to prey on Dutch shipping.39 As one report in the London Gazette in 
June 1667 noted in relation to Dutch prizes: 
 
a great store of prizes lately brought in daily by Scottish vessels and of late 
scarcely a day hath passed in which there had not been two or three prizes sent 
in, so much that the harbour [Burntisland] is so thronged that they are forced to 
send several of them to other places.40 
 
Although such actions inevitably had an impact on commerce, the numbers of French 
prizes taken were in fact remarkably small.41 
Despite some successes of their own, the Scots suffered losses to privateers 
during these wars. In 1666 a commission was given to the Duke of Beaufort to arm a 
frigate, l’Ermine, against ‘aux Anglais et autres ennemis de l’Etat’.42 The taking of so 
many Dutch merchantmen by the British nations affected French trade, as many of the 
vessels that were captured were French ships sailing under flags of convenience or were 
Dutch ships transporting French goods. As a result, many French products remained in 
warehouses in French ports – hurting the interests of both the merchants and the 
national government and economy.43 Scotland did, however, benefit as a result of the 
damage done to the Dutch carrying trade by privateers. As the Dutch began to disappear 
from Scottish waters more merchants were encouraged seriously to consider owning 
their own ships.44 In this sense, the wars provided some impetus for Scotland’s 
merchants, encouraging them to expand their personal investment in overseas trade and, 
as a by-product, helped to promote Scotland’s commercial significance in Europe.  
While most profit that was made through privateering was legitimate, privateers 
also attempted to use underhand methods (some more intelligent than others) to achieve 
financial gain. In September 1665 a French captain was arrested in France for using an 
English letter of marque against the Dutch, the French and even the English 
themselves.45 Furthermore, not all prizes were judged legitimate. In 1629 John 
Anderson and John Daw captured two Calais vessels, the St Michael and the St Peter, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The fortification eventually came to fruition at Lerwick, but was burned by the Dutch in 1673. 
Murdoch, Terror, 257 
40 Sunderland Report, 1 July 1667, London Gazette, issue 170 
41 Murdoch, Terror, 174-5 
42 ADCM B5607 
43 Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, 132-3 
44 F. Roberts and I. MacPhail, Dumbarton Common Good Accounts, 1614-1660 (Dumbarton, 1972) 264 
45 Rommelse, ‘English Privateering’, 21 
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while they were at anchor off Molde, Norway.46 The captured skippers and crews 
brought cases against the Scots for cruelty – two of the Scottish crew were found guilty 
and John Haddon, captain of one of the privateers, was sentenced to death (although 
Charles I later commuted the sentence to banishment from Scotland) and the French 
vessels were freed.47 Three French ships taken by the Royal Navy in 1627 also had to be 
given back as they had been taken while under the convoy of a Dutch-man-of-war.48 
The Scots sustained fewer losses at the hands of the French than may have been 
expected, and both parties sustained a relatively small number of losses at each other’s 
hands: the greater distance to Scottish waters and the far smaller merchant marine 
certainly contributed to this.49 
More pertinently, it is plausible that the importance of Franco-Scottish trade was 
an inhibiting factor on the desire of the French and Scottish privateers to take each 
other’s vessels, and the Privy Council received numerous petitions from merchants 
wishing to continue to trade with France during wartime.50 While privateering posed a 
very real threat to shipping and trade (as did piracy during peacetime), concern over 
privateers or pirates as a specific, isolated danger did not always manifest itself in the 
records kept by individual merchants or mariners.51 The Elie skipper Alexander 
Gillespie sailed to France during the 1666-1667 war, yet when privateers were 
encountered he dealt with them civilly and his logbook does not mention any concerns 
or problems arising.52 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 29 December 1629, Edinburgh, NAS AC7/2, 231, 241 
47 8 January 1630, 22 March 1630, 12 June 1630, Edinburgh, NAS AC7/2, 251, 260, 291; 2 April, 6 June 
1630, RPCS, ii, III, 521-3, 589; 17 February 1631, RPCS, ii, IV, 148; Murdoch, Terror, 20, 178. Harry 
Thomson and Alexander Gedd were acquitted of the charge of cruelty. John Anderson and John Daw 
were acquitted of charges of taking the ships wrongfully, as they had been acting under a commission 
from William, Earl Marischal, and the prizes had been declared lawful in Leith. This perhaps 
demonstrates the shortcomings of the jurisdiction over such matters in Scotland, and the confusion that 
could arise. John Daw was held prisoner in Bordeaux for taking Leveane Rickleman’s ship The Sanct 
Peter, and Rickleman was prevented from returning to Bordeaux until Daw was freed. Rickleman 
eventually appealed to the Admiralty Court for permission to return to Bordeaux before his ship was 
wrecked, and was allowed to do so on the condition that he secured Daw’s release, a bargain that was 
upheld. 
48 7 December 1627, APCE, 1627-1628, 167, cited in Murdoch, Terror, 171 
49 J. Bruijn, ‘Dutch Privateering during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars: in The Low Countries 
History Yearbook: Acta Histoiriae Neerlandicae, XI (1978) 92 
50 Murdoch, Terror, 175 
51 See, for example, Hew Ross to Lady Ross, La Rochelle, 8 April 1611, NAS GD3/13/4/2 
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II. INDIRECT RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCE 
‘Your Majesteis subjectis ar haiely distrest, thair voyage maid unprofitable, 
and thay thameselffis compellit to serve’.53 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, merchant ships were often pressed into government service, in 
varying capacities, during times of war. In September 1626 the Privy Council noted that 
‘for defence of his awne dominionis and persute of the enemie [Charles] is to outreik his 
navyis and armies be sea and land, and to send royall supplies to his confederattis, in all 
whiche caises shippis ar necessarie above all things’, permitting no ship to go abroad 
without a licence.54 The impressment of these ships was more explicitly stated in the 
Privy Council two months later. 
 
For the better praeventing and resisting of the Spanishe praeparationis whairwith 
this Iland is threatnit, causit stay and arreist all the shippis within his Majesties 
dominionis, to the intent thay might be in reddines to be armed and send to sea 
as the necessities and occasioun of thair imployment and service sould require.55 
 
All ships already on voyages were recalled. On 27 September Thomas Haddington, the 
Earl of Melrose and first Earl of Haddington, wrote to the Scottish burghs informing 
them that the King had ordered the Privy Council 
 
to make stay of all shippes bound for France, and commands to all such as are 
gone, to prevent the danger that some of them may happin to incurre by goinge 
to France, in regaird…of some lait differences between him and the Frenche 
King; and at this same tyme all the serviceable shipps within the kingdome wer 
arrested for his Majestie, and at his command.56 
 
While the Privy Council register explicitly mentions Spain rather than France, the 
antiquary James Balfour’s supposition that this legislation was also motivated by 
conflict with France is logical.57 Even before the impressment of merchant ships was 
publicly announced, the Privy Council had begun making preparations for war. In July 
1626 they wrote to the Council of Aberdeen asking how many ships could be assembled 
for the King’s wars, what their burden was and the number of men they could hold. 
They were also asked how many seafaring men were within the town as men, as well as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 21 July 1625, Edinburgh, RPCS, ii, I, 88 
54 28 September 1626, Edinburgh, RPCS, ii, I, 431 
55 21 November 1626, RPCS, ii, I, 445 
56 Balfour, Annales, II, 146-147 cited in RPCS, ii, I, 430, 432n., lxvi 
57 RPCS, ii, I, 432n. For more information on both Haddington and Balfour, see ODNB. 
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their ships, were pressed into service.58 Two days later Gilbert Cullen was sent to 
Aberdeen as Commissioner to the Privy Council and a week later they produced ‘a nott 
of the schippis belonging to the toune of Aberdeen and of their burdenis’.59 These 
included the Bonacord, master Gilbert Anderson, which was reported to be 50 tuns in 
burden, and ‘presently absent at hir voyage in France, whair shee hes almost being this 
year bypast’.60 Such recruitment was not always successful, however: 
 
none of these shippis caries any ordinance, except onlie the Bonacord, quhilk 
caries bot two taliounes; and they have not amongis thame all abone fyftie 
marineris to sail tham, quhairof their is bot fourtie belongis heir. The remanent 
ar hyred elsquhair.61 
 
In August 1626 the Aberdeen Council were informed ‘of the grit preparatiouns of a 
powerfull and forayne cuntrey to invade…That a competent number of shippis providit 
with all weirlyke furnitour may be sett onto and maintained be the burrowes during the 
tyme of this common danger’.62 In October 1626 these ships were 
 
lying in the harbour, being six in number, an embargo laid on, by order of the 
Council, in pursuance of a missive from the secretary of state…I [the Earl of 
Melrose] am comandet by his majestie to command yow in his name to take 
order preceislie that nain of your shippes sail any whair out of the dominionnes 
whill we have warr.63 
 
The enlisting of merchant vessels for war was inevitably unpopular, and this 
remained so during recruitment for Scottish participation in the second Anglo-Dutch 
War. The Scottish burghs could theoretically be fined 500 merks for each man they 
failed to provide for the Royal Navy, and when in 1665 Aberdeen had difficulty raising 
the 14 men she was obliged to (as the seamen had absented themselves during the call 
for service) the withdrawal of brewing privileges from the wives of these men was 
threatened as an incentive.64 However, while the enlisting of merchant vessels for war 
may have been unpopular with merchants individually, the recalling of ships was not a 
direct attempt to stifle trade specifically between Britain and her ‘enemy’ countries; this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Little, ‘Comparative Survey’, 336; for the later Stuart wars see 339-345 
59 17 July 1626, ACA, Aberdeen Council Minutes, LI, 275, 276 
60 25 July 1626, RPCS, ii, I, 669. This demonstrates the continuation of trade with France up until the 
outbreak of war. 
61 25 July 1626, RPCS, ii, I, 669 
62 10 August 1626, Edinburgh, ACL, I, 249-250 
63 October 1626, ACA, Aberdeen Council Minutes, LI, 299 
64 Smout, Scottish Trade, 64; 15 March 1665, J. Stuart (ed.), Extracts from the Council Register of the 
Burgh of Aberdeen, 215; Little, ‘Comparative Survey’, 340, n.26 
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was simply a side-effect of recruitment for the war effort, as during the British Civil 
Wars (Chapter 4). 
Merchants appear to have benefited and been inconvenienced in almost equal 
measure by being commandeered to transport men or goods for the Crown during the 
Franco-Stuart conflicts. In September 1626 Andrew Brown, master of the Tyme of 
Leith, transported soldiers from Aberdeen to Glückstadt in Denmark. He intended (as 
ordered by the owners of the ship) to go on to Bordeaux and try for a freight back to 
Scotland, taking advantage of being able to take a return cargo custom-free (Chapter 2). 
However, he was prevented from doing so ‘by the outbreak of war between the King’s 
majestie and the Kingdome of France’.65 In April 1628 Archibald Douglas, captain of 
the Lyon, was ordered to take the Earl of Morton to the Isle of Rhé for the La Rochelle 
expedition. He was compensated for this voyage, being given two barrels of peas and a 
barrel of herring for provisions on returning to the Isle of Wight.66 In October 1667, a 
contract was made between Lord George Douglas, Colonel to the Scots Regiment, and 
James Mowat, the Paris merchant, for transportation of 300 men from Leith or 
Burntisland to Dieppe.67 Mowat commissioned John Brown, the son of a merchant 
burgess of the same name in Edinburgh, to act on his behalf in Scotland and prepare two 
ships for this purpose. While this commission may have been inconvenient (for 
example, it may have prevented him from transporting a cargo back to France from 
Scotland, although alternatively it may have saved him from travelling in ballast), the 
contract stated that Mowat ‘should be free of all…dampnadge interest & expenses’.68 
Presumably, Mowat could also take advantage of the concession relieving him from 
paying customs duties on any return cargo to Scotland. While these cases demonstrate 
the benefits merchants could in theory gain from such commissions, this did not always 
come to fruition. Brown had to bring the Tyme home in ballast, being unable to obtain a 
return freight, gaining nothing for himself or the owners of the ship from the voyage. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 10 December 1629, Edinburgh, NAS AC7/2, 219; W. Welwood, An Abridgement of all sea-lawes 
(London, 1613) 48-9 
66 29 April 1628, AC7/2, 77 
67 24 October 1667, NAS GD172/1919. The transportation of Scottish men suggests that Scotland was 
involved in organised campaigns in her own right in this war, and also that the Treaty of Breda, agreed on 
21 July 1667, did not signal the end of all aggression between Britain and France. For the activities of 
those Scots who embarked for Louis XIV’s service from Rye in September and October see Little, 
‘Comparative Survey’, 344-5 
68 This instrument was endorsed in November, confirming that James Mowat had fulfilled his part of the 
contract to provide the ships. 30 November 1633, NAS GD172/2400 
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Perhaps, then, the sympathy apparently held by the Privy Council for merchants 
affected by these wars is understandable. In the summer of 1625 Alexander Gray of 
Dundee, master of the Falcoun, William Black in Anstruther, master of the Blew Due, 
John Dow in Crail and ‘some others’ petitioned the Privy Council when, upon being in 
France pursuing trade, they were 
 
stayed at the Rotchell be commandement from Monsieur de Subyis and the 
governour and magistattis of the Rotchell, and commandit to attend thair 
directionis and service; quhairthrow your Majesteis saidis subjectis ar haiely 
distrest, thair voyage maid unprofitable, and thay thameselffis compellit to 
serve.69 
 
The Privy Council ‘could not in so just a manner refuse thame’, and recommended to 
the King that ‘a coarse’ should be taken for their ‘comfort and relief’.70 The Privy 
Council chose to act in their merchants’ interests on more than one occasion. In 
December 1625 a Dunkirker took a ship of the Scotsman Gilbert Weddell, the Mary, 
which had been freighted to Calais with wheat. The ship and goods were ‘made lawfull 
pryze’. Yet Weddell, on the grounds that his ship after being sold to a Frenchman in 
Dieppe was taken by English ships and brought into Plymouth, asked that the ship be 
returned to him. Despite the ship having been initially classed as lawful prize, the Privy 
Council acquiesced to his demand in July 1627.71 Furthermore, many such successful 
appeals to the Council resulted in victories for French ships. Shortly before war 
officially broke out in May 1627, but after relations had become tense, Scottish 
merchants trading in France complained regarding an arrest made in Scotland of some 
French ships, a bark of Calais and a hoy of Rouen, who were detained under suspicion 
that they were Dunkirkers, ‘his Majesteis profest and declaired enemies’, but were 
released after they were ‘cleared to belong to Frenschemen’.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 21 July 1625, Edinburgh, RPCS, ii, I, 88 
70 Ibid, 89 
71 19 July 1627, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, II, 20-1 
72 28 May 1627, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, I 613 
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III. MERCHANT METHODS 
‘Recouped by the purchase and import of wine’:73 
 
Whether as a direct result of embargoes or not, trade between Scotland/Britain and 
France was affected during the Franco-Stuart wars. The records of the Admiralty of Le 
Havre record no ships going to or coming from any of the British nations between 9 
July 1627 and 11 April 1629.74 Similarly an entry book for Kirkcaldy from November 
1666 to November 1667 records no voyages between this port and France.75 However, it 
is not unlikely that as this trade was officially contraband, the port officials chose to 
turn a blind eye to it, and did not record it as diligently as they may have done in 
peacetime. Furthermore, restrictions on trade must be considered in their true context. In 
1668 the mayor of Bordeaux issued a declaration preventing foreign merchants from 
concluding any association in France, except with French merchants.76 Although 
ostensibly this may seem to have been an attempt to stifle international trade in a time 
of war, the stipulation that foreign merchants could continue to trade with French 
merchants suggests, instead, that this was an attempt simply to protect or enhance 
France’s domestic economy. This explanation seems all the more likely when it is 
considered that this stipulation was made during the French intendant Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert’s financial reforms in France (Chapter 1). Furthermore statistical analyses, as 
already discussed, are not always conclusive. Analysis of the percentage of ships 
entering or departing the port of Leith from or to France suggests that the wars of 1627 
to 1629 did have an adverse affect on Franco-Scottish trade. As a percentage of ships 
going from Leith to European destinations, those going to France fell dramatically from 
41.2% in 1611-1612 to just 5% in 1626-1628. This, however, is not necessarily 
indicative of a fall in trade to France. It must also be noted that the percentage of ships 
going to the Netherlands rose between these periods, from 22.3% to 37.8%. This 
suggests that merchants continued to trade to the continent, but chose to trade through 
other European destinations; furthermore, upon reaching Europe goods were likely to 
have been transported overland, allowing merchants to facilitate trade with French 
locations but avoid using French ports which were ostensibly closed to them 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 26 April 1628, NAS AC7/1, 153; 28 April 1628, NAS AC7/1, 154 
74 ‘Enregistrement des exportations du Havre pour d’autres ports (de France ou de l’étranger) du 9 juillet 
1627 au 11 avril 1629’, ADSM 216 BP 145, f 15r-f 59r 
75 1666-1667, NAS E72/9/3 
76 3 November 1668, TNA SP117/288 
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(Introduction).77 This data, being presented in percentages rather than numbers of ships, 
does not allow us to gauge the amount of trade in real terms that continued during this 
period. For the later Franco-Stuart conflict, however, Eric Graham has compiled data 
showing numbers of ships entering the port of Leith from European destinations, giving 
a better indication of the volume of trade that continued during this conflict:78 
 
Table 5.1 Ships entering Leith from Europe, 1638-1667 
Numbers in bold: Scottish ships only. 
* Graham does not specify whether this represents the Dutch Republic or the Spanish 
Netherlands, or a combination of both. 
 
The gaps in this data make it difficult to draw firm conclusions from it, but it indicates 
that imports to Leith from France fluctuated throughout the seventeenth century, falling 
during the 1666-1667 war – although not ceasing altogether. However, there is a 
marked rise in entries from the Low Countries during 1667, suggesting again that 
merchants did not cease trading to France but instead found ways to avoid trading to 
ports that were prohibited or areas in which there was a real danger from privateering by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 McNeill and MacQueen, Atlas of Scotland, 270. The origin of this data is not stated, neither is any 
distinction made between the Dutch Republic (or the United Provinces/States General/Northern 
Netherlands) and the Spanish Netherlands (Southern Netherlands). 
78 E. Graham, A Maritime History of Scotland, 1650-1790 (East Linton, 2002). Data compiled by Graham 
from the books of shore dues, privilege and censors records of Leith, NAS E71-2 
Country of Origin 1638 1660 1661 1662 1663 1667 
NORWAY 39 6 9 19 15 6 
BALTIC 20 6 7 5 7 11 
GERMANY 0 1 0 1 0 6 
LOW 
COUNTRIES* 
28 6 8 7 6 27 
ENGLAND 13 8 10 6 7 21 
FRANCE 35 10 12 25 10 5 
SPAIN 4 0 4 0 1 0 
AMERICAN 
COLONIES 
0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 139 37 50 63 46 78 
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transporting goods overland and transporting them home from the Low Countries. 
Perhaps more interestingly, the numbers of ships entering Leith from England also rose 
considerably in 1667. While it is unlikely that this represents importation of French 
goods from England (as English merchants were operating under the same prohibitions) 
it suggests that rather than deprive themselves of business, Scottish merchants adapted 
their activities and imported goods from alternative destinations. In fact, when the total 
number of ships arriving in Leith is considered, overseas trade appears considerably 
higher in 1667 than it had been for the rest of the decade, for the years for which there is 
available data.79 
The 1627-1629 war against France has been cited as causing the first break in 
economic ties with France,80 with Edgar Lythe specifically stating that the £400,000 
raised in Scotland in 1625 for war against the French represented ‘active participation’ 
on behalf of Scotland and was the ‘last straw on the back of the Auld Alliance’.81 He 
maintains that the 3000 troops sent to La Rochelle under the Earl of Morton in 1627 
signified the moment that the old economic alliance ended.82 Yet while these wars 
inevitably had an impact on Franco-Scottish trade, to couch it in this way is to overstate 
the case. On 19 December 1626, the importation of French wine into Scotland was 
forbidden, although the reasons formally cited for this were scarcity of money and the 
behaviour of poor people who ‘spend the most pairt of thair meanis in drinking of 
wyne’.83 However, as noted in Chapter 1, this act in fact seems to have been made in 
retaliation for a violent incident sanctioned by the Duke of Epernon, the French 
Governor of Guyenne, in which a fleet of 200 English and Scottish vessels sailing from 
Bordeaux was seized, this occurring before any formal declaration of war between the 
two countries – the Scottish ships were released ‘in respect of the ancient league’, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Graham, Maritime History, 144 has suggested that peace with the Dutch after the end of the second 
Anglo-Dutch war revived Scotland’s trade to the Low Countries, and states that there was a ‘drift in 
Scotland’s foreign-going trade away from France and towards England and her colonies’. However, 
although the records for 1667 may suggest this, the data has been compiled from 1667 as a whole, yet the 
second Anglo-Dutch war persisted until the Dutch victory at the Raid on the Medway in June. Without 
comparable data from 1665 and particularly 1666, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. This data 
requires further evaluation as it suggests that trade to the Low Countries rose during the Anglo-Dutch 
war, clearly anathema to the political situation. 
80 G. Donaldson, Scotland, James V-James VII (Edinburgh, 1965) 387 
81 Lythe, Economy of Scotland, 211. Whyte agrees with this assessment: Whyte, Scotland before the 
Industrial Revolution, 272 
82 S. Lythe, The Economy of Scotland in its European Setting, 1550-1625 (Edinburgh/London, 1960) 172. 
The prohibitions placed on trade with France have been cited as specific reasons for the unpopularity of 
the wars in Scotland. M. Lee, The Road to Revolution, Scotland under Charles I, 1625-37 (Illinois, 1985) 
82 
83 19 December 1626, Edinburgh, RPCS, ii, I, 478-479 
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the English ships remained captive.84 Under the decree preventing the importation of 
French wine two French barks, the Hoip of Rouen, master Jacques Ilkus, and the St 
Johnne of Calais, master Paul Lupine, were sequestrated in Leith in January 1627 but 
were freed upon petition from their masters, the reason given for this being that the 
French authorities had liberated the Scottish portion of the British fleet that had been 
arrested by the Governor of Guyenne, further consolidating the speculation that the 
embargo was implemented in retaliation for this earlier misdemeanour.85 Embargoes 
were not implemented as strongly as the tenor of them might suggest – on this occasion 
the Privy Council (and to a certain extent Charles himself) demonstrating some level of 
apathy towards this prohibition – possibly due to Scotland’s commitments elsewhere in 
this period, not least to the King’s uncle in Denmark.86 Furthermore, when several 
merchants complained in January 1627 that their shipments of wine had been 
confiscated, Charles allowed the cargo to be restored, accepting that the merchants had 
been unaware of the embargo when they had first undertaken the voyage.87 Two days 
later another Scottish merchant, who had imported French wine in a Flemish ship, was 
permitted to sell his cargo despite the embargo.88 
Franco-Scottish trade did not grind to a halt in either of the Franco-Stuart 
conflicts of the seventeenth century, and merchants utilised the methods investigated in 
Part I in order to continue trading, including trading through different ports and 
transporting their goods in neutral (usually Swedish) ships, and once again merchants 
acted directly to influence commercial policy. When in 1627 Charles tried to prevent 
the sale of French wine already present in Scotland the merchants protested so fiercely 
that the monarch relented, allowing the sale of this wine to continue.89 In February 1628 
an embargo was placed on the importation of any French goods in any ships, with the 
ban on French wines which had been in place since December 1626 being specifically 
reiterated, removing the loophole which allowed French goods to be imported in neutral 
shipping.90 Scottish merchants informed the Privy Council that ‘upoun the occasioun of 
the troubles fallin out betuix the Kings Majestie and the Frenshe King, we out of our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 RPCS, ii, I, 479-480n. 
85 9 January 1627, Holyrood, RPCS, ii I, 486-7, lxxiii 
86 Murdoch, Terror, 169-70; S. Murdoch, Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660 
(East Linton, 2003) 202-8 
87 30 January 1627, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, I 506-507 
88 1 February 1627, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, I, 527-528 
89 Lee, Road to Revolution, 82; 6 January 1627, RPCS, ii, I, 488-9 
90 5 February 1628, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, II, 567-8 
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most humble respect to his Majesties interesse have dewtifullie forborne all trading in 
France’,91 but asked that: 
 
for the better securing of our estaits there frome the danger of arreistment we 
gave ordour to our factouris to lift and imploy our stockes upon Frenshe 
commoditeis and to imbarque the same in Flemish bottomes the better to assure 
the transport thairof hither without challenge or impediment.92 
 
These merchants also raised concerns for the wider implications of the wars; embargoes 
on French markets compelled merchants to pursue trade in Flanders, a market that was 
not as well known and therefore less certain. While merchants did adapt their trading 
methods and traded to alternative destinations when necessary, this was not always 
welcomed. If merchants in these locations denied their business it would place their 
trade in jeopardy; moreover, in return for the goods they sold merchants had to accept 
‘suche commoditeis as they please give us’ in return, as the transportation of money to 
or from the Low Countries was forbidden.93 Continuous protestations from merchants to 
the Privy Council, and Council to King, eventually culminated in a letter from 
Whitehall on 26 March 1628 conceding that all French goods already purchased by 
merchants may be brought into the country until 1 July.94 This news reached Holyrood 
on 7 April: 
 
the King has granted permission to all merchants who had stocks of wine in 
France at the time of his proclamation forbidding the import of the same, to 
import it before 1 July 1628. And that the wynes to be brocht home be them ar 
the returne of thers gudes within ffrance. By the end of April they must inform 
the Admiral of what wine they have in France, and the quantities they have, and 
thereafter may import only existing stock.95 
 
While the prohibition in 1628 may have only been relaxed temporarily, merchants also 
played a part in its later abrogation and, even before this had been achieved, flouted it as 
they perceived that it should not apply to them. In January 1629 the Earl of Linlithgow, 
the acting Lord High Admiral, rightfully arrested a consignment of French wines 
brought into Leith. However, the Scottish merchants asserted that they were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 26 February 1628, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, II, 243 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 243, xxxii, see also 11 March 1628, 265-6; 25 March 1628, 284-5 
94 7 April 1628 (26 March 1628), RPCS, ii, II, xxxiii-xxxiv, 305-307 
95 7 April 1628, Holyrood, NAS AC7/1, 152. The time limit on the relaxation of the embargo seems to 
have been implemented; in January and February 1629 wine that had been imported contrary to this 
decree was arrested. 27 January 1629-February 1629, NAS AC7/1, 232-239 
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encouraged to this kynde of imployment of their stockes by the exemple of the 
English who (as they affirme) wer daylie buying and sending over to England 
great quantitie of Frenshe wynes which had a free and uncontrolled vent there, 
without challenge or arrestment.96 
 
Perhaps as a result of the Scottish merchants mentioning that ‘their factours had sent 
home these wynes for furnishing of the countrie at the tyme of your Majesteis muche 
expected heerecomming’, the embargo on French wines was lifted on 12 February 1629 
– ten weeks before the formal declaration of peace at Susa on 24 April.97 
While these relaxations allowed merchants to continue legitimately trading with 
France via some means, it is not inconceivable that once the embargo was relaxed 
speculative merchants found ways of taking advantage of it. While in this case 
relaxation allowed only for the importation of wine already in their possession, 
merchants might, for example, declare more than they had, allowing them to purchase 
the difference later. Following the granting of the concession, there was a sudden spate 
of merchants making appeals to the Admiralty Court, declaring money abroad that 
‘could only be recouped by the purchase and import of wine’.98 The Glasgow merchants 
John Hamilton and William Hill declared that factors in France held money of theirs – 
naming James Ligorie, a merchant of Le Croisic, who owed 2000 francs for Scottish 
cloth, plaiding and hides, Tobias Pedro, also in Le Croisic, owing 2800 francs for coal 
sent in August 1626 and Roger Lorentine, factor at Bordeaux, who owed them 1200 
francs for herring and salmon sent in September 1626. Hamilton and Hill specified that 
they needed to buy wine if they were to recoup this money.99 Two days later the 
Edinburgh merchant John Slowane declared that François Burse, his factor in France, 
held 5000 francs as the proceeds of skins sent by him in 1626 and 1627, again stating 
that this money could only be recouped ‘by the purchase and import of wine’.100 It is 
surprising that merchants who were savvy enough to understand the implications of this 
legislation had previously been so lax in recouping debts, only now acting to acquire 
money owed to them for goods taken to France over eighteenth months before, rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 29 January 1629, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, III, 24-5 
97 29 January, 12 February 1629, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, III, xxii-xxxiii, 24-5, 44. Lee, considering only 
political and diplomatic matters, rather than the pressure exerted by the merchants, suggests that this was 
prompted by the fall of La Rochelle in 1628; asserting that Charles ‘cut his losses’ and made peace, 
‘promptly’ re-opening the wine trade: Lee, Road to Revolution, 82-3 
98 26 and 28 April 1628, NAS AC7/1, 153-4 
99 26 April 1628, NAS AC7/1, 153 
100 28 April 1628, NAS AC7/1, 154. It is probable that this was a Scottish factor by the name of Francis 
Bursie. He may have had links to John and Peter Bursie, the Scottish factors in Sweden in the 1640s and 
1650s mentioned by Murdoch, Network North, 221 
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than recouping the debt the previous season. Perhaps these claims may have been 
exaggerated, or perhaps their factors in France were prepared to support such claims; 
not least as without trade, the factors themselves made no profit (Chapter 2). 
While certain embargoes were relaxed, others were simply not effectively 
implemented. In June 1628 James Smallat, merchant burgess of Dumbarton and master 
and owner of the Providence, made a complaint about having the goods aboard his ship 
unlawfully seized and driven to the Kyle of Alloway on Mull. What interests us more 
than the details of the claim, however, is the planned voyage of the ship. Smallat had 
loaded herring in the Clyde before proceeding to Ireland and loading the rest of the 
ship’s cargo, including cloth, butter and cheese. They then set sail to France. Despite 
trade with France from England and Scotland – and their dominions, which included 
Ireland and Nova Scotia – having been under prohibition since February, this voyage 
seems to have been permitted, and the Council highlighted no such embargo in relation 
to this voyage.101 When a case was brought before the Admiralty Court in April 1628 by 
Andrew Watson, captain of the Blessing of Burntisland against George Scott, the former 
master of the ship, the case was settled, including £38 10s. to be paid to Scott by Wilson 
for 1 last of Rochelle salt, despite the prohibition on French commodities – although in 
this case this may have been permitted because the salt was purchased and loaded 
before the implementation of the prohibition.102 In September however Patrick Baxter 
freighted the Angel for transporting goods from Leith to Dysart, and from there to his 
home port of Dundee.103 The cargo was French salt, suggesting not only that this salt 
was imported during the war with France, but also that French goods continued to be 
traded domestically despite the war. 
While some merchants demonstrably adopted specific tactics to allow them to 
continue to trade with France or to take advantage of relaxed legislation, others seem to 
have continued trading openly. Inevitably, there are many gaps in the evidence of 
particular merchants, but an examination of correspondence and bills of exchange 
enacted during both of these wars does not suggest that merchants’ business was 
adversely affected. A month after war broke out in May 1627 Andrew Bethune 
[Beaton], a Scot active in Paris throughout this period, furnished 11,000 francs to John 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 24 June 1628, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, II, 340. Prohibition: 5 February 1628, Holyrood, RPCS, ii, II, 567-8 
102 16 April 1628, NAS AC7/2, 63. This may be the father of the Watson brothers noted below trading 
from Kirkcaldy in the 1660s. 
103 28 January 1629, Edinburgh, NAS AC7/2, 132 
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Seaton, according to a bill of exchange by William Dick (Chapter 2).104 In June and 
August 1666, following the declaration of war in February, the customs records for 
Kirkcaldy show imports of French wine from St Martins by Patrick Angus, and 48 
dozen French Coudeberks hats by James Broune, an Edinburgh hatmaker.105 In 
February 1666 Jean Mel is recorded in the records of the Admiralty of La Rochelle as 
the captain of the Lion, on a voyage from Scotland to La Rochelle with a loading of 
herring, salmon, butter and tallow, with no suggestion that this was in contravention of 
any specific legislation and without mention of the current political climate.106 
The Edinburgh merchant Alexander Hamilton also continued to deal in French 
goods, primarily wine. His trade continued seemingly unaffected up to and after the 
declaration of war in 1666 and was pursued through established mercantile networks. 
Links with George Jardine, Robert Johnston, James Lundy and John Penston in the 
early 1660s continued throughout 1666. Penston appears in numerous transactions with 
Hamilton concerning the purchase of wine and in April Andrew Johnston, probably a 
relative of Robert Johnston, dealt with Hamilton for French wine, hoops and chairs. 
Jardine and Robert Johnston bought French wine from Hamilton in May. These 
associations continued throughout the height of the war with France; in October and 
December 1666, Penston again appears in transactions with Hamilton concerning 
French wine.107 Moreover, this ledger demonstrates the breadth of Scottish commercial 
networks in France, as Hamilton records a business transaction involving Michel Mel in 
February 1665 comprising a ‘voyage to deip in a French skipper, mr [scarlet] per 
convoyance of James Grame merchant debett 237.12 to stockings 237:12 for 9 dozen at 
44s per dozen to be sold per mittchell mell for my acompt’.108 
Similarly, correspondence recorded in the Watson Papers relating to the 
commercial ventures of the Kirkcaldy merchant brothers Alexander and Andrew 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 5 May 1627, Paris, NAS GD7/2/33. Beaton continued to act on Dick’s behalf throughout the war: 
Bond, Earl of Montrose to Andrew Bethune [Beaton], Paris, in the name of William Dick, 11 September 
1634, Edinburgh, NAS GD220/6/638. Beaton dealt with the Earls of Mar and Erskine, 22 September 
1637, 2 November 1638, GD124/2/54. We have no record of the intervening years (which is not 
uncommon) but the implication is that he continued to live in and pursue trade with France throughout 
this period, and he certainly did business with James Mel: J Smyth to Andrew Beaton, 14 March 1634, 
Edinburgh, NAS GD7/2/34. He also had business with James Meill [Mel]. Mel is cited here as James Mel 
‘elder’, suggesting the presence of a James Mel ‘younger’, presumably his son; it is not clear which 
generation of this family the James Mel trading with John Clerk was (Chapter 3). 
105 20 June 1666, 28 August 1666, NAS E72/9/1 
106 18 February 1666, ADCM, B5667. Although this occurrence took place after France’s declaration of 
war on Britain, it appears that Mel had already set sail before the Scottish declaration of war on France. 
107 16 September 1664-8 December 1666, f 38r-f46v, NLS Adv.mss.31.3.2 
108 1 February 1665, NLS Adv.MS.31.3.2, f 40v 
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Watson demonstrates continuing trade with France (and elsewhere) throughout the 
1660s.109 The wars with France appear to have inconvenienced their trade enough for 
James Carstairs, one of their business associates, to note in April 1668 that ‘we her that 
ther is peace with England & france concluded’,110 yet the nature of the transactions 
suggests that they had continued to pursue their business despite this inconvenience. In 
May Carstairs wrote that ‘John Jack shewes me that the time appointed for the payment 
of the bills from nantez is not expired and as soon as the bills are payed he and I shall 
account and I shall shewe him what the difference is betwixt yowe and he’.111 Further 
evidence comes from an account from 5 March of Mr Legatt to Alexander and John 
Watson, which includes goods such as sea instruments, books, hats and the cost of 
posting letters from France, although we are not given a precise date for these itemised 
expenditures.112 It is unlikely that this merchant network would have been able to 
pursue such wide-ranging trade so soon after the end of the war if the war had affected 
trading routes. 
The methods used by this particular merchant network require some further 
examination. Their correspondence demonstrates the undertaking of one particular 
voyage with multiple destinations including Bordeaux, Rotterdam, Norway and 
London, and the ways in which the Watson brothers conducted their trade illuminates 
the methods that continued to be used in this period, consolidating the fact that 
merchant ventures cannot often be viewed as bilateral voyages between two ports. Some 
of the Watsons’ cargoes were loaded at Dunbar, rather than at Kirkcaldy, demonstrating 
the use of multiple ports but also raising questions concerning the true origin of these 
goods.113 Furthermore, the Watsons traded within a family network, including cousins 
in Stirling, Edinburgh and Fife who were also involved in maritime trade.114 These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Destinations in France included Nantes: SAUL ms38527/1/1/1, 16 May 1668, ms38527/3a/20/2, 23 
September 1668; La Rochelle: ms38527/3a/19/10, 23 July 1668; Bordeaux: ms38527/3b/2/7, 15 August 
1668, ms38527/1/1/6, 21 August 1668, ms38527/1/2/4, 28 August 1668, ms38527/1/1/4, 25 September 
1668. On other occasions the exact destination is not stated. It is not clear exactly when the prohibition on 
French wines was lifted, and it is not until April 1669 that a new eruption of merchants bringing French 
wine into Scotland prevails: 7 April 1669, Edinburgh, NAS E73/25/1. The Watsons traded in French wine 
and brandy: account of Mr George Lesley, 23 September 1668, ms38527/3a/20/2; James Carstairs to 
Alexander and Andrew Watson, 25, 30 September, 2 October 1668, Bordeaux, ms38527/1/1/4, 
ms38527/1/2/5, ms38527/3b/6/4; Alexander Watson to James Carstairs in Bordeaux, 22 October 1668, 
Kirkcaldy, ms38527/1/2/2; Alexander Watson to Ebenezer Watson, 30 December 1668, Leith, 
ms38527/1/1/8; Andrew Glasfurd to Andrew Watson, n.d., Cupar, ms38527/3a/9/10 
110 James Carstairs to Alexander and Andrew Watson, Rotterdam, 21 April 1668, SAUL ms38527/1/1/10 
111 James Carstairs to Alexander Watson, Rotterdam, 16 May 1668, SAUL ms38527/1/1/1 
112 5 March 1668, SAUL ms38527/3b/2/7 
113 C. and P. Martin, ‘Introduction’ to the Watson Papers, SAUL ms38527, 2 
114 Ibid, 2-3. Another cousin in Inverness asked advice on how his son might train as a merchant. 
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family networks can tentatively be traced further back. In an account of March 1668, 
there is a transaction between a Mr Legatt and ‘John Watson in Burntisland’, who was 
possibly a relation of Alexander and Andrew.115 The Andrew Watson who brought a 
case against George Scott before the Admiralty Court in 1628 was captain of the 
Blessing of Burntisland and, while Watson is a common name, it may be speculated that 
these individuals were related. The Watson brothers also imported both French and 
Spanish wines apparently indiscriminately, testifying to the health of the market for 
wines from both destinations (Chapter 2).116 
Trade pursued with France during the 1666-1667 war was effected with varying 
degrees of success. In May 1667 the St Jacob was captured and the case brought before 
the Admiralty Court, whereupon the skipper and steerman of the ship stated that there 
was a load of salt on board belonging to a French factor. The Admiralty Court intimated 
that only the salt, and not the ship itself, would therefore be judged prize, in accordance 
with the prohibition. But before the decision could be ratified, a Hamburger offered to 
prove that both the ship and goods belonged to the British king’s allies – this backfiring 
as the Court decreed after his testimony that both the goods and the ship were lawful 
prize, stating that his testimony had rendered that of the skipper ‘extra prediciall & 
elicit’. It seems that the Hamburger, possibly in cahoots with the skipper, attempted to 
facilitate the release of the goods as well as the ships, but through his testimony actually 
damning the St Jacob as not only carrying French commodities, but being, if not 
French, of a country of which ships were lawful prize, contrary to the skipper’s original 
testimony.117 Four months later the Flower de Luce of Stockholm, master Joachim 
Burmaster, appears on a list of Swedish owned ships taken by Scottish privateers. The 
goods onboard the ship belonged to Dutch citizens and the steerman, timmerman and 
cook were all Dutch. The ship went to France despite the pass stating a different 
destination (we are not told where). Furthermore, the pass cited salt but the ship was 
also found to be carrying wine, vinegar and pepper, and never having ‘broke ground’ in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 5 March 1668, SAUL ms38527/3b/2/7 
116 Alexander Watson to Ebenezer Watson, Leith, 30 December 1668, SAUL ms38527/1/1/8; two bonds, 
Alexander Watson for excise on 12 butts and three butts of seck, 1 July 1669, SAUL ms38527/1/2/9. 
During the 1670s, Alexander appears to have retired, using Andrew as his business agent for his 
remaining mercantile interests which included shares in ships. C. and P. Martin, ‘Introduction’, SAUL, 
ms38527, 3 
117 22 May 1667, NLS Adv.mss.6.2.1 f 78r 
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any Swedish harbour.118 Although the master of this ship was ultimately not cunning 
enough to pull off the deception and the ship was caught, both the practices of using 
neutral shipping and false documentation are demonstrated by this example. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The Franco-Stuart wars of 1627-1629 and 1666-1667 were, despite both being fought 
under Stuart monarchies, markedly different. Yet in many ways the effect they had on 
Franco-Scottish commerce was similar. In both conflicts Scotland involved herself in 
many guises; as a nation under duress, as an independent nation pursuing her own 
agenda, but also through the actions of individuals who saw opportunities to pursue 
personal profit despite the obstacles ostensibly presented by the wars, whether through 
commerce or privateering. Many merchants found ways of circumventing embargoes, 
legislation and dangers at sea. While such methods were utilised, however, there were 
also merchants who continued to trade in their usual way, with the usual people, despite 
the ongoing war effort – such activity raising questions about whether the wars can be 
said to have had any serious effect on these trading links at all. The dedication of 
Charles I, Charles II, Louis XIII and Louis XIV to the Franco-Stuart wars can and 
should be questioned, along with their motives. There is little evidence suggesting that 
either side was determined to pursue a war against the other, particularly during the 
1666-1667 conflict, but rather chose to pursue courses of action which they believed 
would have long-term gain for them – not unlike the merchants we have examined 
throughout the course of this thesis. Under the Stuart kings, war with France indeed 
seems to have been half-hearted, and perhaps it is unsurprising that restrictions on trade 
were overturned by pressure exerted by merchants, or that merchants continued to trade 
without any demonstrable fear of retribution. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 26 September 1667, SRA Anglica VII, DXLII, 1660-1670 (unfoliated). Although the Treaty of Breda 
was signed on 21 July 1667, the restrictions on trade were not lifted until February 1668. Murdoch, 
Terror, 396 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
‘I will trade to France, in spite of anybody.’1 
International Conflict and Continuation of Commerce II, 1688-1713 
 
The Stuart monarchy involved itself in multiple European wars during the seventeenth 
century – throughout all of which Franco-Scottish trade continued to be carried on by 
merchants, factors and mariners. As the seventeenth century progressed, however, there 
rose a growing fear of French political and economic hegemony that for many was 
confirmed by the Treaty of Nijmegen, which ended hostilities between the French and 
the Dutch in 1678.2 This fear was exacerbated by British involvement in the third 
Anglo-Dutch War (1672-1674) – Charles II, in allying himself with Louis XIV, 
increased fears across Europe that a papist and arbitrary government would be imposed 
on Britain with the help of the French King.3 Furthermore, involvement in the Dutch 
War of 1672-1678 established William of Orange as the chief opponent of France’s 
ambitions in Europe prior to his acquisition of the British monarchy in the ‘Glorious 
Revolution’ of 1688-1689.4 While the Glorious Revolution was in some ways an 
internal conflict, as John Brewer has contended, ‘in a wide historical perspective it is 
arbitrary to make any separation of the Revolution of 1688-1689 from the war which 
followed’.5 Indeed, William immediately became involved in international conflict 
against France – one of his primary motives in seeking the British thrones. The Glorious 
Revolution was arguably ‘the untimely upset that wrecked the fine balance of Anglo-
Scottish rivalries that had been held in check by their common allegiance to the Stuart 
monarchy’.6 William’s declarations of war on France have been seen not only as 
detrimental to Scottish trade, but indicative that Scotland’s interests, which had been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Moses Corbett, 1691, CSPD, 1690-1, 479 
2 G. Howat, Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy (London, 1974) 5 
3 J. Miller, ‘Crown, Parliament and People’ in J. Jones (ed.), Liberty Secured? Britain before and after the 
Glorious Revolution (Stanford, 1992) 60 
4 T. Claydon, William III and the Godly Revolution (Edinburgh, 2002) 11-12. For more information on 
the Glorious Revolution see: E. Cruickshanks, The Glorious Revolution (Basingstoke/New York, 2000); 
J. Miller, The Glorious Revolution (London, 1983); G. Holmes (ed.), Britain after the Glorious 
Revolution (London, 1969); J. Israel (ed.), The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution 
and its World Impact (Cambridge, 1991); J. Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution 
(Manchester, 1980) 
5 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London, 1989) cited in 
J. Jones, ‘The Revolution in Context’ in Jones (ed.), Liberty Secured?, 37 
6 E. Graham, ‘In Defence of the Scottish Maritime Interest, 1681-1713’ in Scottish Historical Review, 
LXXI (1992) 90 
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accommodated within ‘the existing framework of independent nations ruled by the 
divinely appointed James VII, a sovereign informed in Scottish maritime affairs and 
benevolent towards his northern subjects’, were now subsumed into the wider interests 
of Britain, dominated by England.7 Scottish concerns were arguably of secondary 
importance for the house of Orange, as the domination of the English Parliament 
‘guaranteed the supremacy of the English mercantilist interest in British maritime 
affairs’.8 While once again, historians have been too quick to draw such conclusions, 
the shift in dynamic within the British monarchy and the splits it fostered between 
Jacobites and Williamites inevitably means that the Nine Years’ War differed in nature 
from the earlier, Franco-Stuart wars. 
 
I. THE NINE YEARS’ WAR, 1688-1697 
‘All our treasure is stock-jobb’d/While we groan under slav’ry’.9 
 
William’s pursuit of war against France in some ways damaged both Scottish and wider 
British commercial interests as war closed British markets to French imports; it being 
asserted that direct trade to France was virtually ruined as a result.10 William was 
particularly careful to ensure that his commercial foreign policy included keeping 
Scotland out of any French alliance – as well as declaring war in Scotland’s name,11 he 
ensured that restrictions on commerce, communication and emigration were imposed, 
‘discharging all the leidges of his Majesties antient kingdom of Scotland to trade, 
corospond or have any intercourse or medling with the said French king or any of his 
subjects’.12 The freedom of movement previously enjoyed between the two countries 
was curtailed: ‘we have thought fitt to require…all persones during this tyme of warr 
who intend to goe out of [Scotland] to apply themselves for passes’.13 Such 
declarations, as well as being motivated by war with France, were also undoubtedly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Graham, ‘Scottish Maritime Interest’, 90 
8 Ibid. 
9 A. Lang, ‘Jacobite Songs’ in Scottish Historical Review, VIII (1911) 146 
10 F. O’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century: British Political and Social History, 1688-1832 (London, 
1997) 52-3; T. C. Smout, Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union, 1660-1707 (Edinburgh/London, 1963) 245 
11 10 July 1689, RPCS, iii, XIII, 529. This was almost two months after England had declared war on 
France on 17 May 1689: J. Cornette, Chronique de Règne de Louis XIV: de la fin de la Fronde à l’aube 
des Lumières (Paris, 1997) 370 
12 6 August 1689, Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, XIV, 18; This was later reiterated: 22 April 1693, APS, IX, 
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13 4 May 1691, RPCS, iii, XVI, 274; SP, I, 67 
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precipitated by rebellion against the new monarchy within the British Isles. On 23 April 
1689 an 
 
embargo [was] laid on all shipes and Barkes within this Kingdome till further 
order…no shipes or Barkes aforesaid be allowed to sail abroad till they first find 
cautione to the respective collectors that they shall not goe to France or 
Ireland.14 
 
The commercial aspect of the Franco-Scottish relationship was specifically targeted, 
and in May Government officials were authorised to 
 
stay and arreast all…ships and vessels…conveying any goods or merchandize in 
them belonging to the French King or to his subjects and inhabitants or 
belonging to any persone within…this kingdome [Scotland].15 
 
The French Trade Bill, November 1690 and the Trade with France Prohibition Act, 
March 1693, consolidated such embargoes.16 Despite the lack of interest allegedly 
shown to Scotland by William III, she was nonetheless dragged into international 
conflict, and the Scottish Privy Council issued their declaration of war on France on 6 
August 1689.17 Shortly after this the Council, as ‘William and Mary…have not as yet 
nominat and appoynted any persone to be Lord High Admirrall of this kingdome nor 
have given orders for commissiones or letter of mart to privat men of warr’, took it 
upon themselves to issue a commission to Captaine William Burnsyde, to man The 
Dogarwyne of Edinburgh, and 
 
to take and apprehend, and incaise of resistance to fyre, burne, sink and destroy 
the ships and goods of the French or Irishes in rebellione against their 
Majesties…and alsoe to stay and areist all other ships and vessells of 
whatsomever other kingdome, countrey, natione of people conveying any goods 
or merchandise in them belonging to the French king or to his subjects and 
inhabitants.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 22 April 1689, APS, IX, 58 
15 RPCS, iii, XVI, 1691, 277; see also CSPD, 1689-1690, 310, 371 
16 Historical Manuscripts Commission: Fourteenth Report, The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1692-
1693 (London, 1894) 384f. Scotland had also to contend with legislation from England, as in 1695 the 
Navigation Acts were made more stringent, and the penalties for infringement more severe: T. Keith, 
‘The Economic Causes for the Scottish Union’ in English Historical Review, XXIV (1909) 47, 54 
17 6 August 1689, Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, XIV, 17-18; S. Murdoch, ‘The French Connection: Bordeaux's 
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(Cambridge, 2007) 34 
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This was consolidated in February 1690 by the Privy Council, which granted ‘letters of 
marque and generall reprizall’ to John Boswell ‘for apprehending ships or goods 
belonging to the French or Irish’.19 However, such actions again seem more concerned 
with countering any possibility of a domestic Jacobite rebellion, rather than embargoes 
being used as tools of international warfare.  
The prohibitions issued during this period, whether as a direct result of 
international war or not, along with the higher taxation such conflicts inevitably 
fostered, can (and have) been used to allege that the Franco-Scottish relationship 
suffered irreparable damage following the Glorious Revolution.20 War against France 
has been seen as ‘damning to Scottish shipping and markets’ and Scotland’s continental 
trade as ‘declining or stagnant…[as] war had undermined relations with France and 
wiped out the special privileges Scotland had enjoyed a hundred years before, under the 
Auld Alliance’.21 Inevitably William’s French wars, especially when coupled with 
internal politics and economic difficulties, saw tensions emerge across the British 
Isles.22 One popular Jacobite song, while unsurprisingly hostile to William, attests to 
widespread feeling in Scotland at this time, including the salient lines: ‘And, all our 
treasure is stock-jobb’d/ While we groan under slav’ry’.23 
Scotland did in some ways suffer as a result of trading prohibitions. From 1689 
Scottish herring and salmon were prohibited from entering France, ‘a great and heavy 
imposition laid on our native product by the French King’, with one petition from Ayr 
stating that fishing had been ‘the only subject of our trade’.24 The need to recruit men 	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estimated that the cost of William’s Wars against France cost £130million p.a. – three times as much as 
the Second Dutch War, and five times more than Anne’s wars. G. Holmes, ‘Post-Revolution Britain and 
the Historian’ in Holmes (ed.), Glorious Revolution, 22 
21 T. C. Smout, ‘The Road to Union’ in Holmes (ed.), Glorious Revolution, 184, 187 
22 Cruickshanks, Glorious Revolution, 50; J. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and 
Marlborough (Oxford, 1988) 20-6; S. Murdoch and J. Young, ‘Union and Identity: Scotland in a Social 
and Institutional Context’ in J. Sevaldsen and J. Rahbek Rasmussen, The State of the Union: Scotland 
1707-2007 (Copenhagen, 2007) 41; T. Harris, Revolution: the Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 
1685-1720 (London, 2006) 495; J. Young, ‘The Parliamentary Incorporating Union of 1707: Political 
Management, Anti-Unionism and Foreign Policy’ in T. Devine and J. Young (eds.), Eighteenth Century 
Scotland: New Perspectives (Edinburgh, 1999) 23. By this treaty, Louis XIV recognised William III as 
legitimate monarch. 
23 Lang, ‘Jacobite Songs’, 146. ‘Our Darien can witness bear/ And so can our Glenco, Sir;/ The South 
Sea it can make appear/ What to our King we owe, Sir:/ We have been murder’d, starv’d, and rob’d/ By 
those your kings and knav’ry/ And, all our treasure is stock-jobb’d/ While we groan under slav’ry.’ 
24 Ayrshire Archives, Ayr Burgh Records B6/36/1, Petition to the Lord Provost of Ayr, 27 September 
1701, cited in C. Whatley, The Scots and the Union (Edinburgh, 2006) 160 
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for the war effort has been seen as particularly damaging as it led to unseasonable 
patterns of sailing.25 All trading ships were prevented from leaving port between 
February and May, and were required to have returned by February the following year. 
Furthermore, the extent of naval operations meant that there was little protection against 
privateering available for those merchant ships that did venture out.26 The Glasgow 
merchant George Lockhart claimed that he lost his share on 22 ships between 1690 and 
1698, and on two more in 1699 and 1700.27 Several Scottish merchants were taken by 
French privateers – for example, David and John Williamson, father and son from 
Kirkcaldy, were captured by a French privateer while bound for Holland in May 1689 
and taken to Amiens as prisoners, and the Grangepans skipper Thomas Smith and his 
seamen were on a voyage from Bo’ness to Rotterdam in May 1689 when they were 
captured by a Dunkirk privateer and taken to Rochefort.28 
 
II. SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE 
‘The Scots had a free trade with France, which I now confirm’.29 
 
The real extent to which Scotland was ‘dragged’ into a war against her auld ally, 
however, must be questioned. William acknowledged the damage the war would cause 
to Scottish trade and in February 1693, while implementing a press for the navy, stated 
‘for the security and encouragement of the free trade of Scotland we have ordered that 
no pressmen seize any seaman on board any ship belonging to Scotland’.30 The Privy 
Council had already acted to prevent Scottish merchantmen being pressed, in 1690 
granting a protection to David Wood, a Montrose skipper, and his entire crew: 
 
considering that his Majestie…hath recommended to the saids Lords to find out 
a way for raising a competent number of seamen for his service, being resolved 
that Scotsmen (if prisoners) shall be equally relieved with the English and that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Jones, War and Economy, 17 
26 Ibid. 
27 APS ix 49; Smout, Scottish Trade, 69; Murdoch, Terror, 295; T. Keith, Commercial Relations of 
England and Scotland, 1603-1707 (Cambridge, 1910) 155 
28 19 September 1689, RPCS, iii, XIV, 306-7, 11 October 1689: 405. For a detailed account of the actions 
of privateers during the Nine Years’ War see Murdoch, Terror, Chapter 7. 
29 SPD VIII, home office, admiralty, IV, 101, cited in Keith, Commercial Relations, 151-2 
30 28 February 1693, CSPD, 1693, 47; A. Little, ‘A Comparative Survey of Scottish Service in the 
English and Dutch Maritime Communities c. 1650-1707’ in A. Grosjean and S. Murdoch, Scottish 
Communities Abroad in the Early Modern Period (Leiden, 2005) 343 
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Scots trading ships shall have protectione on board for preventing their mens 
being pressed.31 
 
Furthermore, the initial privateering commissions granted to Scots to take French and 
Irish ships came before the official declaration of war in Scotland, suggesting that some 
Scots were willing participants in this conflict.32 Scotland acted independently during 
the Nine Years’ War, as she had in conflicts earlier in the century (Chapter 5). 
Theoretically, commercial activity between all of the British nations and France was 
prohibited, yet in 1691 the Captain of the Pembroke, sent by the lords of the English 
Admiralty to examine boats suspected of trading with France, observed that 
 
the Scots had a free trade with France, which I now confirm…I heard of one 
Francis Duncombe, master of the John, pink, whom I followed to this place, 
intending to have examined him, but about twenty of his men presented their 
arms at me…and farther they told me that free trading was allowed in these parts 
with France.33 
 
The English were clearly aware of this continuing trade, as they deployed privateers and 
men-of-war to cruise around the Scottish coasts and arrest ships suspected of trading 
with France and the American Colonies.34 
As in other conflicts, Scots used various methods to continue pursuit of trade, 
such as using neutral ships, registering their ships as belonging to a neutral country, or 
carrying falsified documents and passes. The ship the Maria registered as a Swedish 
ship in 1694, despite being owned by a Scot and skippered by Jasper Stewart, a Scottish 
burgess of Stockholm.35 This was specifically to avoid capture by French privateers – 
Swedish neutrality allowing the ship to sail from Aberdeen to La Rochelle and then on 
to Sweden.36 Not all merchants successfully employed such tactics, however, and it was 
reported in the London Gazette in May 1695 that ‘a Flushing Privateer brought last 
Tuesday into Leith Road 4 Suedes and Danes laden with Wine, Salt, Brandy and 
Mollosses from France’.37 Yet some Scottish and English merchants, rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 11 February 1690, Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, XV, 77-78 
32 6 August 1689, Edinburgh, RPCS, iii, XIV, 17-18 
33 TNA SP32, Home Office, Admiralty, IV, 101, cited in Keith, Commercial Relations, 151-3. There 
were also complaints from England that Scotland was providing victual for the enemy, although the Scots 
denied this claim. 
34 22 May 1693, RPCS, cited in Keith, Commercial Relations, 153 
35 NAS RH15/106/772, 13 January 1694, Stockholm; Murdoch, Terror, 312; S. Murdoch, Network North: 
Scottish kin, commercial and covert association in Northern Europe, 1603-1746 (Leiden, 2006) 217-8 
36 Murdoch, Terror, 312 
37 London Gazette, 13 May 1695, issue 3079 
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continuing to adopt covert methods through which to trade, also blatantly disregarded 
prohibitive legislation. In 1689 the Commissaries of Customs told the Lords of the 
Treasury that they ‘daily received advice of ships, by art and violence, getting out of 
port and going to France, without giving security, according to the King’s late order not 
to go to France, and that there was a great number of English shipping then at 
Bourdeaux’.38 In London in June and July 1695, it was reported that the Rupert brought 
in a vessel to London ‘laden with salt from France’, with no indication here that this 
was contrary to legislation.39 
Assertions that ‘Franco-Scottish trade…was decisively brought to an end in 
1689 by the Glorious Revolution’40 require qualification, particularly when the 
openness with which many individuals continued to pursue commerce – often with 
government knowledge and consent – is considered. In 1690 Sir John Hall of Dunglass, 
Lord Provost of Edinburgh, petitioned on behalf of the royal burghs of Scotland for the 
return of 
 
several charters of the Great Council of France and decreets of the Parliament of 
Rouen, containing exemptions and privileges in favour of Scottish merchants in 
the kingdome of France and duchy of Normandy, which have been allwayes 
keeped in a particular shuttle of the chartor chist of the town of Edinburgh and 
were taken out to be advised in order to the borrowes sending one in their name 
to the king’s ambassador at Paris for continueing and renewing these 
privileidges.41 
 
The House of Lords returned these charters to the petitioner, knowing they would be 
used to facilitate French trade. In January 1692 six passes were issued by the Scottish 
Privy Council for five Glasgow ships and one Leith ship to travel from Scotland to 
Bordeaux to trade, although only for authorised goods.42 These passes were granted just 
three years after William and Mary consolidated their power in Britain, suggesting that 
despite William’s political and religious grievances with France, he recognised the 
importance of the continuation of trade. France treated Scotland as an independent 
nation during this conflict, not always subjecting her auld ally to the legislation that was 
put in place against her southern neighbour. The Admiralty of La Rochelle issued an 
ordinance in 1690 concerning the opening and closing of ports, reporting a ‘Lettre de 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 30 March 1689, CTP, I, 34 
39 A Collection for Improvement of Husbandry and Trade, London, issue 153, 5 July 1695 
40 Smout, Scottish Trade, 168 
41 RPCS, iii, XV, 125; Murdoch, ‘French Connection’, 35 
42 13 January 1692, SP, I, 67 
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Seignelay interdisant aux vaisseaux anglais, hollandaise et de la Flandre espagnols de 
sortir des ports de France sans avoir chargé des denrées ou marchandises de France’, but 
placing no similar stipulation on the Scots or Irish.43 In November 1691 a French 
merchant in La Rochelle, Abraham Duport, petitioned the Admiralty of that town for a 
passport for John Broune, commander of the Scottish ship the Jean of Pittenweem, to 
travel from La Rochelle to Scotland – the passport was granted on 22 November.44 
Throughout the 1690s both Scottish and Irish ships were continually granted passes in 
the port of La Rochelle. In May 1692 the Scot Edmond Gould was granted a passport 
for the Poste, to pass through La Rochelle on his way to Norway.45 The owner of the 
Jacques (Charles Cahell) applied for a passport to go to Scotland in July, and in October 
and November three Scottish ships, the Concorde (Robert Mackarel), the Marguerite of 
Glasgow (also owned by Charles Cahell) and the Jacques of Leith once more registered 
passports for voyages from La Rochelle to Scotland.46 Robert Mackarel appears again in 
December, registering a passport for the Providence, bound for Scotland, and James 
Dallein, master of the Elizabeth of Glasgow, arrived from Scotland on 14 December 
1692.47 Records from this port for 1695 demonstrate further that the French authorities 
continued to allow both Scottish and Irish trade, but seemingly no English; in this 
calendar year, 15 passports were granted to British ships, with 12 of those being 
Scottish and the remaining three Irish (Appendix VI.i).48 Certainly, the port of La 
Rochelle enjoyed the continuing presence of Scottish merchants throughout the period, 
with Michel and Jean Jolly appearing consistently between 1676 and 1698 in the 
records of the Cour du Gouvernement, Sénéchaussée et Présidial de la Rochelle.49 This 
corroborates some merchant trading patterns examined in Chapter 3, although there are 
also some anomalies. Several individuals owned more than one of the ships being 	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granted passports in this year – Daniel Masson, Jean Mackarel50 and Abraham Duport 
being particularly prolific, supporting the notion that those involved in commerce 
tended to spread their interest as insurance against loss. However, from this data it 
appears that the France-based Scots and Irish employed several different commanders, 
rather than using the same individuals they knew and trusted. It is of course possible 
that these individuals were employed on a regular basis, but evidence pertaining to these 
patterns has yet to be uncovered. 
 La Rochelle was not an anomaly; the records of other west coast French ports 
corroborate this evidence and the records for the Bordeaux region are particularly 
revealing. Throughout the 1690s numerous Scottish ships are recorded being granted 
permission by the Admiralty of Guyenne to pass through this port (Appendix VI.ii).51 In 
contrast to La Rochelle, however, English activity can also be detected. Between 1688 
and 1697, many English ships were also accorded passports by the Admiralty of 
Guyenne (Appendix VI.iii).52 However, the times at which they were active differ 
markedly from the patterns of Scottish or Irish activity, as demonstrated by Figure 6.1. 
First, the majority of English cases fall during the year 1689, with no passports being 
recorded as being granted to English ships between July 1692 and April 1696. This 
suggests either that English merchants honoured the embargo, or that French authorities 
were effective in implementing it against them. The Scottish cases, however, occur 
between 1691 and 1696 – Scottish merchants perhaps recognising that the lack of 
English trade under the embargo left a vacuum for them to fill. Moreover, the French 
authorities condoned this trade, highlighting the independence afforded by the French to 
Scottish activity during this conflict. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Jean Mackarel is elsewhere recorded as Irish, although here he was explicitly freighting ships for 
Scotland, as was Robert Mackarel above, who we can speculate was a relation. AN Marine B7 505/351, 
n.d., concerning the ships La Fortune of Dublin, ‘capitaine Jean White, armé par Jean Mackarel, 
marchand Irlandais établi à la Rochelle’. This ship was under investigation for transporting Protestants. 
White appears again under the same charges: AN Marine B7 505/353, 4 August 1699. 
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been taken from the following database: http://bd.archivescanadafrance.org/sdx-222-acf-pleade-
2/acf/home.shtm 
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Figure 6.1    Passports granted to British ships by the Admiralty of Guyenne, 1689-1697 
 
The special treatment granted to Scots by the French can be gleaned from 
records of prizes taken during the course of the Nine Years’ War. Prizes brought into Le 
Havre between 1692-1697 register no Scottish or Irish ships being captured, but include 
English (Appendix VI.iv).53 Similarly, records for prizes taken into Nantes by corsaires 
between 1689 and 1691 include several English ships but no Scots or Irish.54 The 
Scottish port records corroborate the continuation of trade despite the embargo on 
shipping to France laid on 23 April 1689.55 This embargo, however, only prohibited 
shipping to France (or Ireland) – to prevent the transportation of Jacobite rebels – and 
merchants were still able to bring wines into Scotland. Edward Burd brought the 
George of Edinburgh into Leith in May 1689, and the collectors of Customs and 
Foreign Excise noted ships bringing in merchandise from France after the prohibition 
on shipping was implemented.56 However, a second embargo laid in 1691 was more 	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55 23 April 1689, APS, IX, 58. The transportation of people to France was forbidden: 31 October 1689, 
CSPD, 1689-1690, 310: ‘I hope the example of Joyce, who is sent for in custoday, will be a warning to all 
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emphatic, and in May Ninian Gibsone, Glasgow merchant and captain of the Lamb, was 
granted a commission to ‘arreast all other ships and vessels of whatsoever other 
kingdome, country, nation or people, conveying any goods or merchandize in them 
belonging to the French King or to his subjects’.57 This embargo was likely the reason 
that the Admiralty of Guyenne stopped granting passes to English ships in this year, 
although they had allowed English merchants to trade in the Guyenne ports during the 
first two years of the war.58 Scots, however, continued to trade after 1691. Two months 
after the embargo was laid, Robert Watson brought into Leith on the Constantina of 
Copenhagen, coming from Bilbao, 110 tuns and 2 hogsheads of French wine. William 
Wemyss, in the Pearle of London, brought in 26 tuns of French wine ‘conforme to the 
Lords of Thesirii ther order’, and in September several merchants are recorded bringing 
in French wine – one of these being George Clark in the Golden Flight of Stockholm, 
with 88 tuns.59 Scottish merchants continued to pursue trade with France despite official 
prohibitions, often with consent of authorities who granted them passes with which to 
do so, and this was a pattern repeated under Queen Anne. 
 
III. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: 1702-1713 
‘The Peace of Ryswick began the ruin of the flourishing trade established by Colbert, 
and the War of Succession completed it.’60 
 
Scotland once again became involved in war against France through British 
participation in the War of the Spanish Succession. Even before war had been officially 
declared both Scotland and France had begun to lay impositions on each other’s 
commerce. Following discussions throughout December, in January 1701 the Scottish 
Parliament issued an ‘Act Dischargeing Wine Brandie and all other Liquors of the 
growth of France’, declaring a prohibition on 
 
the importation of all French wines, Brandie and other strong waters and vinegar 
made in France from any place whatsomever; the brandie strong waters and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 4 May 1691, RPCS, XVI, 276-8 
58 Some English merchants were given passports after this date – some passes were granted in 1690, 
1692, 1696 and 1697, but were far fewer in number than those granted to the Scots. 
59 NAS E72/15/51, 1 
60 Voltaire (M. Pollock, trans.), The Age of Louis XIV (London, 1958) 334 
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vinegar from and after the first day of May next and all other wine from and 
after the first day of October next to come.61 
 
This proclamation was largely retaliatory, being as it was expressly to remain in force 
‘while the same liberties and immunities be granted to herrings and all other goods 
exported from this Kingdom into France and the same freedom and immunities granted 
to Scots ships sailing thither that any other Nation enjoy in that Kingdom’.62 In 
September of the same year, the French issued an arrêt preventing the importation of 
alcohol, textiles, and metal from Great Britain63 and placed greater impositions on 
goods ‘du crû et fabrique d’angleterre, Écosse, Irlande et pays en dépendent’.64 News of 
this imposition and its perceived impact on trade travelled quickly throughout Scotland, 
and Charles Lord Yester wrote to his father John, second Marquess of Tweeddale, on 
the 23 September stating ‘as of the project you write off, about our trade with France, I 
believe it wil come to nothing; for, by the accounts we have in the last publick news, the 
King of France seems to have discharged all trade with Brittain’.65 On 11 April 1702, a 
month before war was officially declared, the French issued an arrêt preventing the 
entry of any manufactures from England, Scotland or Ireland.66 War was declared in 
May, Scotland’s declaration being made by the Privy Council just over one week after 
that of England.67 The following month Britain imposed an additional duty on French 
goods, which was reported in London in June 1702, and shortly afterwards all trade 
with France was prohibited.68 On 28 August 1703 the French Council of Commerce 
issued an arrêt prohibiting trade with all enemy powers – England, its dependencies, 
Holland and Germany.69 Moreover, even after the Treaty of Utrecht had been agreed in 
March/April 1713, British ships still encountered some problems in renewing their trade 
with France, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 24 and 27 December 1700, 31 January 1701, APS, X, 232, 233, 278; 31 January 1701, NAS 
PA7/17/1/90/i-vi 
62 Ibid. 
63 E. Levasseur, Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 volumes (Paris, 1911) I, 363; T. Schaeper, The 
French Council of Commerce, 1700-1715: A Study of Mercantilism after Colbert (Ohio, 1983) 111-114; 
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64 Keith, Commercial Relations, 150. Keith recognised that this prohibition did not entirely put an end to 
trade with France. 
65 Charles Lord Yester to his father [John second Marquess of Tweedale], Dagaty, 23 September 1701, 
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a great many of our Merchant Ships are arrived at Rochel, Bourdeaux, Natz, and 
other Harbours of France; but being ordered to keep at a certain Distance from 
the Harbour for 30 or 40 Days, the Chamber of Commerce have writ to the 
Intendants, representing the Prejudice which will thereby accrue to Trade.70 
 
In some respects, the impact of Anne’s French war was similar to that of 
William’s – particularly in the problems it created for merchants through unseasonal 
sailings, delays and insufficiency of protection for shipping.71 Yet Scotland again 
remained a distinctly separate player in this conflict, and neither Scottish nor French 
authorities fully implemented trade embargoes. French privateers have been seen as 
particularly injurious and there were instances in which Scottish ships were taken.72 
However, the impact of such activity on Scottish overseas commerce has recently been 
re-investigated, and Steve Murdoch has demonstrated that the ‘suffering’ of the Scots at 
the hands of the French was nothing like as catastrophic as has been previously 
suggested.73 Some staggering figures for British captures were reported in London. In 
1704 Daniel Defoe’s the Review of the Affairs of France reported that ‘in general, our 
Trade has thriven upon the War, notwithstanding I compute above 30 Millions Sterling 
lost at Sea, by French Privateers’.74 It was the English, however, who appeared to suffer 
the greatest losses at the hands of the French, again suggesting that Scottish merchants 
received special consideration in comparison. A London pamphlet from 1701 declared: 
 
they know very little of Trade, who are ignorant that the greatest advantage the 
French gain of us in a War, is in their Privateers surprising so many of our 
Merchant Ships, which can never be avoided in a War, because of the great 
quantity of Shipping we employ in every corner of the Seas, and the 
Impossibility of assigning Convoys to every Part of the World. Some have 
affirm’d, how true I know not, that during the last War they took Three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Flying Post or the Post Master, London, 18 June 1713, issue 3390. A copy of the treaty suspending 
arms between France and England in 1713 can be found at ADLA C 690 
71 Jones, War and Economy, 161 
72 Petition to the Convention of Royal Burghs from James Cuming, Edinburgh, whose ship was left by its 
convoy and taken by French privateers. 12 July 1709, Edinburgh, IV, CRB, 489. That there was a convoy 
in place at all testifies that institutions in Scotland permitted this trade to continue. See also the case of 
the Eagle Galley of Aberdeen, taken on a return voyage from Liborne by a French privateer from St 
Malos: 4 September 1706, ACA, Propinquity Book II (unfoliated); or the case of the Anna of 
Pittenweem, taken off the coast of Aberdeen by a French privateer, l’Amazon of Calais in August 1705 
and ransomed for 5094 livres (£310/£354 8s 4d sterling): ACA, Propinquity Book I, f 169, 170, 172 – for 
the latter case see also Murdoch, Terror, 301. Murdoch notes that the transaction that took place to pay 
the ransom was facilitated by Scottish factors in France. Trade with the Northern Isles was disrupted; 
Smith, Shetland Life and Trade, 37-8. See 29 July 1690, Edinburgh, RPCS iii XV 338-9. 
73 Murdoch, Terror, 320-1. For the older view see Graham, ‘Scottish Maritime Interest’ 88-109; Graham, 
A Maritime History of Scotland, 1650-1790 (East Linton, 2002) 151-155 
74 Review of the Affairs of France, London, 19 December 1704, issue 83 
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Thousand Sail of our Ships, and the loss to the English has been Computed at 
Twenty Million.75 
 
IV. RELAXATION OF LEGISLATION 
‘All laws prohibiting the importation of any goods from France should be repealed’.76 
 
Often, both merchants and authorities failed to adhere to the embargos implemented 
during this conflict, and on some occasions prohibitions were revoked from an early 
point in the war. Just a week before war was declared by Scotland, and just after war 
had been declared by England, a renewed Franco-Scottish alliance was being 
considered. On 5 May 1702, in a letter to Caspar Frederick Henning, one J.G. wrote 
from Paris that: ‘depuis Mecredy la Cour est à Marly où l’on delibere actuellement sur 
l’alliance entre la France et l’Ecosse, et sur les moyens d’engager les Escosais dans 
l’Interest de la France.’77 This did not come to fruition, but actions on the part of both 
the Scottish and French throughout a time of ostensible conflict highlight a desire to 
prolong the commercial relationship. Despite the arrêt they had issued on 28 August 
1703 the French Council of Commerce announced shortly afterwards that they were re-
opening trade with Scotland and Ireland, and was soon flooded with requests for 
passports from Frenchmen and from Irish and Scottish merchants residing in French 
ports.78 The Scottish Wine Act of 1703 rescinded all previous legislation concerning the 
importation of French wine – in direct contravention of the economic blockade that was 
a key strategy in the Crown’s war effort against the French.79 This act benefited the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Anon., Reasons against a war with France or an argument shewing that the French King’s Owning the 
Prince of Wales as King of England, Scotland and Ireland; is no Sufficient Ground of a War (London, 
1701), TNA SP9/248, 12-13. Complaints of Scottish merchants can be found directed at the behaviour of 
English ships, rather than French. During the War of the Spanish Succession some Edinburgh merchants 
petitioned Queen Anne complaining of Scottish vessels being stopped and seized by English ships under 
fabricated claims that they were bound for France – even though the Scots could prove that they had in 
fact been freighted for Lisbon. n.d., c. 1702-1707; NAS, PA7/21, f196; Murdoch, Terror, 322 n.199. 
Indeed, Isobel Grant has suggested that ‘as far as the Scots were concerned, the worst offenders in terms 
of piracy were the English’, and routes to France and the Netherlands were particularly liable to attack. 
Between 1569-87 £20,717 worth of goods were taken from the Scots, of which £15,974 remained un-
restored. I. Grant, Social and Economic Development in Scotland Before 1603 (Edinburgh/London, 1930) 
344; see also T. Pagan, The Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland (Glasgow, 1926) 159, who 
argues that the Convention fitted out planned expeditions against the English, using up their resources 
and Keith, ‘Economic Causes’, 51 
76 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of Lord Polwarth, 3 volumes (London, 
1911-1931) I, 9-10, George Baillie of Jerviswood to Marchmont, 16 May 1713 
77 J.G. to Caspar Frederick Henning in London, 5 May 1702, Paris, TNA SP78/153/72. This could 
perhaps be James Gordon, although this is pure speculation. 
78 Schaeper, Council of Commerce, 113 
79 Whatley, Scots and the Union, 200; Murdoch, ‘French Connection’, 37; Graham, ‘Scottish Maritime 
Interest’, 103 
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Treasury through increased import duties, but also legalised practices merchants were 
already pursuing.80 In February 1706 Captain Archibald Cockburn of Edinburgh, Daniel 
Masson of St Martins and Alexander Young of St Martins brought a case to the 
Admiralty Court against George Gordon in Leith, formerly of Bordeaux, representing 
the Bordeaux merchant Samuel Martin and Peter Lawson, master of the St Anne of 
Bergen. They claimed £13,026 Scots for ‘tonnage for fourty tuns claret wyne from 
Bordeaux to Leith’.81 From the moment they declared war, Scotland asserted her 
independence from England, Parliament refusing to augment the tariffs on merchandises 
coming in from France despite urgent requests from Queen Anne to do so.82 The French 
Council continued to grant passports to Scottish vessels83 and by 1706 permitted direct 
trade with England, thus pursuing trade not only with her auld ally but also her 
erstwhile enemy.84 In 1708 and 1710, the Lord High Admiral of Great Britain ordered 
all ‘captains and commanders of her Majesty’s ships and vessels, as also all persons 
who now have, or shall have private commissions or letters of Marque, not to molest 
any of the fishing vessels belonging to the subjects of France’ – part of a reciprocal 
agreement with the French.85 On 15 March 1711, two years before the Treaty of 
Utrecht, the British Parliament formally allowed the importation of French wine in 
neutral vessels. Suggestions were being made in London by the end of the conflict in 
1713 that ‘all laws made in Great Britain since the year 1664 prohibiting the 
importation of any goods from France [should] be repealed’.86 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Whatley, Scots and the Union, 199. Some remained unconvinced that a move towards France would be 
of any assistance, claming that exports of salmon, herring, butter and beef to France were not as 
beneficial as had previously been believed and that the cost of importing French wine would not be 
balanced. ‘Philopatris’ to the Duke of Hamilton, 1703, NAS GD406/1/5217; Whatley, Scots and the 
Union, 200 
81 15 February 1706, Edinburgh, NAS AC13/1, 40, 259. This Daniel Masson is almost certainly the same 
individual trading in La Rochelle and St Martins during the Nine Years’ War. 
82 H. Sée and A. Cormack, ‘Commercial Relations between France and Scotland in 1707’ in Scottish 
Historical Review, XXIII (1926) 276. This split was recognised immediately in Britain. In November 
1701, six months before war was officially declared, a report in a London newspaper advertised a new 
publication: The dangers of Europe, From the Growing Power of France. With some Free Thoughts on 
Remedies. And particularly on the Cure of our Divisions at Home: In Order to a Successful War Abroad, 
against the French King and his Allies: Flying Post or the Post Master, London, 29 November 1701, 
issue 1025 [my emphasis] 
83 They also offered a similar favour to the Dutch. Sée and Cormack, ‘Commercial Relations’, 275 
84 Schaeper, French Council of Commerce, 114 
85 11 May 1708, TNA, HCA 26/13; Murdoch, Terror, 307; London Gazette, 10 May 1708, 7 September 
1710, issue 4741. It has been argued that from 1710 the tenor of the war changed and conditions more 
favourable to peace began to emerge. Cornette, Chronique, 517 
86 Schaeper, The French Council of Commerce, 131; Levasseur, Histoire, 406; George Baillie of 
Jerviswood to Marchmont, 16 May 1713, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Polwarth, I, 9-10. 
Schaeper includes an assessment that even though these wines were still subject to the high import duties 
implemented in the 1690s, many Englishmen were becoming tired of inferior and unfamiliar wines from 
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V. CONTINUATION OF COMMERCE 
‘They left in Bordeaux several sail of Scotch ships, which were taking in their lading.’87 
 
This conflict again saw Scots receive special treatment from the French in comparison 
to their English and Irish counterparts. ‘Prizes and ransoms’ recorded by the Admiralty 
of Le Havre detailing during the 1700s denote a high percentage of English and several 
Irish cases, but no Scots:88 
 
Year Total Cases Recorded English/% Irish/% 
1704 14 5/36% 1/7% 
1705 1 0 0 
1706 3 1/33% 1/33% 
1709-1710 2 1/50% 0 
 
Table 6.1 Prises et rançons, Le Havre, 1704-1710 
 
Similarly, prizes recorded by the Admiralty of Dieppe from 1702-1705 included many 
English ships, but only one Irish (in 1705) and no Scots.89 This seems to have been 
reciprocated, as in 1702 the French closed ports between Dunkirk and Bayonne because 
of ‘un grand nombre de frigates et autres vaisseaux des ports d’Angleterre et de 
Hollande, pour croiser sur les côtes de son royaume et enlever les vaisseauz marchands, 
barques et autres bâtiments qui y naviguent’, but not mentioning any similar Scottish 
activity.90 The Irish, despite losing some ships to the French, continued their trade, and 
the Repertoir des conges par l’éstranger for Nantes from 1707-1710 shows a high rate 
of Irish merchant activity within this port:91  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Portugal, Spain and Italy and so were willing to pay higher prices for the French product. Schaeper, 
French Council of Commerce, 131; Chapter 2. 
87 The Post-Man and the Historical Account, London, 20 January 1705, issue 1366 
88 1704-1710, Archives Départementales de Seine-Maritime, Rouen [hereafter ADSM] 216 BP 317 
89 1702-1705, ADSM 214 BP 12-15 
90 1702, ADCM B62/118 
91 ADLA B4725. It should be noted that of these ‘Scottish cases’, the first, from 7 November 1708, 
involves Thomas Harper, of l’aventure de Glasco, 70tx, for Glasgow; the second is again mastered by 
Thomas Harper, this time on the Jan de Glasco, 30tx, but bound for Dublin. J. S. Bromley notes that trade 
with Scotland and Ireland did not disappear during the war. He calculates that between 1707 and 1710 
174 Irish ships entered Bordeaux, 164 La Rochelle, and 164 Nantes. J. Bromley, ‘Le Commerce de la 
France de l’ouest et la Guerre Maritime’ in Annales du Midi, LXV (1953) 64 n.68; Schaeper, French 
Council of Commerce, 142 n.35. In Table 6.2 ‘Other’ includes ships from various countries, 
predominantly the Scandinavian nations and Spain, but no ships are recorded as being from England. 
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Year Dutch Irish Scottish Other Total 
1707 (April-Dec) 83 11 0 65 159 
1708 (Jan-Dec) 182 27 1 60 270 
1709 (Jan-Dec) 87 28 1 49 165 
1710 (Jan-Feb) 4 4 0 3 11 
 
Table 6.2 Repertoir des conges par l’éstranger, Nantes, 1707-1710 
 
The Scots that were taken by the French in this period appear to have been those 
engaging in trade not between Scotland and France, but elsewhere in Europe. For 
example the Helen of Dunbar, skippered by John Ferguson, was taken by a French 
privateer in 1704 while returning from Stavenger with timber.92 The Henrietta of 
Bo’ness, skippered by Duncan Finlayson, was captured by a French privateer in 1710 
and taken to Calais while en route from Holland.93 Such occurrences perhaps suggest 
that it was trade with Scotland, rather than merchant Scots themselves, who enjoyed 
special treatment. It is interesting that despite the Baltic convoy apparently being 
targeted by the French, the Scots continued to employ methods such as using neutral 
shipping or disguising their own ships as neutral in order to circumvent trade 
embargoes.94 English merchants also used this tactic. In June 1707 The Little Jacob, ‘of 
and for Stockholm’, Jacob Gentleman master, laden with salt from La Rochelle, was 
reported arriving in Falmouth – Gentleman presumably using a Stockholm ship (or a 
ship he was claiming to be from Stockholm) in order to facilitate trade to London in 
Rochelle salt.95 
However, such caution was not always necessary for the Scots and Irish (and 
indeed, may well have backfired), for often the French authorities not only overlooked 
but authorised this continuing commerce. It has been calculated that between 1702 and 
1712, 109 Scottish and 387 Irish ships entered Bordeaux with Council of Commerce 
passports,96 although the records of the Admiralty of Guyenne record only three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Murdoch, Terror, 404 
93 Ibid, 406 
94 Murdoch, Terror, 310-6; Smout, Scottish Trade, 65, 69 
95 The Daily Courant, London, 5-6 June 1707, issue 1661. On 6 June, the report states that ‘she has been 
plounder’d by 4 French Privateers of 26, 18, 14 and 12 guns’. 
96 Schaeper, French Council of Commerce, 142 n 35 
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Scottish ships being granted passports to trade through Bordeaux between 1702 and 
1713:97 
 
Document Ref 
(ADG) 
Date Master of Ship Name of Ship Tonnage 
6B 79 187-187v 1702 Daniel Feur la Marguerite 60 
6B 79 188-188v 1702 Daniel George le Diligent 60 
6B 82 223v-225 1706 Robert Kay (Écossais 
habitant Bordeaux) 
Vigilent de Bordeaux 150 
 
Table 6.3 Passeports et soumissions, Amirauté de Guyenne, 1702-1706 
 
In 1705 information circulated in London that the Prince of Flushing, who had come 
into Falmouth with a Dutch ship as prize, laden with wine and brandy from Bordeaux, 
had ‘left in that Port several sail of Dutch, Irish and Scotch ships, which were taking in 
their lading’.98 Far from attempting to stem this trade, Queen Anne earned herself a 
reputation amongst Scottish authorities for granting passes that allowed merchants to 
continue. In August 1705, James Ogilvy, the Earl of Seafield, wrote that 
 
ther is a letter from the Councel too her Majestie sent to Sir David Nairn, 
advising the granting of passes to Scots ships for ther securitie in ther tread with 
France and Spain, this being agreable too the treatie with the States of Holand. 
Without wee had done this, the merchants wer to have applyed to the Parlament, 
so wee thought it better to send this letter, which, wee hope, will be granted.99 
 
Precedent for passes being granted perhaps encouraged a group of Edinburgh merchants 
to petition the Queen in September: 
 
during the time of war for carrying on their said trade…request that passes be 
granted by her Majestie to the subjects of this Kingdome trading to France and 
Spain and that her Majesty may be pleased to give such orders as shall protect 
them in their said trade as well against her Majesties ships of war and privateers 
as those of her allies.100 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 ADG 6 B 79, 82. While large samples of the original sources have been checked for accuracy, the 
majority of this data has been taken from the following database: http://bd.archivescanadafrance.org/sdx-
222-acf-pleade-2/acf/home.shtm 
98 The Post-Man and the Historical Account, London, 20 January 1705, issue 1366 
99 Letter from James Ogilvy, first earl of Seafield, 26 August 1705, Edinburgh, Seafield, 77 
100 14 September 1705, APS, XI, 247 
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In October, reports continued to circulate in London that ‘the Franchises of the Fair of 
Bordeaux have been extended to the last day of Novemb., a month more than they used 
to be, in favour of the Dutch and Scotch Ships that shall come there to lade Goods of 
the Growth or Manufacture of this Kingdom’.101 
Despite official prohibitions the French, Scots and even the English recognised 
the benefits of allowing participation in this trade to continue. In January 1709 a 
petition was brought to the Lord High Treasurer by merchants trading to Portugal, Spain 
and Italy, complaining of a proposal brought by merchants in Virginia and Maryland 
asking for liberty to export tobacco, plantation goods and British manufactures to 
France in neutral ships and in return to import wine from France. The petition had 
initially gone to the Commissaries of Customs, who  
 
were of opinion that though the trade of Portugal, Spain and the Straits was very 
beneficial to Great Britain, and ought by all means to be encouraged, yet that the 
enlarging the vent of the plantation goods and British manufactures, would be a 
further advantage to the nation; even on the supposition that some French wines 
might be imported in return for such goods.102 
 
The Treasury concluded that they were not qualified to determine ‘whether this 
advantage were of importance enough to open any trade with France at this time’, which 
‘was a subject for much higher consideration than for this Board’.103 However, they 
were clearly of the opinion that allowing French wines to enter Great Britain was a 
reasonable price to pay for the expansion of the Plantation Trade. 
Given the willingness on both sides of the Channel to relax and even ignore 
trading embargoes, it is perhaps unsurprising that Franco-Scottish commerce continued 
regardless of initial legislation. Certainly, suggestions that the leading Scottish factors 
left Bordeaux eighteen months after the War of the Spanish Succession broke out in 
1702 because they no longer had any business in France are misleading.104 Despite the 
threatened punishments that would be administered to any Scot found trading with 
France – including the death penalty – trade with Bordeaux and other French ports 
continued. In February 1706 Robert Arbuthnot wrote to Henri François d’Aguesseau, 
the procurator fiscal in France, concerning the continuation of Franco-Scottish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Post Man and the Historical Account, London, 26 October 1705, issue 1548, Paris 
102 20 January 1708/9, CTP, IV, 90-1 
103 Ibid. 
104 Smout, Scottish Trade, 66; this has now been refuted by Murdoch, ‘French Connection’, passim; 
Murdoch, Terror, 310-6. See 17 December 1707, NAS CS96/3074; 27 February 1723, NAS RH15/32/21; 
SP, III, 305 
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commerce – and one month later his kinsman Thomas is registered entering the port of 
Dieppe.105 From 15 March 1711, as mentioned above, the British Parliament formally 
allowed the importation of French wine, although other commodities were also 
permitted to pass, including stockings, herring and various cloth as an account book of 
an anonymous Edinburgh merchant testifies.106 In 1712 a transaction for the sale of 
salmon and grilse from James Menzies of Pitfoddels, merchant in Aberdeen, was 
carried out in Dieppe through James Arbuthnot (possibly a relative of Thomas), despite 
peace not being declared until the following year.107 By the beginning of 1713 (before 
the Treaty of Utrecht came into force) reports were coming from England of ships from 
France entering British ports, these occurrences being reported strikingly matter-of-
factly.108 On 16 May 1713 Robert Arbuthnot wrote to James Menzies of the ‘miserable 
market’ for salmon in Rouen, but attributed this to ‘the bad condition your salmond 
came to france in’ rather than the ongoing conflict.109 The account books of William 
Russell and Company, merchants in Wigtown, denote trading with various destinations 
in Holland, Norway, England and Scotland but also with Nantes and Rouen, throughout 
the 1700s.110 
Concern for trade and the improvement of the nation did not seem to have 
featured at the forefront of merchants’ considerations throughout these periods of 
conflict. Instead, their concern was often with their families. A letter from John Barclay 
in Peterhead to his wife at Buthlaw talks of the return of a C. Gordon with a Scots wine-
ship under his convoy, and a ‘little French privateer’ with six guns that he had taken. 
The tenor in which this is reported suggests that this forms only a small part of his 
interest and concern, the letter beginning by reporting that ‘Megie being so very ill, as I 
found her; though I hope is it only a feaver of cold’ and ending by stressing ‘I extremely 
long for your return, tho I cannot premise to goe for you…And the morrow being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 5 February 1706, AN B7 504/213; 1 March 1706, ADSM, 214 BP 4, 160v 
106 1711, NAS RH9/1/200 passim (unpaginated) 
107 1712, Rouen, NAS GD237/11/108/29 
108 British Mercury, London, 21 January 1713, issue 393: Gravesend, 18 January, report of the Susanna 
arriving from Bordeaux. 
109 Robert Arbuthnot to [?James Menzies of Pitfoddells], 16 May 1713, Rouen, NAS GD237/11/108/29 
110 1701-1704, NAS CS96/1145-1150/3. The Letter-Book of John Stuart of Inverness also demonstrates 
the continuation of trade beyond the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. His correspondence 
shows continuing commercial links between Scotland and France until 1729, but also shows the 
continuing presence of Scottish merchant families in France – in this instance, the Gordons in Bordeaux. 
W. Mackay (ed.), The Letter-Book of Bailie John Steuart of Inverness, 1715-1752 (Edinburgh, 1915) esp. 
8-9, 12-15, 18-19, 146-7, 190, 243-4, 294-5, 343-4 
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Saturnday, you cannot readily expect me, thos I incessantly expect you’.111 In this case, 
Barclay is demonstrably more concerned with the health of his family and seeing his 
wife than with the wine trade or with privateering. In fact, the way in which he 
describes the privateer brought in by two earls, who ‘were nobly intertain’d, for above 
ane hour’s time’, speaking of ‘21 great shot’ and ‘noise of great guns’, suggests that 
these occurrences were viewed as everyday rather than extraordinary, as part of the 
normal course of business. 
Furthermore, political affiliations do not appear to have interfered with 
commercial exchange between France and the British nations, despite claims that 
‘political affiliations were significant for the trading classes’.112 While ports such as 
Bordeaux and La Rochelle have often been thought of as Jacobite, Hanoverians were 
also present, and it is now clear that those of both Whig and Tory persuasion settled in 
France during the Jacobite period.113 The Old Pretender himself declared in 1718 ‘God 
forgive our Whigs on this side of the sea’.114 Business dealings of several Jacobite 
commercial agents suggest how little some involved in Franco-Scottish trade cared 
about political affiliations. The Earl of Mar – ‘Bobbing John’ – dealt with both Robert 
Arbuthnot and Robert Gordon after beginning to act for the Stuart cause. However, 
while Mar was still working for the British government – and before he offered his 
allegiance to George I – he had already been trading with Arbuthnot. In March 1716 
Mar wrote to Arbuthnot from Paris that 
 
I wish I had been to drink the wine you were sending me on the other side…the 
thin wines here do not agree with my stomach for constant drinking, so I want 
some good old claret very much, which is not to be got here, and I wish you 
could find me a way of sending me some soon.115 
 
Thomas and James Arbuthnot were not alone among Robert’s brothers to continue 
trading with France during the War of the Spanish succession. Their half-brother 
George, baptised in 1688, was a career officer in Queen Anne’s army. After Anne’s 
death, however, he remained in France and worked as a wine merchant, before later 
returning to Hanoverian Britain and trading on London East India Company ships to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 John Barclay to Mrs. Barclay, 15 June 1705, Peterhead, AUSC ms 1160/4/2 
112 P. Monod, ‘Dangerous Merchandise: Smuggling, Jacobitism and Commercial Culture in Southeast 
England’ in The Journal of British Studies, XXX (1991) 169 
113 Campbell to Mar, 12 November 1717, SP, V, 194; Mr Brady to James III, 14 August 1716, SP, II, 346  
114 James III to Dillon, 7 January 1718, SP, V, 373 
115 Duke of Mar to Robert Arbuthnot, 15 March 1716, Paris, SP, II, 16-17 
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China.116 Ultimately, neither merchants nor authorities appear to have discriminated 
based on political affiliation. Rather, it seems that more importance was placed on 
nationality. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Scottish merchants continued to pursue trade with France throughout the international 
conflicts of the seventeenth century, whether under a Stuart, Orange or Hanoverian 
regime. Moreover, while some clandestine tactics were adopted many merchants traded 
openly with their ‘enemy’ and this often with governmental or monarchical support. 
Schaeper has argued that France only reopened any trade with Britain because she had 
come to rely on Scotland and Ireland for various foodstuffs, suggesting that trade was 
re-opened only out of necessity.117 The French government undoubtedly had their own 
agenda in continuing to pursue a commercial relationship with Scotland – and it should 
not be surprising that they considered their wider European position, as they had 
throughout the period. Arguably, it was only once the French Council of Commerce 
realised that total commercial warfare was damaging to their interests they relaxed their 
arrêt to allow the importation of goods from Scotland, and to foment divisions within 
Queen Anne’s kingdoms.118 The attitude of contemporaries would appear to corroborate 
this. When Robert Arbuthnot wrote to d’Aguesseau in February 1706, he claimed that 
there was a political aim in France granting these favours to Scotland – fomenting 
disunion between England and Scotland.119 In January 1713 a letter was written to the 
editor of a London newspaper suggesting that ‘Your Lordship is under such strange 
Perplexities when you begin to form your Apprehensiens of the French King’s Designs, 
that I hope no Mortal will believe, you or your old Friends were ever in his Interests, or 
let into his Secrets’.120 The leniency shown to the Scots, moreover, was not consistent. 
In October 1705, the French Board of Trade granted an extension of time to the 
passports of Dutch traders, who were technically the direct enemies of France, but not 
to Scots.121 Once again, perception becomes an important element as Scotsmen, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 ODNB 
117 Schaeper, French Council of Commerce, 110-11, 113; Murdoch, ‘French Connection’, 36-7 
118 Ibid. 
119 Sée and Cormack, ‘Commercial Relations’, 275; Murdoch, ‘French Connection’, 36-7 
120 The Examiner, January 1712/3, London, issue 28 
121 Sée and Cormack, ‘Commercial Relations’, 276-7 
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believing that these decrees were applicable to themselves, set sail for Le Havre in 
December and were captured by pirates from Ostend.122 
Yet while the concessions granted by the French may not have been consistent, 
the extent to which Scotland was offered favoured-nation status during these conflicts is 
striking, and Louis XIV’s assertion in 1703 that ‘the whole French nation had their 
hearts unfeignedly Scottish’ suggests that there remained some vestige of the perception 
of the Auld Alliance into the early eighteenth century.123 For any French privateer with 
a commission against British ships it would have been relatively simple to stake out the 
entry to the Gironde River, blocking the entrance to Bordeaux and capturing any ships 
attempting to enter that port – a method successfully employed against the English. Yet 
as the records of the Admiralty of Guyenne testify, Scots continued to be allowed to 
enter this port – perhaps as the French were all too aware of the damage they would do 
to their own economy and international commerce by depriving themselves of Scottish 
trade. The monarchy and government of both France and Britain seem to have been 
complicit in what were essentially contraband trading ventures during the later wars of 
the seventeenth century. These were not cases of rogue Scottish merchants disobeying 
orders and choosing to pursue trade that they knew to be illegal – they continued to ask 
permission of both French and British authorities, ensuring that they obtained the 
correct paperwork. Once again, commercial and economic development was given 
greater priority than political expediency. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
‘The said privileges [are] still in vigour.’1 
 
Sanjay Subrahmanyam has recently concluded that ‘once one leaves behind the 
antiseptic realm of theoretical economic models, and enters into an historical world of 
flesh and blood, merchants appear not as faceless facilitators, but as a social reality’.2 
Throughout this thesis, we have seen that it is only by adopting such an approach that 
commercial connections can be fully scrutinised and understood. Reliance on ‘official’ 
sources – on port books, customs records, government embargoes and legislation – has 
fostered various misunderstandings, including assumptions that the Scottish 
Reformation and the Treaty of Edinburgh ended the Auld Alliance and that trade 
embargoes had a detrimental effect on commerce. It has also encouraged lack of 
consideration of the variety of commodities that comprised this trade and the ways in 
which they were traded. Yet it has certainly not been the intention of this thesis to 
discount such sources entirely, and a thorough re-examination of the official sources 
themselves goes some way to addressing some of these inaccurate assumptions. 
Comprehensive re-examinations of port records, of prizes taken and the provision of 
passports have shed new light on this often-misunderstood relationship. For example, 
while the Aberdeen port records for 1597 to 1670 at first glance show a decline in trade 
between this port and France, in fact closer examination points to trade being affected in 
only one direction (Chapter 4). A closer examination of the prizes taken by the French 
during the Nine Years’ War points to a continuation of the Auld Alliance (Chapter 6; 
Appendix VI.iv), and while the Admiralty of Guyenne provided passports for both 
Scottish and English ships during this conflict, the years in which these respective 
passes were granted speaks volumes for the attitude of the French authorities towards 
these nations (Chapter 6; Appendices VI.i, VI.ii, VI.iii). Furthermore, such attitudes 
continue to demonstrate, as has been shown throughout this thesis, that Scotland did not 
become an English satellite state but maintained her own commercial links even when 
this actively countered the actions of the British monarchy (Chapters 5 and 6). This, 
particularly when coupled with Scottish dealings with French diplomats in the 1640s, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 W. Macray (ed.), Correspondence of Colonel Hooke, 2 volumes (1870-1) 109-111, 23-29 January 1707 
2 S. Subrahmanyam, ‘Introduction’ to S. Subrahmanyam (ed.), Merchant Networks in the Early Modern 
World (Aldershot, 1996) iii-xiv 
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suggests that the British dynamic should be re-evaluated (Chapters 1 and 4). While 
England has traditionally been seen as the most powerful partner within the British 
alliance, the ways in which Scotland maintained her independence and exploited both 
the French and English for her own ends suggests that she was in no way subsumed 
under English control. 
 Official sources, however, while remaining important for any economic study, 
should no longer necessarily be seen as central to them. In some ways they remain 
fundamentally misleading, for example in causing many scholars to assume that wine, 
salt, fish and woollen goods comprised the whole of Scotland’s trade with France 
(Chapter 2). Even when this has been recognised not to have been the case, the type and 
diversity of goods Scotland imported has caused some somewhat inaccurate 
assessments of her economic strength, leading Christopher Smout to claim that such a 
range of imports provides ‘an illuminating example of Scotland’s economic 
backwardness’.3 Such an assessment of Scotland’s manufacturing abilities, while not 
wholly inaccurate (it is indisputable that Scotland’s manufacturing capabilities were far 
below those of many other European states, including England), fails to take into 
account the reasons for this. Scotland’s merchants, factors, manufacturers and 
government were far more aware of the wider economic impact of their activities than 
they have hitherto been given credit for, and would have no doubt known that it was not 
economically viable for Scotland to attempt to manufacture a wide range of goods 
herself. While the petitions of the Edinburgh sugar maker Robert Richardson in 1669, 
the Masters of the Soap Works in Leith in 1672 and the salt masters in Aberdeen in 
1681 inevitably had personal concerns at their heart, they also demonstrate the extent to 
which these individuals and groups understood the consequences their actions had for 
Scotland’s economy and manufactures (Chapter 1). 
 Examinations of records of private transactions support the hypothesis that 
commercial agents had a high level of economic understanding. Many private 
exchanges took place through commissions and accounts, but outwith the jurisdiction of 
port officials and their records (Chapter 2). They also demonstrate a far wider range of 
commodities being traded between Scotland and France than has been previously fully 
considered, and while the importance of staple commodities such as wine, salt, fish and 
wool is undeniable, many other goods were also exchanged including luxury cloth, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 T. C. Smout, ‘The Overseas Trade of Scotland with Particular Reference to the Baltic and Scandinavian 
Trades, 1660-1707’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1959) 54f 
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jewellery and furniture. Furthermore, it is now clear that scholars of economic history 
should not concern themselves only with the buying and selling of ‘traditional’ 
commodities but with all types of commercial exchange. In living and trading in French 
ports Scots contributed to France’s local and regional economies, a factor which has 
until recently been overlooked.4 Consideration of this element of commercial exchange 
is particularly essential if the balance of trade between any two nations is to be 
understood, and its omission has contributed to the accepted view that Scotland’s 
balance of trade with France was unfavourable – another assumption regarding this 
relationship that must now be reassessed. There are other ways in which a 
preoccupation with port records has contributed to misunderstandings. In examining 
such sources, scholars have assumed that the origins and destinations of goods matched 
the ports through which they were transported – that goods travelling between the ports 
of Rotterdam and Aberdeen, for example, originated in the Netherlands and ended up in 
Scotland. In fact, the amount of goods sent home with friends, relatives or business 
partners alters our perception of both the volume and worth of goods traded, and 
passage of goods highlights that commodities were often re-shipped or transported 
overland either before or after overseas transfer (Introduction; Chapter 3). 
 Consideration of every aspect of commerce, rather than solely of that moved 
through official trading channels, highlights the importance of considering the 
individuals involved at every level of these transactions. Interestingly, the nature of the 
activity of commercial agents in France lies in contrast to many areas of Europe in 
which research has thus far been undertaken, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. More so 
than in other areas, commercial agents in France appeared more willing and able to 
adapt their itineraries based on opportunity, rather than following a foreordained 
agenda. This ability to think on their feet undoubtedly contributed to the amount of 
commercial activity which persisted during times when this trading link appeared to be 
under duress, and while all networks were fundamentally based on trust and 
recommendations, within these relationships this appears to have been particularly 
important. This is demonstrated no more effectively than by the number of commissions 
which did not contain specific instructions; for example when Alexander Indrew was 
instructed by John Steuart in 1715 to sell salt beef ‘either for mony or Barter of some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This aspect of commercial exchange has recently been recognised by Steve Murdoch: ‘The French 
Connection: Bordeaux's 'Scottish' networks in Context, c.1670-1720’ in G. Leydier, Scotland and Europe, 
Scotland in Europe (Cambridge, 2007) 42 
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vendible goods’ (Chapter 2).5 Far from ‘merchants carrying out every stage of their 
trading operation personally’, a high level of trust was placed in individuals at all levels 
of transactions.6 The settlement of merchant families such as the Galbraiths, the Lavies, 
the Macmaths, the Gordons, the Popples and the Clerks in France undoubtedly 
contributed to the success of this trading network. Yet even within these families 
settlement was not necessarily permanent and, indeed, not all descendants followed the 
family precedent (Henry Lavie, William Macmath, Hugh Galbraith). Success was also 
not guaranteed for those who did attempt to follow in their ancestors’ footsteps (James 
Hope, James Mel, William Erskine). Family connections, moreover, while important for 
younger merchants attempting to gain access to the network, were not always viewed in 
a positive light, as in the case of John Dougall younger (Chapter 3). While family 
connections were utilised, trust between individuals and their ability to continue to trade 
seems to have been the most important element within these commercial networks. The 
experience and commercial understanding of the merchants who successfully pursued 
Franco-Scottish trade during periods of conflict is astounding, and emphasises again the 
importance of considering merchants ‘not as faceless facilitators, but as a social 
reality’.7 Trade and commerce were not entirely unaffected by such upheaval, and as we 
have seen merchants were sometimes forced to adapt their trading methods in order to 
circumvent embargoes. Many merchants looked to alternative commodities or 
destinations, as ‘official bans on trade diminished neither supply nor demand for 
import/export commodities – but forced merchants involved in coastal trade to create 
new routes, new destinations and new commercial connections’ (Chapter 2).8 
 International conflicts, bringing with them trade embargoes, prohibitive customs 
rates and active privateering, have perhaps understandably been assumed to have had a 
negative effect on commerce and shipping. ‘The last straw on the back of the Auld 
Alliance’9 (1627-1629 war), ‘damning to Scottish shipping and markets’, ‘declining or 
stagnant…war had undermined relations with France and wiped out the special 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 John Steuart to Alexander Indrew, 8 August 1715, Inverness, W. Mackay (ed.), The Letter-Book of 
Bailie John Steuart of Inverness, 1715-1752 (Edinburgh, 1915) 8-9; see also James Carstairs to 
Alexander and Andrew Watson, 15 August 1668, London, SAUL, Watson Papers, ms38527/1/1/2, stating 
that the journey he had been commissioned to undertake would ‘intend for france and from thence to 
Holland, zelland ore brittan’ [my emphasis]. 
6 H. Smith, Shetland Life and Trade, 1550-1914 (Edinburgh, 1984) 38 
7 Subrahmanyam, ‘Introduction’ to Subrahmanyam, Merchant Networks, iii-xiv 
8 Ibid, 245 
9 S. Lythe, The Economy of Scotland in its European Setting, 1550-1625 (Edinburgh/London, 1960) 211. 
Whyte agrees with this assessment: I. Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial Revolution: An Economic 
and Social History (London, 1995) 272 
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privileges Scotland had enjoyed a hundred years before, under the Auld Alliance’10 
(Nine Years’ War) are just some of the opinions of scholars of how war affected both 
Franco-Scottish commerce and the Auld Alliance in this period. Yet such opinions can 
now be proven to be largely unfounded. More than the ability of merchants and skippers 
to circumvent such obstacles, the complicity of authorities in allowing them to do so 
speaks to the true nature of these prohibitions, and also to the importance of these 
trading links to both France and Scotland. Many embargoes and prohibitions, even 
those laid in times of war, did not have political motivations at their heart (for example 
the bans on the export of coal in 1563 and wool in 1581 and 1597; Chapter 1).11 Even 
when trading embargoes and prohibitions were used as direct weapons of war, they 
were not diligently upheld or were altered at the behest of merchants, for example the 
wine which was permitted to be exported under the December 1626 prohibition, or the 
lenient treatment showed to Robert Constable in 1643 (Chapters 5 and 1). It is no longer 
possible to link politics and commerce inextricably, to assume that all economic 
sanctions were politically motivated or that all political actions necessarily had an 
economic effect. Alongside an acceptance of this, scholars must also now recognise 
links that have previously been ignored. As discussed in the Introduction, as advocated 
by Henriette de Bruyn Kops and as demonstrated throughout this thesis, a separation of 
‘Economic History’ and ‘Social History’ as genres now seems somewhat futile.12 A 
wholly economic approach demonstrably leaves us with gaps in our understanding, 
leads us to make inaccurate assumptions, and most of all has caused scholars to repeat 
without question accepted views surrounding not only Scotland’s specific relationship 
with France but also her economic position within Europe more generally. In order to 
understand the state of a nation’s trade or economy fully, the actions of those 
individuals involved in it at all stages must be more fully considered (Chapter 3). 
While commerce continued and the ‘special relationship’ between Scotland and 
France endured, the nature of the Auld Alliance inevitably changed between 1560 and 
1713, although claims that ‘the onset of the Protestant Reformation [in Scotland] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 T. C. Smout, ‘The Road to Union’ in G. Holmes, Britain After the Glorious Revolution (Suffolk, 1969) 
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11 A. MacDonald, The Burghs and Parliament in Scotland, c.1550-1651 (Aldershot, 2007) 68; 1 
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shattered Scotland’s close relationship with France (enshrined in the ‘Auld Alliance’)’13 
must now be re-evaluated. International and domestic shifts in policy and government, 
and both domestic and international conflict did affect the ways in which the Alliance 
was viewed. Yet this was not necessarily commensurate, as has usually been assumed, 
with its collapse. Assertions that Scotland became subsumed under English control and 
that any meaningful commercial relationship between Scotland and France died in 1560 
now fail to stand up to scrutiny. Throughout the period under consideration, both sides 
made approaches to the other, making very real attempts to prolong their relationship. 
The desire on the French, as well as the Scottish, side to maintain the Alliance further 
suggests that the Alliance was not as one-sided as has always been assumed, and the 
French as well as the Scots recognised the benefits of its preservation. 
 There is one issue, concerning both practical commerce and notions of alliance, 
which has come across perhaps more strongly than any other throughout the course of 
this thesis – that of perception. Often, belief in the perpetuation of the alliance and of 
trading privileges was more important than any official continuation, as demonstrated 
by the Scottish shipmasters in 1712 who believed that they were entitled to the same, or 
better, privileges than the Dutch, despite no formal exemption having been granted 
(Chapter 1).14 While no document has been unearthed thus far that allows us to pinpoint 
the exact terms of the privileges that continued to be enjoyed by the Scots trading with 
France, it is clear that Scots received different treatment to natives of the other British 
nations throughout this period, particularly throughout the Nine Years’ War and the 
War of the Spanish Succession, during which the provision of passports by the French 
and the prizes taken by their Admiralties demonstrates a concern to protect their 
commerce with Scotland and the continuation of a notion of a ‘special relationship’ 
(Chapter 6). 
While this study has readdressed fundamental misunderstandings concerning 
Franco-Scottish relations, Scotland’s economic position within Europe and approaches 
to Economic History more generally, there are inevitably areas stemming from this 
study that require further attention. First, activity within other areas of mainland France, 
such as the financial centre of Lyon, should be examined if we are fully to understand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 J. Ohlmeyer, ‘Seventeenth Century Ireland and Scotland and their wider worlds’ in T. O’Connor and 
M. Lyons (eds.), Irish Communities in Early Modern Europe (Dublin, 2006) 459 
14 Lord Advocate Stewart to [?], 9 August 1712, Edinburgh, TNA SP54/4/78; H. Sée and A. Cormack, 
‘Commercial Relations between France and Scotland in 1707’ in Scottish Historical Review, XXIII 
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Scotland’s economic relationship with France. Secondly, activity within the French 
colonies should also be considered. In 1601, the Convention of Royal Burghs instructed 
a commissioner to get customs rates in France reduced, being asked to focus on specific 
ports, including Calais, Dieppe, Le Havre and Rouen, but also Cayenne.15 Activity in 
‘New France’, and conflict with Nova Scotia, also deserve further attention, but fall out 
of the remit of this thesis. Furthermore, this research has been necessarily limited to the 
specific Franco-Scottish experience, thus leaving a great deal unsaid about several 
issues. While some comparison with Scotland’s other European relationships has been 
drawn (Chapter 3), this needs to be far more detailed if we are to contextualise how 
‘special’ Scotland’s relationship with her auld ally was. As highlighted in Chapter 5, the 
fact that Scotland continued to trade with the Low Countries during the second Anglo-
Dutch War requires further attention. This thesis has also left a great deal unsaid about 
the wider British agenda. La Rochelle, for example, hosted a multinational British 
merchant community, within which merchants from different British nations interacted 
and cooperated in order to facilitate trade, as shown to some degree (Chapters 2 and 6; 
Appendix VI.i) by the examples of Henry Shelle, Daniel Masson, Abraham Duport, 
Charles Cahell and Jean and Robert Mackarel.16 
 Yet what this thesis has convincingly shown is that there are many fundamental 
misunderstandings that have perpetuated through generations of literature, and which 
scholars must now begin to address; misunderstandings which concern not only the 
specific Franco-Scottish relationship, but which have implications for how we approach 
questions of commercial globalisation. If the methodologies adopted here are applied to 
commercial links that have so far escaped detailed attention, our picture of the 
development of the global economy in this period, and the relative positions of 
countries within it, will be enhanced. But in the meantime it has been demonstrated that 
for the period and scope of this particular research, Lewis Innes was apparently correct 
when he informed Nathaniel Hooke in 1707 that ‘the said privileges’ the Scots enjoyed 
in France were ‘still in vigour’.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 14 February 1601, Edinburgh, CRB, II, 97-8 
16 This is the topic of an Economic History Society postdoctoral fellowship held at the Institute of 
Historical Research (University of London) by the author during the academic year 2010-11. This project 
is entitled ‘“Every man lives by exchanging”: the British Commercial Dynamic on the French Atlantic 
Coast, c.1603-1707’. 
17 Lewis Innes to Nathanial Hooke, 23-29 January 1707, W. Macray (ed.), Correspondence of Colonel 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I.i 
 
Total customs paid at Scottish ports, 1 August-November 17041 
 
 
Port Total Customs 
Leith No total 
Portglasgow 17642 14 4 
Glasgow 2351 6 0 
Bo’ness 6255 5 0 
Prestonpans 3035 5 4 
Auton 321 17 0 
Dumfries 1365 8 4 
Kirkcaldy 2739 15 7 
Dundee 2541 0 2 
Montrose 302 2 2 
Aberdeen 2788 8 10 
Inverness 892 17 0 
Jedbrugh 409 4 4 
Castletown 990 0 0 
Irvine 658 6 0 
Portpatrick 1666 13 4 
Portpatrick (Dunragit) 1244 5 0 
Alisonbank No total 
Perth No total 
Ayr No total 
Kelso No total 
Edinburgh 652 5 10 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 NAS E73/128 
 211	  
Appendix I.ii 
 
Customs rates, France, 1664 and 16672 
 
 
Goods Unit 1664 rate 
(livers, sous) 
1667 rate 
(livers, sous) 
Woollen Stockings Dozen Pairs 3 10 8 0 
Silk Stockings Pair 0 15 2 0 
Cotton Stockings Dozen Paris 2 0 4 0 
English bays Piece of 25 ells 5 0 10 0 
Double bays Piece of 50 ells 15 0 30 0 
Burails (single) Piece of 25 ells 4 0  8 0  
Spanish woollens (fine) Piece of 30 els 70 0 100 0 
English and Dutch woollens (fine) Piece of 215 ells 40 0 80 0 
English cloth called douzaines Piece of 9-10 ells 4 10 10 0 
Woollen hats cwt 8 0 20 0 
Gilt leather cwt 15 0 30 0 
Tanned ox leather Dozen hides 12 0 14 0 
Coal Barrel 0 8 1 4 
Chamois style leather Dozen hides 1 10 3 0 
Lace and embroidery of Linen Pound 25 0 50 0 
Tin plate Barrel 15 0 30 0 
Frizes (Spanish and Flemish) Piece of 20 ells 8 0 16 0 
Frizes (English) Piece of 18 ells 3 0 7 0 
Molletons Piece of 26 ells 6 0 12 0 
Soap cwt 3 10 7 0 
Serges de seigneur et d’Ascot, and so 
forth 
Piece of 20 ells 6 0 12 0 
Milled serges Piece of 15 ells 10 0 15 0 
Scotch serges Piece of 25 ells 2 0 4 0 
Tapestries (old, or new, Flemish, but 
not from Brussels or Antwerp) 
cwt 60 0 100 0 
Tapestries (old or new from Brussels or 
Antwerp) 
cwt 120 200 
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Appendix II.i 
 
Conversion rates, measurements of wine3 
 
 
Gallon Rundlet Barrel Tierce Hogshead Firkin, 
puncheon, 
tertian 
Pipe, 
butt 
Tun  
       1 Tun 
      1 2 Pipe, butt 
     1 1.5  3 Firkin, 
puncheon, 
tertian 
    1 1.3 2 4 Hogshead 
   1 1.5 2 3 6 Tierce 
  1 1.3 2 2.7 4 8 Barrel 
 1 1.75 2.5 3.5 4.7 7 14 Rundlets 
1 18 31.5 42 63 84 126 252 Wine 
gallon 
3.79 68.14 119.24 158.99 238.48 317.97 476.96 953.92 Litres 
(pre-
1824) 
1 15 26 .25 35 52 ½  70 105 210 Gallon 
(imperial) 
4.55 68.19 119.3 159.1 238.7 318.2 477.3 954.7 Litres 
(post-
1824) 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 These conversion rates are by no means standard. For example, Henriette de Bruyn Kops has slightly 
different figures: de Bruyn Kops, Spirited Exchange, 345 
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Appendix III.i 
 
Consumers of wine imported in the Rowland of Hambrough 
by John Harmonson Lepman, 22 January 16734 
 
 
Merchant Consumers 
John Hall (5 tuns) John Bowes, Widow Livingston, Alexander Brusson, James Allison, 
Widow Garvine, William Cunningham, George Braithwitt, William 
Davidson 
Robert Learmonth 
(16 tuns) 
Isabell Rae, James Cleghorn, James Angus, James Tompson, Mrs 
Campbell, Widow Caddell, James Alson, Alexander Abercromby, 
Adam Darling, Richard Wilkie, John Browne, James Geines, John 
Bining, William Ewing, Henry Gourlay, John Murray, James Hamilton, 
Herr Gourlay, Captain Cockburne, George Blyth, William Davidson, 
Widow Livingston, Widow Caldwell, James Hary, Sam Cranston, 
Duke Hamilton, James Geines, Thomas Speirs, Stephen Douglas 
Andrew Stevinson 
(11 tuns 2 hhds) 
Alexander Bryson, Andrew Wardlaw's relict, James Menteith, James 
Steith, William Cunningham, Alexander Pearson, Thomas Fisher, John 
Anderson, James Penterer, William Cunningham, Andrew Smart, 
William Seaton, Patrick Young, Widow Herrick, James Monteath, 
Widow Murray, William Cunningham, Alexander Pearson, John 
Anderson, Widow Pollock 
William Hay  
(11 tuns 2 hhds) 
David Seaton, Hugh Blair, Robert Stark, Patrick Sheill, George Hutson, 
George Hutson, Widow Caldwall, James Cleghorne, Widow Garvin, 
Thomas Speirs, John Braice, William Davidson, Widow Watt, Robert 
Montgomery, Mary Pears, Adam Cunningham, Robert Meine 
John Govan  
(4 tuns 3 hhds) 
William Sinclair, Widow Greer, Widow Gillis, Mary Pears, John 
Penston, Widow Greer, Andrew Young, Widow Murray 
Thomas Wilson  
(4 tuns 3 hhds) 
Alexander Fliskin, William Aickman, Robert Wilson, Francis 
Tompson, James Ker, Alexander Crumbie, James Clarke, William 
Aickman 
Henry Bourne  
(4 tuns 3 hhds) 
William Nicoll, Thomas Fisher, William Aickman, Patrick Steel, James 
Deane, William Nicoll 
David Calderwood 
(4 tuns 3 hhds  
1 tearce) 
James Campbell, James Robertson, Henry Cunningham, Widow 
Tompson, Alexander Brysson, Widow Caddell, Walter Baird, William 
Muirhead, Robert Semple 
Patrick Ffyf  
(8 tuns) 
John Anderson, Alexander Pearson, Alexander Hay, George Farquhar, 
Robert Meince, Adam Cunningham, Alexander Pearson, John 
Anderson, Widow Hamilton, Alexander Brysson, Widow Wardlaw, 
Alexander Hay, Hellen Elphingston, Alexander Montgomery, 
Alexander Hay, Widow Wardlaw, Patrick Steill, Hugh Blair, Widow 
Fulton, John Bruce, Alexander Pearson 
Patrick Andrew  
(10 tuns) 
Andrew Callice, Widow Tompson, Widow Cowan, Adam 
Cunningham, Widow Gib, John Rotherford, Widow Gibb, Andrew 
Steir, Peter Coinster, Widow Tompson, James Deane, Widow 
Masterton, James Cleghorne 
Alexander Sympson 
(5 tuns) 
George Hutson, Widow Livingston, Robert Strachan, Widow Steir, 
Janet Gray, Adam Cunningham, George Strachan, David Livingston, 
Patrcik Steill, William Aickman 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Data compiled from the entry books of Leith, November 1672-November 1673, NAS E74/15/13; 
E74/15/15. This is one example of several in these sources. 
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George Reid  
(12 tuns) 
Mary Peirs, Andrew Cassie, Widow Sickeson, Widow Wardlaw, 
Widow Caddell, Henry Cunningham, David Govan, Mary Pears, James 
Halliburton, William Ewing, John Rotherford, John Farquson, Patrick 
Steill, Widow Dickson, James Geines, James Halliburton, Widow 
Caddell 
William Murehead 
(3 tuns) 
For himself 
Sir Alexander Hope 
(20 tuns) 
Thomas Tait, Hugh Blair, John Galloway, Widow Garvan, James 
Deane, Laird Ava 
James Law 
(1 hhd) 
For himself 
Andrew Johnston  
(2 hhds) 
For himself 
John Trotter  
(2 hhds) 
For himself 
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Appendix VI.i 
 
Passports granted to British ships in La Rochelle, 16955 
 
 
Entry 
No. 
Ship 
Name 
Of Destination Owner Master Date 
58-9 Hélène Glasgow  Daniel 
Masson 
Archibald 
Murchye 
15 January 
60-1 Daniel Dublin  Daniel 
Masson 
Edward 
Taylor 
15 January 
62 Succèz Cork 
(registered as a 
Scottish ship) 
 Joseph 
Comershard 
 
 
 
 
 
17 January 
63 Fortune Glasgow  Daniel 
Masson for 
Galbraith 
 5 February 
67-8 Chester Irish Bilbao Jean 
Mackerel 
 16 April 
72-
73bis 
Jean et 
Jacques 
Leith  Abraham 
Duport 
Edward 
Burd 
9 May 
74-75 Elisabeth Scottish  Alexander 
Lait 
 19 May 
79 Elisabeth Glasgow  Jean 
Mackarel 
Robert 
Buckle 
12 August 
80 Catherine Leith  Abraham 
Duport 
Jean Lait 3 September 
81 Jacques Leith  Abraham 
Duport 
George 
Hil 
15 September 
82 Christine Glasgow  Jean 
Mackarel 
Hugh 
Campbell 
24 September 
84-5 Hélène Glasgow  Daniel 
Masson 
Jacques 
Sinclair  
5 October 
87 Guillaume 
et Georges 
Scottish  Abraham 
Duport 
Robert 
Kew 
22 October 
88-89 Jean Dublin  Daniel 
Masson 
Jacques 
Moor 
5 November 
90 Jean et 
Samuel 
Aberdeen  Abraham 
Duport 
David 
Houisson 
3 December 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ADCM B5691/57-90 
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Appendix VI.ii 
 
Scottish ships granted permission by the Admiralty of Guyenne 
to pass through the port of Bordeaux, 1691-1697 
 
 
Document Ref 
(ADG) 
Date Master of Ship Name of Ship Tonnage 
6B 75 25v-26	   1691	   John Bartown le Holy Island 60 
6B 75 53-53v	   1691	   Thomas Ridle le Hopeful 102 
6B 75 67-67v	   1691	   François Duncan la Marguerite  
6B 75 81-81v	   1691	   Thomas Ridell le Hopeful Marquet 112 
6B 75 124v-125 1692 Alexandre 
Eroudey 
The Hope and Confidence 60 
6B 75 129v-130 1692 Danis Fargisson l'Ami de Glasgow  
6B 75 130v-131 1692 Jean Miller le Guillaume 60 
6B 75 160v-161 1692 Robert Holmes l'Anne de Belfast (entered 
as Scottish) 
50 
6B 75 161-161v 1692 John Watson la Jeanette 80 
6B 75 141v-142v 1693 Hughe Dyat Jean et Anne 40 
6B 76 2v-3	   1694	   John Barr The George of Leith 50 
6B 76 3v-4	   1694	   George Still The James of Leith 50 
6B 76 5-5v	   1694	   Leonard Robertson le Jacques 30 
6B 76 39v-40	   1694	   Robert Arthur l'Elisabeth 60 
6B 76 40-40v	   1694	   Jacques Raé la Marguerite 60 
6B 76 147-147v	   1695	   Jean Marchand le Grissel 65 
6B 76 154-154v	   1695	   Jean-Jacques 
Fervier 
le George 70 
6B 76 154v-155v	   1695	   Jean Jasson le Dragon 100 
6B 76 159v-160v	   1695	   Jacques Cook le George 50 
6B 76 160v-161v	   1695	   Jean Kewe le Thomas 50 
6B 76 161v-162v	   1695	   Jean Dauling l'Elisabeth 50 
6B 76 162v-163v	   1695	   Robert Arthur l'Elisabeth 60 
6B 76 163v-164v	   1695	   Alexandre Stuart l'Aventure 100 
6B 76 164v-165v	   1695	   Jacques Rail écossais la Marguerite 60 
6B 76 165v-166v	   1695	   Edouard Burd le Jean et Jacques  
6B 76 167v-168v	   1695	   Jean Tist la Catherine 200 
6B 76 169-169v	   1695	   Robert Alizon le Henry 60 
6B 76 169v-170v	   1695	   George Hil le Jacques 50 
6B 76 173-174	   1695	   Charles Ramsri l'Ange de Glasgow 40 
6B 76 174-175	   1695	   Patrick Higgens la Madelaine 110 
6B 76 175-176	   1695	   Thomas Gourlay la Marguerite 90 
6B 76 176-177	   1695	   Adam Tod la Concordia 50 
6B 77 6v-7v	   1695	   George Beevorick l'Ami de Kirkaldy 50  
6B 77 59v-60	   1695	   Eric Kruskenk The Speedwell 90 
6B 77 71-71v	   1695	   Guillaume Ponton le Lion Rouge 125 
6B 77 105v-106v 1695 Jean Jounge Jacques 30 
6B 77 121v-122v	   1696	   Jacques Simson la Catherine 50 
6B 77 133v-134v	   1696	   George Hill Jean et Jacques de Leith 80 
6B 77 138-139	   1696	   Georges Weir le Christian 100 
6B 77 139-140	   1696	   Edward Hill le Jacques 45 
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6B 77 172v-173v	   1696	   David Houissan le Jean et Samuel 90 
6B 77 173v-174v	   1696	   Jean Houisson l'Elisabeth  
6B 77 174v-175v	   1696	   Charles Ramsey James 42 
6B 77 190v-191v	   1696	   George Lay le Faucon 70 
6B 77 211-212	   1696	   Jacques Gabraith l'aiguron 80 
6B 77 217-217v	   1696	   William Ponton le Lion Rouge 120 
6B 77 228-229	   1697	   Charles Ramsey l'Amitié de Glasgow 60 
6B 77 265-266	   1697	   Jean Honison le Robert 30 
6B 77 285-286v	   1697	   William Ponthon le Lion Rouge 120 
6B 77 291-292	   1697	   Alexandre Young l'Anne 20 
6B 77 292 bis-293	   1697	   Charles Ramezay l'Unité 55 
6B 77 293-294	   1697	   John Noir le Jacques 45 
6B 77 294-295	   1697	   Edouard Hic le Jacques 50 
6B 77 295-296	   1697	   Jacques Wilson le Bewer 86 
6B 77 301v-302v	   1697	   John Young la Providence 50 
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Appendix VI.iii 
 
English ships granted permission by the Admiralty of Guyenne 
to pass through the port of Bordeaux, 1691-1697 
 
 
Document Ref 
(ADG) 
Date Master of Ship Name of Ship Tonnage 
6B 73 149-149v 13 janvier 1689 Robert Thurkettol la Marie 36 
6B 73 156-156v 13 janvier 1689 William Holman l'Amitié 120 
6B 73 74-74v 13 janvier 1689 Guillaume Gattas la Bonne Aventure 80 
6B 73 146v-147 16 janvier 1689 Manasses Paine le Dauphin 80 
6B 73 148v 16 janvier 1689 John Errington la Bonne-Vivante 45 
6B 73 91-91v 16 janvier 1689 Edouard Smith le Facteur de Bordeaux 160 
6B 73 96v-97  16 janvier 1689 James Modden le Lucas 120 
6B 73 89v-90v 22 janvier 1689 Daniel Wisilaw le Thomas 60 
6B 73 79v-80 23 janvier 1689 Nicolas Flagg les Deux Frères 44 
6B 73 86-87 23 janvier 1689 Robert Michal la Tourterelle 60 
6B 73 102-102v 24 janvier 1689 Thomas Knowles la Dextroite 100 
6B 73 104-104v	   24 janvier 1689 William England le Marigold 120 
6B 73 105-105v	   24 janvier 1689 Thomas Wood le Gladre 300 
6B 73 109-109v	   24 janvier 1689 Joseph Brandell la Bonne Volonté 90 
6B 73 126	   24 janvier 1689 John Hirris le Scedive 60 
6B 73 90v-91	   24 janvier 1689 Robert Bristoll le Félix 60 
6B 73 105v-106	   27 janvier 1689 Jean Godrling le Marie 120 
6B 73 145v	   27 janvier 1689 William 
Henderson 
la Recontre 50 
6B 73 75v-76	   27 janvier 1689 Roger 
Grassingham 
le Thomas et Elisabeth 140 
6B 73 82-82v	   27 janvier 1689 Jean Pilton la Prospérité 50 
6B 73 88v-89	   27 janvier 1689 John Dyx le Hopewell 80 
6B 73 94	   27 janvier 1689 Samuel Castent la Sacrade 100 
6B 73 83	   30 janvier 1689 Henry Moon le Désiré 70 
6B 73 102v-103	   31 janvier 1689 Richard Miles le Bon Plaisir 100 
6B 73 104v-105	   31 janvier 1689 Richard Dany l'Amitié 90 
6B 73 121-121v	   31 janvier 1689 Jean Fuller le Lys 200 
6B 73 124-124v	   31 janvier 1689 Jean Miquitsil le Bachelier 200 
6B 73 140v-141	   31 janvier 1689 John Roch le Saint-Patrice 100 
6B 73 59-59v	   31 janvier 1689 Guillaume 
Alington 
le Guillaume et Jeanne 50 
6B 73 92-92v	   31 janvier 1689 William Godleg l'Estoille 100 
6B 73 99-99v	   31 janvier 1689 Thomas Hercher la Catherine 120 
6B 73 91v-92	   06 février 1689 Nicolas Willy le Heron 200 
 6B 73 151v	   08 février 1689 Allan Scott l'Aventurier 150 
6B 73 100v-101	   16 février 1689 Ambroise Lorrain le Loyal Jacques 75 
6B 73 101v-102	   16 février 1689 Jean Beale le Marchand de 
Golchester 
130 
6B 73 112v	   16 février 1689 William LeRoy l'Edouard 160 
6B 73 147v-148	   16 février 1689 Thomas Weir l'Hélène 100 
6B 73 155-155v	   16 février 1689 François Pety la Prospérité 50 
6B 73 58-58v	   16 février 1689 Thimothé Tourson le Bourgeois 100 
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Aventurier  
6B 73 74v-75v	   16 février 1689 Michel Williams l'Anne et Marie 160 
6B 73 92v-93	   16 février 1689 Conry Cobb le Robert 60 
6B 73 76-76v	   16 février 1689 Thomas Bealle la Rebecca 30 
6B 73 107	   20 février 1689 William Lanes le Vilain 32 
6B 73 108v-109	   20 février 1689 Edouard Tomlin l'amitié 75 
6B 73 126v-
127v	  
20 février 1689 William Chipman le Marchand 100 
6B 73 165-165v	   20 février 1689 Joseph Goodrrin la Rébecca 52 
6B 73 59v-60	   20 février 1689 Jacob Farland les Armes de Biscaye 
de Londres 
150 
6B 73 60-60v	   20 février 1689 William Shower le David Jacson 70 
6B 73 85v-86	   20 février 1689 Henry Pay la Suzane 34 
6B 73 89v	   20 février 1689 Leonard Mocher l'Anne 60 
6B 73 93v	   20 février 1689 George Linhorn l'Anne 65 
6B 73 97v-98v	   20 février 1689 Henry Olding l'Avanture des Amis 
de Londres 
150 
6B 73 98v-99	   20 février 1689 Roger Clame le Devoir 80 
6B 73 99v-100v	   20 février 1689 Abraham 
Downton 
le Francois de Londres 140 
6B 73 103-103v	   21 février 1689 Edouard Tibfort le Scort 110 
6B 73 114-114v	   26 février 1689 Richard Robin la Contrintude 75 
6B 73 108-108v	   19 mars 1689 Robert Addelses le Robert 66 
6B 73 130-130v	   21 mars 1689 Thomas Jackson la Marie et Sarra de 
Hull 
60 
6B 73 126v	   23 mars 1689 Georges Hephens l'Industrie 65 
6B 73 97-97v	   23 mars 1689 Joseph Chapprott le Joseph 90 
6B 73 150-150v	   30 mars 1689 Thomas Burton le Jean 150 
6B 73 106-106v	   31 mars 1689 Daniel Clark la Bretagne 60 
6B 73 107v	   31 mars 1689 John Ross le Henri 50 
6B 73 109v-110	   31 mars 1689 William Receng le Retour 175 
6B 73 130v-131	   31 mars 1689 Peter Thornson la Marie et Anne 70 
6B 73 131v	   31 mars 1689 Thomas Grimston la Providence 120 
6B 73 149v-150	   31 mars 1689 Joseph Ould La Bonne Volonté 64 
6B 73 152-152v	   31 mars 1689 Philips Smith le Succès 40 
6B 73 150v-151	    Thomas Allan l'Anne 110 
6B 73 155v-156	   07 avril 1689 William Tronnard le Saint-Mathieu 200 
6B 73 122v-
123v	  
12 avril 1689 Joseph Fray le Sprituel 44 
6B 73 123v-124	   29 avril 1689 Daniel Janneran la Judith 80 
6B 73 127v-128	   29 avril 1689 Jacob Maczten le Saint-Pierre 75 
6B 73 154-154v	   31 avril 1689 Thomas Petit Jean la Marie 100 
6B 73 165v-166	   07 mai 1689 Thomas Sutton John Canton 26 
6B 73 166-166v	   30 juin 1689 John Canton le Thomas et Anne 26 
6B 74 55-55v	   12 juillet 1690 William Wilson le Blessing 30 
6B 75 83-84	   12 janvier 1692 Jean Cain le Thomas de Londres 50 
6B 75 84-84v	   11 février 1692 Jacob Seale le Guillaume et Pierre 
de Londres 
150 
6B 75 128-128v	   30 juillet 1692 Henry Bichet le Lion 50 
6B 77 101-102v 05 avril 1696 Jean Baroe La Princesse de 
Lancaster 
30 
6B 77 103-104 06 mai 1696 Jean Wellon la Fortune 25 
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6B 77 130v-
131v 
21 juillet 1696 Patrick Willson le Henri 60 
6B 77 132-132v 31 juillet 1696 Robert Ballandin la Catherine 60 
6B 77 240-241 10 février 1697 Jean Baron la Princesse de 
Lancaster 
30 
6B 77 231-232 18 février 1697 Jean Young la Providence 60 
6B 77 284-285 17 juillet 1697 Johan Swift La Ville de Bristol 45 
6B 77 300v-
301v 
03 août 1697 Wil Kinson la Loyalité 50 
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Appendix VI.iv 
 
Prizes brought into Le Havre, 1692-16976 
 
 
Date Ship Taken Nationality Ship Taken By 
1692 Le Thomas et Marie English La Marguerite and Le Granadan 
of St Malo and La Paix of 
Granville 
1692 La Roue de Fortune English Francois le Fer, captain of Le 
Marquis (avec traduction 
d’instructions anglaises pour la 
guerre de course) 
24 December 1692 Le Dauphin English Failly and Carrion (King’s ship) 
1693 Le Saint Sacrament Portuguese ‘La Favourite’ (King’s ship) 
1693 L’Ange Tutélaire Dutch  
1694 Le Renard Dutch La Palme Couronnée, Louis 
Bommelard de Dunkerque 
1695 Le Diligent English  
 Robert et Anne English Le Chasseur Royal of Dunkirk, 
Jean Simon 
1697 Le Saint-André Danish 
(released) 
Le Marie, Gabriel de Jonnaute 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 ADSM 216 BP 316 
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